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Index
$ bet (L bet)
anchoring and, 141–143
overpricing, 16, 148–149, 154, 158, 159–160
preference reversals and, 20–22, 56, 58, 69, 73–76, 114–119, 146–158, 675
pricing vs. choice and, 124–135, 229–231
pricing vs. rating and, 135–141. See also economic theory of choice
accuracy vs. cognitive effort, 332–333, 338
action and decision making. See Search for Dominance Structure
adaptive toolbox, 26
addiction, 382, 384–385, 392, 401–402, 451–452
adding options, 419–424
extremeness aversion and, 423–424
regularity condition and, 420–423. See also binary vs. triadic; deferred choice option
adding strategy, weighted, 21, 328, 335
adding-up effects, 377, 382–384
adding vs. multiplying, 17, 22
additive extension effect, 575–578
additive model of preferences, 108, 109, 644
adolescent decision making, 439, 665–666
advertising, managing preferences in, 38–39
affect, 29, 434–453
affect heuristic, 434
affective vs. cognitive, 434–437, 460–462, 463
affect-referral heuristic, 447
attention focusing and, 29
attitude heuristic and, 447–448
as common currency, 29, 459–460
downside of, 449–452
dual-process theory and, 435
evaluability of, 439–440
hot vs. cold, 547–549
image and, 439
as information, 29, 456
insensitivity to probability and, 443–445
memory and, 457
as motivator, 435–436, 458–459
P bets/$ bets and, 21
probability/relative frequency/risk and, 445–447
proportion dominance and, 440–443
reason and, 28–30
risk-as-feelings hypothesis and, 448–449
risk-benefit judgments and, 29, 442, 444, 445, 446
as spotlight, 458. See also mere exposure; valuation, by prototype/scope of problem
affective evaluability, 21
affective mapping, 440, 441
affective tag, 450
affective valuation, 565, 567–568
Allais paradox, 8, 34–35, 183, 358, 487, 488
alternative-based. See attribute-based vs. alternative-based
ambiguity aversion, 188–189
anchor. See anchoring
anchoring, 402–403, 587–590, 698–699
attitude vs. economic preference and, 587–590
overview of anchoring effects, 588
upward bias in binary questions, 588–590
computer betting and, 118
in contingent valuation, 698–699
gambles/bets and, 118
overview of, 588
priming and, 25
upward bias in binary questions and, 588–590
willingness to pay and, 248, 249–250. See also anchoring manipulation; coherent arbitrariness
anchoring and adjustment, 16, 21–22, 83–84, 113–114, 123, 129, 131, 230–231
anchoring manipulation, 141–143, 247–248
arbitrage (money pump), 10–11
artifacts, turning into main effects, 653
artificial neural network, 221, 223
as-if model, of preference/choice, 399
asymmetric dominance, 14, 225, 226, 228, 229, 330, 422–423
attention
anchoring and, 160, 587–590
focusing and affect, 29
as information processing measure, 127–128, 334–335
attention weights, 222–223, 231
attitude, voluntary vs. involuntary, 334–335, 337
attitude expression, 568
attitude heuristic, 447–448
attitude vs. economic preference, 565–593
anchoring and, 587–590
economics vs. psychology, 565
evaluation factor in, 568–570, 571, 572
norm theory and, 579–583
psychophysics of valuation, 583–587
dollar responses vs. category scales, 585, 586
magnitude scaling, 584
without modulus, 585
punitive damages, 442, 592
valuation, 567–568
by prototype, 572–579
extension neglect, 572–574, 575–578
insensitivity to scope, 574–575, 578–579
willingness to pay (SWTP)/contingent valuation, 566, 590–592
attraction effect. See asymmetric dominance
attractiveness rating. See ratings, attractiveness
attractiveness representations, 362–363
attractiveness restructuring, 366, 367, 369–370
attribute-based vs. alternative-based, 327–328
dimensional vs. interdimensional, 125
transitions, 128
within-attribute vs. interattribute, 196, 197, 210–212
attributes
comparable, 193, 201–202, 203
comparable vs. enriched, 18, 199, 201–203
cues, 4, 5, 27, 29, 47, 75–76, 87, 92–93, 197, 278, 406, 455
enriched, 193, 201–203
enriched vs. comparable attributes, 18, 199, 201–205
evaluability of, 166–170
hard vs. soft, 537–538
monetary vs. nonmonetary, 264–266
more important, 16, 97, 99, 123, 414, 430, 451
perceived, 362
proxy, 174
attribute-task compatibility, 18, 192–219
comparable attributes, 193
enriched attributes, 193
vs. evaluability, 207–210
attribution theory, 432
auctions
English clock, 9–10
multiperson, 258–261
second vs. second-to-last price, 10
axioms
independence, 16, 34–35, 149–150, 154
preference invariance, 235
reduction principle, 16
transitivity, 7–8, 14, 16, 118, 147–150, 159, 183
Bayes’ Theorem, 23, 261
B bid. See pricing
BDM (Becker, deGroot, and Marschak) method, 8, 12, 70, 88, 149–150, 248, 262
behavioral economics, 5, 11–12, 690
bets. See gambles; lotteries
between-subjects vs. within-subject, 17, 187–188, 238, 240, 242, 266–267, 280
bias
distinction. See misprediction/mischoice
diversification, 379
bidding. See preference reversal (PR); pricing
binary choice, 83, 196, 414
binary vs. triadic choices, 224–229. See also adding options
bounded rationality, 23, 323–324, 434
bracketing. See choice bracketing
building code, 36, 37–38, 648–650
buying price. See pricing
canonical representation, 337
cash equivalent. See pricing
category/magnitude scale surveys, 584
category scales, 585, 586
certainty equivalence, 9, 81, 123, 125, 248. See also pricing
certainty matching, 12
Change-of-Process Theory, 17, 20
changes, during decision making, 37. See also constraint-satisfaction; Diff Con theory
choice
accuracy vs. effort, 332–333, 338
as adaptive, 339
binary choice, 83, 196, 414
binary vs. triadic, 224–229
choice goals framework, 333–336
choice heuristics, 24
choice overload hypothesis, 25–26, 302, 311–318
choosing for others, 37–39
deferred, 228, 229, 230–231
economic theory of, 77–93
how much choice, 704–706
