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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 October 2023
One of the most important developments in international law for the protection of displaced women and girls—the implied non-refoulement obligation in the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has received little scholarly or jurisprudential attention. This Article presents, for the first time, a doctrinal analysis of the full corpus of asylum complaints decided by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (Committee). It analyzes the early development of a prohibition on return to real, personal, and foreseeable risks of serious forms of discrimination against women; highlights critical shortcomings in the Committee's asylum practice; identifies key areas for improvement; and reflects on the Committee's as-yet-unrealized potential to contribute to international law in this area.
This Article is based on a paper presented at the Seventh Annual Conference of the Refuge Law Initiative at the University of London, United Kingdom (June 21–23, 2023). The author would like to acknowledge and thank Scientia Professor Jane McAdam AO, Justin Gleeson SC, Natasha Yacoub, Brian Gorlick, Dr. Tristan Harley, and Associate Professor Daniel Ghezelbash for their support and valuable input on earlier drafts, and the reviewers for their thoughtful comments.
1 Charlesworth, Hilary, Chinkin, Christine & Wright, Shelley, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AJIL 613 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a select list of earlier works on this topic, see Ogg, Kate & Rimmer, Susan Harris, Introduction to the Research Handbook on Feminist Engagement with International Law, in Research Handbook on Feminist Engagement with International Law 5 (Ogg, Kate & Rimmer, Susan Harris eds., 2019)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Id. at 621.
3 Id. at 643.
4 Whereas “‘sex’ here refers to biological differences between men and women . . . ‘gender’ here refers to socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and society's social and cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting in hierarchical relationships between women and men and in the distribution of power and rights favouring men and disadvantaging women.” CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties Under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, para. 5, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (2010). Both concepts, as well as CEDAW's reinforcement of the man/woman binary, have been subject to feminist critique. Otto, Dianne, Queering Gender [Identity] in International Law, 33 Nord. J. Hum. Rts. 299 (2015)Google Scholar. This Article acknowledges that “gender” and “women” are not synonymous.
5 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 137. E.g., Indra, Doreen, Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience, 6 Refuge 3 (1987)Google Scholar; Greatbatch, Jacqueline, The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse, 1 Int'l J. Refugee L. 518 (1989)Google Scholar; Johnsson, Anders B., The International Protection of Women Refugees: A Summary of Principal Problems and Issues, 1 Int'l J. Refugee L. 221 (1989)Google Scholar.
6 Arbel, Efrat, Dauvergne, Catherine & Millbank, Jenni, Introduction: Gender in Refugee Law: From the Margins to the Centre, in Gender in Refugee Law: From the Margins to the Centre 3 (Arbel, Efrat, Dauvergne, Catherine & Millbank, Jenni eds., 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 Edwards, Alice, Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with International Refugee Law and Policy 1950–2010, 29 Refugee Surv. Q. 21, 25–31 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kneebone, Susan, Women Within the Refugee Construct: “Exclusionary Inclusion” in Policy and Practice – the Australian Experience, 17 Int'l J. Refugee L. 7, 26–37 (2005)Google Scholar; Michelle Foster, Why We Are Not There Yet: The Particular Challenge of “Particular Social Group,” in Gender in Refugee Law, supra note 6.
8 Macklin, Audrey, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 25 (1998)Google Scholar; Mullally, Siobhán, Domestic Violence Asylum Claims and Recent Developments in International Human Rights Law: A Progress Narrative?, 60 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 459 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Anker, Deborah, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the “Domestic” Sphere: The Non-state Actor Question, 15 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 391 (2001)Google Scholar.
9 Kneebone, supra note 7; Mullally, supra note 8, at 478–80.
10 Sunny Kim, Gender-Related Persecution: A Legal Analysis of Gender Bias in Asylum Law, 2 Am. U. J. Gender, Social Pol'y & L. 107 (1994).
11 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Gender Guidelines].
12 E.g., United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, Gender Guidelines: Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, Memorandum from Phyllis Coven (1995); Canada Immigration and Refugee Board, Guideline 4: Gender Considerations in Proceedings Before the Immigration and Refugee Board (updated 2022); United Kingdom Home Office, Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim (updated 2018).
13 Arbel, Dauvergne & Millbank, supra note 6, at 9, 11; Shauna Labman & Catherine Dauvergne, Evaluating Canada's Approach to Gender-Related Persecution: Revisiting and Re-embracing “Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories,” in Gender in Refugee Law, supra note 6; Christel Querton, Gender and the Boundaries of International Refugee Law: Beyond the Category of Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 37 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 379 (2019); Catherine Dauvergne, Women in Refugee Jurisprudence, in The Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law 728–29 (Cathryn Costello, Michelle Foster & Jane McAdam eds., 2021); Adrienne Anderson & Michelle Foster, A Feminist Appraisal of International Refugee Law, in The Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law, supra, at 66–69.
14 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. The principle of non-refoulement derives from international refugee, human rights, humanitarian, and customary law, and “prohibits States from transferring or removing individuals from their jurisdiction or effective control when there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of irreparable harm upon return, including persecution, torture, ill-treatment or other serious human rights violations.” OHCHR, Technical Note: The Principle of Non-refoulement Under International Human Rights Law (2018).
15 M.N.N. v. Denmark, para. 8.10, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/55/D/33/2011 (2013) [hereinafter M.N.N.].
16 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the Gender-Related Dimensions of Refugee Status, Asylum, Nationality and Statelessness of Women, para. 23, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/32 (2014) [hereinafter General Recommendation 32].
17 A further two states, the United States of America and Palau, are signatories to but have not ratified CEDAW.
18 Catherine Briddick, Unprincipled and Unrealised: CEDAW and Discrimination Experienced in the Context of Migration Control, 22 Int'l J. Discrimination L. 224 (2022).
19 Başak Çalı, Cathryn Costello & Stewart Cunningham, Hard Protection Through Soft Courts? Non-refoulement Before the United Nations Treaty Bodies, 21 Ger. L.J. 355 (2020).
20 See also Sarah Scott Ford, Nordic Migration Cases Before the UN Treaty Bodies: Pathways of International Accountability?, 91 Nord. J. Int'l L. 44 (2022).
21 Loveday Hodson, Women's Rights and the Periphery: CEDAW's Optional Protocol, 25 Eur. J. Int'l L. 561, 561 (2014). See also Andrew Byrnes, The “Other” Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 14 Yale J. Int'l L. 3 (1989).
22 Christopher McCrudden, Why Do National Court Judges Refer to Human Rights Treaties? A Comparative International Law Analysis of CEDAW, 109 AJIL 534, 535 (2015).
23 Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright, supra note 1, at 643.
