1 See some examples in K.D. Schenkel, “Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective” (2009) 78 UMKC Law Review 181, 181–83, 196; J. Grannis, “Community-Driven Climate Solutions: How Public-Private Partnerships with Land Trusts Can Advance Climate Action” (2020) 44 William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 701. We explain why trust is a necessary component in a liberal property regime in H. Dagan and I. Samet, “Express Trust: The Dark Horse of the Liberal Property Regime” in S. Degeling, J. Hudson and I. Samet (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Express Trusts (Oxford 2023).

2 Perhaps the most famous example is “The Paradise Papers” project – a special investigation by The Guardian and 95 media partners worldwide into a leak of 13.4 million files from two offshore service providers and 19 tax havens’ company registries, which found that many of the tax avoidance schemes relied on the trust structure: “Paradise Papers: A Special Investigation”, The Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/paradise-papers (last accessed 21 January 2024). See also the BBC Panorama programme, “Millionaire Bankrupts Exposed”, which exposed how wealthy business people used trusts and other tricks to keep hold of their wealth, while those they owe money to are left with nothing: “Millionaire Bankrupts Exposed”, available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09m5wdd (last accessed 21 January 2024); M. Bennett and A. Hofri-Winogradow, “The Use of Trusts to Subvert the Law: An Analysis and Critique” (2021) 41 O.J.L.S. 692.

3 Following changes to the way trusts are being taxed, it is now nearly impossible to use an onshore trust structure to avoid taxes. The Income Tax Act 2007 stipulates that trustees must pay income tax at the highest rate for any income from the trust assets: see Part 9 (special rules about settlements and trustees).

4 H. Dagan and I. Samet, “What’s Wrong with Massively Discretionary Trusts” (2022) 138 L.Q.R. 624, 629.

5 E.g. L. Smith, “Give the People What They Want? The Onshoring of the Offshore” (2018) 103 Iowa Law Review 2155; J.P. Webb, “An Ever-Reducing Core? Challenging the Legal Validity of Offshore Trusts” (2015) 21 Trusts & Trustees 476.

6 E.g. D. Russell and T. Graham, “Trusts: Weapons of Mass Injustice or Instruments of Economic Progress?” (2017) 23 Trusts & Trustees 363; R.M.B. Antoine, “The Offshore Trust: A Catalyst for Development” (2007) 14 Journal of Financial Crime 264.

7 In the US, the spillover has already taken place and some states have enacted asset protection trusts that can also be self-settled: see the review in A.J. Hirsch, “Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust” (2006) 27 Cardozo Law Review 2685, 2685–87.

8 See e.g. the extensive arguments that support Tony Molloy’s observation that “[a]lmost 50 years of specialist trust practice has left me with no doubt … [that o]ffshore trusts are routinely involved in fraud and evasion on an industrial scale”: T. Molloy, “High-Net-Worth Trusts in the Twenty-First Century: Confiscatory Taxes and Duties?” in R.C. Nolan, K.F.K. Low and T.H. Wu (eds.), Trusts and Modern Wealth Management (Cambridge 2018), 536, emphasis removed.

9 Smith, “Give the People What They Want?”, 2156.

10 See e.g. R. Lee, “The Evolution of the Modern International Trust: Developments and Challenges” (2018) 103 Iowa Law Review 2069; L. Smith, “Massively Discretionary Trusts” (2019) 25 Trusts & Trustees 397. In the US context, see E. Marty-Nelson, “Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too” (1994) 47 Rutgers Law Review 11.

11 E.g. Re McPhail and Other Appellants v Doulton and Other Respondents (sometimes referred to as Re Baden’s Trust) [1971] A.C. 424 (H.L.); Serious Fraud Office v Litigation Capital Ltd. [2021] EWHC 1272 (Comm). See also A.S. Hofri-Winogradow, “The Stripping of the Trust: A Study in Legal Evolution” (2015) 65 University of Toronto Law Journal 1.

12 D.R. McNair, “Cook Islands Asset Protection Trust Law” (2010) 3 The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and the Law 321, 322; S.G. Gilles, “The Judgment-Proof Society” (2006) 63 Washington and Lee Law Review 603. Offshore practitioners market such advantages to their clients in an explicit way: see e.g. “Best Offshore Trust Jurisdiction – a Comparison”, available at https://www.offshorecorporation.com/trust/ (last accessed 21 January 2024).