indifference in, 9, 59, 63, 81–82
limited vs. extensive, 300, 301–302
matching, 104, 105, 184–185
noncomparable, 327
perceptual approach to, 338
reason-based. See reason-based choice
sticky choices, 695, 697, 707
tyranny of, 318
vs. matching, 96–97
choice bracketing, 27, 337, 372–395
broad, 372, 373
broad vs. narrow, 393–395
narrow, 372, 373, 380
vs. joint/separate evaluation, 375–376
vs. outcome editing, 375–376
choice–experience inconsistency, 526–527, 528–529. See also misprediction/ mischoice; miswanting
choice partitioning. See choice bracketing; joint and separate evaluations, preference reversals between; outcome editing
choice/ratings sensitivity, 212–214
choose vs. reject, 416–417
classical choice theory, 417. See also economic theory of choice
classical conditioning, 29, 401–402
Coase theorem, 684
coercion, 692
cognitive dissonance, 367
cognitive effort vs. accuracy, 332–333, 338
cognitive inertia, 389–390
coherent arbitrariness, 25, 37, 246–270
anchors and, 251–254, 255–258, 261–264
contingent valuation and, 266–267
criminal deterrence and, 268–269
economic variables and, 269–270
financial markets and, 267
labor markets and, 267–268
market forces and, 258–261
nonmonetary, 250, 264–266, 613–614
welfare economics and, 270
comparative advantage model, 435
comparable vs. enriched attributes, 18, 199, 201–203
comparative valuation. See joint evaluation
compatibility, 15, 104–106, 184
attribute-task. See attribute-task compatibility
computer betting and, 16
effect on preference reversals, 15–16
prediction study example, 105
scale, 15–16
similarity study example, 105–106
strategy, 15–16
compensatory strategy, 328, 357, 358, 367
compromise effect, 14, 225–226, 228, 229
computational model, 220–234
binary/triadic choice and, 224–229
choice/prices reversals and, 229–231
neuroscience connection with, 232–233
lateral inhibition, 232–233
overview of, 220–221. See also decision field theory
concave value functions, 606–608
concreteness principle, 640
conditioned/unconditioned stimulus, 466–467
conflict resolution, 27, 353–354
connectionist model, 221, 223, 235–236
consequentialist utility, 547, 549
consistent vs. selective processing, 327
consolidation. See Diff Con theory
constraint-satisfaction, 24, 235–245, 358, 370
coherence shifts and, 240–244
multiattribute decision-making and, 236–240
constructed preference measures, 629–652
assessing effectiveness of, 633–635
constructive preferences and, 631–633
context matching and, 647
stable/coherent/known preferences, 630–631
stages of preference construction, 635–646
construction of preference. See preference construction
constructive preference. See preference construction
consumer choice, constructive, 323–341
adaptivity and, 339
choice goals framework for, 333–336
context matching for prediction, 340
decision strategies for, 327
combined, 330
elimination by aspects, 23, 82–83, 329, 335
equal weight, 329
good/bad features, 330
lexicographic, 328–329
majority of confirming dimensions, 329–330
relational heuristics, 330–331
satisficing, 329
weighted adding, 21, 328, 335
decision tasks for, 326–327
factors influencing, 325. See also attribute-task compatibility
consumer products, as preference reversal stimuli, 13
consumption utility, 549
context matching, 338–339, 340, 647
contingent model. See contingent weighting
contingent trade-off. See contingent weighting
contingent valuation (CV), 25, 32–34, 565–566, 661–662, 680
anchor effects in, 698–699
attitude vs. economic preference in, 590–592
manipulation and, 38–39, 662
problems with, 33, 610. See also contingent valuation (CV), environmental preferences and; WTA; WTP
contingent valuation (CV), environmental preferences and, 609–626
constructive nature of environmental preferences, 611–614
environmental-values-elicitation approach, 614–619
environmental-values-elicitation approach criterion, 617
federal law effect on, 609–610. See also multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), in resource valuations
contingent weighting, 15, 17, 22, 95–121, 156
choice-matching discrepancy and, 102, 112, 119
invariance principle and, 119
lability of preferences and, 121
ordinal method of choice/cardinal method of matching and, 120
preference reversal application, 114–119
prominence hypothesis and, 120
real-world decisions and, 121
true preference and, 120–121. See also prominence hypothesis, tests of; prominence effect, theoretical analysis of
contractual studies vs. gist studies, 660–662
controlled exposures, affect and, 437–438
subliminal priming paradigm, 438
counts, of good or bad features, 330
criminal deterrence, arbitrariness and, 268–269
cross-category stimuli (different categories), 13
cues, 4, 5, 27, 29, 47, 75–76, 87, 92–93, 197, 278, 406, 455
CV. See contingent valuation
decision analysis, 36–37, 657–658
decision costs, 83–84
decision field theory (DFT), 18–19, 20, 221–224, 359
binary/triadic choices and, 226–228, 229
choice process in, 221–224
dynamic value-matching model in, 224
lateral inhibition in, 232–233
decision frames, 637–639. See also framing effects.
decision making and action. See Search for Dominance Structure
decision utility, 505
characteristics of
carriers of utility, 490
framing effects, 490
loss aversion, 490, 491–492
vs. experienced utility, 31, 32, 452, 489–490, 493–496, 501–502, 542
vs. predicted utility, 31–32
defaults, 682–688
Libertarian paternalism and, 695, 696, 697
natural experiments to test power of, 683–685
organ donations and, 685–688
organ donor preferences and, 682–683
deferred choice option, 228, 229, 230–231
definite vs. disjunctive reasons, 424–428
deliberative model, of physician-patient relationship, 671, 672
description invariance, 14, 160. See also framing effects.
