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Rethinking Derogations from Human Rights Treaties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 January 2021

Laurence R. Helfer
Laurence R. Helfer*
Affiliation:
Harry R. Chadwick, Sr. Professor of Law, Duke University; Co-editor-in-Chief, American Journal of International Law. For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Curtis Bradley, Alan Greene, Gerald Neuman, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, and the participants in a conference on COVID-19 and Public International Law at Trinity College Dublin School of Law. Olivia Daniels provided excellent research assistance.
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Abstract

Numerous governments have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by declaring states of emergency and restricting individual liberties protected by international law. However, many more states have adopted emergency measures than have formally derogated from human rights conventions. This Editorial Comment critically evaluates the existing system of human rights treaty derogations. It analyzes the system's problems, identifies recent developments that have exacerbated these problems, and proposes a range of reforms in five areas—embeddedness, engagement, information, timing, and scope.

Type
Editorial Comment
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 115 , Issue 1 , January 2021 , pp. 20 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © 2021 by The American Society of International Law

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References

1 “A derogation of a right or an aspect of a right is its complete or partial elimination as an international obligation.” McGoldrick, Dominic, The Interface Between Public Emergency Powers and International Law, 2 Int'l J. Const. L. 380, 383 (2004)Google Scholar.

2 Niall Coghlan, Dissecting Covid-19 Derogations, Verfassungsblog (May 5, 2020), at https://verfassungsblog.de/dissecting-covid-19-derogations. For the texts of all derogation notices, see Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No. 5), Notifications Under Article 15 of the Convention in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic, at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/webContent/62111354; Organization of American States, Recent Suspensions of Guarantees Regarding Multilateral Treaties, at http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_suspension_guarantees.asp; Depositary Notifications (CNs) by the Secretary-General (Search: Treaty Reference IV-4), at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/CNs.aspx?cnTab=tab2&clang=_en.

3 Alan Greene, States Should Declare a State of Emergency Using Article 15 ECHR to Confront the Coronavirus Pandemic, Strasbourg Observers (Apr. 1, 2020), at https://strasbourgobservers.com/2020/04/01/states-should-declare-a-state-of-emergency-using-article-15-echr-to-confront-the-coronavirus-pandemic.

4 See, e.g., Cassandra Emmons, International Human Rights Law and COVID-19 States of Emergency, Verfassungsblog (Apr. 25, 2020), at https://verfassungsblog.de/international-human-rights-law-and-covid-19-states-of-emergency; Martin Scheinin, COVID-19 Symposium: To Derogate or Not to Derogate?, Opinio Juris (Apr. 6, 2020), at https://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/06/covid-19-symposium-to-derogate-or-not-to-derogate.

5 See note 50 infra (reviewing treaties that contain derogations clauses or protect nonderogable rights).

6 See, e.g., High Commissioner for Human Rights, Compilation of Statements by Human Rights Treaty Bodies in the Context of COVID-19 (June 19, 2020), available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/COVID19/External_TB_statements_COVID19.pdf.

7 For a further discussion, see Laurence R. Helfer, Populism and International Human Rights Institutions: A Survival Guide, in Human Rights in a Time of Populism: Challenges and Responses 218 (Gerald L. Neuman ed., 2020).

8 For influential analyses, see Human Rights in Emergencies (Evan J. Criddle ed., 2016); Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (2006); Joan Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Human Rights During States of Emergency (1994).

9 A. W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention 477 (2001).

10 See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 Yale L.J. 1011 (2003); Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Victor V. Ramraj ed., 2008).

11 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Laurence R. Helfer & Christopher J. Fariss, Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties, 65 Int'l Org. 673, 675 (2011).

12 See treaty depository sources cited in note 2 supra.

13 Triestino Mariniello, Prolonged Emergency and Derogation of Human Rights: Why the European Court Should Raise Its Immunity System, 20 Ger. L.J. 46, 47 (2019).

