“Law in general,” says Montesquieu, “is human reason so far as it controls all the people of the earth, and the political and civil laws of each nation can only be considered as individual cases in which this human reason is applied.” Reason was held by the Romans to constitute one of the fundamental elements of law. Cicero announced the existence of “a veritable law, true reason (recta ratio), in conformity with nature, universal, immutable and eternal, the commands of which constitute a call to duty and the prohibitions of which avert evil.”

It is at present unnecessary to consider what influence the Stoic, Academic and Epicurean doctrines had on Roman jurisprudence, and it would be risky to support as absolutely final any view which might be expressed on the subject. During the last phases of the Republic there had already come to exist in the world’s capital a fusion of the different schools of philosophy; and traces of the Platonic teachings constantly appear in the expression of the great orator’s lofty thought.

The treaties of Münster and Osnabrück gave to Europe a sort of international constitution which remained the basis of its public law down to the French Revolution. But it would be a serious error to assume that the international community of states as revealed to the world by the Peace of Westphalia implied the recognition of the science of international law as understood and practiced by the society of nations at the present time. The science of international law as it exists today is a result of slow historical growth and is the product of two main factors, viz., certain theories or principles on the one hand, and international practice or custom on the other. The relative value and influence of the contributions of each of these factors is so difficult to determine that they have never been thoroughly eifted or separated — a task left for the future historians of international law.

It is common knowledge that the United States was originally settled either by God-fearing men and women fleeing from persecution, or by political refugees who were unable to bring about reforms which they believed essential to good government and were unwilling to comply with the state of affaire existing in the Old World, or, finally, by those who, unfortunate at home, were desirous of bettering their condition in the New World. The Pilgrim and the Puritan, the Episcopalian and the Catholic, the Quaker, the Presbyterian and the Lutheran settled the Atlantic Coast. The roundhead and the cavalier, the rich and the poor and the inmate of the debtor’s prison found themselves side by side upon a plane of equality without the traditions and the conservatism of an older world. Whether the colony was composed of Puritans and manifested intolerance to the protestant brother of a different faith; whether the settlement remained loyal to the Church of England, as Virginia, or favored the Catholic, as Maryland, or freely accepted the law-abiding without questioning his religion, as the Quakers of Pennsylvania, the principle of religious toleration steadily gained ground, and by the time of the Revolution it may be said generally that religious differences ceased to influence men or their conduct toward each other, by virtue of a conception of liberty which embraced not merely the right to and protection of property but the freedom of thought, of speech and of public worship. The example of Virginia, which in 1786 established religious freedom by statute, profoundly influenced the Federal Government and the various States of the Union; for, by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, it is provided that “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” and the States of the American Union have, in their various Constitutions, placed the same restriction upon their legislatures. The amendment of the Constitution and the like provisions in State Constitutions were not dictated by indifference or hostility to the principles of the Christian religion, but aimed to prevent not merely the establishment of any one form of religion, however widely spread, but to establish upon a firm footing the right before the law of every religious sect.

Since the publication of our last article, the political independence of Bulgaria has been juridically established from the constitutional point of view.

As we have already seen, the Bulgarian diplomatic and governmental situation had been developed in fact, without ever having been theoretically or diplomatically discussed. This is natural. The Bulgarian Government took great care not to raise that question, contenting itself from the internal point of view with Art. 17, of the Constitution of Tirnovo, which gave to the Prince, in general, the conduct of diplomatic negotiations. It might have been contended that Bulgaria, which was a vassal state, had no absolute right to make purely political treaties; and it is doubtful that King Ferdinand, before the establishment of Bulgarian independence, had ever entered into any written political treaties. Moreover, if he had, it would have raised an internal constitutional question; for, in such case, it would have been incumbent upon him to refer the matter to the Sobranjé.

We presume that many of our readers have noticed the recent debate in the Congress of the United States on the subject of retaliation upon rebel prisoners of war in our hands for the treatment ours have received from the rebel authorities; and we think not a few must have been surprised at the course of that discussion. That opinions on this subject should differ is very natural; but so very wide a difference, or rather a direct conflict of opinion, on fundamental principles, would suggest that either the law itself was unsettled, or that the speakers did not well understand it. Indeed, on these questions of the laws and usages of war there is great want of information, not only among our people generally, but among our legislators, courts, lawyers, military officers and other public men. Nor is this to be wondered at. Prior to the present war, the people of the United States made no claim to be a military people; on the contrary they prided themselves as being civil in the strict sense of that word, and disclaimed and discountenanced all knowledge of the military art, or acquaintance with the science of war. Indeed, a profound peace of more than three-quarters of a century could scarcely be said to be interrupted by the insignificant contest of 1812, or the short war with the weak and demoralized Eepublic of Mexico. During this long period our pursuits as a nation have been, not of arms, but of agriculture, manufactures and commerce. Moreover, our very astute politicians and legislators have assured us, time and again, that there was no necessity for any military organization or military knowledge in the United States, for our untrained militia were more than sufficient for any contingency that could possibly arise. It is true that Washington and his contemporaries who achieved our independence and founded the Eepublic took a different view of this question; but who would presume to compare their opinions with those of the sages who lead our modern Congressional debates!

The highest duty of an American diplomatic or consular officer is to protect citizens of the United States in lawful pursuit of their affairs in foreign countries. The document issued in authentication of the right to such protection is the passport.

Broadly speaking, the Department issues two kinds of passports — those for citizens and those for persons who are not citizens. Citizens’ passports are ordinary and special; aliens’ passports are for travel in the United States and for qualified protection abroad of those who have taken the first steps to become American citizens.

The citizen’s passport is the only document issued by the Department of State to authenticate the citizenship of an American going abroad. The Act of August 18, 1856, makes the issuance to one who is not a citizen a penal offense if it is committed by a consular officer. Before this law was passed the Department did not issue the document to aliens; but it was permitted to this government’s agents abroad sometimes to issue it to others than American citizens. The Personal Instructions to the Diplomatic Agents of the United States of 1853 said: