If we ask ourselves what it was that secured to the world since the time of the Reformation a fair measure of peace and security, the answer will surely lie in the fact that a firm conviction pervaded all minds of the sacredness and sanctity of territory. It was not a reasoned conviction: no conviction based on reason is of compelling force. Its force lay in the fact that an invasion of territory deprived the invaded party of reason: it was a touch on a nerve, which would provoke an automatic violent reaction: its consequences were incalculable. It is these irrational urges which lie at the base of all our reasoning and assumptions. In this case, it was not so much that an invaded state would feel stung to resist the invader, however hopelessly; it was rather that an invaded state could not but resist—had no idea of not resisting.

War, as a social phenomenon, has been defined as “a fight between human societies, in primitive conditions between savage tribes, in the civilized world between states.” Ever since history has recorded the activities of organized groups, war has been one of its principal topics. Since it appears to be a fundamental element in their life, its explanation has been sought in the basic conditions of their existence. Thus, it is said, the law of growth and expansion, innate as a natural tendency in the individual being as well as in organized societies, compels them with irresistible force to assert their rights and to seek “security” by combating others. War, it seems, is ordained by nature and is an inevitable result of competition.

The familiar and confusing distinction between de facto and de jure recognition is made even more confusing in a recent British decision, The Arantzazu Mendi. The failure to understand the distinction between de facto recognition of a new state or government and de jure recognition, has been in part caused by a careless use of terms. “The subject has been unduly complicated,” writes Borchard, “by the chameleonic uses of the term de facto, which has been applied promiscuously to de facto authorities in the field, to governments not established by constitutional methods, and as an adjective to qualify recognition. …” Raestad notes that although “de jure recognition” is more or less equivalent to “recognition,” and a “dejure government” to “government,” the term de facto is used differently. What is the difference between (1) de facto recognition of a government, (2) recognition of a de facto government, and (3) recognition as a (or the) de facto government?

The terms of Annex Three of the Anglo-Italian Agreement signed at Rome on April 16, 1938, focus attention, inter alia, upon the legal status of a vast area adjoining the British Crown Colony of Aden. Not only does this part of the agreement bring to the fore many questions relative to the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea region, but recent political developments in India as well have resulted in a change in legal status of Aden together with the Aden hinterland. These changes under the British Crown are important in a discussion of British jurisdiction in this area.

The 25th Session of the International Labor Conference opened on June 8 in Geneva and ended on June 28. Appropriately enough, its President was Dr. Edmond Schultess, of Switzerland, a Federal Councillor and chief of the economic department of the Swiss Government since 1925. This was the first time a Swiss national had been honored with this position and the appropriateness of the election lay in the fact that just fifty years ago Switzerland sent out a renewed invitation to an international labor conference which led directly to the convocation of the Conference in Berlin in 1890. Figures in the Provisional Record of the 25th Session list 45 countries represented at the session through 154 delegates and 198 advisers, for a total of 352 persons in attendance.