The April number of the Journal has an editorial note by Professor J. W. Garner in which he reviews the status of “ freedom of the seas and states that “ since the World War a new conception of neutrality has become widespread.” He concludes that “ the present chaotic state of the law is regrettable, if not an actual danger to the peace of the world,” and thinks that the subject requires “ preliminary study by jurists and naval experts.”

I was much struck, in reading the interesting editorial comment on the “ Interpretation of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War” in the April issue of this Journal by the observations made regarding the admissibility of extraneous evidence for the purpose of construing treaties. The learned writer expresses the view that the intent of the parties may be sought outside the text of the agreement, not only in specific reservations, but also in “ interpretations, clarifications, understandings, constructions, qualifications or actual conditions set forth during the negotiations prior to the ratification.” This position is assumed to have the clear sanction of international law and also to be intrinsically desirable. In venturing to make the following observations I am not moved by the effect of the application of this principle to the particular case of the Kellogg Pact. My own view is that, broadly speaking, the interpretations contained in the diplomatic correspondence are implicit in the text of the Pact itself and, therefore, it is not of much practical moment to determine their precise legal effect. But the broader question of the method of construction of treaties in general is, in my opinion, not only important, but one of the most vital in international law at the present time. It goes to the root of international life today, which is so largely and increasingly based upon conventional provisions, involving asit does the issue whether states are to be bound by the engagements they have embodied in a ratified written instrument, or by supposed intentions which may be sought elsewhere.

For the political scientist, the constitutional position of the Council of the League of Nations offers a thorny problem. In general, the Assembly and Council are each empowered to deal “ with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.” But, in addition, the Council is assigned special duties by Articles 6, 7, 8, 10, 14,15,16 and 24 of the Covenant and by the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly. The First Assembly tried to delimit the powers of Assembly and Council, but it must be admitted that the report presented to the Committee on General Organization by M. Viviani and Mr. Rowell (of Canada) was almost a confession of failure. They rejected comparisons with first and second chambers or legislative and executive bodies and added “ the truth is that the League offers no analogy in constitutional law.” The most recent League publication on the organization of the League contents itself with describing the Council as “ a semi-permanent organ of the Assembly.” Undeterred by its anomalous position, however, the Council has steadily grown in prestige and moral authority until election to it is keenly coveted. It is the purpose of this article to trace the steps which led to the election of Canada to the Council at the Eighth Assembly. No finer compliment to the growing importance of Canada in international affairs has yet been paid, a compliment which came appropriately enough in the year of the nation's Jubilee of Confederation.

The unsolved problems arising from the foreign settlements and concessions in China are of such a nature as to make a study of the former foreign settlements in neighboring Korea a timely contribution to the literature on the general subject. The very contrasts which the settlements in Korea present to those in China serve to clarify the problems in the latter country.

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that Madam Rosika Schwimmer, avowed “ uncompromising pacifist,” is not eligible to become a citizen of the United States has focused attention upon our naturalization laws and their judicial construction. Especial interest has been aroused in those provisions which prescribe the qualifications concerning the applicant's attachment to the principles of the Constitution of the United States.