The Paradox of Predictivism

Cambridge University Press
9780521879620 - The Paradox of Predictivism - by Eric Christian Barnes
Frontmatter/Prelims

THE PARADOX OF PREDICTIVISM

An enduring question in the philosophy of science is the question of whether a scientific theory deserves more credit for its successful predictions than it does for accommodating data that was already known when the theory was developed. In The Paradox of Predictivism, Eric Barnes argues that the successful prediction of evidence testifies to the general credibility of the predictor in a way that evidence does not when the evidence is used in the process of endorsing the theory. He illustrates his argument with an important episode from nineteenth-century chemistry, Mendeleev’s Periodic Law and its successful predictions of the existence of various elements. The consequences of this account of predictivism for the realist/anti-realist debate are considerable, and strengthen the status of the ‘no miracle’ argument for scientific realism. Another significant consequence is that scientific method embodies a pervasive epistemic pluralism, according to which expert scientists who assess theories depend heavily on the judgments of other scientists. Barnes’s important and original contribution to the debate will interest a wide range of readers in philosophy of science.

ERIC CHRISTIAN BARNES is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Southern Methodist University.

THE PARADOX OF PREDICTIVISM

ERIC CHRISTIAN BARNES
Southern Methodist University

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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First published 2008

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To Veronica, who is my happiness

Acknowledgments			page ix
1	The paradox of predictivism		1
	1.1	Introduction	1
	1.2	Pumping up the intuition that prediction matters	2
	1.3	The paradox of predictivism	5
	1.4	A sketchy history of predictivism	7
	1.5	Weak and strong predictivism	24
	1.6	Overview of the argument of this book	27
2	Epistemic pluralism		31
	2.1	Introduction	31
	2.2	Novelty for pluralist evaluators	33
	2.3	A pluralist model of theory evaluation	38
	2.4	Expert pluralism	51
	2.5	Conclusion	58
3	Predictivism and the Periodic Table of the Elements		60
	3.1	Introduction	60
	3.2	Unvirtuous predictivism	61
	3.3	Virtuous predictivism	64
	3.4	Virtuous predictivism in Bayesian terms	69
	3.5	Four species of predictivism	80
	3.6	Mendeleev and the periodic law	82
	3.7	Mendeleev’s background beliefs	87
	3.8	Predictivism and the periodic law	96
	3.9	Conclusion	122
4	Miracle arguments and the demise of strong predictivism		123
	4.1	Introduction	123
	4.2	Neither truth nor empirical adequacy explain novel success	126
	4.3	The miraculous endorsement argument for realism	141
	4.4	The base rate fallacy	162
	4.5	The realist is a pluralist	166
5	The predicting community		168
	5.1	Introduction	168
	5.2	The coin flip example once again	169
	5.3	Eva meets Priscilla	172
	5.4	The community of predicting scientists	173
	5.5	A predictive paradox	179
	5.6	Counterpredictors	181
	5.7	Applications	185
	5.8	Realism, pluralism, and individualism	187
	5.9	Conclusion	189
6	Back to epistemic pluralism		190
	6.1	Introduction	190
	6.2	Toward a more rigorous model of pluralistic theory evaluation	195
	6.3	Scenario one: the mapmakers	197
	6.4	Scenario two: the probabilistic jury	205
	6.5	Applications for the two scenarios	210
	6.6	Mixed weights	212
	6.7	Weighting gone wrong	214
7	Postlude on old evidence		217
	7.1	Introduction	217
	7.2	H-independent e-evidence: Einstein in 1915	223
	7.3	Beyond the e-difference approach: a theistic solution to the quantitative problem	230
	7.4	Two solutions to the quantitative problem	232
	7.5	Implications for Bayesianism?	237
	7.6	Conclusion	238
8	A paradox resolved		240
	8.1	Introduction	240
	8.2	Confirmation theory	240
	8.3	The realist/anti-realist debate	242
	8.4	The methodology of science	243
Glossary			246
Bibliography			249
Index			258

