The Paradox of Predictivism

Cambridge University Press
9780521879620 - The Paradox of Predictivism - by Eric Christian Barnes
Table of Contents

Acknowledgments			page ix
1	The paradox of predictivism		1
	1.1	Introduction	1
	1.2	Pumping up the intuition that prediction matters	2
	1.3	The paradox of predictivism	5
	1.4	A sketchy history of predictivism	7
	1.5	Weak and strong predictivism	24
	1.6	Overview of the argument of this book	27
2	Epistemic pluralism		31
	2.1	Introduction	31
	2.2	Novelty for pluralist evaluators	33
	2.3	A pluralist model of theory evaluation	38
	2.4	Expert pluralism	51
	2.5	Conclusion	58
3	Predictivism and the Periodic Table of the Elements		60
	3.1	Introduction	60
	3.2	Unvirtuous predictivism	61
	3.3	Virtuous predictivism	64
	3.4	Virtuous predictivism in Bayesian terms	69
	3.5	Four species of predictivism	80
	3.6	Mendeleev and the periodic law	82
	3.7	Mendeleev’s background beliefs	87
	3.8	Predictivism and the periodic law	96
	3.9	Conclusion	122
4	Miracle arguments and the demise of strong predictivism		123
	4.1	Introduction	123
	4.2	Neither truth nor empirical adequacy explain novel success	126
	4.3	The miraculous endorsement argument for realism	141
	4.4	The base rate fallacy	162
	4.5	The realist is a pluralist	166
5	The predicting community		168
	5.1	Introduction	168
	5.2	The coin flip example once again	169
	5.3	Eva meets Priscilla	172
	5.4	The community of predicting scientists	173
	5.5	A predictive paradox	179
	5.6	Counterpredictors	181
	5.7	Applications	185
	5.8	Realism, pluralism, and individualism	187
	5.9	Conclusion	189
6	Back to epistemic pluralism		190
	6.1	Introduction	190
	6.2	Toward a more rigorous model of pluralistic theory evaluation	195
	6.3	Scenario one: the mapmakers	197
	6.4	Scenario two: the probabilistic jury	205
	6.5	Applications for the two scenarios	210
	6.6	Mixed weights	212
	6.7	Weighting gone wrong	214
7	Postlude on old evidence		217
	7.1	Introduction	217
	7.2	H-independent e-evidence: Einstein in 1915	223
	7.3	Beyond the e-difference approach: a theistic solution to the quantitative problem	230
	7.4	Two solutions to the quantitative problem	232
	7.5	Implications for Bayesianism?	237
	7.6	Conclusion	238
8	A paradox resolved		240
	8.1	Introduction	240
	8.2	Confirmation theory	240
	8.3	The realist/anti-realist debate	242
	8.4	The methodology of science	243
Glossary			246
Bibliography			249
Index			258

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Eric Christian Barnes

Southern Methodist University, Texas

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