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The Paradox of Predictivism

Cambridge University Press
9780521879620 - The Paradox of Predictivism - by Eric Christian Barnes
Index


Index

accommodations, evidential 24–5, 82–7, 165

   ad hoc theory 11, 46–7, 120

   dubious 2–3, 5, 46

   glorious 5

   Mendeleev and 88, 96–7, 97–101, 101–2, 104–5, 112–13

   Worrall and 117

accuracy, probability 207–8

Achinstein, P. 6, 59

ad hoc hypotheses 3, 13–14, 18, 63, 185, 241

   see also built to fit explanations

ad hoc theory

   accommodations 11, 46–7, 120

   endorsements 45

   rescues 2–3, 63

adhocery 109

aether theory of nervous system 7–9, 10

agent evaluation 207

agnostic evaluators 106–7

agnostic predictivism 191–4

American Astronomical and Astrophysical Society (AAAS) 103

anthropologists example 213

anti-inductivism 122

anti-realists 16–65, 125–6, 143, 146–7, 152–4, 164, 167, 187

   /realists debate 123–4, 126, 142, 163, 166, 186, 242–3

   challenge 155–62

anti-superfluity principle (ASP) 127–8, 136–41, 243

Arago, D. F. J. 8

arbitrary conjunctions 25, 120

argon 84

Aristotle 40, 222

assessment, theory see theory evaluation

atomic weights 82, 86, 93, 102, 105

   calculation (Km1) 88–90, 97–101, 119

authority 40–1, 245

   epistemic 190, 211

   pluralism and 33

   of science 50–1

auxiliary hypotheses 117, 134–5

Avogadro’s hypothesis 88


background beliefs

   arbitrary 174–7, 182–3

   common body of 204

   comprehensiveness 192–4, 195–7

   defined 190

   differing 202, 205, 209

   empirically adequate 161–2, 164–5

   experts and 52, 54, 56–8

   Mendeleev’s 87–96, 97–104, 107, 109–13, 119

   non-experts and 41, 45, 46–7, 49

   novel success and 125, 192–4, 196

   observation and 223, 226

   per se predictivism and 114

   pluralist evaluators 65–6

   prior probabilities and 163, 166

   probability function and 230, 233–5, 239

   scientific community 39, 120

   silly 189

   success predictivism and 191

   theoretical 205–7, 210, 211

   true 131–2, 137–9, 144–6, 168–72, 187–9, 193–5, 241

   virtuous predictivism and 69–73, 77–8

background knowledge 233, 237

background theories 143–4, 148–9, 151, 155, 164, 167, 187

Bamford, G. 12

Barnes, E. 19, 116, 127

Barrett, J. 59

base rate fallacy 125, 162–6

Bateson, William 150–1, 165

Bayes’ theorem 16, 21, 163, 174, 188, 189, 199

   old evidence and 217–18, 221–2, 225, 237–8

   virtuous predictivism and 69–80

beliefs, basic 228

   see also background beliefs

Bensaude-Vincent, B. 90, 92–3, 96

benzene 147

Berthelot, Marcellin 92, 105, 116

beryllium 105

Berzelius, J. J. 89, 95

biographicalism 6–7, 14–15, 24–6, 140, 187

   pluralism and 33

Boyd, Richard 46, 49, 121, 128

   miraculous endorsement argument for realism 139, 141, 143–4, 144–62, 243

Boyle, Robert 43

Brush, S. 83–4, 87, 103–4, 105, 108–10

Bryan, William Jennings 50

Bugg, William 52

built to fit explanations 13, 130–1, 132–6, 137, 141, 161, 240

   see also ad hoc hypotheses


Callender, C. 125, 155, 162, 243

candidate theories 137, 164–5

Cannizarro, Stanislao 88–9, 97, 100, 119

Cassebaum, H. 93

Cavendish, H. 3

Ceci, S. 215

Chariots of the Gods (von Daniken) 47

Chemical News 108

Chemical Society of London 95

Chihara, C. 220

Christensen, David 232–7

Clarke, F. W. 103

classifiers 93

Clavius, C. 132

Coady, C. A. J. 32

coin flip example 4–5, 17, 19–21, 169–72, 172–3, 173–9

   counterpredictors 181–4

Collins, R. 6

communitarian epistemology 32

community see predicting community; scientific communities (SCs)

