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A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism

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  • Page extent: 272 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.568 kg

Hardback

 (ISBN-13: 9780521876490)

A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism Cambridge University Press
9780521876490 - A METAPHYSICS FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM - by Anjan Chakravartty
Table of Contents


Contents

List of tablespage ix
List of figuresx
Prefacexi
List of abbreviationsxvii

Part 1 Scientific realism today

1

Realism and antirealism; metaphysics and empiricism
3
1.1      The trouble with common sense3
1.2      A conceptual taxonomy8
1.3      Metaphysics, empiricism, and scientific knowledge13
1.4      The rise of stance empiricism17
1.5      The fall of the critique of metaphysics20

2

Selective scepticism: entity realism, structural realism, semirealism
27
2.1      The entities are not alone27
2.2      Lessons from epistemic structuralism33
2.3      Semirealism (or: how to be a sophisticated realist)39
2.4      Optimistic and pessimistic inductions on past science45
2.5      The minimal interpretation of structure52

3

Properties, particulars, and concrete structures
58
3.1      Inventory: what realists know58
3.2      Mutually entailed particulars and structures61
3.3      Ontic structuralism: farewell to objects?70
3.4      Ontological theory change76
3.5      Return of the motley particulars80

Part II Metaphysical foundations

4

Causal realism and causal processes
89
4.1      Causal connections and de re necessity89
4.2      Is causal realism incoherent?96
4.3      A first answer: relations between events102
4.4      A better answer: causal processes107
4.5      Processes for empiricists114

5

Dispositions, property identity, and laws of nature
119
5.1      The causal property identity thesis119
5.2      Property naming and necessity126
5.3      Objections: epistemic and metaphysical134
5.4      Vacuous laws and the ontology of causal properties141
5.5      Causal laws, ceteris paribus147

6

Sociability: natural and scientific kinds
151
6.1      Law statements and the role of kinds151
6.2      Essences and clusters: two kinds of kinds156
6.3      Clusters and biological species concepts162
6.4      Sociability (or: how to make kinds with properties)168
6.5      Beyond objectivity, subjectivity, and promiscuity174

Part III Theory meets world

7

Representing and describing: theories and models
183
7.1      Descriptions and non-linguistic representations183
7.2      Representing via abstraction and idealization187
7.3      Extracting information from models192
7.4      The inescapability of correspondence199
7.5      Approximation and geometrical structures205

8

Approximate truths about approximate truth
212
8.1      Knowledge in the absence of truth simpliciter212
8.2      Measuring “truth-likeness”214
8.3      Truth as a comparator for art and science218
8.4      Depiction versus denotation; description versus reference224
8.5      Products versus production; theories and models versus practice230

References
235
Index244



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