design frames, inappropriate, 639
remedies, 639–640
DFT. See decision field theory
Diff Con theory, 27, 35, 351, 356–371
compared with Search for Dominance Structure, 346, 351
decision-making levels in, 359–361
alternative-focused thinking, 360
attractiveness attributes/metastrategies, 360
goal conflicts, 360
recognition-primed decisions, 359–360
value-focused thinking, 360
framework for, 361–367
decision alternatives, 361–363
decision alternatives/goal elicitation/editing, 363
holistic differentiation, 364–365
post-decision consolidation, 364
process differentiation, 365
selecting reference/preliminary choice alternative, 364
structural differentiation, 365–366
overview of, 359
process perspective and, 358, 359–361, 367–370
different categories. See cross-category stimuli
Differentiation and Consolidation. See Diff Con theory
dimensional transition. See attribute-based vs. alternative-based
dimensional vs. interdimensional. See attribute-based vs. alternative-based
disjunctive vs. definite reasons, 424–428
dissonance theory, 432, 561
distinction bias. See misprediction/mischoice
diversification bias, 379
dollar use, individual differences in, 586–587
dominance
proportion, 440–443
as qualitative decision rule, 104
strict, 352
subjective, 350–351
dominance effect, 13
asymmetric, 14, 225, 226, 330, 422–423
constraint-satisfaction and, 240–244. See also Search for Dominance Structure
dominance structuring, 435
Dominance theory, 361
double matching, 10, 13
dual indifference map
induced by additive model, 109
induced by general model, 108
dual-process theory, 22, 28, 30, 435, 445
duplex bet. See duplex gamble
duplex gamble, 4–6, 49
example of, 4, 43
duration neglect, 31, 498
dynamic inconsistency, 494
dynamic value matching, 224, 230–231
economic preference, 680–681. See also attitude vs. economic preference
economics, neuro-/neural, 30
economic theory of choice, 77–93
BDM method in, 8, 12, 70, 88, 149–150, 248, 262
economic-theoretic hypotheses, 79–82
income effects, 81
indifference, 81–82
misspecified incentives, 79
strategic behavior theory and, 88–89, 90–91, 92. See also preference reversal, economist reaction to; psychological-theoretic hypotheses
economic theory of labor supply, 386
economism, lay, 32, 533–537, 542–543
editing, 23, 358, 363
pre-editing, 343
effort-related goals, 333
effort vs. accuracy. See cognitive effort vs. accuracy
elicitation, goal, 363
elicitation effects. See procedure invariance
elimination by aspects, 23, 82–83, 329, 335
Ellsberg paradox, 487, 488
embedding design, 578
embedding problem. See scope insensitivity
emotion, minimizing negative, 26, 274
endowment effect, 492–493, 494, 700–701
English clock auction, 9–10
enriched attributes
vs. comparable attributes, 18, 199, 201–203
vs. impoverished options, 415–416
environmental preferences. See contingent valuation (CV), environmental preferences and
equally attractive/equally valued options, 414, 430–432
equal weights, 21
ethics, of preference management, 38–39
EU. See expected utility
EV. See expected value
evaluability, 163, 250, 439–440
affective, 21. See also joint and separate evaluations
evaluation factor in attitudes, 568–570, 571, 572
evaluation mode vs. evaluation scale, 17–18, 164
expected utility (EU), 21, 42, 52, 78
independence axiom of, 149–150, 154
expected value (EV), 42, 69
experienced utility, 493, 505
vs. decision utility, 31, 32, 452, 489–490, 493–496, 501–502, 542
expertise. See visual primes, effects on experts/novices
explicit consent, 682
explicit list design, 578
expressed preference, 632
Expression Theory, 14–15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 118, 129, 131, 144–145
extensionality, 118–119, 488, 567–568
extension neglect, 573
extremeness aversion, 423–424
eye fixation, 23
facts restructuring, 366
fairness/fair divisions, 14, 38–39, 388
fan effect, 406
file-drawer analogy, 6–7
financial markets, 267, 279
fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imagery), 30
focalism, 32
formal modeling vs. reason-based analysis, 411–413
Four Queens Casino. See preference reversal (PR), in Las Vegas
frames
myopic decision, 637–639. See also framing effects
framing effects, 14, 23, 358
consent and, 673–677
constructive consumer choice and, 336–337
decision theory and, 490
medical decisions and, 699–700
semantic, 402
violations of, 160
functionalism, lay, 32, 539–542
relationship with lay economism/ scientism, 541–542
gambles
duplex, 4–6, 49
as multidimensional stimulus, 52–53
multi-outcome, 13
two-outcome, 41, 42
generalized utility model, 150
gestalt, 354, 355, 361
gist studies, 659, 660–662
vs. contractual studies, 660–662
goal-based strategy, 21, 333–336
attention/selectivity/perception in, 334–335
choice heuristics and, 335–336
consumer goals, 333–334
goal elicitation, 363
good or bad features, counts of, 330
habit formation, 384–385
happiness. See lay rationalism, in predicted experience vs. decision inconsistency; miswanting
H bet. See P bet/H bet
hedonic, 452
vs. utilitarian, 604. See also rationality assumption
hedonic experience
experienced utility and, 501–502
predicted utility and, 493–496
real-time/retrospective utility and, 496–500
heuristics, 611
affect-referral, 447
attitude, 447–448
choice, 24, 335–336, 390–391
judgment, 407
optimizing, 311
preexisting, 390–391
relational, 330–331
holistic differentiation, 351, 353, 364–365
hot vs. cold decisions, 547–549
hyperbolic discounting, 383
imagery, 30
image theory, 358
imaging the numerator, 445–447
immune neglect, 32, 558, 560
importance beliefs. See importance weights
importance of attribute. See more important dimension
importance weights, 41
important. See more important dimension
imprinting effects, 470
incentive-compatible scheme, 272. See also BDM
incentives, 84, 147, 150, 255, 278, 332, 386
misspecified, 7, 79
monetary, 115, 152–153, 632, 683. See also economic theory of choice
