Until quite recent times, it would have been unprofitable, in the case of most nations, to inquire what the philosophy of government held by the people was, or what effect it had on the foreign relations of the nation, or on international relations generally. There were few nations in which the people were so enlightened and expressed themselves so fully that it was possible to distinguish and define the particular philosophy of government held by them; and even if it had been possible to do so, it would have been of little use to try to discover what effect this philosophy had on international relations, since the fact was that it had little or no effect. The people of each nation, ignorant of foreign affairs by reason of the difficulties of travel and communication, allowed the executive to control the foreign relations under the advice of a council in the selection of which they had no voice, and representing certain privileged classes of persons who used the power of the nation as means to accomplish such ends as they thought desirable.

Oceans have ever been the chief theater of universal history. The terrestrial sphere known to antiquity lay around the Mediterranean which, as its name indicates, was destined to remain the center of events, until the famous sea-heroes, impelled by a desire to explore, undertook bold voyages to distant, unknown regions, and Christopher Columbus finally discovered the Western Hemisphere, bringing it in contact with the considerations, hopes, needs of expansion and, last but not least, also, fears of Europe.

The manner of the performance of the duty of preventing hostile expeditions, and the means to be employed for that purpose, are matters largely or entirely for the discretion of the individual state. It cannot be said that any particular method is required or sanctioned by international law. This discretion is limited, however, by practical necessity and by the exigency of good faith.

Now that the conquest of the air has become an accomplished fact and the adaptability of aircraft to hostile operations has been fully demonstrated, the question of the necessary modifications of, or additions to the laws of warfare becomes a matter of present interest and importance. It would be as idle as presumptuous for any writer—no matter what his reputation or ability—to attempt the formulation of a complete code that takes into account a “law of the air.” Such a work could be satisfactorily accomplished only by an international conference after an exhaustive discussion and a nice adjustment of belligerent and neutral interests. Possibly the Third Hague Conference, scheduled to meet in 1915, may undertake the work; but wars do not wait on conferences, and hence a study of the subject in the light of recent developments may serve a useful purpose.

Two projects for the creation of an international prize court were laid before the Second Hague Peace Conference on the same day (June 22, 1907) one by the German and one by the British delegation. The United States at the time and France later warmly approved the proposed institution, and a joint project in the nature of a compromise was drafted and presented to the Conference by the four Powers, which, after much debate, prolonged discussion, opposition on the part of some delegations and hesitation on the part of others, was adopted with some amendments by the Conference and forms what is known as the Convention Relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court of October 18,1907. Although signed by thirty-three Powers, the court contemplated by the convention has not been established by reason, it would seem, of objections raised by Great Britain to Article 7 of the convention, to remedy which a conference of leading maritime nations was called by Great Britain to agree upon important principles of law to be applied by the court, when constituted, in the decision of certain classes of prize cases. In this conference, known as the International Naval Conference, held at London from December 4, 1908, to February 26, 1909, representatives of Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Russia, and Spain participated. An agreement, called the Declaration of London, dated February 26,1909, upon the principles of law to be applied by the proposed court, in accordance with Article 7 of the original convention, was reached. Like the original convention, it was also in the nature of a compromise. It met with the approval of the British Government, for it was signed by the delegates of that government acting under instructions, as is the wont of diplomatic conferences, and it seemed at the time that it removed the objections to the ratification of the original convention and to the establishment of the Prize Court in so far as Great Britain was concerned. The government considered it satisfactory and introduced a bill in both Houses of Parliament, modifying British practice in such a way as to meet the requirements of the Prize Court Convention, as modified by the Declaration of London. It passed the House of Commons, but failed in the House of Lords, owing to the unexpected, bitter and persistent opposition on the part of the public, so that the government has up to the spring of 1914 ratified neither the Hague Convention nor the Declaration of London. The signatories of the original convention and of the Declaration have waited, and are still waiting, for favorable action by Great Britain upon these two international documents, apparently unwilling to create the International Prize Court without the co-operation of Great Britain, and to bind themselves by the provisions of the Declaration framed by a conference called by Great Britain to meet British objections, unless it be ratified by Great Britain. The establishment of the Prize Court, therefore, is thus made to depend upon the action of Great Britain.