24 Under human rights law, non-refoulement cases may arise outside the asylum context, for example in relation to extradition. However, the only relevant cases to come before the Committee to date have involved asylum seekers: thirty-five cases involved women whose asylum applications had been assessed and refused at the national level and two involved removal to other European States under the Dublin system.
25 N.S.F. v. United Kingdom, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/38/D/10/2005 (2007); Zhen Zhen Zheng v. Netherlands, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/42/D/15/2007 (2008); Guadalupe Herrera Rivera v. Canada, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/50/D/26/2010 (2011); M.P.M. v. Canada, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/51/D/25/2010 (2012); M.N.N., supra note 15; M.S. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/55/D/40/2012 (2013); M.E.N. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/55/D/35/2011 (2013); N. v. Netherlands, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/57/D/39/2012 (2014); Y.C. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/59/D/59/2013 (2014); S.O. v. Canada, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/59/D/49/2013 (2014); Y.W. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/60/D/51/2013 (2015); M.C. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/62/D/56/2013 (2015); A. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/62/D/53/2013 (2015); N.Q. and S.A. v. the United Kingdom and N. Ireland, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/63/D/62/2013 (2016); V. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/64/D/57/2013 (2016); P.H.A. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/65/D/61/2013 (2016); K.S. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/65/D/71/2014 (2016); E.W. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/66/D/54/2013 (2017); A.M. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/67/D/77/2014 (2017); F.F.M. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/67/D/70/2014 (2017); N.M. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/67/D/78/2014 (2017); S.J.A. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/68/D/79/2014 (2017); A.S. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/69/D/80/2015 (2018); S.F.A. and H.H.M. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/69/D/85/2015 (2018); H.D. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/70/D/76/2014 (2018); M.K.M. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/71/D/81/2015 (2018); S.A.O. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/71/D/101/2016 (2018); A.R.I. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/72/D/96/2015 (2019); R.S.A.A. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/73/D/86/2015 (2019); A.N.A. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/73/D/94/2015 (2019); K.I.A. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/74/D/82/2015 (2019); F.H.A. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/108/2016 (2020); Rahma Abdi-Osman, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/76/D/122/2017 (2020); L.O. v. Switzerland, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/76/D/124/2018 (2020); M.A. v. Switzerland, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/80/D/145/2019 (2021); D.N.S. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/81/D/144/2019 (2022); Bandboni v. Switzerland, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/85/D/173/2021 (2023) [hereinafter all cases are referred to by the author's pseudonym or surname].
26 GBV is “violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.” General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, para. 6, UN Doc. A/47/38 (1992).
27 Briddick, supra note 18, at 230.
28 Id. at 226, 234 (emphasis in original).
29 UN Fourth World Conference on Women, Progress Achieved in the Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Report by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, para. 16, UN Doc. A/CONF.177/7 (June 21, 1995).
30 General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 26, para. 1; Alice Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law 179–81 (2010).
31 CEDAW, supra note 14, Arts. 18, 21.
32 Byrnes, supra note 21, at 57.
33 Id. at 56–65; Theodor Meron, Editorial Comments: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Prohibition of Discrimination Against Women, 84 AJIL 213 (1990).
34 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc. A/RES/54/4, 2131 UNTS 83 (Oct. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
35 Hodson, supra note 21, at 564.
36 Optional Protocol, supra note 34, Art. 3.
37 Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rule 69(8), UN Doc. HRI/GEN/3/Rev.3 (May 28, 2008) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure]. The Working Methods also refer to case rapporteurs carrying out “necessary research” in preparing draft Views on admissibility and merits. Working Methods of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and Its Working Group on Individual Communications Received Under the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW Convention, para. 22 (Nov. 17, 2020), at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/WorkingMethods.docx [hereinafter Working Methods].
38 For comparable critique of other UNTBs, see Andrew Byrnes, An Effective Complaints Procedure in the Context of International Human Rights Law, in The UN Human Rights Treaty System in the 21st Century 139 (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000); Lutz Oette, The UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Impact and Future, in International Human Rights Institutions, Tribunals, and Courts (Gerd Oberleitner ed., 2018).
39 Nigel Rodley, Duplication and Divergence in the Work of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies: A Perspective from a Treaty Body Member, 105 ASIL Proc. 512, 517 (2011).
40 Frans Viljoen, Fact-Finding by UN Human Rights Complaints Bodies: Analysis and Suggested Reforms, 8 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 49, 65 (2004).
41 Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the Human Rights Committee?, in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring 15, 29, 43 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
42 Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, Rule 62; Working Methods, supra note 37, para. 1. Earlier versions of the Committee's Working Methods are not readily available.
43 Working Methods, supra note 37, para. 22.
44 Id., paras. 23–24.
45 Optional Protocol, supra note 34, Art. 7(2).
46 Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, Rules 70(3), 72(6). Individual opinions were annexed to only two out of the thirty-six asylum cases decided by the Committee between 2007 and 2022. Zheng, supra note 25; M.E.N., supra note 25.
47 Steiner, supra note 41, at 43 (on comparable Views of the Human Rights Committee).
48 See Geir Ulfstein, Individual Complaints, in UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy 92–103 (Helen Keller & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012); Machiko Kanetake, UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies Before Domestic Courts, 67 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 201 (2017).
49 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 33: The Obligations of States Parties Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, para. 11, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (2009).
50 Id., para. 13; Başak Çalı & Alexandre Skander Galand, Strengthening and Enhancing the Effective Functioning of the UN Human Rights Treaty Body System Individual Complaints Mechanisms 2 (2020).
51 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Rep. Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 2010 ICJ Rep. 639, 664 (Nov. 30) (in relation to the Human Rights Committee).
52 Rosanne van Alebeek & André Nollkaemper, The Legal Status of Decisions by Human Rights Treaty Bodies in National Law, in UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies, supra note 48; Kanetake, supra note 48, at 217.
53 Çalı, Costello & Cunningham, supra note 19, at 356; Oette, supra note 38, at 11.
54 See, e.g., Comments of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Draft General Comment 33, The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 3 (Oct. 17, 2008), at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GC33/UK.doc.
55 See text accompanying notes 312–315 infra.
56 Two earlier asylum cases, N.S.F. and Zheng, were ruled inadmissible for failing to exhaust domestic remedies. A separate dissenting opinion by three Committee members in Zheng persuasively critiqued the majority views for failing to acknowledge the author's intersectional discrimination.
57 Rivera, supra note 25, paras. 4.1, 4.4; M.P.M., supra note 25, para. 4.11; M.N.N., supra note 15, paras. 4.5–4.9; M.S., supra note 25, paras. 4.4–4.13; M.E.N., supra note 25, paras. 4.6–4.9; N., supra note 25, paras. 4.2–4.3.