income effects, 81
independence axiom, 16, 34–35, 149–150, 154
independence of irrelevant alternatives, 419
indifference curves, 81
individual differences, 461–462, 586–587, 705
induced preferences, 438
information acquisition patterns, 125
information processing, 23, 41–42, 58, 83–84, 334–335
informed consent/construction of values, 38, 668–681
assumption of existing preferences, 672–674
consent as deliberative process, 674–677
perfect/imperfect/pure procedural values, 677–680
in physician-patient relationship, 670
promoting well-being/freedom, 669–670
regulatory decision making, 680–681
insensitivity to scope. See scope insensitivity
instrumental value, 38
IntelliQuest, 215
interattribute vs. within-attribute. See attribute-based vs. alternative-based
interdimensional vs. dimensional. See attribute-based vs. alternative-based
internal inconsistencies, 527
interpretive model, of physician-patient relationship, 671
interval scale, 620
intransitivity, 14, 118, 147–150, 159, 183
intrinsic value, 678–679
intuitive prediction, 573
invariance, 160, 235. See also procedure invariance
isolation effect, 490
JE. See joint evaluation
joint and separate evaluations, preference reversals between, 163–191
attribute evaluation and, 166–170
with dichotomous values, 172, 174–175
difficulty in, 172
easy- vs. difficult-to-evaluate attribute, 172
evaluability information, 167
neutral reference point knowledge and, 168–169
no evaluability information, 167–168
worst/best possible values and, 169, 170
difference from traditional preference reversal, 164
evaluability and JE/SE reversals, 173
evaluability/other explanations for preference reversal, 183–187
change-of-process theory, 185
choice-matching, 184–185
choice task/rating task, 186
compatibility principle, 184
P-bet/$-bet, 183–184, 187
want/should proposition, 185
implications of, 187–191
ambiguity aversion, 188–189
gross insensitivity to important variables, 187–188
value of concern vs. proportion attribute, 188
JE vs. SE, 164–165, 189–191
real-life ramifications of, 163–164
review/explanation of JE/SE reversals, 176–183
from different categories, 180–183
from same category with explicit tradeoffs, 176–179
from same category without explicit tradeoffs, 179–180
joint evaluation (JE)
decision vs. experienced utility and, 31
vs. separate evaluation, 17–18, 35. See also joint and separate evaluations, preference reversals between; misprediction/mischoice
judgment by prototype, 572
judgment heuristics, 407
jury awards, 33, 415–416, 583–587
justification, 84, 544–545. See also reasons
labile values, constructing preferences from, 653–667
adolescent decision making and, 665–666
decision theory research and, 657–658
environmental change and, 660–662
not knowing what one wants and, 654–655
psychophysics research and, 655–657
reactive measurement and, 658–660
contract studies, 659
gist studies, 659
imperfections in evaluation process, 660
sins of commission/omission, 658–659
success of evaluation process, 659–660
risk communication and, 662–664, 665. See also lability
lability, 121, 398, 645, 707. See also labile values, constructing preferences from
labor markets, 267–268
Las Vegas. See preference reversals (PRs)
lateral inhibition, 19, 223, 232–233
lay rationalism, 31–32
as automatic, 543
manipulation for justification of, 544
medium maximization and, 527
priming role in, 543–544. See also lay rationalism, in predicted experience vs. decision inconsistency
lay rationalism, in predicted experience vs. decision inconsistency, 532–549
consumption utility and, 549
hard vs. soft attribute study, 537–538
influences on, 545–547
medium effect, 546–547
prominence effect, 546
transaction utility theory, 546
underweighing hot factors/ overweighing cold factors, 547
lay economism role in, 533–535, 536–537, 542–543
lay functionalism role in, 539–540, 541–542
lay scientism role in, 537–538, 539
main proposition summary, 534
too hot/too cold decisions, 547–549
L bet. See $ bet
levels of decision making, 359–361
alternative-focused thinking, 360
attractiveness attributes/metastrategies, 360
goal conflicts, 360
recognition-primed decisions, 359–360
value-focused thinking, 360
lexicographic strategy, 20–21, 83
lexicographic semiorder, 8–11, 83
as qualitative decision rule, 104
Libertarian paternalism, 39, 689–707
amount of choice to offer and, 704–706
absence/presence of informed preferences, 704–706
personal valuation of freedom of choice, 705–706
preference variation across individuals, 705
transparency of mapping options/preferences, 704–706
autonomy and, 692
determining choice
by cost–benefit analysis, 702–703
by rules of thumb, 703–704
inevitability of paternalism, 694–702
government example, 696–700
savings/employers example, 695–696
misconceptions about paternalism, 691–692
objections to, 706–707
limitations, 706–707
mistrust of planner, 706
slippery slope argument, 706
overview of, 689–692
rationality of choices and, 692–694
reasons difficult to avoid effects on choice, 700–701
endowment effect, 700–701
ill-formed preferences, 701
inertia, 700
suggestion, 700
life values, 348, 349
Likert scale, 312, 313, 315
limited vs. extensive choice. See choice, limited vs. extensive
linear regression models, 4–5, 45
loss aversion, 226, 380–381, 490, 491–492, 683
loss aversion coefficient, 491
lotteries
multistage, 8
one-stage, 8, 150
preference reversals and, 11
two-stage, 8, 150
magnitude scaling, 584
without modulus, 585
majority of confirming dimensions, 329–330
mandated choice, 688
manipulation
anchoring and, 141–143, 247–248
choice overload and, 316
CV studies and, 662
of overall attribute goodness, 238
visual primes and, 287–289, 292
mapping
affective, 440, 441
preference, 644–646
biases in scale usage, 645–646
functional mapping representations, 398–399
scale compatibility influences, 644–645
market forces, coherent arbitrariness and, 258–261
