Cambridge Catalogue  
  • Help
Home > Catalogue > How the Weak Win Wars
How the Weak Win Wars
Google Book Search

Search this book

Details

  • 2 tables
  • Page extent: 276 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.58 kg

Library of Congress

  • Dewey number: 355.4/2
  • Dewey version: 22
  • LC Classification: U163 .A776 2005
  • LC Subject headings:
    • Asymmetric warfare--Case studies
    • Military history, Modern--Case studies

Library of Congress Record

Hardback

 (ISBN-13: 9780521839761 | ISBN-10: 0521839769)

How the Weak Win Wars

Cambridge University Press
0521839769 - How the Weak Win Wars - A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict - by Ivan Arreguín-Toft
Frontmatter/Prelims


How the Weak Win Wars

How do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use. Using statistical and in-depth historical analyses of conflicts spanning two hundred years, Ivan Arreguín-Toft shows that, independent of regime type and weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favors strong actors, while opposite strategic approaches favor the weak. This new approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts allows us to makes sense of how the United States was able to win its war in Afghanistan (2002) in a few months, while the Soviet Union lost after a decade of brutal war (1979–1989). Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction theory has implications not only for international relations theory, but for policymakers grappling with interstate and civil wars, as well as terrorism.

IVAN ARREGUÍN-TOFT is Fellow in the International Security Program, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He has authored numerous conference papers and his articles have appeared in International Security and the Cambridge Review of International Affairs. He is a veteran of the US Army where he served in Augsburg, Germany as a military intelligence analyst from 1985 to 1987.



CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 99

How the Weak Win Wars

A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict




Editorial Board

Steve Smith (Managing editor)

Thomas Biersteker Phil Cerny Michael Cox

A. J. R. Groom Richard Higgott Kimberley Hutchings

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe Steve Lamy Michael Mastanduno

Louis Pauly Ngaire Woods


Cambridge Studies in International Relations is a joint initiative of Cambridge University Press and the British International Studies Association (BISA). The series will include a wide range of material, from undergraduate textbooks and surveys to research-based monographs and collaborative volumes. The aim of the series is to publish the best new scholarship in International Studies from Europe, North America and the rest of the world.


CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

100 Michael C. Williams
       The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations

99 Ivan Arreguín-Toft
       How the Weak Win Wars
       A theory of asymmetric conflict

98 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds.)
       Power in Global Governance

97 Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach
       Remapping Global Politics
       History’s revenge and future shock

96 Christian Reus-Smit (ed.)
       The Politics of International Law

95 Barry Buzan
       From International to World Society?
       English School theory and the social structure of globalisation

94 K. J. Holsti
       Taming the Sovereigns
       Institutional change in international politics

93 Bruce Cronin
       Institutions for the Common Good
       International protection regimes in international society

92 Paul Keal
       European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
       The moral backwardness of international society

91 Barry Buzan and Ole Wœver
       Regions and Powers
       The structure of international security

90 A. Claire Cutler
       Private Power and Global Authority
       Transnational merchant law in the global political economy

Series list continued after index


How the Weak Win Wars:

A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

Ivan Arreguín-Toft




CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press,
New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521548694

© Ivan Arreguín-Toft 2005

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2005

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Arreguín-Toft, Ivan.
How the weak win wars: a theory of asymmetric conflict / Ivan Arreguín-Toft.
 p. cm. – (Cambridge studies in international relations; 99)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 521-83976-9 – ISBN 0-521-54869-1 (pbk.)
1. Asymmetric warfare – Case studies. 2. Military history, Modern – Case
studies. I. Title. II. Series.

U163.A776 2005
355.4’2 – dc 22  2004058131

ISBN-13 978-0-521-83976-1 hardback

ISBN-10 0-521-83976-9 hardback

ISBN-13 978-0-521-54869-4 paperback

ISBN-10 0-521-54869-1 paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for
the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or
third-party internet websites referred to in this book,
and does not guarantee that any content on such
websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.








To Monica


Epigraph

Do not press a desperate enemy

Sun Tzu


Contents




List of figurespage  x
Prefacexi
Acknowledgmentsxiii
List of abbreviationsxv
1Introduction1
2Explaining asymmetric conflict outcomes23
3Russia in the Caucasus: the Murid War, 1830–185948
4Britain in Orange Free State and Transvaal: the South African War, 1899–190272
5Italy in Ethiopia: the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1940109
6The United States in Vietnam: the Vietnam War, 1965–1973144
7The USSR in Afghanistan: the Afghan Civil War, 1979–1989169
8Conclusion200
Appendix228
References235
Index243


Figures

1Percentage of asymmetric conflict victories by type of actor, 1800–2003page 3
2Percentage of conflict victories by type of actor over time4
3Expected effects of strategic interaction on conflict outcomes39
4Strategic interaction and asymmetric conflict outcomes, 1800–200345
5Strategic interaction and conflict outcomes when weak actor received no external support46

© Cambridge University Press


printer iconPrinter friendly versionemail iconEmail a colleague AddThis