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The Market for Force

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  • 7 tables
  • Page extent: 326 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.52 kg

Paperback

 (ISBN-13: 9780521615358 | ISBN-10: 0521615356)




THE MARKET FOR FORCE





The legitimate use of force is generally presumed to be the realm of the state. However, the flourishing role of the private sector in security over the last twenty years has brought this into question. In this book Deborah Avant examines the privatization of security and its impact on the control of force. She describes the growth of private security companies, explains how the industry works, and describes its range of customers – including states, NGOs, and commercial transnational corporations. She charts the inevitable trade-offs that the market for force imposes on the states, firms, and people wishing to control it, suggests a new way to think about the control of force, and offers a model of institutional analysis that draws on both economic and sociological reasoning. The book contains case studies drawn from the US and Europe as well as Africa and the Middle East.

DEBORAH D. AVANT is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for Global and International Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. She is the author of Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons From Peripheral Wars (1994) and of numerous articles.





THE MARKET FOR FORCE


DEBORAH D. AVANT







CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge, CB2 2RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press,
New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521615358

© Deborah D. Avant 2005

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2005

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

ISBN-13 978-0-521-85026-1 hardback
ISBN-10-0-521-85026-6
ISBN-13 978-0-521-61535-8 paperback
ISBN-10-0-521-61535-6

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or
accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in
this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will
remain, accurate or appropriate.





Dedication

For my boys




Contents




List of figure and tables page ix
List of acronyms x
Acknowledgements xiii
1 Introduction 1
  Private security and the control of force: the question 3
  Private security and the control of force: the answer 5
  A transnational market for military and security services 7
  Mercenaries, privatization, and other slippery terms 22
  The current market compared 26
  Why the current market? 30
  Plan of the book 38
2 Private security and the control of force 40
  Clarifying the control of force 40
  How should privatization affect the control of force? 45
  State contracts for private force 57
  State regulation of private security 65
  Non-state financing and the control of force 70
  Methods and claims 77
3 State capacity and contracting for security 81
  Sierra Leone's contracts for military services 82
  Croatia's contracts for military services 98
  US contracts for military services 113
  Comparisons 138
4 Dilemmas in state regulation of private security exports 143
  The United States 146
  South Africa 157
  The United Kingdom 167
  Transnational markets and political trade-offs 175
5 Private financing for security and the control of force 178
  Transnational corporate financing and the control of force 180
  Humanitarian relief in war zones 192
  Conserving nature in the state of nature 204
  Comparisons 215
6 Market mechanisms and the diffusion of control over force 219
  Market mechanisms 219
  Diffusion of control 228
  Institutional innovations 240
  Competing mechanisms, conflict, and change in history 245
  Discussion 251
7 Conclusion 253
  Institutional mechanisms and political processes 254
  Globalization, the state, and the sovereign system 257
Bibliography 265
Index 302





Figure and tables



Figure
1.1 Contracts in battlespace page 17
Tables
1.1 Military and security companies operational between 1990 and 2004 10
1.2 Dimensions of the public/private choice 24
1.3 The variety of arrangements for allocating violence 25
3.1 US military aid appropriations for Croatia, 1995-2003 107
3.2 Effects of private provision of adviceand training on the control of force 140
4.1 Export control trade-offs 176
5.1 Effects of private financing on the control of force 216





Acronyms



ACCS African Center for Strategic Studies
ACOTA African Contingency Operations Training Assistance
ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative
ANC African National Congress
BP British Petroleum
CARTS Army Readiness Training Program
CDF Civil Defense Forces
CONDO Contractors on Deployed Operations
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
DFARS Federal Acquisitions Regulations for Defense
DFID Department for International Development
DOD Department of Defense
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DSB Defense Science Board
DSL Defense Systems Limited (aka ArmorGroup)
DTAP Democracy Transition Assistance Program
EAST Eagle Aviation Services and Technology
ECOMOG Monitoring Group set up by ECOWAS
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EO Executive Outcomes
EU European Union
FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FARS Federal Acquisition Regulations
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FMF Foreign Military Financing
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FND Frederick, Nicholas, and Duncan
FY financial year
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