Does mathematics need new axioms? was the second of three plenary panel discussions held at the ASL annual meeting, ASL 2000, in Urbana-Champaign, in June, 2000. Each panelist in turn presented brief opening remarks, followed by a second round for responding to what the others had said; the session concluded with a lively discussion from the floor. The four articles collected here represent reworked and expanded versions of the first two parts of those proceedings, presented in the same order as the speakers appeared at the original panel discussion: Solomon Feferman (pp. 401–413), Penelope Maddy (pp. 413–422), John Steel (pp. 422–433), and Harvey Friedman (pp. 434–446). The work of each author is printed separately, with separate references, but the portions consisting of comments on and replies to others are clearly marked.

This article presents Tarski's Address at the Princeton Bicentennial Conference on Problems of Mathematics, together with a separate summary. Two accounts of the discussion which followed are also included. The central topic of the Address and of the discussion is decision problems. The introductory note gives information about the Conference, about the background of the subjects discussed in the Address, and about subsequent developments to these subjects.

On October 4, 1937, Zermelo composed a small note entitled “Der Relativismus in der Mengenlehre und der sogenannte Skolemsche Satz”(“Relativism in Set Theory and the So-Called Theorem of Skolem”) in which he gives a refutation of “Skolem's paradox”, i.e., the fact that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory—guaranteeing the existence of uncountably many sets—has a countable model. Compared with what he wished to disprove, the argument fails. However, at a second glance, it strongly documents his view of mathematics as based on a world of objects that could only be grasped adequately by infinitary means. So the refutation might serve as a final clue to his epistemological credo.

Whereas the Skolem paradox was to raise a lot of concern in the twenties and the early thirties, it seemed to have been settled by the time Zermelo wrote his paper, namely in favour of Skolem's approach, thus also accepting the noncategoricity and incompleteness of the first-order axiom systems. So the paper might be considered a late-comer in a community of logicians and set theorists who mainly followed finitary conceptions, in particular emphasizing the role of first-order logic (cf. [8]). However, Zermelo never shared this viewpoint: In his first letter to Gödel of September 21, 1931, (cf. [1]) he had written that the Skolem paradox rested on the erroneous assumption that every mathematically definable notion should be expressible by a finite combination of signs, whereas a reasonable metamathematics would only be possible after this “finitistic prejudice” would have been overcome, “a task I have made my particular duty”.

§1. Mathematics and the physical world. Genuine scientific knowledge cannot be certain, nor can it be justified a priori. Instead, it must be conjectured, and then tested by experiment, and this requires it to be expressed in a language appropriate for making precise, empirically testable predictions. That language is mathematics.

This in turn constitutes a statement about what the physical world must be like if science, thus conceived, is to be possible. As Galileo put it, “the universe is written in the language of mathematics”. Galileo's introduction of mathematically formulated, testable theories into physics marked the transition from the Aristotelian conception of physics, resting on supposedly necessary a priori principles, to its modern status as a theoretical, conjectural and empirical science. Instead of seeking an infallible universal mathematical design, Galilean science usesmathematics to express quantitative descriptions of an objective physical reality. Thus mathematics became the language in which we express our knowledge of the physical world — a language that is not only extraordinarily powerful and precise, but also effective in practice. Eugene Wigner referred to “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences”. But is this effectiveness really unreasonable or miraculous?

Numbers, sets, groups and algebras have an autonomous reality quite independent of what the laws of physics decree, and the properties of these mathematical structures can be just as objective as Plato believed they were (and as Roger Penrose now advocates).

Julius König is famous for his mistaken attempt to demonstrate that the continuum hypothesis was false. It is also known that the only positive result that could have survived from his proof is the paradox which bears his name. Less famous is his 1914 book Neue Grundlagen der Logik, Arithmetik und Mengenlehre. Still, it contains original contributions to logic, like the concept of metatheory and the solution of paradoxes based on the refusal of the law of bivalence. We are going to discover them by analysing the content of the book.

In the present paper the story is told of the brief and far from tranquil encounter of L.E.J. Brouwer and A. Fraenkel. The relationship which started in perfect harmony, ended in irritation and reproaches.

The mutual appreciation at the outset is beyond question. All the more deplorable is the sudden outbreak of an emotional disagreement in 1927. Looking at the Brouwer–Fraenkel episode, one should keep in mind that at that time the so-called Grundlagenstreit was in full swing. An emotional man like Brouwer, who easily suffered under stress, was already on edgewhen Fraenkel's book Zehn Vorlesungen Über die Grundlegung der Mengenlehre, [Fraenkel 1927] was about to appear.

With the Grundlagenstreit reaching (in print!) a level of personal abuse unusual in the quiet circles of pure mathematics, Brouwer was rather sensitive, where the expositions of his ideas were concerned. So when he thought that he detected instances of misconception and misrepresentation in the case of his intuitionism, he felt slighted. We will mainly look at Brouwer's reactions. since the Fraenkel letters have not been preserved.

The late Mrs. Fraenkel kindly put the Brouwer letters that were in her possession at my disposal. I am grateful to the Fraenkel family for the permission to use the material.

I am indebted to Andreas Blass for his valuable suggestions and corrections.

Abraham Fraenkel (then still called Adolf) was one of the first non-partisan mathematicians, if not the first, who developed a genuine interest in intuitionism.

The advantages and disadvantages of formalization in philosophy are summarized. It is concluded that formalized philosophy is an endangered speciality that needs to be revitalized and to increase its interactions with non-formalized philosophy. The enigmatic style that is common in philosophical logic must give way to explicit discussions of the problematic relationship between formal models and the philosophical concepts and issues that motivated their development.

