Acceptable Premises

Index

absolute probability, see inherent probability

acceptability, 3, 4, 6, 21, 31, 65

   for basic premises, 34

   being accepted criterion, 12–14

   being accompanied by argument criterion, 14

   BonJour’s criterion, 78–79

   formal definition, 32

   inadequacy of classical foundationalist conditions, 6–9

   internalist notion, 71–72

   known truth criterion, 11–12

   pragmatic condition:

     first approximation, 62

     internalist notion, 71

     refined formulation, 63

   probability criterion, 15–19

   truth criterion, 10–11

   Wellman’s view, 35–37

acceptance, 3, 4

accessibility relation R, 151

accidental universality, 206, 209–210

   analysis of causation, see causation, analysis through accidental universality

acquired signs, 134

actions, aretaic value, 253, 260, 267

active sympathy, 241

actual value, 224–225

adequate ground (for a belief ), 81, 82

affiliation, 246–250

agape-response, 241–242

agapic spectator, 257–260, 264, 265–268, 269–271

   as cultural projection, 271–275

Alston, William, 79, 87, 88, 159, 160, 372–373, 376

analogies, 167

analytic statements, 97, 98, 99, 122

apportionment (of reward to merit), 229, 236

a priori intuition, 119, 323–324

aretaic judgments, 218

aretaic value, 218, 363–366

argument evaluation, xii

Aristotle, 55

artificial language, 286

ascriptions of belief, 158

ascriptions of intention, 159–162

ascriptions of subjunctive necessity and possibility, 170–171, 204–205

attachment, 246–247, 255

attributions of sign, 162–163

Audi, Robert, 183, 184, 223, 227, 232, 233, 236, 237

Aune, Bruce, 160, 161

authority-conferring field, 304–305

   certification, 305–306

   formal, 304–305

   informal, 304–305

avowals, 125

basic belief, 5, 109, 199

   properly basic, 5, 8, 200, 201, 202, 233, 263–268

   of aretaic value of others, 261–263

   empathy as generating, 191

   of intrinsic value, 233

   psychological causation, 192

basic dialectical situation, 28–29

basic premise, xi, 6, 8, 376–378

Beardsley, Monroe C., 106

belief, 3

   basic, see basic belief

belief-generating mechanisms:

   interpersonal, 41

   personal, 41

Blair, J. Anthony, xii, 10, 11, 33–35

BonJour, Laurence, 72, 76–78, 372–374

   on “givenist” position, 373–374

Broad, C. D., 276–280

broadly logically determinate statements, 98–100, 112

broadly logically indeterminate statements, 100

burden of proof, xi, 24

   evidential, 23

   initiating, 23

Burks, Arthur W., 146, 148, 153, 157

Carnap, Rudolf, 155

Carneades, 47

casuistry, 319

cataleptic impression, 47

causal law, 147

causal statements, 155–157, 199–202

causal subjunctive, 147

causation:

   analysis through accidental universality, 209–210

   Hume’s analysis, see Hume, David, analysis of causation

   metalinguistic analysis, 210

Cederblom, Jerry, and Paulsen, David, 308

certainty:

   necessary condition for acceptability, 6

   sufficient condition for acceptability, 4

character, aretaic value, 253, 260, 267

Clarke, D. S., 60, 62–63, 64, 71

classical foundationalism, 4, 5, 6–9

Coady, C. A. J., 125, 281–282, 283, 284, 286, 288, 299, 300, 301, 302, 304, 307, 335, 358

Cohen, L. Jonathan, 3, 21, 137, 158, 159, 160, 172, 186, 221, 252–253

commitments, aretaic value, 253, 260, 264–267, 269–271

common knowledge, 296, 304, 346, 355, 359–360

   certainty, 311–312

   nature, 310–311

   presumption, 311

common sense, 51, 52, 132

common sense school of philosophy, 49–50

comparisons, 166–167

   see also analogies

conceptually true statements, 116, 120

consciousness of obligation, 241

conclusions of inference, 183

conclusions of reflection, 183–184

Conee, Earl, 79

constitutive rules, 134, 136, 193, 195, 196, 198

cost:

   of an action or state of affairs:

     preliminary definition, 60

     refined definition, 61

   expected cost, 62–63

   local nature, 66

covariation, detection, 174, 179–180

Damasio, Antonio R., 223

Daniels, Charles B., 150, 152

defeater, 58

Descartes, Rene, 5–6, 7, 9, 50, 75, 76, 370

   arguments for classical foundationalism, 8–9

deontic judgments, 218, 221

deontic value, 218, 363

descriptions, 95, 101–105, 108, 112

design plan, 43, 49, 54–56, 58, 128, 135, 141, 142, 213, 238, 250, 292

desires, aretaic value, 251–253, 259–260, 264–267, 269–271

dialectical situation, 27, 28

   basic, 28–29

dialogical situation, 27

discursive justification, 19

dispositional statements, 157–158, 199, 201

duty, sense, 274–275

empathy, 190–191, 234–235, 241, 249, 255, 352

empirical intuition, 171

empirical subjunctives, 171

epistemic justification:

   Alston’s conception, 82, 372

     avoiding externalist and internalist objections, 82–83

   BonJour’s conception, 76–79

epistemic probability, 16

   criteria for acceptability, 17–19

ethical relativist objection, 271–275

evaluations, 95, 101, 112

   presumption for basic belief of aretaic value, 363–366

     of oneself, 365–366

     of someone else, 364–365

   presumption for basic belief of deontic value, 363

   presumption for basic belief of intrinsic value, 360–363

     generated by moral intuition, 361–362

     generated by moral sense, 360–361, 362

   presumption for judgments of personal value, 362

   presumption on word of others, 358–360

     common knowledge, 359–360

     cultural disagreement, 359–360

     of moral expert, 358–359

evaluative statements, 101

externalist internalism, 72

   avoiding objections to externalism, 72

extensional nonevaluative statements, 105, 107, 108

excellence, teleological or criterial, 237

Fahnestock, Jeanne, 95–97, 166, 167

fairness, 243, 248

feelings, aretaic value, 253, 254–259, 264–267, 269–271

Feldman, Richard, 79

Firth, Roderick, 79

fidelity, 244, 245, 248

firsthand report, 296

Fisher, Alec, 374–375

Fogelin, Robert J., 10

formally true statements, 114–115, 120

foundationalism:

   classical, see classical foundationalism

Frankena, William K., 218, 219

Freeman, James B., 150, 152

generalizations, 125, 126

Gettier, Edmund L., 67, 68

“givenist” position, 373–374

Goodman, Nelson, 207, 212–214

Govier, Trudy, 14, 310, 311, 312

Grennan, Wayne, 15–16

Hamblin, C. L., 12–14

Hempel, Carl G., 214

Hitchcock, David, 210, 263

homeostatic property cluster, 175, 179

Hume, David, 49, 206, 212, 370–371

   analysis of causation, 207–209

   reports of unexpected, 334–335

Ilbert, Sir Courtnay, 22

impartial spectator, 255–257

individual report, 325

   presumption through introspection, 328–329

   presumption through memory, 329

   presumption through perception, 326–327

   presumption through taking proponent’s word, 329–342

     personal testimony, 330–337

     testimony received through chain, 337–342

induction, 126

inductive strength, 17

inherent probability, 16

   criterion for acceptability, 16

institution, 134, 193

institutional explanations, 145–146

institutional facts, 134

institutional intuition, 171, 202, 352–353

institutional perception, see perception, acquired, institutional

institutional subjunctives, 171, 202

   presumption for, 352–353

instrumental value, 219

integrity, personal, see personal integrity

interpretive classifications, 164–166, 199, 202–203

intensional non-evaluative statements, 105, 107, 108

internal access requirement, 79, 80

internalism, 75, 77

internalist externalism, 82

interpersonal source of belief, 110

interpretations, 95, 101–102, 105–108, 112

   denials, 168

   presumption on word of others, 353–357

interpretive category, imposition of, 174

intrinsic goods, types of, 226, 228

intrinsic value, 219, 222, 226, 227

   of persons, see personal value

introspection, 125, 127

   concerning causes of bodily events, 139

     presumption, 140

   individual reports:

     presumption, 328–329

   primary sorts, 138

     presumption, 139–140

intuition, 172, 173

   empirical, 171

   institutional, 171

   personal, 350–352

   physical, 174, 182–187, 347–350

Johnson, Ralph, 33–35

judgment, 289

Jung, C. G., 110–111

Kant, Immanuel, 252

Kornblith, Hilary, 175–182, 184, 187

knowledge, 228, 236

Kruger, Arthur N., 95, 97, 105, 106, 122, 157

Kuhn, Thomas S., 335

leading principle, 81, 172

Leblanc, Hugues, 152

Lennox, James G., 55

Locke, John, 5, 6, 75, 76, 300, 370

MacLagan, W. G., 241–242, 256, 272–273

mathematical statements, 98–99, 116–117, 120–121

media, 296

Meilaender, Gilbert C., 80

memory, 126, 127

   primary employment, 140

     presumption of reliability, 141

   secondary employment, 140

     presumption of reliability, 142

meta-awareness requirement, 76–78, 83

metaphysical statements, 117, 121

minimization-maximization, 167–168

mixed statements, 108

model interlocutors, 33–34

Moore, Brooke Noel, 144

Moore, George Edward, 100, 231–232, 386

moral expert, 358–359

moral intuition, 222, 223–224, 226, 233, 239–240, 242, 250, 268–269, 361–362

moral reflection, 237

moral sense, 221, 222, 223, 226, 233, 234–239, 242, 243–244, 249–250, 254, 261, 264–268, 269–271, 360–361, 362

   objections, 275–280

Myers, Isabel Briggs, 110–111

Nagel, Ernest, 144, 145, 209, 210, 211

natural kinds, 176, 178–182, 183–184, 207, 213, 214, 215–217

natural sign, 129, 132

   of mental states of others, 133, 188, 189

necessary statement, 114

Nolt, John Eric, 16–17

nomically sufficient condition, 154

nomic necessity, 170, 210–212 see also ascriptions of subjunctive necessity and possibility

nomic possibility, see ascriptions of subjunctive necessity and possibility

nomic uniformity, 150, 151

nomic universality, 206, 210–212

nonevaluative statements, 101

nonmoral value, 218, 226

nonprojective generalizations, conditions for presumption, 345

objective duty, 74, 75

objective probability, see probability, objective

obligation, consciousness, see consciousness of obligation

original perception, see perception, original

passive sympathy, see empathy

Parker, Richard, 144

Peirce, Charles S., 81, 172, 371–372

perception, 125, 126, 127

   acquired or learned, 134–137, 287

     presumption, 135–137

      pragmatic argument, 137

     institutional, 135, 136

   developmental nature, see perception, acquired or learned

   original:

     presumption, 132–133

      pragmatic argument, 137

   presumption for individual reports, 326–327

Perelman, Ch. and L. Olbrechts- Tyteca, 40, 188, 267

personal explanations, 144–145

personal identity, belief, 140, 142

personal integrity, 244, 249

personally initiated belief, 110

personal source of belief, 110, 112

personal subjunctives, 171, 193

   presumption, 350–352

personal value, 230–232, 240–242, 362

physical explanations, 143–144

physical subjunctives, 171

   presumption, 347–350

Pinto, R. C., 26

Plantinga, Alvin, 5, 9, 42–44, 55, 58, 68, 69, 74, 75, 83, 86, 99, 100, 119, 126, 127, 128, 140, 213–214, 239, 266, 282, 286, 294, 367, 368, 376, 382, 383

pleasure, 226–228, 232, 234–235

   sadistic, see sadistic pleasure

Popkin, Richard, 370

pragmatic condition for premise acceptability, see acceptability, pragmatic condition

premise acceptability, xii

presumption, xi, xii, 21, 24, 26, 29, 38–39, 42, 87–88

   challenger presumption, 29–30

   of cognitively appropriate environment, 54

   jurisprudential concept, 21–23

   pragmatic dimension, 60–65

   of proper function, 53–54

   proponent presumption, 30, 35

   questions determining, 33, 65

   of reliability for certain belief- generating mechanisms:

     commonsense defense, 49–50

     as properly basic, 49

     as sole criterion for presumption, 53

   rhetorical concept, 23–24

   of truth-oriented design plan module, 56

   of warrant and pragmatic condition necessary and sufficient condition, 65

   of warrant a necessary condition, 57

   of warrant a sufficient condition, 57–59

presumption of warrant:

   distinct from warrant, 67–69

   internalist notion, 70–71

presumptive justification, 19

Price, Richard, 228

prima facie duties:

   beneficence, 243, 244

   gratitude, 243

   justice, 243

   nonmaleficence, 243, 244

   not telling lies, 244

   promise keeping, 244

   reparation, 243, 245

   self-improvement, 244, 249

   self-respect, 244, 249

prima facie duty, 243, 250

   principles, 221

   table, 245

principle of credulity, 291, 294

principle of veracity, 293

probability:

   criterion for acceptability, see acceptability, probability criterion

   epistemic, 16, 17–19

   inherent, 16

   objective, 45, 52

projective generalizations, conditions for presumption, 345–346

properly basic belief, see basic belief, properly basic

proximate intention, 189

psychological essentialism, 178

Pyrrho, 369

Quine, Willard van Orman, 98, 177, 213, 215–217, 383

   objection to analytic/synthetic distinction, 117–119

   web of belief, 374–375

Quinton, Anthony, 118

Randall, John Herman, 55

reason, 98, 100, 119

received belief, 110

Reid, Thomas, 49, 50, 128–134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 187, 188, 212, 242, 282, 283, 285, 289, 291, 367, 370–371

   concept of suggestion, 128

   reply to perceptual skeptic, 50

   senses:

     seeing, 130–131

     smelling, 128–129

     touch, 129–130

Reidian foundationalsim, 367

relevant variables, 151, 174

reliability, 45

reports, 125

   astonishing or implausible, 333–337

   summary report, 125, 126

Rescher, Nicholas, 19, 23, 24–25, 33, 38, 40, 303

respect for persons, 241

Ross, W. D., 60, 120, 218–219, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229–232, 243–245, 251–252, 259, 268, 375

Ryle, Gilbert, 194

sadistic pleasure, 238

Searle, John R., 100, 134, 193, 194, 195–198

secondhand report, 296, 299

Secor, Marie, 95–97, 103, 166, 167

self-evident proposition, 6

semantically true statements, 115–116, 118, 120

sentiments, moral, 243

sign, 285–286

   of authority, 287–288

singular causal statements, 163–164

Skagestad, Peter, 371

skeptic, perceptual, reply to Reid, 50, 51

skepticism, 369–372

   Pyrrhonian, 369–370

Skyrms, Brian, 17–18

Smith, Adam, 254, 255

S-model, 152

source vouching for a statement (premise), xii

speech act, 195–198

Sproule, J. Michael, 23, 94, 95, 96, 102, 106, 154, 155, 166, 167, 376

Stough, Charlotte L., 47

Stevenson, Charles L., 74

subjective duty, 74, 75

subjective conditional, truth conditions, 153

subjunctive disjunctions, 168–170

subjunctive of freedom, 148

summary report, conditions for presumption, 342–345

Swinburne, Richard, 144

sympathy, 243, 247, 254, 272–274

   active, see active sympathy

   passive, see empathy

synonymy, 118–119

testifying, 284, 288–289, 290

testimony, 286, 292

   argument from design plan for presumption, 292

   chain, 296

   expert, defined, 304

     argument for presumption, 307–308

     presumption of trust, 308

     for logically determinate statements, 324–325

   externalist notion defined, 284

   institutional, 296

     as genuine testimony, 314

     presumption, 314–315, 327

   internalist notion defined, 290–291

     necessary condition, 288, 290

   personal notion defined, 297

   pragmatic justification, 292

   presumption of warrant composed, 295

   warrant composed, 294

Thomas, Stephen Naylor, 15

Toulmin, Stephen, 149, 172, 173, 183, 377

   model of argumentation structure, 83–84

truth condition for subjunctive conditional, 153

truth-functions of interpretations, 203–204

Ullian, J. S., 213

Ullmann-Margalit, Edna, 22

virtue, 228

vouching for a statement, 289–290

vouching source for a statement (premise), xii

Walton, Douglas N., xii

warrant, 42, 83

   conditions, 42–44

   distinct from presumption of warrant, 67–69

   externalist notion, 69–70

Wellman, Carl, 8, 14, 35–37

Whatley, Richard, 23–24, 40

Wilson, James Q., 234, 243–244, 246, 248, 253, 255, 273–275

Wisdom, William A., 152