market prices, 4, 12, 209, 210, 247, 248, 251, 259, 546, 613, 615
markets
effect on preference reversals, 10
financial, 267, 279
labor, 267–268
multiattribute utility theory and, 624
social/market interaction, 281
matching
cardinal, 120
certainty, 12
choice, 184–185
choice-matching discrepancy, 102, 104, 105, 112, 119
choice/prices and, 231
context, 338–339, 340, 647
double, 10, 13
dynamic value, 224, 230–231
probability, 12–13, 124
proportional, 15, 22
vs. choice, 96–97
MAUA. See multiattribute utility analysis
MAUT. See multiattribute utility theory
measurement
reactive, 36–37, 653, 658–660. See also constructed preference measures
measurement theory, 95
medical field, managing preferences in, 38
medium effect, 546–547
medium maximization/lay rationalism, 527
melioration, 384
memory
accessibility, 401–405
affect and, 457, 496–500
interference and inhibition, 404–405
interrogation, 400–401
reactivity, 402–403
structure, 405–407. See also memory processes, in preference construction
memory processes, in preference construction, 397–409
functional mapping of preference representations, 398–399
preferences as memory (PAM) framework, 399–409
affect/memory in, 409
alternative theories and, 407–408
inference/inhibition, 404–405
interrogating memory, 400–401
levels of analysis in, 408–409
memory accessibility, 401–405
priming, 401–402
reactivity, 402–403
reactivity, long-term effects of, 403
reactivity, short-term effects of, 402–403
structure of representations, 405–407
significance/implications/applications, 409
mere exposure, 29, 36, 437, 464–470, 494
absence of aversive events as unconditioned stimulus, 466–467
affect/cognition independence and, 468–470
consequences of, 469–470
diverse stimuli as exposure condition function, 468
overview of, 464–465
repeated experiences as positive affect source, 467–469
subliminal induction and, 466
mere repeated exposure. See mere exposure
metagoals, 333–334
microlevel analysis. See computational model
mind-set theory, 345–346
minimizing effort, 361
minimizing negative emotion, 26, 274
mischoice. See misprediction/mischoice
misprediction/mischoice, 31, 504–531
causes of, 505–506
distinction bias, 508–515
diversity and, 378–379
joint vs. separate evaluations as cause, 505–506
general theory, 506–508
mischoice, 515–525
choice–experience inconsistency, 526–527
improving predictions/decisions, 528–529
lay rationalism/medium maximization, 527
other evidence for mischoice, 524–525
relationship with evaluability, 525
misspecified incentives, 7, 79
miswanting, 30–32, 37, 550–563
causes of, 32
fundamentals of, 551–554
imaging wrong events, 551–552
misinterpreting feelings, 553–554
using wrong theory, 552–553
liking vs. wanting and, 550–551
over time, 555–562
focalism role in, 556–557
immune neglect role in, 558, 560
thinking/feeling and, 554–555
monetary bet study, 151–157
bets, 151
discussion, 153–155
distribution of response patterns, 161
results, 152–153, 154, 161
monetary incentives, 115, 152–153, 632, 683
money pump (arbitrage), 10–11
more important dimension, 16, 97, 99, 123, 414, 430, 451
motivated bracketing, 391, 394
motivational consequences, of choice, 302
Mouselab software, 126, 128
multiattribute utility analysis (MAUA), 643–644. See also multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), in resource valuations
multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), in resource valuations, 619–626
advantages/disadvantages of MAUT/CV, 623–626
accommodation/multidimensionality of value, 623
asks right questions, 624
cost, 626
excludes irrelevancies, 624
flexibility in changing circumstances, 625
lessens embedding problem, 624–625
minimizes response refusals, 623–624
separates facts/values, 624
suitability for construction, 625–626
proposed approach for MAUT/CV, 619–620, 623
assess utilities, 622
calculate total value, 622
perform sensitivity analysis, 622–623
structure problem, 620–622
multiple-stimulus. See joint evaluation
multistage lottery, 8
myopic decision frames, 637
remedies for, 637–639
myopic loss aversion, 381
naturalistic decision making, 353–354
negative valence, 223
neuromarketing, 30
neuro-/neural economics, 30
neuroscience, 19, 30, 232–233
noncomparable choice, 327
nonmatrix representations, 361–362
nonreversible decisions, 35
nonvalued features, 429–430
norm theory, 181–182, 579–583
nuclear power, 439, 446
on-line recommendation agents, 38–39
optimization, 7, 77–78, 93, 160, 191, 310, 316–317, 387, 490
optimizing heuristic, 311
optimizing vs. satisficing, 313, 316–317
opt in vs. opt out, 39, 685–688, 694–696
ordinal/cardinal, 123
ordinal pricing, 12, 150
ordinal utility, 270
ordinal vs. cardinal arguments, 104
organ donors, 39, 682–683, 685–688
organ donor preferences, 682–683
outcome editing, 375–376
outcome transition, 128
outrage model, 572
overprediction, 508–515
overpricing, 16, 148–149, 154, 158, 159–160
overweighing cold factors/underweighing hot factors, 547
pain, 250, 498–500
paired comparisons. See joint evaluation
paired stimuli. See joint evaluation
PAM. See preferences as memory (PAM)
paternalism
in physician-patient relationship, 671
in preference measurement, 651. See also Libertarian Paternalism
patient decision making, 369
P bet/H bet, 9, 11, 20–22, 56, 58, 69, 74–75, 77–92, 123, 124–143, 146–158, 160, 229–231, 675
Peak & End rule, 497–498, 499, 502
peanuts effect, 383–384
perfect procedural value, 677
political campaign, managing preferences in, 38–39
positive valence, 223
post-decision processes, 359–361. See also Diff Con theory
pre-decision processes, 359–361, 368. See also editing
predicted utility, 31, 409, 490, 493–496, 505
vs. decision utility, 31–32
pre-editing, 343
preexisting heuristics, 390–391
preference, 39–40
economic, 680–681. See also attitude vs. economic preference
expressed, 632
lability. See labile values, constructing preferences from