Acknowledgments

In the course of writing this book I have been helped by many people. My most immediately obvious debt of gratitude is to my colleagues at Southern Methodist University who have supplied me with considerable intellectual support and expertise during my thirteen years at SMU – most of which has been occupied with something or other to do with this book. These people include Roberta Ballarin, Phillipe Chuard, Alan Hausman, David Hausman, Mark Heller, Steve Hiltz, Robert Howell, Jean Kazez, Jim Lamb, Clayton Littlejohn, Mark McCullough, Alastair Norcross, Luke Robinson, Jonathon Sutton, Brad Thompson, and Steve Sverdlik. I am conscious of a special debt to Doug Ehring, who has been a terrific mentor during my time at SMU. My thoughts as presented in this book have also been the result of correction and/or nourishment by comments (in and out of print) by Peter Achinstein, David Christensen, Ellery Eells, Keith Lehrer, Patrick Maher, Paul Meehl, Elliot Sober, Edrie Sobstyl, Eric Scerri, Kent Staley, Wayne Woodward, and John Worrall. At Cambridge University Press I would like to thank Hilary Gaskin and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and comments on this work.

I am grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a 1994 summer seminar stipend that kicked off my interest in confirmation theory, and to Larry Laudan for teaching an excellent seminar. Thanks are also due to Southern Methodist University for a sabbatical leave during the spring of 2005 during which part of this book was written.

This book draws on some of my published articles. These include the articles listed below. In every case I am indebted to journal referees who offered considerable help in working through my ideas. I am grateful to Oxford University Press, Springer Publishing Company, and Taylor and Francis Group for permission to include material from the following articles:

1996 “Discussion: thoughts on Maher’s Predictivism,” Philosophy of Science, 63, 401–410.

1996 “Social predictivism,” Erkenntnis 45, 69–89.

1998 “Probabilities and epistemic pluralism,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49, 31–37.

1999 “The quantitative problem of old evidence,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50, 249–264.

2000 “Ockham’s razor and the anti-superfluity principle,” Erkenntnis 53, 3, 353–374.

2002 “Neither truth nor empirical adequacy explain novel success,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80, 4, 418–431.

2002 “The miraculous choice argument for realism,” Philosophical Studies 111, 2, 97–120.

2005 “Predictivism for pluralists,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56, 421–450.

I would also like to take this opportunity to offer thanks to those who taught me philosophy. To begin at the all important beginning: Susan Mills Finsen, Daniel Graham, Dan Magurshak, and Jack Worley were certainly the four most important things that happened to me during my undergraduate years at Grinnell College. Their teaching, encouragement and support not only prepared me well and got me excited about philosophy, but helped me believe in myself at a time when such help was truly appreciated. The story continues at Indiana University, where I was likewise treated to wonderful teaching from many professors, but especially Nino Cochiarella, Alberto Coffa, Noretta Koertge, and John Winnie. I learned a lot from my colleagues at Denison University during my four years there. To all these people I am grateful for helping me grow as a philosopher, and for many fine memories of youth.

Reaching further back in time, my debts grow more profound even as they become harder to describe. My mother and father created a very loving and happy home in which the life of the mind was greatly admired. I suspect my fascination with scientific method has its roots in my memories of my father’s laboratory, where my earliest memories of the world of grown ups were formed. At a tender age I came to connect (oversimply, obviously) the capacity for scientific thought with the living of a fully realized human life. I like to think that my attempt to understand scientific method is part of a larger project of understanding what the living of such a life entails.

I owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude to my wife, Veronica Barnes, whose love, kindness and wise counsel continue to dazzle me after nineteen years of marriage. And to my daughters, Rachel and Faith, I express heartfelt gratitude for sometimes quieting down when I needed to write, and for all the happiness and fun they bring to my life.

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The Paradox of Predictivism

Eric Christian Barnes

Southern Methodist University, Texas

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