58 M.N.N., supra note 15, para. 4.9.
59 Id., para. 4.8 (emphasis added); M.E.N., supra note 25, para. 4.8; M.S., para. 4.10.
60 M.N.N., supra note 15, para. 4.9; M.E.N., supra note 25, para. 4.9; M.S., supra note 25, para. 4.13.
61 M.E.N., supra note 25, para. 4.8.
62 M.N.N., supra note 15, para. 8.7. M.N.N. was ultimately ruled inadmissible on the basis that the author had failed to sufficiently substantiate her claim that removal to Uganda would expose her to a real, personal, and foreseeable risk of GBV.
63 Id., para. 8.8.
64 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85.
65 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171. This point had already been recognized in various international fora. See UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11; Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, para. 22, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2008).
66 General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, paras. 10, 15.
67 M.N.N., supra note 15, para. 8.10; M.E.N., supra note 25, para. 8.9 (emphasis added).
68 M.N.N., supra note 15, para. 8.10.
69 General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, para. 22.
70 Id., para. 23 (emphasis added).
71 A., supra note 25, para. 9.8; R.S.A.A., supra note 25, para. 8.9; Bandboni, supra note 25, para. 7.9.
72 Y.C., supra note 25, para. 4.19 (emphasis added); Y.W., supra note 25, para. 6.4; M.C., supra note 25, para. 4.7; A., supra note 25, para. 6.3.
73 Y.C., supra note 25, para. 4.19 (emphasis added); Y.W., supra note 25, para. 6.5; M.C., supra note 25, para. 4.7; A., supra note 25, para. 6.3.
74 Torture Convention, supra note 64, Art. 1.
75 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11, para. 19 (emphasis added).
76 General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, para. 27 (emphasis added).
77 As of 2023, seven states (Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, the Cook Islands, Malaysia, the Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, and Singapore) are parties to the CEDAW but not the Refugee Convention or Protocol, ICCPR, or Torture Convention. More than fifty other states are parties to the CEDAW and some but not all of the Refugee Convention as modified by the 1967 Protocol, ICCPR, and Torture Convention.
78 The prohibition on return to persecution, torture, and arbitrary deprivation of life is also recognized as a rule of customary international law, and thus binding on all states regardless of treaty ratification or accession. General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, para. 18.
79 Comparing the scope of non-refoulement obligations is only part of the comparison of protection under international refugee and human rights law. Whereas the Refugee Convention provides a legal status with various rights and protections, the prohibitions on refoulement under human rights treaties, narrowly construed, are limited to imposing an obligation of non-removal on the state. However, various scholars have sought to define the content of, or rights that follow from, “complementary protection” under human rights law, with McAdam arguing that “beneficiaries of complementary protection are entitled to the same legal status as [Refugee] Convention refugees.” Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law 197 (2007); see also Jason M. Pobjoy, Treating Like Alike: The Principle of Non-discrimination as a Tool to Mandate the Equal Treatment of Refugees and Beneficiaries of Complementary Protection, 34 Melb. U. L. Rev. 181 (2010); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law 350 (4th ed. 2021). In practice, some states afford beneficiaries of complementary protection a domestic legal status which is generally equivalent to that of a refugee, while others confer only a lesser status or no status: Id. at 392–96. On “subsidiary protection” and the “two-tier protection regime” in the European Union (EU), see: Jean-François Durieux, The Vanishing Refugee: How EU Asylum Law Blurs the Specificity of Refugee Protection, in The Global Reach of European Refugee Law 246–53 (Hélène Lambert, Jane McAdam & Maryellen Fullerton eds., 2013); Minos Mouzourakis, Refugee Rights Subsiding? Europe's Two-Tier Protection Regime and its Effect on the Rights of Beneficiaries, AIDA & ECRE (2016).
80 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 79, 244–45; Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Non-refoulement No. 6 (XXVIII) (1977).
81 On the distinction between the (negative) obligation of non-refoulement and the (positive) obligations of refugee protection more broadly, see Jean-François Durieux, Three Asylum Paradigms, 20 Int'l J. Minority & Group Rts. 147, 167–69 (2013). On the “siphoning” of refugee claims into human rights claims, see Cathryn Costello, The Search of the Outer Edges of Non-refoulement in Europe: Exceptionality and Flagrant Breaches, in Human Rights and the Refugee Definition: Comparative Legal Practice and Theory 207–08 (David Cantor & Bruce Burson eds., 2016).
82 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11, para. 6.
83 Francesco Maiani, The Concept of “Persecution” in Refugee Law: Indeterminacy, Context-Sensitivity, and the Quest for a Principled Approach, in Les Dossiers du Grihl, Hors-Série No. 4, (Feb. 28, 2010), at https://journals.openedition.org/dossiersgrihl/3896.
84 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 79, at 67–71; UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection: Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, paras. 51–60, UN Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.4 (2019) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook]; Hugo Storey, What Constitutes Persecution? Towards a Working Definition, 26 Int'l J. Refugee L. 272 (2014); Mirko Bagaric & Penny Dimopoulos, Discrimination as the Touchstone of Persecution in Refugee Law, 3 J. Migration & Refugee Issues 14 (2007).
85 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11, para. 14; UNHCR Handbook, supra note 84, paras. 51–55.
86 Various serious harms which predominantly or exclusively affect women have become well-established categories of persecution. Dauvergne, supra note 13, at 732–33.
87 Foster, supra note 7; UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11, paras 22–34.
88 James C. Hathaway, The Causal Nexus in International Refugee Law, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 207, 209 (2002).
89 Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 265, 339 (2002); James Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status 375–76 (2d ed. 2014); Dauvergne, supra note 13, at 734–35. See also text accompanying notes 382–386 infra.
90 Comparing non-refoulement under international refugee and human rights law generally, Chetail argues that the relevance of the former's subordination to the five grounds of persecution “should not be overestimated, for it can be counterbalanced by a cogent interpretation of the grounds of persecution with due regard to the object and purpose of the [Refugee] Convention.” Vincent Chetail, Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations Between Refugee Law and Human Rights Law, in Human Rights and Immigration 36 (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2014).
91 Torture Convention, supra note 64, Arts. 1, 16.
92 Kindler v. Canada, para. 6.2, UN Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1993); Ng v. Canada, para. 6.2, UN Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1993); Cox v. Canada, para. 16.1, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993 (1994).
93 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31[80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, para. 12, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004).
94 Kaba v. Canada, para. 10.1, UN Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1465/2006 (2010).
95 Çalı, Costello, and Cunningham observe that the standard of proof applied by all UNTBs is broadly similar. Çalı, Costello & Cunningham, supra note 19, at 374.
96 Kaba, supra note 94.
97 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 79, at 380–387.
98 Çalı, Costello & Cunningham, supra note 19, at 367; see also Michelle Foster, Non-refoulement on the Basis of Socio-Economic Deprivation: The Scope of Complementary Protection in International Human Rights Law, N.Z. L. Rev. 257 (2009); Costello, supra note 81, at 197–205.
99 Çalı, Costello & Cunningham, supra note 19, at 366–67.
100 But see Chetail who argues that “identifying the specific human rights triggering the principle of non-refoulement remains a largely academic and arguably sterile exercise” because “[s]erious violations of any human rights would prompt the correlative prohibition of refoulement, as soon as the gravity of the prospective violation amounts to degrading treatment.” Chetail, supra note 90, at 35.
101 For a recent EU case involving return to “values, norms and conduct that do not afford women and girls the freedoms that they enjoyed in the Netherlands,” see Opinion of Advocate General Collins, K. and L. v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, C-646/21, paras. 19–48 (Ct. Just. EU July 13, 2023).
102 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11, para. 8.
103 Id., paras. 4, 5, 8, 22.
104 General Comment No. 2, supra note 65, para. 22; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality of Rights Between Men and Women), para. 17, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000).
105 M.E.N., supra note 25, para. 2.5.
106 Id., para. 5.6.
107 Id., para. 4.10.
108 M.E.N., supra note 25, individual opinion (dissenting), Dubravka Šimonović, C'ee Memb., joined by Halperin-Kaddari, Neubauer & Pimentel, C'ee Membs., para. 4 [hereinafter M.E.N. Joint Dissent].
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id., para. 12.
112 N., supra note 25, para. 6.4.
113 M.E.N. Joint Dissent, supra note 108, para. 11.
114 Id., para. 12.
115 Id., para. 13.
116 M.E.N., supra note 25, paras. 4.3, 6.2.
117 Id., para. 8.3.
118 M.E.N. Joint Dissent, supra note 108, paras. 13–14.
119 Id., para. 15.
120 Id., para. 16.
121 General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, para. 25.
122 Id., para. 15.
123 Id., para. 16.
124 See also Y.C., supra note 25, paras. 5.1, 6.4; Y.W., supra note 25, paras. 2.1, 8.8.
125 N., supra note 25, para. 2.3.
126 Id., para. 2.5.
127 Id., para. 4.11.
128 Id., para. 6.9.
129 Id., para. 6.8.
130 Id., para. 6.9.
131 Id., para. 4.12.
132 Id.
133 Id., para. 4.11.
134 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Mongolia, para. 25, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/MNG/CO/7 (2008).
135 Id.
136 N., supra note 25, paras. 5.6–5.7.
137 Id., para. 6.10.
138 S.O., supra note 25, paras. 2.1, 9.6.
139 General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, para. 29.
140 A., supra note 25, para. 2.2.
141 Id., para. 9.4.
142 Id., para. 7.2.
143 Id., para. 7.5.
144 Id., paras. 4.2, 6.2, 6.4.
145 Id., paras. 9.2, 9.5.
146 Id., para. 9.3.
147 Id.
148 Id., para. 9.4.
149 Id., para. 9.5
150 Id., para. 9.7, citing CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Pakistan, para. 21, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/4 (2013).
151 A., supra note 25, para. 9.6.
152 Id., para. 9.8.
153 See, e.g., A.K. v. Australia, para. 6.4, UN Doc. CAT/C/32/D/148/1999 (2004); S.G. v. the Netherlands, para. 6.6, UN Doc. CAT/C/32/D/135/1999 (2004); Z. v. Australia, para. 9.4, UN Doc. CCPR/C/111/D/2049/2011 (2014); Mr. X and Ms. X v. Denmark, para. 7.5, UN Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/2186/2012 (2014); see also Section VI.B infra.
154 Vertido v. The Philippines, para. 8.2, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (2010); R.P.B. v. The Philippines, para. 7.5, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 (2014); M.S. v. The Philippines, para. 6.4, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/58/D/30/2011 (2014).
155 N.Q. and S.A., supra note 25, para. 2.10.
156 Id., paras. 2.10–2.11.
157 Id., para. 6.6, citing M.S. v. The Philippines, supra note 154.
158 Id., paras. 6.8–6.9.
159 Id., paras. 6.7–6.9.
160 In V., Denmark's findings were not in issue since the author had never attempted to seek protection from the authorities before leaving India and presented no evidence that they were unable or unwilling to protect her. In P.H.A., the Committee did defer to Denmark's assessment of the author's credibility, but on matters that did not directly relate to her status or experience as a woman. P.H.A., supra note 25, paras. 6.4–6.6.
161 See Section V.C infra.
162 Briddick, supra note 18, at 234.
163 A.M., supra note 25, para. 4.12.
164 Id.; F.F.M., supra note 25, para. 4.3; S.J.A., supra note 25, paras. 4.7–4.8; M.K.M., supra note 25, para. 10.8; S.A.O., supra note 25, para. 3.3; R.S.A.A., supra note 25, para. 2.6; F.H.A., supra note 25, para. 4.4.
165 N.M., supra note 25, para. 4.2; S.J.A., supra note 25, para. 4.8; S.A.O., supra note 25, para. 3.3.
166 S.F.A. and H.H.M., supra note 25, para. 4.5.
167 N.M., supra note 25, para. 4.2; S.J.A., supra note 25, para. 4.6; H.D., supra note 25, para. 4.4; R.S.A.A., supra note 25, para. 2.6.
168 A.S., supra note 25, para. 4.9; H.D., supra note 25, para. 4.4.
169 A.S., supra note 25, para. 4.9; K.I.A., supra note 25, paras. 4.3, 4.7, 4.9.
170 S.A.O., supra note 25, para. 3.3.
171 K.S., supra note 25, paras. 4.8–4.9; S.J.A., supra note 25, para. 4.7.
172 K.S., supra note 25, paras. 4.8–4.9; E.W., supra note 25, para. 4.8; F.F.M., supra note 25, para. 4.3; N.M., supra note 25, para. 4.2; S.J.A., supra note 25, para. 4.6; A.S., supra note 25, para. 4.9; H.D., supra note 25, para. 4.4; A.R.I., supra note 25, para. 6.2; R.S.A.A., supra note 25, para. 2.6; A.N.A., supra note 25, para. 4.2; K.I.A., supra note 25, paras. 4.7, 4.11; D.N.S., supra note 25, para. 6.7.
173 F.F.M., supra note 25, para. 4.3.
174 Cheryl Llewellyn, (In)credible Violence: An Analysis of Post-Alvarado Domestic Violence Asylum Cases in the United States, 41 J. Women, Pol. Pol'y 170, 175–76 (2020).