preference as memory. See preferences as memory
revealed, 270, 401
“true,” 84, 270
variability in, 2. See also preference construction; preference management; preference reversal
preference construction, 434
antecedents to, 22–24
bounded rationality, 23
choice heuristics, 24
choice rules studies, 23
file-drawer analogy, 22
information processing studies, 23
judgment studies, 22
memory studies, 22
Prospect theory, 23
traditional utility theory, 23
violation of procedure invariance, 24
characteristics of problems needing, 1–2
numerical responses, 1, 2
tradeoffs. See tradeoffs
unfamiliarity, 1, 40
evidence of, 24–26
theories of, 26–28. See also constructed preference measures; consumer choice, constructive; memory processes, in preference construction
preference elicitation. See labile values, constructing preferences from
preference management, 34–39
of other people, 37–39
ethics of preference management, 38–39
inevitable preference management, 39
own preferences, 34–36
tools for, 36–37
change during decision process, 37
coherent arbitrariness, 37
miswanting, 37
preference reversal (PR)
axiom violations, 16, 147–150
beginnings of, 4–6
blossoming of, 12–14
causes of. See also theories of
anchoring and adjustment, 16, 20–22, 83–84, 113–114, 123, 129, 131, 230–231
cognitive processes, 123–124
economist acceptance of, 5, 11–12
economist reaction to, 6–12
auctions, 9–10
axiom violations, 16, 147–150, 154, 159
choice indifference points, 9
explaining away, 8–11, 16
two-stage game, 10
eliminating preference reversals, 10, 203–205
expected utility and, 52
in Las Vegas, 6, 7, 69–76
preference-with-error hypothesis, 8–9, 11
procedure invariance, 14, 147–150
reversals-with-error hypothesis, 9
theories of, 14–22
attribute-task compatibility, 18, 192–219
Change-of-Process theory, 17
comparable vs. enriched attributes, 18
compatibility, 15–16, 97, 104–106, 123–124, 155–157, 184
contingent weighting. See contingent weighting
decision field theory. See decision field theory
evaluability, 21, 163, 250, 439–440
Expression theory, 14–15, 124
prominence effect, 15, 16–17, 112
separate vs. joint evaluation, 17–18, 163–191
type of
adding deferred option, 226–229
adding third option, 225
BDM method, 8, 12, 70, 88, 149–150, 248, 262
buying vs. selling, 12, 13, 14–17, 38, 39
choice vs. pricing, 5–6, 9, 124–135
choosing vs. rejecting, 28, 416–417
consumer products, 13, 178, 192–219
cross category, 13, 705
dominance, 13
framing effects. See framing effects
gambles. See gambles
in judgment, 14
matching. See matching
price comparisons, 15
rating vs. choice, 186, 212–214
rating vs. pricing, 5, 11–12, 15, 17, 123, 135–141
time preferences. See time preferences study
time limits, 14
preferences as memory (PAM), 28, 399–409
affect/memory in, 409
alternative theories and, 407–408
inference/inhibition, 404–405
interrogating memory, 400–401
levels of analysis in, 408–409
memory accessibility, 401–405
priming, 401–402
reactivity, 402–403
structure of representations, 405–407
presumed consent, 682
price/brand quality, 199–200
pricing
anchoring and adjustment (See anchoring and adjustment)
BDM. See BDM (Becker, deGroot, and Marschak) method
buying prices
B bids, 52, 58, 63
vs. selling prices, 12, 13, 14–17, 38, 39, 56
WTP prices, 165, 175, 178, 179, 187
as certainty matching, 12
cognitive processes in, 124–141
decision field theory and. See decision field theory
ordinal, 12, 150
overpricing, 16, 148–149, 154, 158, 159–160
as plain choice task, 9
price comparisons, 15
selling prices, 4–6, 9, 81, 82, 87–88, 92, 125–126, 146, 147–150, 155, 156, 231.
See also BDM
bids to sell (S bids), 50, 52, 54–56
elicitation not relying on independence axiom, 150
vs. choice, 5–6, 9
cognitive processes in, 124–135
vs. rating, 5, 11–12, 15, 17, 123
cognitive processes in, 135–141
priming
by anchor/form of question asked, 25
priming task study, 596–598
semantic, 283
subliminal priming paradigm, 438. See also visual primes, effects on experts/novices
prisoner’s dilemma, 428
probabilities vs. payoffs, 124
probability
affect and, 445–447
insensitivity to, 443–445
probability matching, 12–13, 124
probability preferences, 23, 43
problem restructuring, 366
procedure invariance, 14, 16, 24, 95–96, 97, 122
violations of, 102, 104, 105, 112, 119, 160
process
change-of-process theory, 185
complexity of valuation process, 604–605
consistent vs. selective, 327
differential attribute processing, 210–212
dual-process theory, 22, 28, 30, 435, 445
information, 23, 41–42, 58, 83–84, 334–335
two-stage model, 5, 11–12
vs. structural approach, 356–358
process differentiation, 351–352
process model, two-stage, 5, 11–12
process tracing, 357. See also Mouselab; think-aloud
prominence effect, 15, 16–17, 19, 20–21, 97, 123, 349–350
lay rationalism and, 546. See also contingent weighting
prominence effect, theoretical analysis of, 112
compatibility principle, 104–106
contingent trade-off models, 106–112
additive model, 108, 109
general model, 106–107, 108
hierarchy of, 111
interlocking condition, 109–111
linear model, 111
proportional model, 107, 111
weighting model, 108–112
prominence hypothesis, tests of, 104
promising alternative, 347
proportional matching, 15, 22
proportion dominance, 440–443
Prospect theory, 23, 477–482, 658, 674–677
proxy attribute, 174
psychological immune system, 558
psychological-theoretic hypotheses, 82–84
elimination by aspects, 23, 82–83, 329, 335
information-processing
decision costs, 83–84
response mode/easy justification, 84
information-processing, decision costs, 83–84
information-processing, response mode/easy justification, 84
lexicographic semiorder, 83
probabilities, 82
strategic responses, 82
psychophysical numbing, 451
psychophysics of valuation, 583–587
category/magnitude scale surveys, 584
dollar responses vs. category scales, 585, 586
improving statistical efficiency, 586
individual differences dollar use, 586–587
magnitude scaling, 584
magnitude scaling, without modulus, 585
psychophysics research, 655–657
public decisions. See public policy
public policy, 35
managing preferences of other people and, 37–38
punitive damages, 442, 592
purchase likelihood rating, 197–198, 205–206, 207–212
purchasing behavior
choice overload hypothesis, 318
pure procedural value, 38, 677–678
qualitative/quantitative differences, 104
quantity design, 574–575
race-to-threshold stopping rule, 222
random lottery selection, 8
ratings
attractiveness, 4–6, 9, 13, 52, 304–305, 357–358
Likert scale, 312, 313, 315
purchase likelihood, 13, 305
strength of preference, 44
rationality
bounded, 23, 323–324, 434
just to make oneself look rational, 68
logical, 30–31
substantive, 31. See also lay rationalism; rationality assumption
rationality assumption, 487–503
challenges to, 487–488
decision utility characteristics, 490–493
carriers of utility, 490
framing effects, 490
loss aversion, 490, 491–492
general discussion, 500–503
multiple notions of utility and, 489–490
predicted utility, 493–496
real-time/retrospective utility, 496–500
substantive criteria of rationality, 487
utility concept and
experienced/decision utility, 489–490, 493–496, 501–502
predicted utility, 490
rational optimization, 310
rational theory of choice, invariance principle in, 119, 417
ratio scaling, 265
reactive measurement, 36–37, 653, 658–660
real-time utility, 496–500
Reappearance hypothesis, 22
reason-based choice, 13, 29–30, 411–432
advantages of, 413
choice under conflict
extremeness aversion and, 423–424
option adding and, 419–424
option seeking and, 419
regularity condition and, 420–423
definite vs. disjunctive reasons, 424–428
equally attractive options, 414, 430–432
nonvalued features, 429–430
pro/con, 417
binary choice, 414
choice–reject, 416–417
enriched vs. impoverish option, 415–416
reasons reducing post-choice satisfaction, 471–485
art poster study, 474–485
moderating effects of art knowledge, 480–481, 482
post-choice satisfaction, 477–479
reduction principle, 16
regret, 7–8, 21, 159
regulatory condition, 420–423
Reidemeister condition, 109
reject vs. choose, 28, 416–417
relational heuristics, 330–331
relative vs. absolute risk, 188
repetitive/nonrepetitive tasks, 370
required active choosing, 696
response modes, 122–123
BDM method, 8, 12, 70, 88, 149–150, 248, 262
bidding. See pricing
certainty equivalence, 9, 81, 123, 125, 248
certainty matching, 12
choice
binary vs. triadic, 224–229
indifference, 9, 59, 63, 81–82
paired comparison. See joint evaluation
probability matching, 12–13, 124
rating
of attractiveness, 4–6, 9, 13, 52, 357–358
of purchase likelihood, 197–198, 205–206, 207–212
reject, 28, 416–417
strategic, 82. See also WTA; WTP
retrospective utility, 496–500
revealed preference, 270, 401
reversals-with-error hypothesis, 9–10
risk aggregation, 380–381
risk as feelings hypothesis, 445
risk aversion, 373–374
risks and benefits, affect in judgments of, 29, 442, 444, 445, 446
risky decisions, 41–50
descriptive theories/constructs for, 43
expected utility, 42
expected value, 42
subjectively expected utility, 42–43
variance preferences, 43
duplex gamble experiment, 49
importance beliefs and, 41
information-processing considerations, 41–42
salami tactic, 394
satisficing, 21, 23, 34, 42, 329
vs. optimizing, 313, 316–317
S bids, 52, 56
scale compatibility, 15–16, 19–20, 194–195
scenario generation, 638
scientism, lay, 32, 537–539
hard vs. soft attribute study, 537–538
medium effect and, 546–547
scope insensitivity, 33, 266–267, 390
embedding problem and, 614
scope/value. See subjective value
screening, 363
SDS. See search for dominance
SE. See separate evaluation
Search for Dominance Structure (SDS), 21, 27, 342–355
acting/deciding relationship, 354–355
compared with other decision making approaches, 351–354
dominance-structuring operations, 348
empirical validity of, 351
dominance structure existence, 347–348
dominance-structuring operations, 348–349
dominance violations/dominance structuring, 350–351
pre-editing, 346–347
preferences vs. choices, 349–350
promising alternative, finding/defending, 347
theory behind, 346
action and, 345
decision making phases in, 343–345
dominance structuring, 345, 351
dominance testing, 343–345, 351
finding-a-promising-alternative, 343
pre-editing, 343
mind-set theory and, 345–346
second-price auction, 10
second-to-last price auction, 10
selective vs. consistent processing, 327
self-control, 383, 392, 394
self-perception, 432
selling price. See pricing
semantic differential, 402, 568–569, 571
semantic priming, 283
sensitivity analysis, 35, 646
sensitivity to scope. See scope insensitivity
separate evaluation (SE), 164
single- vs. paired-stimulus reversals and, 13
vs. joint evaluation, 17–18, 31, 35. See also joint and separate evaluations, preference reversals between; misprediction/mischoice
separate-evaluation task, 206–207
sequential processing, 357
sequential sampling, 12, 222
similarity effect, 14, 224–225
single-stimulus. See separate evaluation
sins of commission vs. omission, 37, 658–659
slippery slope, 706
smoking, cigarette, 29, 373, 383, 450, 451–452
somatic markers, 436–437, 455
SSB model, 159
standard theory of rational choice. See utility theory
starting point and adjustment. See anchoring and adjustment
statistical efficiency, improving, 586
status quo bias, 417, 420, 695
stimuli
conditioned/unconditioned, 466–467
consumer products, 13
cross-category, 13
diverse, and mere exposure, 468
judgment, 14
preference, 13
single-stimulus. See separate evaluation
unique features, 201–202, 209, 211–212
stimulus-based choice, 282
stimulus complexity, 23
stochastic transivity, 83–84
strategic behavior theory, 88–89, 90–91, 92
strategic responses, 82
strategy compatibility, 15–16, 195
strict dominance, 352
structural differentiation, 352
structural vs. process approach, 356–358
