International law is the most rarefied of social sciences. Even so, it has scarcely any sense of its intellectual history. International law is finely articulated, oblique in its analysis, and respectful of its position as an arbiter of national competition and conflict. But aside from the casual citation to an ancient arbitration or the consultation of a famous publicist for an essential principle, little credence has been given to its historical development as either a collection of doctrines or a learned study. This article offers both an intellectual history of an international law doctrine and a tour d’horizon of the nature of discourse in our discipline.

The January 1959 issue of this Journal carried the famous proposal by Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell to build a world public order based on human dignity that would save the world from nuclear Armageddon and protect democratic values. The authors expressed the belief that the democratic countries were responding ineffectively to Marxist-Leninist expansionism because they appealed to international law rules and principles that were asserted or assumed to be universal but, in fact, did not have universal effectiveness. Two dangers existed, therefore: the universal triumph of totalitarianism or nuclear war between blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. The proposed world public order would make it possible to escape this horrendous dilemma.

It seems to me, with all respect, that the Comment by Professor Dorsey exhibits a minimum understanding both of the contemporary world and of the theory and intellectual procedures recommended by Harold Lasswell and his associates for inquiry about the role of international law in that world. Certainly Professor Dorsey and Lasswell and associates observe very different worlds, have very different conceptions of international law, and recommend very different methods of inquiry. It is not clear that Professor Dorsey is constrained by empirical observation and modern scientific methods of inquiry.

Since there exists no international judicial system to adjudicate international claims in the ordinary course of events, individuals and business enterprises with grievances against a foreign country have looked, both jointly and severally, either to the “espousal” of their claims by their government—a discretionary act guaranteeing no ultimate redress—or, assuming their government has been able to negotiate a compromis with the foreign country involved, to the adjudication of their claims by an ad hoc international tribunal, almost always one without funds from which to pay awards once rendered. However, the volume and complexity of the claims spawned by World War II, the arrival of Marxist governments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and the emergence of an economically restless Third World have rendered the espousal process increasingly less effective; and efforts to establish ad hoc international tribunals have been almost uniformly unproductive during the past four decades (the Algerian Accords establishing the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal being the rare exception that proves the general proposition).

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, also known as the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, was adopted by the 18th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), held in Nairobi in June 1981. Contrary to some expectations, the Charter stayed in limbo for only 5 years. It entered into force on October 21, 1986, after the deposit of the 26th instrument of ratification, the number required by its Article 63(3). By April 16, 1987, there were 33 states parties to the Charter, which makes it the largest regional human rights system in existence.

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