competence 195–6, 197

comprehensiveness requirement 192–4, 195–7

conditional confirmation 18–19, 116–19

conditional probabilities 182

confirmation theory 14, 18–19, 116–19, 240–2

   rebound effect 19

   see also novel confirmation

connect the dots example 4, 16

consensus 39, 40–1, 49, 57

   experts and 53, 110

   forced 46, 50

   unforced 43–4

consequentialism, pure 9–15, 18

constructive empiricism 126

Cooke, J. P. 93–4

Copernicus, Nicholas 4, 152, 244

core ideas 18–19, 117, 119, 135, 241

correct probabilities 208

Correns, C. F. J. P 150

counterfactual history 220–1

counterpredictors 181–4

creationism 18–19, 117, 119

creativity 115

credibility 41, 166

   agent 33, 205, 207–8, 212

   endorser 79, 113, 140


Dallas Cowboys example 31

Darden, L. 115, 149–50

Darwin, Charles 90, 142–3, 154, 160

data overfitting 24–6, 121

data-fitting theories 148

Davy Medal 82–3

de Boisbaudran, Lecoq 100, 104

de Chancourtois, A. B. 93

de Milt, C. 89–90, 96

De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (Copernicus) 4

de Sitter, W. 53–4

de Vries, H. 150

demarcation problem 9, 12, 122

Descartes, René 8, 32, 98

D.I. Mendeleev et la loi periodique (Kolodkine) 89

diachronic problem 218

direct observation 95, 98

dissolution of predictivism 15–18, 23–4

distinction problem 226–7

divine e-assurance 230–2

divine M-assurance 230

Dixon, Jeane 168, 185

Dobereiner, J. W. 93

dogmatism 45, 62

Doolittle, E. 229

Drake, Stillman 244

dubious accommodations 2–3, 5, 46

Duhem, P. M. M. 128

Dumas, J. B. A. 93

Dyson, F. W. 53–4


e-difference approach 219–20, 221, 228–9, 235–6

e-evidence, h-independent 223–30, 230–2, 236

Earman, J. 31, 53–4, 221

eclipse expedition (Eddington) 107

Eddington, A. S. 53–4, 107

Edwards, P. 152

Eells, E. 220–1, 232–4

Einstein, Albert 17, 53, 71, 107, 109, 132

   in 1915 223–30

   pure consequentialism and 9–10, 12

eka-aluminum 100

elements and systematic unity (Km2) 90–4, 101–2, 119

emergence of theories 143, 147, 152, 154

emission theory of light 8

empirical adequacy see novel success, truth, empirical adequacy and

empirical knowledge 94–5

empirical success 126, 141, 142–4, 154, 166

endorsement

   -novelty 37, 37n, 240

   defined 35–6

   epistemic significance of 63–4

   level probabilities 61, 66, 77, 193, 196

   pool of 168

   see also miraculous endorsement argument for realism

epistemic authority 190, 211

‘Epistemic Dependence’ (essay) 31

epistemic individualism 110, 189, 242, 243–4

   defined 27, 31–2

   realists and 166–7, 187–9

   romantic ideal of 32, 60

epistemic pluralism 31–59, 190–216, 242

   experts 51–8, 244

   mapmakers example 197–205, 210–11

   mixed weights 212–14

   model of theory evaluation 38–51, 195–7

   non-experts 166, 244

   novelty and 33–8

   overview 27–8, 29

   probabilistic jury example 205–10, 211

   realists and 166–7, 187–9

   weighted averaging, objections to 214–16

   see also pluralist evaluators

epistemic significance

   of endorsement 63, 168, 188, 189

   of judgments of scientists 41, 125, 241–2

   of novelty 123–4, 140

   predictors and 178, 180

   of theory construction 115, 117

equivalence claim 157–8

Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke) 98

Essays on the Intellectual Power of Man (Reid) 55

Eva examples

   Alex and Peter 61–4, 65–9, 70–8, 78–80

   Priscilla and Countess 172–3, 179–81, 181–2

evaluation see theory evaluation

evaluators 96

   agnostic 106–7

   individualist 68, 113–14, 140

   see also experts; pluralist evaluators

evidence

   -based method 212–14

   deletion 220–1, 228

   hunch-producing 202

   intuition and 170, 202, 226, 232, 234

   possession 212–13

   private 203–4

   redundant 237

   sensory 99

   sharing 202–5, 206, 208, 211

   see also accommodations, evidential; old evidence

evolutionary theory 50–1, 151

examples

   anthropologists 213

   coin flip 4–5, 17, 19–21, 169–72, 172–3, 173–9, 181–4

   Dallas Cowboys 31

   Eva, Alex and Peter 61–4, 65–9, 70–8, 78–80

   Eva, Priscilla and Countess 172–3, 179–81, 181–2

   financial advisor 1, 60, 123, 169

   French bread 2–3, 11–12

   mapmakers 197–205, 210–11

   pharmacologists 212–13

   probabilistic jury 205–10, 211

   psychic 3–4

experts 39, 51–8, 166, 244

   humble 54–6, 111, 244

   imperfect 52–4, 107–9, 244

   interdisciplinary 51–2, 111, 244

   non- 39–51, 125, 166, 244

   pluralist 125

   reflective 56–8, 110–11

   team-member 51–2


falsifiability 9–11, 13, 122

Faraday Lecture 89, 91–2

Farrar, W. V. 94

financial advisor example 1, 60, 123, 169

Fine, A. 146

first good theories 145, 147, 155

First Meditation (Descartes) 98

Fitelson, B. 232–5

Foley, R. 31

foundationalism 228

France 89, 96, 105

French bread example 2–3, 11–12

Fresnel, Augustin 8

Freud, Sigmund 9–10

fudging explanation 63

funding 51


Galen 8

Galileo 244–5

gallium 82–3, 86, 100–1, 104, 105, 110, 118

Garber, D. 221

Gardner, M. 6

general theory of relativity (GTR) (Einstein) 9–10, 17, 53–4, 107–9, 132, 223–9, 230

genetic theories 19–24

Gerhardt, C. F. 88, 97

germanium 82, 110, 118

Germany 89, 108

Giere, R. 27, 34, 48, 133

Gillespie, C. C. 104

Gladstone, J. 93

glorious accommodations 5

glorious predictions 5, 8

   successful 3–4, 85

Glymour, Clark 53–4, 133

   old evidence and 217, 219, 221, 224–5, 229, 237

Gmelin, L. 93

Gosse, Philip 18–19

Great Britain 83, 89, 107

Gren, F. A. C. 3

Grossman, M. 229

Gutting, G. 143


h-independent e-evidence 223–30, 230–2, 236

Hacking, I. 13

Hardwig, John 31–2, 52, 60

Harker, D. 20

Hartley, David 7–9, 10

heliocentric theory 4

Herschel, John 8–9, 10

heuristic approach 1–2, 7, 117

high frequency assumption 160–1, 164, 168, 186

history, theory of (Marx) 9

Hitchcock, C. 24–5, 114, 121, 241

Hoel, P. G. 208

Holden, N. E. 89, 95

Homer 12

horizontal inference 125–6, 153, 156–9

Howson, Colin 4, 16–17, 67, 219

humble experts 54–6, 111, 244

Hume, David 10

hunch-producing evidence 202

Huygens, Christian 59

hydrogen 93

hypotheses

   ad hoc 3, 13–14, 18, 63, 185, 241

   auxiliary 117, 134–5

   method of 7–9, 10

   support 69

   theoretical 134–5


Ihde, A. J. 88

imagination 115

imperfect experts 52–4, 107–9, 244

inaccessibility thesis 55–6

individualism see epistemic individualism

individualist evaluators 68, 113–14, 140

inductive logic 10–11, 16

   anti- 122

   pessimistic 163

infinite regress argument 222

instrumental reliability 144, 146

interdisciplinary experts 51–2, 111, 244

intuition 27, 66, 122, 136, 195, 214

   evidence and 170, 202, 226, 232, 234

   posterior probabilities and 76, 80

   weighted averaging and 205, 210


‘Jeane Dixon effect’ 168

justification 37, 221–2, 228, 231


Kahn, J. A. 19, 22–3, 26, 114, 120, 186–7, 241

Kant, Immanuel 32, 90

Kantorovich, A. 115

Kaplan, M. 219

Karlsruhe Conference 88–9, 96, 97

Kauffman, G. B. 93

Kekule, F. A. 147

Kennedy, John F. 168

Kepler, Johann 103

Keynes, John Maynard 15–18, 23–4

Kitcher, P. 3

Knight, D. M. 92, 95, 109

Kolodkine, P. 89

Kremers, P. 93

Kuhn, T. S. 56, 58, 151, 194

Kultgen, J. H. 90–1

Kusch, M. 32


Lackey, J. 32

Ladyman, L. 146

Laing, M. 88

Lakatos, Imre 1, 12–15, 17–18, 62, 135, 151, 238

Landsberg, S. E. 19, 22–3, 26, 114, 120, 186–7, 241

Lange, M. 25–6, 114, 120–1

Laudan, Larry 8–9, 11, 138–9, 142, 151

Laurent, Auguste 89

Lavoisier, A. L. 3, 92

law of octaves (Newlands) 93, 95

Lehrer, K. 208

Lenssen, E. 93

Leplin, Jarret 6, 18, 34, 38, 129, 132, 237

Leverrier, U. J. J. 229

Lewis, D. 220

likelihood ratios 73–4, 78, 85

Lipton, P. 25, 63, 83, 121, 240

Locke, John 98–9

logical positivism 126

Longino, Helen 215, 245

Lundgren, A. 95

Lysenko, T. D. 43, 46


McAllister, J. W. 15, 148

MacDonald, H. 40

Magnus, P. D. 125, 155, 162, 243

Maher, P. 4, 82–3, 173, 175

   method-based theory 19–23, 26, 34–5, 114–16, 169–70, 189, 241

Manahan, S. E. 52

mapmakers example 197–205, 210–11

Marsden, G. 50

Marx, Karl 9, 11, 62

Maxwell, G. 126

Mayo, D. 4, 221, 238

Mendel, G. J. 149–51, 153–4, 165

Mendeleev, Dmitri 49, 97–112, 194, 238–9

   see also periodic law (PL)