13 J. Chipman Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property, 2nd ed. (Boston 1895), 247.

14 See examples in C. Spivack, “Democracy and Trusts” (2017) 42 ACTEC Law Journal 311, 311–12.

15 782 A.2d 410 (N.H. 2001).

16 Ibid., at 413 (Duggan J.).

17 Gilles, “Judgment-Proof Society”, 637.

18 R.C. Ausness, “The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent Financial Planning Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?” (2007) 45 Duquesne Law Review 147, 150.

19 S.E. Sterk, “Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?” (2000) 85 Cornell Law Review 1035, 1043; K.J. Nienhuser, “Developing Trust in the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust” (2015) 15 Wyoming Law Review 551. In England, section 33 of the Trustee Act 1925 allows the trust document to contain provisions to stop a beneficiary from prejudicing his right to the income of the trust, including becoming bankrupt. But in contrast with the situation in the US, the protective trust was never a popular tool for “asset protection” of the settlor’s own property. English laws and international conventions on transactions at under value and fraudulent preferences provide good protection against potential abuse of creditors: W. Cotton, “The Self-Protective Trust” (2013) 19 Trusts & Trustees 259, 259.

20 R.J. Mann, “A Fresh Look at State Asset Protection Trust Statutes” (2014) 67 Vanderbilt Law Review 1741, 1743, fn. 3.

21 As in the infamous case of Northern Rock trusts: see I. Cobain and I. Griffiths, “A Twisty Trail: From Northern Rock to Jersey to a Tiny Charity”, The Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/nov/28/northernrock.subprimecrisis (last accessed 21 January 2024).

22 Smith, “Massively Discretionary Trusts”, 26–28.

23 T.T.Z. Wei, “The Irreducible Core Content of Modern Trust Law” (2009) 15 Trusts & Trustees 477, 489.

24 D.W.M. Waters, “The Protector: New Wine in Old Bottles?” in A.J. Oakley (ed.), Trends in Contemporary Trust Law (Oxford 1996), 63.

25 Re T R Technology Investment Trust plc [1988] B.C.L.C. 256, 264 (Ch.D.) (Hoffmann J.).

26 P. Matthews, “The Black Hole Trust – Uses, Abuses and Possible Reforms: Part 1” (2002) 1 Private Client Business 42, 47. See also Re T R Technology Investment Trust [1988] B.C.L.C. 256, at [623]–[624] (Hoffmann J.); Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 A.C. 415, 491 (Lord Sumption).

27 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3rd ed. (London 1990), 284.

28 On the relational justice duties of owners, see Ḥ. Dagan, A Liberal Theory of Property (Cambridge 2021), ch. 5; in the context of trust, see Dagan and Samet, “What’s Wrong”, 641.

29 Trusts were used in a morally commendable manner to provide for a married daughter: Dagan and Samet, “Express Trust”, 155.

30 J v V [2003] EWHC 3110 (Fam), [2004] 1 F.L.R. 1042, at [130] (Coleridge J.).

31 Charman v Charman [2007] EWCA Civ 503, [2007] All E.R. (D) 425 (the husband had, qua settlor of the offshore trust, the power to replace the trustees and a letter of wishes stated that he should have maximum access to the trust’s capital and income).

32 The courts take into account “the likelihood that trustees will exercise their discretion in favour of a particular beneficiary in deciding what provision to make for a former spouse on divorce”: JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2015] EWCA Civ 139, [2016] 1 W.L.R. 160, at [13] (Lewison L.J.) (referring to Whaley v Whaley [2011] EWCA Civ 617, [2012] 1 F.L.R. 735).

33 Thomas v Thomas [1995] 2 F.L.R. 668, 670–71 (C.A.) (Waite L.J.).

34 [1988] B.C.C. 134 (Ch.D.). See also T. Akkouh and C. Lloyd, “‘Trust-Busting’ After JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev & ors [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch)” (2018) 24 Trusts & Trustees 151, 155; Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. [2011] UKPC 17, [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1721.

35 S. Gadhia, K. Rodgers and J. Ho, “Sham Trusts” (2016) 22 Trusts & Trustees 464, 469.

36 R. Snowden, “Keynote Address: The Use and Abuse of Trusts and Other Wealth Management Devices” (2017) 31 Trust Law International 99, 105.

37 S. Agnew, “The Reservation of Powers by Settlors: Intention and Illusion” [2021] C.L.J. 18, 20–21; M. Bennett, “The Illusory Trust Doctrine: Formal or Substantive?” (2020) 51 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 193, 194; P.W. Lee, “Form, Substance and Recharacterisation” in A. Robertson and J. Goudkamp (eds.), Form and Substance in the Law of Obligations (Oxford 2019), 90.