14 Hafner-Burton, Helfer & Fariss, supra note 11, at 679 n. 1. Outside of Europe and the Americas, the ICCPR states parties that have the highest number of derogations are Algeria, Israel, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. Id. at 679.

15 See, e.g., Council of Europe, Guide on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Derogation in Time of Emergency (Dec. 31, 2019) [hereinafter Guide on Article 15 of the ECHR]; Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 8 (1987).

16 Aniceto Masferrer, Introduction: Security, Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Countering Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era, in Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency: Security and Human Rights in Countering Terrorism 1, 9 (Aniceto Masferrer ed., 2012).

17 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The Cloak and Dagger Game of Derogation, in Human Rights in Emergencies, supra note 8, at 126, 130–31, n. 23; Mariniello, supra note 13, at 51–54.

18 See, e.g., A and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05 (ECtHR Grand Chamber 2009).

19 As of early May 2020, twelve of twenty-four states parties (50%) had suspended guarantees under the ACHR, while ten of forty-seven states (21%) had derogated from the ECHR. Only fourteen of 173 states parties (8%) had derogated from the ICCPR, and all but two had also derogated from the regional conventions. Coghlan, supra note 2. In June and July 2020, Ethiopia, Namibia, Paraguay, Senegal, and Thailand filed notices of derogation from the ICCPR. Depository Notifications, supra note 2.

20 Databases collecting pandemic-related restrictions of human rights include: COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker, at https://www.icnl.org/covid19tracker; COVID-DEM Infohub, at https://www.democratic-decay.org/covid-dem; and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Pandemic Backsliding Project, at https://www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/pandemic-backsliding.

21 See Coghlan, supra note 2, Table 2.

22 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, COVID-19 and the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg Observers (Mar. 27, 2020), at https://strasbourgobservers.com/2020/03/27/covid-19-and-the-european-convention-on-human-rights.

23 The State's Positive Obligations Under IHRL During the Coronavirus Outbreak, Strasbourg Observers (May 5, 2020), at https://strasbourgobservers.com/2020/04/29/announcement-webinar-the-states-positive-obligations-under-ihrl-during-the-coronavirus-outbreak-5-may.

24 See, e.g., Nina Sun, Applying Siracusa: A Call for a General Comment on Public Health Emergencies, Health & Hum. Rts. J. Blog (Apr. 23, 2020), at https://www.hhrjournal.org/2020/04/applying-siracusa-a-call-for-a-general-comment-on-public-health-emergencies.

25 Selam Gebrekidan, For Autocrats, and Others, Coronavirus Is a Chance to Grab Even More Power, N.Y. Times (Mar. 30, 2020), at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/world/europe/coronavirus-governments-power.html.

26 Lisa Reinsberg, Mapping the Proliferation of Human Rights Bodies’ Guidance on COVID-19 Mitigation, Just Security (May 22, 2020), at https://www.justsecurity.org/70170/mapping-the-proliferation-of-human-rights-bodies-guidance-on-covid-19-mitigation; see also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Res. No. 4/2020 Human Rights of Persons with COVID-19 (July 27, 2020), available at https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/Resolution-4-20-en.pdf.

27 See, e.g., UNHRC, Statement on Derogations from the Covenant in Connection with the COVID-19 Pandemic, para. 2, CCPR/C/128/2 (Apr. 24, 2020) [hereinafter UNHRC COVID Statement].

28 ECHR, Art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS 5. Similar formulations appear in: ACHR, Art. 27, June 27, 1981, 21 ILM 58; and ICCPR, Art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171.

29 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, The Bound Executive: Emergency Powers During the Pandemic (Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2020-52, University of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 747, July 26, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3608974.

