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Acceptable Premises

Details

  • Page extent: 416 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.555 kg

Library of Congress

  • Dewey number: 160
  • Dewey version: 22
  • LC Classification: BC71 .F734 2005
  • LC Subject headings:
    • Logic

Library of Congress Record

Paperback

 (ISBN-13: 9780521540605 | ISBN-10: 0521540607)




Contents




Preface page ix
Acknowledgments xiii
PART 1. ACCEPTABILITY: DIALECTICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL COSIDERATIONS
1   Why Do We Need a Theory of Acceptability? 3
  1.1   Acceptance – A Basic Definition 3
  1.2   Acceptability, Certainty, and Epistemic Duty 4
  1.3   “Popular” Criteria for Acceptability 10
  1.4   Conditions for Acceptability 19
2   Acceptability and Presumption 21
  2.1   Uses of “Presumption” 21
  2.2   Presumption and Dialectics 27
  2.3   Challenger Presumption and Acceptability 30
  2.4   Comparison with Other Views 33
3   Factors Determining Presumption: Basic Considerations 38
  3.1   Principles of Presumption – A Basic Survey 40
  3.2   Presumption and Belief-Generating Mechanisms 41
  3.3   Belief-Generating Mechanisms and Warrant 42
  3.4   Warrant and the Factors Determining Presumption 44
  3.5   Warrant, Presumption of Warrant, and Presumption 67
4   Epistemological Considerations: Acceptability, Deontology, Internalism, Justification 73
  4.1   Classical Foundationalist Accounts of Epistemic Obligation 74
  4.2   BonJour’s Defense of the Meta-Awareness Requirement 76
  4.3   Nondeontological Conceptions of Epistemic Justification 79
  4.4   Alston’s Account of Epistemic Justification 80
  4.5   Epistemic Justification and Acceptance 85
PART 2. STATEMENTS, BELIEF-GENERATING MECHANISMS, AND PRESUMPTIVE RELIABILITY
5   What Types of Statements Are There? 93
  5.1   Rhetorical Systems of Statement Classification 95
  5.2   A Fourfold Typology of Statements 97
  5.3   Basic Beliefs, Inferred Beliefs, Received Beliefs 109
  5.4   Basic Belief-Generating Mechanisms: A Heuristic Suggestion 110
6   Necessary Statements and A Priori Intuition 114
  6.1   What Types of Necessary Statements Are There? 114
  6.2   Necessarily True Statements and Reason 119
  6.3   Is There a Presumption of Reliability for A Priori Intuition? 121
7   Descriptions and Their Belief-Generating Mechanisms 124
  7.1   What Types of Descriptions Are There? 124
  7.2   Perception and Its Presumption 127
  7.3   The Presumptive Reliability of Introspection 138
  7.4   Memory and Its Presumption 140
8   Interpretations and Their Modes of Intuition 143
  8.1   Three Types of Explanations 143
  8.2   Explanations and Subjunctives 146
  8.3   An Analysis of the Subjunctive Conditional 150
  8.4   What Types of Interpretations Are There? 154
  8.5   Types of Subjunctives, Types of Explanations, and Intuition 171
  8.6   Physical Subjunctives and Physical Intuition 174
  8.7   Personal Subjunctives and Personal Intuition 187
  8.8   Institutional Subjunctives and Institutional Intuition 193
  8.9   Interpretations in General and Intuition 199
  8.10   Objections and Replies 206
9   Evaluations and the Moral Faculties 218
  9.1   The Standard Account of Types of Evaluations 218
  9.2   Supervenience, Moral Intuition, and Moral Sense 220
  9.3   Judgments of Intrinsic Value 226
  9.4   Judgments of Deontic Value 242
  9.5   Judgments of Aretaic Value 251
  9.6   Objections and Replies 271
10   Taking One’s Word: The Interpersonal Belief-Generating Mechanism 281
  10.1   Importance of Taking One’s Word 281
  10.2   Testimony Defined 284
  10.3   Presumption for Relying on Testimony: Preliminary Considerations 291
  10.4   Sources of Testimony 296
  10.5   Personal Testimony and Its Presumption 297
  10.6   When Is There a Presumption for Testimony Received Through a Chain? 299
  10.7   Expert Testimony and Its Presumption 303
  10.8   The Issue of Common Knowledge 309
  10.9   Presumption for the Word of the News Media? 312
  10.10   Presumption for Institutional Testimony 313
PART 3. PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVE
11   An Outline of the Practice of Epistemic Casuistry 319
  11.1   When Is There a Presumption for a Basic Premise Which Is Logically Determinate? 323
  11.2   Under What Conditions Is There a Presumption for a Basic Premise Which Is a Description? 325
  11.3   Under What Conditions Is There a Presumption for a Basic Premise Which Is an Interpretation? 347
  11.4   Where Is There a Presumption for a Basic Premise Which Is an Evaluation? 357
12   Theoretical Considerations: A Commonsense Foundationalism 367
  12.1   Why Foundationalism? 367
  12.2   Why Common Sense? 369
  12.3   Objections and Replies 372
  12.4   Prospects 375
Notes 379
References 389
Index 395

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