38 J. Brightwell and L. Richardson, “Mezhprom v Pugachev: Bold New Approach or Illusory Development?” (2018) 24 Trusts & Trustees 398, 400; JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch), 20 I.T.E.L.R. 905. When a similar point came up in a different context, the court refused to stretch the principle established there any further: see The Law Society v Dua and Another [2020] EWHC 3528 (Ch), [2021] W.T.L.R. 1469.

39 JSC Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch), at [113]–[140] (Birss J.).

40 Ibid., at [278].

41 Commentators disagree about the legal basis of the decision: see e.g. Bennett, “Illusory Trust Doctrine”, 142.

42 In the US, see e.g. Spivack, “Democracy and Trusts”, 331.

43 See e.g. D.A. Chaikin and E. Brown, “An Alternative Australian Trusts Act: Enhancing Australia’s Capacity to Grow and Export Financial Services”, available at https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pc.gov.au%2F__data%2Fassets%2Fword_doc%2F0008%2F193427%2Fsubdr050-services-export.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK (last accessed 21 January 2024); Smith, “Give the People What They Want?”, 2172–74.

44 “Modernising Trust Law for a Global Britain”, available at https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/modernising-trust-law-for-a-global-britain/ (last accessed 21 January 2024).

45 Trustees Act 1967 (Singapore), s. 90(5); Trustee Ordinance (Hong Kong) 2014, s. 41X(1); L. Ho, “‘Breaking Bad’: Settlors’ Reserved Powers” in Nolan, Low and Wu (eds.), Trusts and Modern Wealth Management, 38.

46 Chaikin and Brown, “Alternative Australian Trusts Act”, 7.

47 Smith, “Give the People What They Want?”, 2159. In Australia, see proposals in Chaikin and Brown, “Alternative Australian Trusts Act”, 1.

48 On the global tax agreement, see D. Bunn and S. Bray, “The Latest on the Global Tax Agreement”, available at https://taxfoundation.org/blog/global-tax-agreement/ (last accessed 21 January 2024).

49 F.W. Maitland famously regarded the development of the trust as “the greatest and most distinctive achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence”: F.W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures, 2nd ed., rev. by J. Brunyate (Cambridge 1936), 29.

50 L. Katz, “Conscience with a Filter: Comments on Equity: Conscience Goes to Market” (2020) 21 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 22, 22–24, footnote 6; P.B. Miller, “Conscience and Justice in Equity: Comments on Equity: Conscience Goes to Market” (2020) 21 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 37, 40–42.

51 See e.g. Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27, [2022] 3 W.L.R. 911, at [4] (Lord Briggs).

52 I. Samet, “On Trusts, Angels, Morality and Fusion: Reply to My Critics” (2020) 21 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 50, 50–53.

53 B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (first published 1921, New York 2005), 16, 61–62.

54 (1759) 1 Eden 177, 28 E.R. 652.

55 P. Matthews, “Burgess v Wheate (1759)” in C. Mitchell and P. Mitchell (eds.), Landmark Cases in Equity (Oxford 2012), 115.

56 Ibid., at 144.

57 [1996] A.C. 669 (H.L.).

58 Ibid., at 705 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).

59 E.g. R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford 1997), 204–6.

60 S. Agnew, “The Meaning and Significance of Conscience in Private Law” [2018] C.L.J. 479, 487.

61 On this changing nature of the trust (and its predecessor, the “use”), see D. Foster, “Historical Conceptions of the Express Trust, c 1600–1900” in Degeling, Hudson and Samet (eds.), Philosophical Foundations.

62 [2017] UKSC 6, [2017] A.C. 424.

63 (1883) 9 App. Cas. 34 (H.L.).

64 Akers v Samba Financial Group [2017] UKSC 6, at [24] (Lord Mance).

65 Ewing v Orr Ewing (1883) 9 App. Cas. 34, 40 (H.L.) (Lord Selborne L.C.).

66 Akers v Samba Financial Group [2017] UKSC 6, at [89] (Lord Sumption).

67 See also Byers and others v Saudi National Bank [2023] UKSC 51, [2024] 2 W.L.R. 237, at [36], [40] (Lord Briggs).

68 Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, 392 (P.C.) (Lord Nicholls).