30 Only Armenia references derogations in its constitution. Const. of Armenia, ch. 2, Art. 76 (1995) (rev. 2015) (providing for temporary suspension of certain human rights “subject to the international commitments undertaken with respect to derogations from commitments in emergency situations or during martial law”). A few other constitutions include safeguards similar to treaty derogation clauses but do not mention derogations. See, e.g., Const. of Georgia, ch. 8, Art. 71(4) (1995) (rev. 2018); Const. of Mexico, ch. 1, Art. 29 (1917) (rev. 2015).

31 Hafner-Burton, Helfer & Fariss, supra note 11, at 675.

32 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, para. 27, UN Doc. A/HRC/37/52 (Feb. 28, 2018) (report by Fionnuala Ní Aoláin) [hereinafter Ní Aoláin Report].

33 UNHRC, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency, para. 17, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) [hereinafter General Comment No. 29].

34 Jaime Oràà, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law 77 (1992).

35 Coghlan, supra note 2.

36 Ní Aoláin Report, supra note 32, para. 26.

37 Kushtrim Istrefi & Stefan Salomon, Entrenched Derogations from the European Convention on Human Rights and the Emergence of Non-judicial Supervision of Derogations, 22 Austrian Rev. Int'l & Eur. L. 7, 22–23 (2017).

38 E.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, para. 207 (ECtHR 1978) (“By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it.”).

39 See Hafner-Burton, Helfer & Fariss, supra note 11, at 697–701 (analyzing “serial derogations” by Colombia, Israel, Turkey, Venezuela, and the United Kingdom); Marshall v. United Kingdom, App. No. 41571/98 (ECtHR 2001) (upholding detention without judicial review in reliance on a derogation filed ten years earlier).

40 ECHR, supra note 28, Art. 15; ACHR, supra note 28, Art. 27; ICCPR, supra note 28, Art. 4.

41 Derogations must also not violate a state's other international law obligations. See Part III(B) infra.

42 Guide on Article 15 of the ECHR, supra note 15, paras. 21–22.

43 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 38, para. 214; Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, Herd Immunity and Lockdown: The Legitimacy of National Policies Against the Pandemic and Judicial Self-Restraint by the ECtHR, Strasbourg Observers (May 11, 2020), at https://strasbourgobservers.com/2020/05/11/herd-immunity-and-lockdown-the-legitimacy-of-national-policies-against-the-pandemic-and-judicial-self-restraint-by-the-ecthr.

44 Baş v. Turkey, App. No. 66448/17, para. 224 (ECtHR 2020).

45 General Comment No. 29, supra note 33, para. 5.

46 Id., para. 15; see also UNHRC, General Comment No. 35, Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), para. 67, CCPR/C/GC/35 (2014) (“The procedural guarantees protecting liberty of person may never be made subject to measures of derogation that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights.”).

47 Expert studies on derogations and emergency measures include: Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the [ICCPR], UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (1985); Richard Lillich, Current Developments: The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency, 79 AJIL 1072 (1985). The International Law Association is expected to issue a report on the topic. See ILA Committee on Human Rights in Times of Emergency, at https://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committees.

48 Hurst Hannum, Rescuing Human Rights: A Radically Moderate Approach 58 (2019).

49 Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 4, Sept. 15, 1994; European Social Charter (Revised), Art. F, May 3, 1996, ETS 163; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Art. 19, Feb. 1, 1995, ETS 157; European Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level, Art. 9, Feb. 5, 1992, ETS 144.

50 Second Optional Protocol to the [ICCPR] Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 UNTS 414; Protocol No. 6 to the [ECHR] concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Mar. 1, 1985, ETS 114; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Dec. 15, 1989, UN Doc. A/Res/44/144; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, OAS TS 67; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, Dec. 20, 2006; Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994; see also Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Art. 11, Jan. 24, 2007, UN Doc. A/Res/61/106 (“States Parties shall take … all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and the occurrence of natural disasters.”).

51 This number is based on a comprehensive collection of international instruments by the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/ainstls1.htm. It excludes from that collection nonbinding documents as well as treaties on humanitarian law, labor law, and counterterrorism.

