It may be that historians of the future will regard the present age as distinguished above all things by the system of social security introduced by the series of statutes which included the National Health Service Act, 1946, the National Insurance Act, 1948, and the National Assistance Act, 1948.

Until recently it was possible to state with some confidence that English courts have no jurisdiction to wind up a foreign unregistered company which, though carrying on business in England through agents or otherwise, has no place of business here. The term “place of business” was given a very extended meaning in the course of time and came to include the premises of a hotel where the directors of the foreign company stayed annually over a number of years for a period lasting from a few weeks to several months, and from which they conducted their business while in England. However, in 1950, Harman J., in Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesley) (in liquidation) v. Kindersley, decided that a foreign unregistered company which has assets in England can be wound up by English courts, even if it has no place of business in England otherwise than through agents. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Harman J. but Sir Raymond Evershed M.R., in whose judgement the other members of the court concurred, took a different view of the facts. He found that even if the Banque des Marchands de Moscou had no branch or specific place of business in England, it had nevertheless a place of business in England in the extended meaning given to this term by Cohen J. in Rabenek's Case, seeing that one of its directors had transacted business for the bank in England. This reason would have sufficed to dispose of the question whether English courts, in the circumstances, had jurisdiction to wind up the foreign company.

A co-prisoner has never been a competent prosecution witness, save in four exceptional cases:— (i) after a nolle prosequi; (ii) after a plea of guilty; (iii) after an acquittal; (iv) after severance of the trials. Even in the four exceptional cases, it is the practice for the judge to warn the jury against convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of the co-prisoner, if they hold him to be an accomplice. As a defence witness, a prisoner was before the Act of 1898 competent for the defence of a co-prisoner only in the four exceptional cases, but it seems never to have been doubted since the Act that he is competent in all cases. Whether the evidence of the prisoner as a defence witness is evidence against a co-prisoner is a difficult question, but, although there are conflicting authorities, the better view, both in principle and upon authority, seems to be that today a prisoner is a competent defence witness against a co-prisoner in all cases, but the jury should be given the accomplice warning, if they hold him to be an accomplice.

This article is intended to supplement another article, but it is hoped that it may be capable of standing on its own legs. The other article referred to is that entitled “The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence,” by Professor Michael Oakeshott, which appeared in the now extinct journal “Politica” in September and December 1938. The point in that article at which the present article may be appended occurs on p. 350 in the December number (Vol. III, No. 14), where Professor Oakeshott distinguishes two inseparable stages in the process of philosophical inquiry. “First, there is the identification, the mere designation of the subject of enquiry. If we are to determine the meaning of the concept ‘law,’ we must know how to apply the word ‘law.’ And this is to be learnt only by a critical examination of the ways in which the word is ordinarily used. But such an examination leaves us with merely the definition of a word, leaves us merely with the identification of a thing. We have that one thing clearly before us, but we have nothing else; we have the text, but its full meaning is still to seek.” The exploration of this full meaning, of the “context” in which the thing law stands as “text,” is for Professor Oakeshott the second stage in the inquiry which ends with the establishment of a philosophical concept of law—and he has offered guidance of the greatest value to all explorers. This article, however, will be concerned only with the method of obtaining the “text” from which that exploration may begin. It is suggested that it is a particular method of obtaining this “text” which constitutes the distinctive characteristic of a lawyer's jurisprudence.

The purpose of this article is to consider the legal effects of a transfer of property by A to B subject to the performance by B of some obligation in favour of C, a third party to the transfer. The student of the law of contract is well familiar with the common law rule that no one who was not an original party to the contract is entitled to the benefit of that contract. But this rule creates hardship in particular cases and it has been shown that, in the main, three methods have been evolved to evade those unfortunate results. First, the legislature has intervened and provided C, the third party, with statutory rights. Secondly, the doctrine of agency has been invoked whereby C may claim that he is the principal of B. Thirdly, but with varying success, the trust concept has been pressed into service whereby C has sometimes been able to show that he is a beneficiary.

The note which follows in French was prepared by Monsieur M. Letourneur, a maître des requêtes au Conseil d'Etat and the senior Commissaire du Gouvernement, for my personal information. It is, however, so valuable that it obviously demands publication. But though of an extreme lucidity and precision, it may require, for its understanding by a common law lawyer, a context and an introduction.