69 I. Samet, Equity: Conscience Goes to Market (Oxford 2018), ch. 1.3. For the opposite view, see e.g. P. Birks, “Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy” (1996) 26 University of Western Australia Law Review 1, 18. The complaint about Equity’s alleged subjective nature has a long and famous history going all the way back to Thomas Audley, who wrote in 1526 of “a law called ‘conscience’, which is always uncertain, and depends on the greater part on the ‘arbytrement’ of the judge”: J.A. Guy (ed.), Christopher St. German on Chancery and Statute (London 1985), 79–80; see also D.R. Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (Surrey 2010), 69.

70 Samet, Equity, 62–64.

71 M. Briggs, “Equity in Business” (Lincoln’s Inn 2018), [54], available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-181108.pdf (last accessed 21 January 2024); Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27, at [4] (Lord Briggs).

72 Agnew, “Meaning and Significance of Conscience”, 488.

73 Samet, Equity, 207–10.

74 These are the questions that typically arise in, respectively: proprietary estoppel (Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 776); unconscionable bargain (Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. v Total Oil (GB) Ltd. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 173 (C.A.); Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd. v Amadio [1983] HCA 14, (1983) 151 C.L.R. 447); and undue influence (Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 A.C. 773; Johnson v Buttress [1936] HCA 41, (1936) 56 C.L.R. 113).

75 P. Sales, “Proprietary Estoppel: Great Expectations and Detrimental Reliance” (Lincoln’s Inn 2022), [35], available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/Proprietary%20Estoppel%20-%20Oxford%20Property%20Conference%20-%20Lord%20Sales.pdf (last accessed 21 January 2024).

76 Where the answer is not crystal clear, the law can, and does, expect us to err on the side of caution. But if the situation is genuinely perplexing, equity should not find against the defendant as their actions can be the result of a sincere mistake. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. v Akindele [2001] Ch. 437 (C.A.) is an example of a perhaps overcautious application of this policy.

77 Surely also thanks to the attention called to it by G.A. Cohen, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?” (2006) 58 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 113: see, in particular, his complaint in footnote 9.

78 M. Friedman, “How to Blame People Responsibly” (2013) 47 Journal of Value Inquiry 271, 272.

79 As Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard explain, “[blaming] can include, for instance, hatred, anger, resentment, indignation, disgust, disapproval, contempt and scorn, and can be manifest in any number of ways, including seeking retaliation, retribution, and vengeance”: N. Lacey and H. Pickard, “From the Consulting Room to the Court Room? Taking the Clinical Model of Responsibility Without Blame into the Legal Realm” (2013) 33 O.J.L.S. 1, 3. John Gardner qualifies their insight by pointing out that “[t]he problem … is not so much that we live in a ‘blame culture’ but that we live in a ‘call-out culture’ where accusation, reproach, censure, and punishment run wildly out of control and can no longer be managed back into proportion by mediating institutions such as the criminal courts”. He therefore calls for greater care about individuals’ acts of finger-pointing: J. Gardner, “Why Blame?” in I. Solanke (ed.), On Crime, Society, and Responsibility in the Work of Nicola Lacey (Oxford 2021), 92.

80 Like the ancient Persian proverb about the bramble saying to the pomegranate tree, “Wherefore the multitude of thy thorns to him that toucheth thy fruit?”, or the Latin American proverb, “The donkey talking about ears”.

81 G.A. Cohen, “Incentives, Inequality, and Community” in G.B. Peterson (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 13 (Salt Lake City 1992), 273, 275.

82 Cohen, “Casting the First Stone”, 119, emphases in original.

83 P. Todd, “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame” (2019) 53 Noûs 347, 347.

84 G.A. Cohen, Finding Oneself in the Other, ed. by M. Otsuka (Princeton 2013), ch. 7, section 1.

85 G. Dworkin, “Morally Speaking” in E. Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), Reasoning Practically (Oxford 2000), 185.

86 Cohen, Finding Oneself, section 2.

87 M. Bell, “The Standing to Blame: A Critique” in D.J. Coates and N.A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms (New York 2012), 275.

88 See e.g. M.K. Green, “Kant and Moral Self-Deception” (1992) 83 Kant-Studien 149.

89 Dworkin, “Morally Speaking”, 186.

90 R.J. Wallace, “Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons” (2010) 38 Philosophy & Public Affairs 307, 326–27.

91 Ibid., at 328. R.A. Duff, “Blame, Moral Standing and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial” (2010) 23 Ratio 123, 128.