subjective dominance, 350–351, 352
subjective likelihood. See subjective probability
subjectively expected utility (SEU), 42–43, 63
subjective probability, 49, 50
subjective value, 594–608
complexity of valuation process, 604–605
concavity and, 606–608
crossover notion and, 596
influence on probability weighting, 605–606
priming task study, 596–598
scope neglect and, 603–604
scope sensitivity/insensitivity study, 598–600
on criminal justice, 602–603
on music book vs. cash, 598–600
on zoology, 600–602
valuation by calculation vs. feeling, 594–596
subjective worth. See subjective value
subsequent satisfaction, choice overload hypothesis and, 317–318
substantive inconsistencies, 527
substantive rationality, 31
sunk-cost fallacy, 548
SWTP (stated willingness to pay), 32, 565–566
taste, changes in, 377, 384–385
temporal bracketing, 374
temporal discounting, 407–408
temporal integration, 497
temporal monotonicity, 497, 498–500
think-aloud, 205–206, 207, 348, 349, 350, 355. See also process tracing
think-aloud protocols, 205–207
strength of preference and, 205–206
threshold bound, in decision process, 221–222
time
as attribute, 13
miswanting over time, 555–562
preferences over time, 336, 337
temporal bracketing, 374
time contraction, 337
time limited in making decision, 14
time pressure, 23, 445
time preferences study, 157–158
distribution of response patterns, 159, 161
options used in, 158
“Tom’s law.” See value construction
tradeoff models, contingent, 106–112
additive, 108, 109
general, 106–107, 108
hierarchy of, 111
interlocking condition, 109–111
linear, 111
proportional, 107, 111
weighting, 108–112
tradeoffs, 1, 2, 326–327, 328, 330, 337, 377–378, 385–388, 423–424, 683
across purchase categories, 387–388
avoidance, 643–644
fair divisions, 388
joint/separate evaluations, 176–180
labor/leisure, 386–387
protective values and, 651
transaction utility theory, 546
transitions. See attribute-based vs. alternative-based
transitivity axiom, 7–8, 16
triangulation, 658
triple cancellation, 109
“true” preference, 84, 270
two-stage process model, 5, 11–12
ultimatum game, 14
underpricing, 115, 148–149, 153, 154, 158
underweighing hot factors/overweighing cold factors, 547
unique features. See stimuli, unique features
utility
carriers of, 490
consequentialist, 547, 549
consumption, 549
decision, 31–32, 452, 490–493, 505, 542, 549
expected, 21, 42, 52, 78
experienced, 31, 32, 452, 489–490, 493–496, 501–502, 542
generalized model, 150
multiattribute, 643–644. See also multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), in resource valuations
multiple notions of, 489–490
ordinal, 270
predicted, 12, 31–32, 409, 490, 493–496, 505
real-time, 496–500
retrospective, 496–500
subjectively expected, 42–43, 63, 356–357
transaction utility theory, 546
weighted, 223
utility functions, 15, 83, 108, 373, 515–516
utility maximization, 8–9, 23, 373, 401, 434, 631
utility theory
gambling decisions and, 52
independence axiom and, 34–35
main theorem of, 673
traditional, 7–8
valence, 223
validity
concurrent, 614–616
construct, 615
predictive, 615
valuation, 567–568
affective, 565, 567–568
comparative valuation. See joint evaluation
economic, 246–247
by feeling vs. by calculation, 33
psychophysics of, 583–587
valuation, by prototype/scope of problem, 572–579
extension neglect, 575–578
insensitivity to scope, 574–575
judgment by prototype/extension neglect, 572–574
testing sensitivity to scope, 578–579
value See also informed consent/construction of values
concave value functions, 606–608
dynamic value matching, 224, 230–231
expected, 42
fundamental, 12, 25, 246–247, 280–281, 638–639
holistic vs. separate, 613
imperfect procedural, 678
instrumental, 38, 678
intrinsic, 678–679
life values, 348, 349
multidimensionality of values, 616–617, 623
perfect procedural, 677
protected, 651
pure procedural, 38, 677–678
subjective. See subjective value
value construction, 271–281
coherent arbitrariness and, 271–273
economics research and, 279–281
factors affecting coherence/arbitrariness, 278–279
financial markets and, 279
social/market interaction and, 281
Tom’s law and, 271, 273
value maximization, 419, 420
variance preferences, 23, 43
verbal protocols. See think-aloud
visual primes, effects on experts/novices, 282–299
effect on information search, 298
attribute weights/product ratings and, 297
choice/constant sum and, 292–293
demand characteristics and, 297
mediating role of search and, 295–297
moderating role of expertise and, 295, 296
search/looking time and, 293–294
effect on preference/choice and expertise moderation of effect, 290
familiarity concept, 283
memory-based choice, 282
stimulus-based choice, 282
theoretical background on priming, 285
categorical priming, 283
feature priming, 283
moderating effects by consumer level of expertise, 283–284
moderating role of expertise, 284–285
priming/expertise/search interaction, 285
priming influence on choice, 283–284
semantic priming, 283
wallpaper as prime, 25, 35–36, 402
voluntary vs. involuntary attitude, 334–335, 337
wallpaper, as prime, 25, 35–36, 402
want/should proposition, 185
Web shopping. See visual primes, effects on experts/novices
weighted adding strategy, 21, 328, 335
welfare economics, 270
willingness to accept. See WTA
willingness to pay. See WTP
within-attribute vs. interattribute. See attribute-based vs. alternative-based
within-subject. See between-subjects
word-association technique, 439
WTA (willingness to accept), 33
vs. WTP, 615. See also coherent arbitrariness
WTP (willingness to pay), 32, 33–34
anchoring and, 248, 249–250
dollar/rating responses and, 612
JE/SE preference reversals and, 165, 175, 178, 179, 187
preference reversals and, 612
stated willingness to pay, 32, 565–566
vs. WTA, 615. See also attitude vs. economic preference; contingent valuation
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