method

   -based theory 19–13, 26, 34–5, 114–16, 169–70, 189, 241

   of hypotheses 7–9, 10

   scientific 6–7, 22–3, 143, 144

methodology 14–15, 27, 243–5

   principles of 145–6, 150, 152, 155

   of scientific research programmes (MSRP) 12–14

Meyer, J. Lothar von 89, 93

Mill, John Stuart 9, 13

miracle arguments 143, 162, 165

   for realism 123–4, 126, 128–32, 136–41, 242

   for strong predictivism 127, 128–32

miraculous endorsement argument for realism 139, 141–62, 165, 242–3

   current state of 142–4

   objections to 144–62

mixed weights 197, 212–14

model of theory evaluation 38–51, 195–7

   criteria for 41

modest approach 200–1, 203–4, 211

Musgrave, Alan 1, 128–9, 132, 142


natural selection 143

Neptune 110

New England Journal of Medicine 41

Newlands, J. A. R. 93–5

Newton, Isaac 7–8, 17, 59, 71, 90

Nickles, T. 13–15

NMR spectroscopy 115

no-miracles argument 121

noble gases 84

non-consequentialism 14–15, 16

non-experts 39–51, 125, 166, 244

non-observation problem 229

Nostradamus 185

novel confirmation 1

   experts and 53–4, 57, 244

   non-experts and 41, 46–9, 244

   periodic law (PL) and 103, 106–11

novel success

   background beliefs and 125, 192–4, 196

   chance and 187

   credibility and 207

   high frequency assumption and 186

   miraculous 124

   periodic law (PL) and 100, 101, 104, 105–6, 109–10, 112–13

   pool of endorsements and 168

   posterior probabilities and 189

   realism and 128–9, 166

   take-off theories and 154–5, 163, 165

   weighted averaging and 210

   see also novel confirmation

novel success, truth, empirical adequacy and 124–5, 126–41, 147, 165

   anti-superfluity principle (ASP) 127–8, 136–41, 243

   built to fit explanations 132–6

   miracle arguments for realism/strong predictivism 123–4, 126–7, 128–32, 136–41, 242

novelty 12–13, 139

   degrees of 186

   epistemic significance of 123–4, 140

   nature of 1–2

   pluralist evaluators and 33–8


objectivity 45–6

observation

   direct 95, 98

   observability 157–8

   observable consequences 138, 141

   statements 133, 159, 197, 236–7

observational acts 226, 227–9, 231, 237

   defined 222–3

Observations of Man (Hartley) 7

Ockham’s razor 127–8, 136–41, 243

Odling, W. 93–5

old evidence 45, 217–39

   Bayes’ theorem and 217–18, 221–2, 225, 237–8

   h-independent e-evidence 223–30, 230–2, 236

   overview 30

   quantitative problem 217–19, 221, 227, 230–2, 232–7, 242

overfitting data 24–6, 121


particle theory of light 59

Partington, J. R. 108

Paulos, John Allen 168

Peirce, C. S. 103

per se predictivism 67–8, 76–7, 107, 117, 191

   tempered 68–9

   thin 69, 97

periodic law (PL) 82–7, 96–121, 194

   arbitrary conjunction and 120

   confirmation theory and 116–19

   data overfitting and 121

   Km1 88–90, 97–101, 119

   Km2 90–4, 101–2, 119

   Km3 94–6, 102–4, 119

   Mendeleev’s background beliefs 87–96, 97–104, 107, 109–13, 119

   method-based theory and 114–16

   overview 28

   talent and 120

   tempered predictivism and 106–14

   thin unvirtuous predictivism 104–6

   thin virtuous predictivism 96–7

   truth-aim methodology and 120–1

Periodic Table of the Elements 49, 82, 87

pessimistic induction 163

Peters, D. 215

Pettenkofer, Max von 93

pharmacologists example 212–13

phlogiston theory 3, 5

Plato 190

pluralist evaluators 140, 171, 172

   agnostic 106–7

   background beliefs and 65–6

   experts 125

   novelty and 33–8

   tempered predictivism and 86, 109–11, 113, 191

   see also epistemic pluralism

Poisson, S. D. 8

Popper, Karl 9–15, 18, 45, 53, 62, 122, 128, 217, 240

Posterior Analytics (Aristotle) 222

posterior probabilities 71, 73–7, 78, 80, 85, 189

practical observability 158

predicting community 168–89

   coin flip example 4–5, 17, 19–21, 169–72, 172–3, 173–9, 181–4

   counterpredictors 181–4

   overview 29

   random factors 179–81, 181–2

   realism, pluralism, individualism 187–9

   size of 168–9, 185–7, 189, 241

   see also scientific communities (SCs)

‘Prediction and the Periodic Table’ (Scerri & Worrall) 83

predictions, risky 11–13

   see also successful predictions

predictivism

   defined 1–2, 5–7

   dissolution of 15–18, 23–4

   genetic theories of 19–24

   history of 7–24

   see also specific types

prestige 214–15

Priestley, Joseph 3

Principia (Newton) 7

prior probabilities 198

   background beliefs and 171, 191, 193, 210

   novel success and 193–4

   periodic law (PL) and 113, 114

   realism and 154, 163–5, 166, 187–9

   species of predictivism and 65, 67, 71, 75–7, 78, 80

private evidence 203–4

probabilistic jury example 205–10, 211

probabilities

   estimation 212–13, 216

   function 230, 233–5

   posting, defined 35–6

   see also posterior probabilities; prior probabilities

Prout’s hypothesis 93–4

pseudosciences 9–10, 12, 15, 62, 122, 240

Psillos 46

psychic example 3–4

psychoanalysis 9–10

Ptolemy 4, 8, 132, 152

publicity vs confirmation 109–10

pure consequentialism 9–15, 18

Putnam, H. 128


qualitative problem 217, 219

quantitative problem 217–19, 221, 227–8, 237, 239

   solutions 230–2, 232–7, 242

quantum mechanics 59

Quine, Q. V. O. 126


Ramsay, W. 84

random factors 21–2, 179–81, 181–2

rationality 32

Rayleigh, Lord John 84

realism 187–9

   miracle argument for 123–4, 126, 128–32, 136–41, 242

   overview 28–9

   retail 125, 163–5, 166

   scientific 49, 127

   wholesale 163–4, 166

   see also miraculous endorsement argument for realism

realists 124–6, 165

   /anti-realist debate 123–4, 126, 142, 163, 166, 186, 242–3

   epistemic pluralism and 166–7

Redhead, M. 133

redundant evidence 237

reflective experts 56–8, 110–11, 244

Reid, Thomas 55

relativity see general theory of relativity (GTR)

relevant candidate explanation 137

reliable methods see method-based theory

research

   programmes 12–14

   project reports 41

retail realism 125, 163–5, 166

retrograde motion 4

revolution, scientific 58

reward structure 42

risky predictions 11–13

Royal Society 43–4, 46, 82–4

Russell, Bertrand 217

Russia 108

Rutherford, Ernest 95


Salmon, W. 11

Sambursky, S. 89

sameness condition 128, 131, 137

scandium 82, 105, 110, 118

Scerri, E. 4, 83–4, 86, 93, 114, 118

Schaffer, S. 43, 46

Schaffner, K. 18

Schlesinger, G. 6, 132–3

scientific communities (SCs)

   defined 38–9

   epistemic pluralism and 39–51, 53–4, 56–7

   periodic law (PL) and 85, 96, 110, 114, 116, 118

   weighted averaging and 205, 211

   see also predicting community

scientific method 6–7, 22–3, 143, 144

scientific revolution 58, 194

scientific theories 9–13, 18

Scopes trial 50

sensory evidence 99

separability requirement 157–9

serendipity 115

Shapin, Steven 43, 46, 59

shared evidence 202–5, 206, 208, 211

simplicity 148–9, 152, 153, 155–7

skepticism 35–6, 45–6, 57, 125, 139, 164, 207

   periodic law (PL) and 83, 91, 94, 97–8, 101–6, 110–12

Sobel, M. 59

Sober, E. 24–5, 114, 121, 148, 241

Social History of Truth (Shapin) 59

social predictivism 241–2

Socrates 190

solar system, heliocentric theory of 4

Solov’ev, Y. I. 107

Sosa, E. 32

Soviet Union (USSR) 43, 46

spectroscopy 100, 115

Speelman, C. 56, 202

Spring, R. J. 100, 108

Stalin, Joseph 43

Stanford, P. K. 139

starlight bending 53

Stockman, A. C. 19, 22–3, 26, 114, 186–7, 241

Strathern, P. 92, 95

strong predictivism 24–7, 61, 124, 142

   miracle argument for 127, 128–32, 136–41

success predictivism 67–8, 76–7, 191

   tempered 69

   thin 69, 97

successful predictions 84, 87, 96, 118, 192–3

   glorious 3–4, 85

   see also novel confirmation; novel success

Suppe, F. 36

Sweden 95

synchronic problem 218

System of Logic (Mill) 9

systematic unity (Km2), elements and 90–4, 101–2, 119


take-off point 46, 145, 165

take-off theories 145–6, 147–55, 155–6, 163, 165

talent 120, 241

team-member experts 51–2

tempered predictivism 25–7, 61, 77–8, 216, 240

   epistemic pluralism and 33, 86, 191, 195

   per se 68–9

   success 69

   unvirtuous 68, 81, 106–14

   virtuous 68, 81, 106–14

temporal account of novelty 1–2

testability 9–10

testimony 32

theoretical account of novelty 1–2

theoretical hypotheses 134–5

theoretical inference and truth-conducivity (Km3) 94–6, 102–4, 119

theoretical knowledge 212–13

theory construction 3, 34–5, 114–16, 136

theory evaluation 5–6, 13, 15, 22, 26–7

   model of 38–51, 195–6

theory of history (Marx) 9

theory-free reasons 151, 152

theory-laden criteria 148, 150

thin predictivism 26–7, 61, 68, 77–8, 240, 242

   per se 69, 97

   social 189

   success 69, 97

   unvirtuous 81, 104–6

   virtuous 81, 96–7

Thomason, N. 6

Thorpe, Thomas 107

thought experiments see examples

track-record based method 212

triads, of elements 93

truth 130–1

   -aim methodology 120–1

   background beliefs and 131–2, 137–9, 144–6, 168–72, 187–9, 193–5, 241

   background theories and 187

   entailment facts 132–6, 137, 141, 170

   of predictivism 189

   truthlikeness 195

   values 207

   see also novel success, truth, empirical adequacy and

truth-conducivity 125, 147–9, 152–5, 156, 162, 163, 165

   theoretical inference (Km3) and 94–6, 102–4, 119


unconditional confirmation 18–19, 116–19

United States of America (USA) 83

unvirtuous predictivism 61–4, 87, 191, 193, 240–1

   overview 28

   realism and 161, 166

   tempered 81, 106–14

   thin 81, 104–6

uranium 105

use-novelty 34–5, 34n, 37, 114, 115, 128–9, 138, 141

USSR 43, 46


van Fraassen, B. 124, 126, 142, 146, 154, 156–8, 160, 219–20

van Spronson, J. W. 93

Velikovsky, Immanuel 185

Venable, F. P. 93

vertical inference 125–6, 153–4, 156

virtuous predictivism 64–9, 87, 191–2, 240–1

   in Bayesian terms 69–80

   miracle arguments and 124–5, 132, 142, 160–1, 166

   overview 28

   tempered 81, 106–14

   thin 81, 96–7

von Daniken, E. 47–8


Wagner, C. 208

Walton, D. 40, 55, 55–6, 245

wave theory 8–9, 59

weak predictivism 24–7, 61, 96, 131

   see also tempered predictivism; thin predictivism

weighted averaging 195–7, 197–205, 206–10, 210–11

   mixed weights 197, 212–14

   objections to 214–16

Whewell, William 8–9, 10, 13–14, 123, 128

White, R. 22, 114, 120–1, 241

wholesale realism 163–4, 166

‘Why I am not a Bayesian’ (Glymour) 217, 237

Winkler, C. A. 105

Worrall, John 4, 38, 83–4, 86

   confirmation theory and 18–19, 114, 116–17, 241


Zahar, E. 1, 13–14, 17, 132


© Cambridge University Press


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