92 K.G. Fritz and D.J. Miller, “The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame” (2019) 6 Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 545, 547.

93 C. Roadevin, “Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing” (2018) 49 Metaphilosophy 137, 148, emphasis in original.

94 Todd, “Unified Account”, 362.

95 Duff, “Blame, Moral Standing”, 129.

96 Gardner, “Why Blame?”. But see the work of Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard, who reject the picture of criminal law as essentially blaming and punishing in favour of viewing it as an institution whose “point is forward-looking: to hold responsible and to account, as a way of regulating behaviour, reducing harm, and upholding approved legal standards protecting the public against harm”. As such, the criminal law “cannot lose its standing to blame – for its function is not to blame to begin with”: N. Lacey and H. Pickard, “Why Standing to Blame May Be Lost but Authority to Hold Accountable Retained: Criminal Law as a Regulative Public Institution” (2021) 104 The Monist 265, 271, 273.

97 V. Tadros, “Poverty and Criminal Responsibility” (2009) 43 Journal of Value Inquiry 391; G. Watson, “Standing in Judgment” in D.J. Coates and N.A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms (New York 2012).

98 Duff, “Blame, Moral Standing”, 133.

99 In tort, see e.g. J.C.P. Goldberg and B.C. Zipursky, “Torts as Wrongs” (2010) 88 Texas Law Review 917; J. Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs (Oxford 2019); A. Ripstein, Private Wrongs (Cambridge, MA 2016). In contract, see C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2015). Though it is not necessarily the case that civil remedies are aimed at correcting such wrongs, see S.A. Smith, Rights, Wrongs, and Injustices: The Structure of Remedial Law, 1st ed. (Oxford 2019).

100 Rebecca Stone suggests, for example, that justification for claims in private law is not rooted in the defendant’s wrongdoing, but rather in the plaintiff’s moral permission to enforce her rights under conditions of epistemic uncertainty about justice: R. Stone, “Private Liability Without Wrongdoing” (2023) 73 University of Toronto Law Journal 53.

101 See e.g. R.E. Scott, “A Joint Maximization Theory of Contract and Regulation” in H. Dagan and B.C. Zipursky (eds.), Research Handbook on Private Law Theory (Cheltenham 2020). In tort, see discussion and sources in Y. Kaplan, “Economic Theory of Tort Law” in Dagan and Zipursky (eds.), Research Handbook.

102 See e.g. T. Etherton, “Equity and Conscience” (2017), available at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/sir-terence-etherton-mr-eldon-lecture-20171030.pdf (last accessed 21 January 2024); G. Virgo, “Whose Conscience? Unconscionability in the Common Law of Obligations” in A. Robertson and M. Tilbury (eds.), Divergences in Private Law (Oxford 2016); D.R. Klinck, “The Unexamined ‘Conscience’ of Contemporary Canadian Equity” (2001) 46 McGill Law Journal 571.

103 C. Mitchell, “Equitable Rights and Wrongs” (2006) 59 Current Legal Problems 267, 380–82.

104 Thus, neither John H. Langbein nor Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei even mention the concept of conscience in their discussions: see J.H. Langbein, “The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts” (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 625; H. Hansmann and U. Mattei, “The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis” (1998) 73 New York University Law Review 434. The same applies for the book-length defence of the proprietary position in M.W. Lau, The Economic Structure of Trusts: Towards a Property-Based Approach (Oxford 2011). Robert H. Sitkoff, who suggests that we reconceptualise trust law as part of “organisational law”, does not devote any attention to conscience categories either: R.H. Sitkoff, “An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law” (2004) 89 Cornell Law Review 621.

105 J. Raz, “Promises and Obligations” in P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.), Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford 1977), 212; see also S.V. Shiffrin, “Immoral, Conflicting, and Redundant Promises” in R.J. Wallace, R. Kumar and S. Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon (Oxford 2011).

106 Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 32 E.R. 656, 658.

107 Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd. [2003] UKPC 26, [2003] 2 A.C. 709, at [51] (Lord Walker).

108 R. Nolan, “Invoking the Administrative Jurisdiction: The Enforcement of Modern Trust Structures” in P.S. Davies and J. Penner (eds.), Equity, Trusts and Commerce (Oxford 2017), 160–66. However, this does not stretch to protectors or objects of purely personal power.

109 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] A.C. 467, at [108], [118] (Lord Toulson); Samet, Equity, 158–63.