175 Lore Roels, How Protecting Your Daughter Can Lead You to Being Denied International Protection in Belgium: On Rape Mythology, Delayed Disclosure, and Asylum, RLI Blog Refugee L. & Forced Migration (May 11, 2023), at https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2023/05/11/how-protecting-your-daughter-can-lead-you-to-being-denied-international-protection-in-belgium.
176 E.W., supra note 25, para. 4.8.
177 M.K.M., supra note 25, para. 4.4.
178 E.W., supra note 25, paras. 5.2, 5.6.
179 M.K.M., supra note 25, paras. 4.5, 5.3.
180 Id., para. 5.3.
181 Id., para. 9.3.
182 General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, para. 50(i).
183 UNHCR & European Refugee Fund of the European Commission, Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems, 72 (May 2013) [hereinafter Beyond Proof].
184 Julia Quilter, Luke McNamara & Melissa Porter, The Most Persistent Rape Myth? A Qualitative Study of “Delay” in Complaint in Victorian Rape Trials, 35 Current Issues Crim. Just. 4 (2022).
185 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook for the Judiciary on Effective Criminal Justice Responses to Gender-Based Violence Against Women and Girls, 89–91 (2019).
186 M.K.M., supra note 25, para. 10.8.
187 N.M., supra note 25, paras. 4.2, 8.3.
188 Id., para. 5.3.
189 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11, para. 36(xi).
190 Beyond Proof, supra note 183, at 61–65; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, RAIO Combined Training Course: Gender-Related Claims, 41–42 (May 16, 2013), at https://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-guidance-raio-officers-gender-related-claims.
191 S.F.A. and H.H.M., supra note 25, paras. 2.7, 4.5.
192 Id., para. 3.7.
193 Id., para. 4.8.
194 General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, para. 50(f).
195 M.K.M., supra note 25, para. 4.7.
196 A.R.I., supra note 25, para. 2.6.
197 F.H.A., supra note 25, para. 4.7.
198 S.A.O., supra note 25, paras. 3.3, 3.8.
199 Beyond Proof, supra note 183, at 41.
200 A.R.I., supra note 25, para. 6.4.
201 A.N.A., supra note 25, para. 4.15.
202 A.M., supra note 25, paras. 4.7, 4.11, 5.9, 8.2. It is not clear from the Views whether Denmark had an opportunity to consider evidence about the ex-husband training abroad during RSD, or if this only arose before the Committee.
203 Discussed in text at notes 244–247 infra.
204 E.W., supra note 25, para. 4.10.
205 Id.
206 Id., paras. 2.2, 5.6.
207 Id.
208 Id., paras. 5.2, 5.6.
209 UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 11, para. 11.
210 General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, para. 29.
211 In addition to the cases discussed below, see D.N.S., A.N.A., and H.D.
212 Beyond Proof, supra note 183, at 149–75.
213 F.H.A., supra note 25, para. 5.5.
214 A.M., supra note 25, para. 5.13
215 K.I.A., supra note 25, para. 3.11.
216 N.M., supra note 25, para. 2.8.
217 Id., para. 4.11.
218 F.F.M., supra note 25, paras. 2.2, 4.11, 8.7.
219 Id., paras. 2.2, 4.4, 5.12–5.13, 8.7.
220 Id., para. 8.7.
221 Id., para. 5.12.
222 A.S., supra note 25, para. 4.9.
223 Id.
224 Id., para. 4.13.
225 Id., para. 8.5, citing General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, para. 16.
226 See UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status Based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, paras. 9, 63(iii), UN Doc. HCR/GIP/12/09 (2012); Application No. 76175, New Zealand, Refugee Status Appeals Authority, para. 92 (Apr. 30, 2008) (N.Z.); Shoshana Rosenberg, Coming in: Queer Narratives of Sexual Self-Discovery, 65 J. Homosexuality 1788 (2018).
227 L.O., supra note 25, paras. 4.5, 5.7.
228 Id., paras. 4.6–4.8.
229 Id., para. 4.8.
230 Id., para. 4.10.
231 Id., para. 4.13.
232 Id., para. 4.20.
233 Id., paras. 3.2, 4.6. This issue was relevant to why the author's ex-husband had not been located in Mongolian registers.
234 Id.. para. 6.3.
235 Id., para. 2.4 n. 2.
236 Id., para. 4.20.
237 The Committee's 2008 Concluding Observations on Mongolia are discussed in relation to N. in text at notes 134–135 supra. Subsequent Concluding Observations from 2016 are discussed in text at note 255 infra.
238 See text at note 256 infra.
239 A.R.I., supra note 25, para. 7.3 (emphasis added).
240 M.E.N. Joint Dissent, supra note 108, para. 11.
241 K.S., supra note 25, para. 4.3.
242 E.W., supra note 25, para. 4.13.
243 Constance MacIntosh, Domestic Violence and Gender-Based Persecution: How Refugee Adjudicators Judge Women Seeking Refuge from Spousal Violence and Why Reform Is Needed, 26 Refuge 147, 148 (2009); Dezameau et al. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2010) 369 FTR 151 (FC), paras. 34–35 (Pinard, J.) (Canada).
244 A.M., supra note 25, para. 4.8.
245 Id., para. 4.7.
246 Id., para. 5.9.
247 Id.
248 The facts in L.O., and a comparable case involving GBV in Mongolia, are set out above. See text at notes 227–238, and 124–137 supra.
249 L.O., supra note 25, para. 2.6. See also para 2.4.
250 Id., para. 4.10.
251 Id.
252 Id., para. 4.13.
253 Id., para. 6.7.
254 Id.
255 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations on the Combined Eighth and Ninth Periodic Reports of Mongolia, para. 18, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/MNG/CO/8-9 (2016).
256 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of Switzerland, paras. 8, 10, 12, 14, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/CHE/CO/4-5 (2016).
257 R.H. v. Sweden, App. No. 4601/14, para. 70 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Sept. 10, 2015).
258 S.J.A., supra note 25, para. 7.9; A.M., supra note 25, para. 8.3; H.D., supra note 25, para. 7.11; K.S., supra note 25, para. 9.8.
259 S.F.A. and H.H.M, supra note 25, para. 7.2.
260 Id., paras. 4.5, 6.4; S.A.O., supra note 25, paras. 3.4, 3.10; F.H.A., supra note 25, para. 4.13.
261 A.N.A., supra note 25, para. 4.13.
262 Id., para. 4.18.
263 D.N.S., supra note 25, paras. 2.5, 4.2, 4.3, 6.10.
264 While R.S.A.A. described herself as a “stateless Palestinian” (para. 2.1), Denmark called her “a Jordanian national” (para. 4.9). The Committee appears to have accepted Denmark's view, as it later affirmed that “the withdrawal of nationality in the author's case would render her stateless” (para. 8.8, emphasis added).