Lyndon's Interpolation Theorem asserts that for any valid implication between two purely relational sentences of first-order logic, there is an interpolant in which each relation symbol appears positively (negatively) only if it appears positively (negatively) in both the antecedent and the succedent of the given implication. We prove a similar, more general interpolation result with the additional requirement that, for some fixed tuple of unary predicates U, all formulae under consideration have all quantifiers explicitly relativised to one of the U. Under this stipulation, existential (universal) quantification over U contributes a positive (negative) occurrence of U.

It is shown how this single new interpolation theorem, obtained by a canonical and rather elementary model theoretic proof, unifies a number of related results: the classical characterisation theorems concerning extensions (substructures) with those concerning monotonicity, as well as a many-sorted interpolation theorem focusing on positive vs. negative occurrences of predicates and on existentially vs. universally quantified sorts.

We propose an original use of techniques from random graph theory to find a Monadic (Minimal Scott without equality) sentence without an asymptotic probability. Our result implies that the 0-1 law fails for the logics (FO2) and] (Minimal Gödel without equality). Therefore we complete the classification of first-order prefix classes with or without equality, according to the existence of the 0-1 law for the corresponding fragment. In addition, our counterexample can be viewed as a single explanation of the failure of the 0-1 law of all the fragments of existential second-order logic for which the failure is already known.

The present paper investigates the power of proper forcings to change the shape of the universe, in a certain well-defined respect. It turns out that the ranking among large cardinals can be used as a measure for that power. However, in order to establish the final result I had to isolate a new large cardinal concept, which I dubbed “remarkability.” Let us approach the exact formulation of the problem—and of its solution—at a slow pace.

Breathtaking developments in the mid 1980s found one of its culminations in the theorem, due to Martin, Steel, and Woodin, that the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals with a measurable cardinal above them all implies that AD, the axiom of determinacy, holds in the least inner model containing all the reals, L(ℝ) (cf. [6[, p. 91). One of the nice things about AD is that the theory ZF + AD + V = L(ℝ) appears as a choiceless “completion” of ZF in that any interesting question (in particular, about sets of reals) seems to find an at least attractive answer in that theory (cf., for example, [5] Chap. 6). (Compare with ZF + V = L!) Beyond that, AD is very canonical as may be illustrated as follows.

Let us say that L(ℝ) is absolute for set-sized forcings if for all posets P ∈ V, for all formulae ϕ, and for all ∈ ℝ do we have that

where is a name for the set of reals in the extension.

We recall the notions of weak and strong Euler characteristics on a first order structure and make explicit the notion of a Grothendieck ring of a structure. We define partially ordered Euler characteristic and Grothendieck ring and give a characterization of structures that have non-trivial partially ordered Grothendieck ring. We give a generalization of counting functions to locally finite structures, and use the construction to show that the Grothendieck ring of the complex numbers contains as a subring the ring of integer polynomials in continuum many variables. We prove the existence of a universal strong Euler characteristic on a structure. We investigate the dependence of the Grothendieck ring on the theory of the structure and give a few counter-examples. Finally, we relate some open problems and independence results in bounded arithmetic to properties of particular Grothendieck rings.

The purpose of this communication is to announce some recent results on the computably enumerable sets. There are two disjoint sets of results; the first involves invariant classes and the second involves automorphisms of the computably enumerable sets. What these results have in common is that the guts of the proofs of these theorems uses a new form of definable coding for the computably enumerable sets.

We will work in the structure of the computably enumerable sets. The language is just inclusion, ⊆. This structure is called ε.

All sets will be computably enumerable non-computable sets and all degrees will be computably enumerable and non-computable, unless otherwise noted. Our notation and definitions are standard and follow Soare [1987]; however we will warm up with some definitions and notation issues so the reader need not consult Soare [1987]. Some historical remarks follow in Section 2.1 and throughout Section 3.

We will also consider the quotient structure ε modulo the ideal of finite sets, ε*. ε* is a definable quotient structure of ε since “Χ is finite” is definable in ε; “Χ is finite” iff all subsets of Χ are computable (it takes a little computability theory to show if Χ is infinite then Χ has an infinite non-computable subset). We use A* to denote the equivalent class of A under the ideal of finite sets.

This paper reports recent progress in applying nonstandard analysis to additive number theory, especially to problems involving upper Banach density.

There has been increasing interest over the last few decades in the study of the effective content of Mathematics. One field whose effective content has been the subject of a large body of work, dating back at least to the early 1960s, is model theory. (A valuable reference is the handbook [7]. In particular, the introduction and the articles by Ershov and Goncharov and by Harizanov give useful overviews, while the articles by Ash and by Goncharov cover material related to the topic of this communication.)

Several different notions of effectiveness of model-theoretic structures have been investigated. This communication is concerned with computable structures, that is, structures with computable domains whose constants, functions, and relations are uniformly computable.

In model theory, we identify isomorphic structures. From the point of view of computable model theory, however, two isomorphic structures might be very different. For example, under the standard ordering of ω the success or relation is computable, but it is not hard to construct a computable linear ordering of type ω in which the successor relation is not computable. In fact, for every computably enumerable (c. e.) degree a, we can construct a computable linear ordering of type ω in which the successor relation has degree a. It is also possible to build two isomorphic computable groups, only one of which has a computable center, or two isomorphic Boolean algebras, only one of which has a computable set of atoms. Thus, for the purposes of computable model theory, studying structures up to isomorphism is not enough.