52 ECHR, supra note 28, Art. 15; ACHR, supra note 28, Art. 27; ICCPR, supra note 28, Art. 4.

53 UNHRC COVID Statement, supra note 27, para. 2(d).

54 CEDAW, Guidance Note on CEDAW and COVID-19, para. 3 (Apr. 22, 2020) (noting increase in domestic violence during the pandemic and asserting that states “have a due diligence obligation to prevent and protect women from, and hold perpetrators accountable for” such violence).

55 For additional examples, see Laurence R. Helfer, Pushback Against Supervisory Systems: Lessons for the ILO from International Human Rights Institutions, in ILO 100 – Law for Social Justice 257, 260–62 (George Politakis Tomi Kohiyama & Thomas Lieby eds., 2019).

56 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law 40 (2009) (quoting Philip Alston & Gerald Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 156, 217 (1987)). ICESCR Article 4 permits states parties to impose “only . . . such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”

57 Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AJIL 462, 491 (2004).

58 E.g., ESCR Committee, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, para. 42, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000).

59 E.g., ESCR Committee, Statement on Poverty and the ICESCR, para. 18, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.59 (2001).

60 Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The Integration of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 31 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2008).

61 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, para. 162 (2005).

62 Thomas M. Antkowiak, A “Dignified Life” and the Resurgence of Social Rights, 18 Nw. J. Hum Rts. 1, 4 (2020).

63 UNHRC, General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the [ICCPR] on the Right to Life, CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018).

64 Id., para. 26; see also Sarah Joseph, Extending the Right to Life Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General Comment 36, 19 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 347, 356–59 (2019).

65 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, App. No. 25965/04, para. 282 (ECtHR 2010).

66 Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, para. 101 (ECtHR Grand Chamber 2001).

67 Volodina v. Russia, App. No. 41261/17, para. 77 (ECtHR 2019).

68 Ní Aoláin, supra note 17, at 127–28.

69 Laurence R. Helfer, Flexibility in International Agreements, in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations 175, 186 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013); Gerald L. Neuman, Constrained Derogation in Positive Human Rights Regimes, in Human Rights in Emergencies, supra note 8, at 15, 21 (describing derogations as a “safety valve”).

70 Hafner-Burton, Helfer & Fariss, supra note 11, at 674–75.

71 European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions and Reports on States of Emergency, CDL-PI(2020)003, at 5 (Apr. 16, 2020).

72 See Gross & Ní Aolain, supra note 8, at 264–68, 324–25.

73 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. Legal. Stud. 83 (2002); Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (2009).

74 For a rare example of a domestic state of emergency law that requires derogation, see Act No. 21-18 of 25 May 2018 (Dominican Republic), Art. 17, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2020/CN.327.2020-Eng.pdf.

75 Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Eur., Res. 2209 (2018): State of Emergency – Proportionality Issues Concerning Derogations Under Article 15 of the ECHR, paras. 20(1)–20(3) (Apr. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Res. 2209].

76 Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Eur., Doc. 14506, Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, para. 103 (Feb. 27, 2018).

77 Kushtrim Istrefi, Supervision of Derogations in the Wake of COVID-19: A Litmus Test for the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, EJIL:Talk! (Apr. 6, 2020), at https://www.ejiltalk.org/supervision-of-derogations-in-the-wake-of-covid-19-a-litmus-test-for-the-secretary-general-of-the-council-of-europe.

78 Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Eur., Committee of Ministers, Reply to Rec. 2125 (2018), para. 6, Doc. 14770 (Dec. 5, 2018).

79 Letter from Council of Europe Secretary General Marija Pejčinović Burić to Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary (Mar. 24, 2020), at https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/secretary-general-writes-to-victor-orban-regarding-covid-19-state-of-emergency-in-hungary.