265 K.I.A., supra note 25, para. 3.2.
266 Id., para. 2.6.
267 R.S.A.A., supra note 25, paras. 2.2, 3.2.
268 K.I.A., supra note 25, para. 5.12; R.S.A.A., supra note 25, para. 4.9.
269 K.I.A., supra note 25, paras. 4.3, 4.7–4.9.
270 Id., para. 7.3.
271 R.S.A.A., supra note 25, paras. 4.5–4.8.
272 K.I.A., supra note 25, para. 4.19; R.S.A.A., supra note 25, para. 4.9.
273 K.I.A., supra note 25, para. 9.7.
274 R.S.A.A., supra note 25, para. 8.5.
275 Id., para. 8.9.
276 Id., paras. 9–10.
277 Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), OJ L180, at 31 ( June 29, 2013) [hereinafter Dublin III Regulation].
278 On the CEAS and Dublin system generally, see Daniel Thym, European Migration Law 337–426 (2023). On the principle of mutual trust, see Hemme Battjes & Evelien Brouwer, The Dublin Regulation and Mutual Trust: Judicial Coherence in EU Asylum Law?, 8 Rev. Eur. Admin. L. 183 (2015); Giulia Vicini, The Dublin Regulation Between Strasbourg and Luxembourg: Reshaping Non-refoulement in the Name of Mutual Trust, 8 Eur. J. Legal Stud. 50 (2015); Sacha Prechal, Mutual Trust Before the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 Eur. Papers 75 (2017); Valsamis Mitsilegas, Humanizing Solidarity in European Refugee Law: The Promise of Mutual Recognition, 24 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 721 (2017); Ermioni Xanthopoulou, Mutual Trust and Rights in EU Criminal and Asylum Law: Three Phases of Evolution and the Uncharted Territory Beyond Blind Trust, 55 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 489 (2018); Vassilis Pergantis, The “Sovereignty Clause” of the Dublin Regulations in the Case-Law of the ECtHR and the CJEU: The Mirage of a Jurisprudential Convergence?, in Migration Issues Before International Courts and Tribunals (Giovanni Carlo Bruno, Fulvio Maria Palombino & Adriana Di Stefano eds., 2019); Georgios Anagnostaras, The Common European Asylum System: Balancing Mutual Trust Against Fundamental Rights Protection, 21 Ger. L.J. 1180 (2020).
279 Cathryn Costello, Dublin-Case NS/ME: Finally, an End to Blind Trust Across the EU?, 2 Asiel en Migrantenrecht 83 (2012); Battjes & Brouwer, supra note 278, at 186; Xanthopoulou, supra note 278, at 493–94.
280 Francesco Maiani & Vigdis Vevstad, Distribution of Applicants for International Protection and Protected Persons, in Setting up a Common European Asylum System: Report on the Application of Existing Instruments and Proposals for the New System 129–30 (2010).
281 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Jan. 21, 2011); N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. & Ors v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Joined Cases 411/10 and 493/10 (Ct. Just. EU Dec. 21, 2011). For discussion of prior jurisprudence on this issue, see Pergantis, supra note 278, at 413–15.
282 Anagnostaras, supra note 278, at 1181.
283 Pergantis, supra note 278, at 412.
284 Dublin III Regulation, Art. 3(2) (emphasis added); see also M.S.S. and N.S., supra note 281.
285 Vicini, supra note 278, at 64.
286 Battjes & Brouwer, supra note 278; Vicini, supra note 278; Mitsilegas, supra note 278; Pergantis, supra note 278.
287 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, paras. 115, 122 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Nov. 4, 2014).
288 Id., para. 122.
289 Opinion 2/13 on the Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, para. 192 (Ct. Just. EU Dec. 18, 2014).
290 C.K. & Others v. Republika Slovenija, C-578/16 PPU (Ct. Just. EU Feb. 16, 2017); Mitsilegas, supra note 278, at 731–32; Xanthopoulou, supra note 278, at 496–98; Anagnostaras, supra note 278, at 1185.
291 Anagnostaras, supra note 278, at 1188–92. For a recent analysis of a related issue, see Ciara Smyth, The Dublin Regulation, Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights: No Exceptionality for Children?, 28 Eur. L.J. 242, 243 (2022).
292 M.A. had been identified as a victim of trafficking and both authors claimed to fear exposure to trafficking or other exploitation if returned to Italy and France. On the intersection of trafficking and refugee protection, see Catherine Briddick & Vladislava Stoyanova, Human Trafficking and Refugees, in The Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law, supra note 13.
293 Abdi-Osman, supra note 25, para 4.3. See also the Views of the Federal Administrative Court at paragraph 4.4.
294 Id., para. 4.17.
295 M.A., supra note 25, paras. 4.11, 6.7.
296 Id., paras. 4.3, 4.6.
297 Abdi-Osman, supra note 25, para. 7.4.
298 M.A., supra note 25, para. 6.7.
299 CEDAW Committee, supra note 256.
300 Bandboni, supra note 25, para 7.6.
301 Id., paras. 7.7–7.8.
302 Id., para. 7.9.
303 E.g. Navanethem Pillay, Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System: A Report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2012); GA Res. 68/268 (2014); UN General Assembly, Report on the Process of the Consideration of the State of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System, UN Doc. A/75/601 (2020).
304 Manfred Nowak, Comments on the UN High Commissioner's Proposals Aimed at Strengthening the UN Human Rights Treaty Body System, 31 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 3, 3 (2013).
305 Edwards, supra note 30, at 92–98.
306 See Başak Çalı & Alexandre Skander Galand, Towards a Common Institutional Trajectory? Individual Complaints Before UN Treaty Bodies During Their “Booming” Years, 24 Int'l J. Hum. Rts. 1103, 1116 (2020); Suzanne Egan, Transforming the UN Human Rights Treaty System: A Realistic Appraisal, 42 Hum. Rts. Q. 762 (2020); Jeremy Sarkin, The 2020 United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body Review Process: Prioritising Resources, Independence and the Domestic State Reporting Process Over Rationalising and Streamlining Treaty Bodies, 25 Int'l. J. Hum. Rts. 1301 (2020).
307 Egan, supra note 306, at 766.
308 Byrnes, supra note 38, at 142; see also Steiner, supra note 41, at 31–40; Oette, supra note 38, at 11.
309 See Byrnes, supra note 38, at 143; Steiner, supra note 41, at 32–36. These critiques warrant further research in the CEDAW context with an eye to how women seeking asylum from gender-based harm might experience the impacts of delay, the nature of the complaints process, and the appropriateness of traditional remedies.
310 See Byrnes, supra note 38, at 151; Van Alebeek & Nollkaemper, supra note 52, at 401–03; Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 905, 922, 944, 946 (2009).
