A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism Cambridge University Press
9780521876490 - A METAPHYSICS FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM - by Anjan Chakravartty
Frontmatter/Prelims

A METAPHYSICS FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM

Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Debates between realists and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science. Anjan Chakravartty traces the contemporary evolution of realism by examining the most promising recent strategies adopted by its proponents in response to the forceful challenges of antirealist sceptics, resulting in a positive proposal for scientific realism today. He examines the core principles of the realist position, and sheds light on topics including the varieties of metaphysical commitment required, and the nature of the conflict between realism and its empiricist rivals. By illuminating the connections between realist interpretations of scientific knowledge and the metaphysical foundations supporting them, his book offers a compelling vision of how realism can provide an internally consistent and coherent account of scientific knowledge.

ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY is Associate Professor at the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology and Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto.

---

A METAPHYSICS FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM

Knowing the Unobservable

ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY
University of Toronto

---

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521876490

© Anjan Chakravartty 2007

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2007

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-0-521-87649-0 hardback

---

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for
external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee
that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

---

---

It is the fault of our science that it wants to explain all; and
if it explain not, then it says there is nothing to explain.

Van Helsing to Dr Seward
Bram Stoker, Dracula

---

Contents

List of tables		page ix
List of figures		x
Preface		xi
List of abbreviations		xvii
Part 1 Scientific realism today
1	Realism and antirealism; metaphysics and empiricism	3
	1.1      The trouble with common sense	3
	1.2      A conceptual taxonomy	8
	1.3      Metaphysics, empiricism, and scientific knowledge	13
	1.4      The rise of stance empiricism	17
	1.5      The fall of the critique of metaphysics	20
2	Selective scepticism: entity realism, structural realism, semirealism	27
	2.1      The entities are not alone	27
	2.2      Lessons from epistemic structuralism	33
	2.3      Semirealism (or: how to be a sophisticated realist)	39
	2.4      Optimistic and pessimistic inductions on past science	45
	2.5      The minimal interpretation of structure	52
3	Properties, particulars, and concrete structures	58
	3.1      Inventory: what realists know	58
	3.2      Mutually entailed particulars and structures	61
	3.3      Ontic structuralism: farewell to objects?	70
	3.4      Ontological theory change	76
	3.5      Return of the motley particulars	80
Part II Metaphysical foundations
4	Causal realism and causal processes	89
	4.1      Causal connections and de re necessity	89
	4.2      Is causal realism incoherent?	96
	4.3      A first answer: relations between events	102
	4.4      A better answer: causal processes	107
	4.5      Processes for empiricists	114
5	Dispositions, property identity, and laws of nature	119
	5.1      The causal property identity thesis	119
	5.2      Property naming and necessity	126
	5.3      Objections: epistemic and metaphysical	134
	5.4      Vacuous laws and the ontology of causal properties	141
	5.5      Causal laws, ceteris paribus	147
6	Sociability: natural and scientific kinds	151
	6.1      Law statements and the role of kinds	151
	6.2      Essences and clusters: two kinds of kinds	156
	6.3      Clusters and biological species concepts	162
	6.4      Sociability (or: how to make kinds with properties)	168
	6.5      Beyond objectivity, subjectivity, and promiscuity	174
Part III Theory meets world
7	Representing and describing: theories and models	183
	7.1      Descriptions and non-linguistic representations	183
	7.2      Representing via abstraction and idealization	187
	7.3      Extracting information from models	192
	7.4      The inescapability of correspondence	199
	7.5      Approximation and geometrical structures	205
8	Approximate truths about approximate truth	212
	8.1      Knowledge in the absence of truth simpliciter	212
	8.2      Measuring “truth-likeness”	214
	8.3      Truth as a comparator for art and science	218
	8.4      Depiction versus denotation; description versus reference	224
	8.5      Products versus production; theories and models versus practice	230
References		235
Index		244

---

Tables

Table 1.1:	Scientific realism and antirealisms	page 10
Table 6.1:	Three types of law-like generalizations	155

---

Figures

Figure 1.1:	Observables and unobservables	page 15
Figure 2.1:	Incident, reflected, and refracted light beams at the interface of two media	35
Figure 2.2:	Property distinctions underlying semirealism	48
Figure 5.1:	Problems associated with vacuous law statements	145
Figure 7.1:	Using representations and descriptions	186

---

© Cambridge University Press