80 The Inter-American Commission regularly issues precautionary measures in response to serious and urgent human rights violations, and it has done so during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Int'l Justice Resource Ctr., Inter-American Commission Issues Precautionary Measures as COVID-19 Threatens Indigenous Communities (July 22, 2020), at https://ijrcenter.org/2020/07/22/inter-american-commission-issues-precautionary-measures-as-covid-19-threatens-indigenous-communities. The UNHRC has occasionally adopted special decisions requesting, as a matter of urgency, a report on the human rights situation in a state party. In future, both procedures could be applied to review derogations.

81 Joan Hartman, Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4 Derogation Provision, 7 Hum. Rts. Q. 89, 101 (1985).

82 General Comment No. 29, supra note 33, para. 17.

83 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Rule of Law Checklist (Mar. 11–12, 2016), available at https://www.venice.coe.int/images/SITE%20IMAGES/Publications/Rule_of_Law_Check_List.pdf.

84 See sources cited in note 20, supra.

85 ACHR Article 27 requires states to notify “the date set for the termination” of a suspension. In practice, states regularly inform the OAS when they terminate suspensions. See OAS, Recent Suspensions of Guarantees, supra note 2.

86 See, e.g., Kouroutakis, Antonios & Ranchordás, Sofia, Snoozing Democracy: Sunset Clauses, De-juridification, and Emergencies, 25 Minn. J. Int'l L. 29 (2016)Google Scholar; Kuyper, Jonathan W., Designing Institutions for Global Democracy: Flexibility Through Escape Clauses and Sunset Provisions, 6 Eth. & Glob. Pol. 195 (2013)Google Scholar.

87 Kushtrim Istrefi, To Notify or Not to Notify: Derogations from Human Rights Treaties, Opinio Juris (Apr. 18, 2020), at https://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/18/to-notify-or-not-to-notify-derogations-from-human-rights-treaties.

88 For further discussion, see Helfer, Laurence R., Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 125 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

89 For example, the IACtHR may adopt provisional measures “in cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons.” ACHR, supra note 28, Art. 63.2.

90 Resolución de la Presidenta de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Adopción de Medidas Urgentes, Caso Vélez Loor v. Panamá (May 26, 2020), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/velez_se_01.pdf .

91 Melina Girardi Fachin & Bruna Nowak, Pandemic Rulings: Between Dialogues and Shortcuts at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Int'l J. Const. L. Blog (July 9, 2020), at http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/07/pandemic-rulings-between-dialogues-and-shortcuts-at-the-inter-american-court-of-human-rights.

92 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, What Can the European Court of Human Rights Do in the Time of Crisis?, Strasbourg Observers (Apr. 14, 2020), at https://strasbourgobservers.com/2020/04/14/what-can-the-european-court-of-human-rights-do-in-the-time-of-crisis.

93 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 16 to the [ECHR] (Oct. 2, 2013), at https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016800d383e.

94 ACHR, supra note 28, Art. 22(3). The ICCPR and ECHR contain similar clauses.

95 Res. 2209, supra note 75, para. 4; see also UNHRC, General Comment No. 37 (Article 21: Right of Peaceful Assembly), para. 96, CCPR/C/GC/37 (2020) (“State parties must not rely on derogation from the right of peaceful assembly if they can attain their objectives by imposing restrictions in terms of article 21.”).

96 Greene, supra note 3.

97 Kuimov v. Russia, App. No. 32147/04, para. 96 (ECtHR 2009).

98 Helfer, supra note 55, at 260.

99 See, e.g., Ali, Abdi Jibril, Derogation from Constitutional Rights and Its Implication Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 17 L., Democracy & Dev. 78, 82–90 (2013)Google Scholar; Amrei Müller, The Relationship Between Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Humanitarian Law 111–48 (2013).

100 See Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 14553/89, 14554/89, paras. 68–73 (ECtHR 1993) (rejecting the claim that a derogation from the ECHR was invalid under the treaty's savings clause because the government failed to “officially proclaim[]” an emergency as required by the ICCPR's derogation clause).