311 Kanetake, supra note 48, at 217, 221–26. On the legitimacy of UNTBs as decision makers in the context of individual complaints, see Geir Ulfstein, The Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Legitimacy Challenges, in Legitimacy and International Courts (Nienke Grossman, Harlan Grant Cohen, Andreas Follesdal & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2018).
312 Byrnes, supra note 38, at 143, 149–51; Cees Flinterman & Ginney Liu, CEDAW and the Optional Protocol: First Experiences, in International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms 97 (Gudmundur Alfredsson, Jonas Grimheden, Bertrand G. Ramcharan & Alfred Zayas eds., 2009).
313 Mechlem, supra note 310, at 910.
314 Id. at 945–46.
315 Byrnes, supra note 38, at 149–50.
316 Jim Murdoch, Unfulfilled Expectations: The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 26, 45 (2010).
317 In 2020, Çalı and Galand observed that the ways in which UNTBs approach the handling of individual complaints (including questions of admissibility) had thus far lacked rigorous comparative examination. They compared various aspects of admissibility but did not consider comparative use of the “manifestly ill-founded or not sufficiently substantiated” ground. Çalı & Galand, supra note 306, at 1104–08.
318 OHCHR, Complaints Procedures Under the Human Rights Treaties, at https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/human-rights-bodies-complaints-procedures/complaints-procedures-under-human-rights-treaties.
319 Audrey Macklin, Truth and Consequences: Credibility Determination in the Refugee Context, Conference Paper, International Association of Refugee Law Judges, 134 (1998).
320 F.F.M., supra note 25, para. 7.5.
321 A.M., supra note 25, para. 7.5.
322 CEDAW Committee, Form and Guidance for Submitting an Individual Communication to Treaty Bodies (Apr. 22, 2021), at https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/tools-and-resources/form-and-guidance-submitting-individual-communication-treaty-bodies.
323 Mechlem, supra note 310, at 946.
324 Id.
325 In the analogous context of the Human Rights Committee, Byrnes observes that dissenting opinions are an “important and welcome development, since they often illuminate both the basis of the majority opinion and alternative approaches to the issue.” Byrnes, supra note 38, at 151; see also Alfred de Zayas, Petitions Before the United Nations Treaty Bodies: Focus on the Human Rights Committee's Optional Protocol Procedure, in International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms, supra note 312, at 43–44.
326 On whether the “margin of appreciation” doctrine is or should be a feature of international law generally, and international human rights law in particular, see Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 Eur. J. Int'l L. 907 (2005); Yuval Shany, All Roads Lead to Strasbourg?: Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine by the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee, 9 J. Int'l Dispute Settlement 180 (2018).
327 The average length of time between the dates of communication and adoption of Views in the reviewed asylum cases was 2.7 years, with the longest case (K.I.A.) taking more than four and a half years.
328 Ford, supra note 20, at 53.
329 Id. at 63, 68–69.
330 Id. at 68–69. See text accompanying notes 375–378 infra.
331 Mechlem, supra note 310.
332 Alexandre Skander Galand, Defer or Revise? Horizontal Dialogue Between UN Treaty Bodies and Regional Human Rights Courts in Duplicative Legal Proceedings, 23 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 16 (2023); Arenz et al. v. Germany, para. 8.6, UN Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/1138/2002 (2004).
333 A.A.A. v. Spain, para. 4.2, UN Doc. CRC/C/73/D/2/2015 (2016).
334 Çalı & Galand, supra note 306, at 1109.
335 On the ECtHR, see Shany, All Roads Lead to Strasbourg?, supra note 326; Galand, supra note 332.
336 See, e.g., Arenz, supra note 332, para. 8.6; A.A.A., supra note 333, para. 4.2; N.L. v. Sweden, para. 7.7, UN Doc. CRPD/C/23/D/60/2019 (2020); Kotor v. France, para. 7.5, UN Doc. CERD/C/105/D/65/2018 (2022).
337 M.S. v. The Philippines, supra note 154, para. 6.4.
338 R.G. v. Denmark, para. 7.4, UN Doc. CCPR/C/115/D/2351/2014 (2015).
339 R.C. v. Sweden, App. No. 41827/07, para. 52 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Mar. 9, 2010).
340 Id., paras. 52–57.
341 See, e.g., R.M. and F.M. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CCPR/C/126/D/2685/2015 (2019); A.Y. v. Switzerland, UN Doc. CAT/C/74/D/887/2018 (2022); S.L. v Australia, UN Doc. CAT/C/75/D/964/2019 (2022); H.K. on Behalf of S.K. v. Denmark, UN Doc. CRC/C/90/D/99/2019 (2022); N.L. v. Sweden, supra note 336.
342 Shany, All Roads Lead to Strasbourg?, supra note 326, at 192; A.A.S. v Denmark, UN Doc. CCPR/C/117/D/2464/2014 (joint diss. op., Shany, Iwasawa & Vardzelashvile, M., 2016).
343 M.K.M., supra note 25, paras. 5.4, 5.5, 10.10.
344 Çalı, Costello & Cunningham, supra note 19, 378.
345 Vertido, supra note 154, para. 8.5; R.P.B., supra note 154, paras. 8.9–8.10.
346 Abdi-Osman, supra note 25, para. 4.17; cf. M.A., supra note 25, paras. 4.10, 6.5.
347 Y.W., supra note 25, para. 3.2.
348 Id., paras. 5.7–5.9.
349 Id., paras. 7.3–7.4.
350 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations on the Eighth Periodic Report of Denmark, paras. 9, 11, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/DNK/CO/8 (2015).
351 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 84, para. 41; Ford, supra note 20, at 69.
352 UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, para. 11 (1998).
353 Id.
354 Beyond Proof, supra note 183, at 41.
355 Jane Herlihy, Kate Gleeson & Stuart Turner, What Assumptions About Human Behaviour Underlie Asylum Decisions?, 22 Int'l. J. Refugee L. 351 (2010); Rebecca Dowd et al., Filling Gaps and Verifying Facts: Assumptions and Credibility Assessment in the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal, 30 Int'l J. Refugee L. 71 (2018).
356 Beyond Proof, supra note 183, at 39.
357 Gregor Noll, Credibility, Reliability, and Evidential Assessment, in The Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law, supra note 13; Hilary Evans Cameron, Refugee Law's Fact-Finding Crisis: Truth, Risk, and the Wrong Mistake (2018); Juliet Cohen, Questions of Credibility: Omissions, Discrepancies and Errors of Recall in the Testimony of Asylum Seekers, 13 Int'l J. Refugee L. 293 (2001); Walter Kälin, Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum-Hearing, 20 Int'l Migration Rev. 230 (1986).
358 Beyond Proof, supra note 183, at 70.
359 Debora Singer, Falling at Each Hurdle: Assessing the Credibility of Women's Asylum Claims in Europe, in Gender in Refugee Law, supra note 6.
360 Thomas Spijkerboer, Stereotyping and Acceleration: Gender, Procedural Acceleration and Marginalised Judicial Review in the Dutch Asylum System, in Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures (Gregor Noll ed., 2005).
361 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 359; Macintosh, supra note 243; Mullally, supra note 8; Llewellyn, supra note 174; Christina Gerken, Credibility, Trauma, and the Law: Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims in the United States, 30 Feminist Legal Stud. 255 (2022); Abigail Stepnitz, Believing Asylum-Seeking Women: Doing Gender in Legal Narratives of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, Soc. Legal Stud. 1 (2023); Melinda McPherson et al., Marginal Women, Marginal Rights: Impediments to Gender-Based Persecution Claims by Asylum-Seeking Women in Australia, 24 J. Refugee Stud. 323 (2011). For a broader analysis outside the migration context, see Deborah Epstein & Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. Penn. L. Rev. 399 (2019); Macklin, supra note 319.
362 Singer, supra note 359, at 100.
363 Id.
364 Id. at 104–05.
365 Noll, supra note 357, at 608; Kälin, supra note 357.
366 Beyond Proof, supra note 183, at 185.
367 Noll, supra note 357, at 616–17.
368 Llewellyn, supra note 174, at 175–76.
369 Gerken, supra note 361, at 258.
370 General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, para. 50(i).
371 See Viljoen, supra note 40, at 72–75; Ford, supra note 20, at 69–72.
372 But see, outside of its jurisprudence, General Recommendation 32, supra note 16, paras. 25, 43, 50(g), (i).
373 Ford, supra note 20, at 71–72.
374 Pauline Muzonzo Paku Kisoki v. Sweden, para. 9.3, UN Doc. CAT/C/16/D/41/1996 (1996).
375 Ralph Wilde, The Unintended Consequences of Expanding Migrant Rights Protections, 111 AJIL Unbound 487 (2017); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C. Hathaway, Non-refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 53 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 235 (2015).
376 Mikael Rask Madsen, Two-Level Politics and the Backlash Against International Courts: Evidence from the Politicisation of the European Court of Human Rights, 22 Brit. J. Pol. & Int'l Rel. 563 (2020).
377 Wilde, supra note 375, at 487.
378 Ford supra note 20, at 46, 59, 68–69; Gráinne de Búrca, Human Rights Experimentalism, 111 AJIL 277, 278 (2017).
379 Ford, supra note 20, at 57–58.
380 Id. at 73–74.
381 Karen Musalo, A Tale of Two Women: The Claims for Asylum of Fauziya Kassindja, who fled FGC, and Rody Alvarado, a Survivor of Partner (Domestic) Violence, in Gender in Refugee Law, supra note 6, at 76.
382 Dauvergne, supra note 13, at 733–35.
383 Mullally, supra note 8, at 459.
384 Id. at 475–76; Musalo, supra note 381, at 94.
385 See Edwards, supra note 30; Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (2012); Caroline Bettinger-López, Human Rights at Home: Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Violation, 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 19 (2008).
386 Heaven Crawley, Saving Brown Women from Brown Men? “Refugee Women,” Gender and the Racialised Politics of Protection, 41 Refugee Surv. Q. 355, 370 (2022).
387 Id. at 368; see also Kneebone, supra note 7; Heaven Crawley, [En]gendering International Refugee Protection: Are We There Yet?, in Human Rights and the Refugee Definition: Comparative Legal Practice and Theory (Bruce Burson & David James Cantor eds., 2016).
388 Crawley, supra note 387, at 322–33.
389 Gerken, supra note 361 at 259.
390 Crawley, supra note 386, at 369–70, 372.
391 Mullally, supra note 8, at 482.
392 Musalo, supra note 381, at 76.
393 Edwards, supra note 30, 96, 99.
394 Hodson, supra note 21, at 562.
395 Edwards, supra note 30, at 64; Christine Chinkin, Feminist Interventions into International Law, 19 Adel. L. Rev. 13, 18 (1997).
396 Edwards, supra note 30, at 102–06; but see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Asylum in a Different Voice?: Judging Immigration Claims and Gender, in Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and Proposals for Reform (Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Ian Schoenholz & Philip G. Schrag eds., 2009).
397 CEDAW, supra note 14, Art. 17.
398 Of the twenty-two female Committee members in 2023, six came from Africa and the Middle East, six from the Asia Pacific, four from the Americas, and three each from Western and Eastern Europe.
399 CEDAW, supra note 14, Art. 17(1).
400 Cassandra Mudgway, Can International Human Rights Law Smash the Patriarchy? A Review of “Patriarchy” According to United Nations Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures, 29 Feminist Legal Stud. 67, 81–82, 97 (2021).
401 Niamh Reilly, Women, Gender, and International Human Rights: Overview, in International Human Rights of Women (Niamh Reilly ed., 2019).
402 Crawley, supra note 386, at 357.
403 Id. at 358. For a critique of the construction of “Third World women” as a homogenous and “powerless” group and cultural reductionism in Western feminism, see Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity 22–33 (2003).
404 Catherine O'Rourke & Aisling Swaine, CEDAW and the Security Council: Enhancing Women's Rights in Conflict, 67 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 167 (2018); Rangita de Silva de Alwis & Amanda M. Martin, Long Past Time: CEDAW Ratification in the United States, 3 U. Penn. J. L. & Pub. Aff. 15 (2018); Debra J. Liebowitz & Susanne Zwingel, Gender Equality Oversimplified: Using CEDAW to Counter the Measurement Obsession, 16 Int'l Stud. Rev. 362 (2014).
405 Amongst others, the Committee has been critiqued for reinforcing a view of women as passive victims and failing to adequately address intersectionality. See Mudgway, supra note 400; Buthaina Mohammed Alkuwari, Human Rights of Women: Intersectionality and the CEDAW, 2022 Int'l Rev. L. 223 (2022). On whether the Committee reinforces cis-heteronormativity, see Elise Meyer, Designing Women: The Definition of “Woman” in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 16 Chi. J. Int'l L. 553 (2016); Margaret Murphy, Queering Women's Rights: Re-Examining CEDAW, Hum. Rts. Pulse (Mar. 1, 2021), at https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/queering-womens-rights-re-examining-cedaw.
406 Hodson, supra note 21, at 567.
407 Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 140, 166 (1989).
408 Murdoch, supra note 316, at 44.
409 Id.
410 Oette, supra note 38, at 17–19.
411 On ratification of CEDAW by the United States, see de Silva de Alwis and Martin, supra note 404.
412 Oette, supra note 38, at 17.
