² There is also, e.g. some numismatic evidence. Cf. Gardner, P., Proc. Brit. Acad. iii. 108Google ScholarJHS 31 (1911)Google Scholar, 151, pl. vii; 33 (1913), 105; Jameson, R., Rev. Num. (1907–1908Google Scholar; 1911), 60; B.M. Cat. Coins, Ionia, xxiv–xxv.

³ See the discussion of Chapman, G.A.H., ‘Herodotus and Histiaeus' Role in the Ionian Revolt’, Historia 21 (1972), 549.Google Scholar

⁴ Forrest; e.g. the arguments of Histiaios at the Danube bridge (4.137) or those of Aristagoras at Sparta (5.49).

⁵ Burn, A.R., The Persians and the Greeks (London, 1962), p. 193.Google Scholar

⁶ Hignett, C., Xerxes' Invasion of Greece (Oxford, 1963), p. 85Google Scholar; Myres, J.L., ‘Persia, Greece and Israel’, Pal. E.Q. 85 (1953), 8–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ Cary, M., CAH iv. 218. It is worth noting, however, that Herodotus tells us that Miletus, the first city to rebel, was at the height of prosperity at this time (5.28).Google Scholar

⁸ Cf. Heinlein, S., ‘Histiaios von Milet’, Klio 9 (1909), 341–51Google Scholar; De Sanctis, G., ‘Aristagora di Mileto’, RIFC 59 (1931), 48–72Google Scholar; Cary, M., op. cit., pp. 214–28Google Scholar; Grundy, G., The Great Persian War (London 1901), pp. 66–144Google Scholar; Blamire, A., ‘Herodoni and Histiaeus’, CQ N.S. 9 (1959), 142–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Burn, , op. cit., pp. 193–223Google Scholar; Evans, J., ‘Histiaeus and Aristagoras: Notes on the Ionian Revolt’, AJPh 84 (1963), 113–28Google Scholar; Lang, M., ‘Herodotus and the Ionian Revolt’ Historia 17 (1968), 24–36Google Scholar. In opposition to these views, especially contra Lang, see Waters, K., ‘Herodotus and the Ionian Revolt’, Historia 19 (1970), 504–8Google Scholar; and Chapman, , op. cit., pp. 546–68.Google Scholar

⁹ e.g. Cary, , p. 216: ‘In Herodotus’ eyes the Ionian Revolt was indeed a mere impulsive fling, and its cause lay no deeper than the sudden inspiration of two Greek adventurers bent on fishing in troubled waters.' But see Waters, p. 504, who does distinguish between the leaders' actions, and the causes of the Revolt.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Cf. Chapman, Evans, Grundy, Heinlein, and Swoboda, H., RE viii. 2 (1913), 2047–50Google Scholar. However, Andrewes, A., The Greek Tyrants (London, 1956), p. 126, defends their motives as quite credible.Google Scholar

¹¹ Mr. Forrest first presented this argument to me. Cf. Blamire, , p. 152Google Scholar; adopted by Chapman, , pp. 561–3. See also Hdt. 5.23;33;6.1–4;30.Google Scholar

¹² Evans, , pp. 120–1Google Scholar; and Chapman, , pp. 559–60, deny Histiaios’ complicity in the rebellion, suggesting that he was, at least initially, a loyal subject to Darius. Yet neither posits the struggle between Histiaios and Aristagoras which I believe best explains the account of the source. See below.Google Scholar

¹³ The Skythian expedition is dated by the Capitoline Stone (JG xiv. 1297Google Scholar) which makes it synchronous with the murder of Hipparchus. The Stone also provides the date 526/5 for the invasion of Egypt by Cambyses. These dates fit the narrative of Herodotus (cf. Hammond, , Historia 3 (1955), 394Google Scholar). Wade-Gery, (JHS 71 (1951), 212–21) arrives at a similar date for the expedition, although by a slightly different argument. His note (p. 215 n.14) adequately rejects the earlier dating of Cary (p. 212) who placed Darius’ attack ‘in or about 516'. I’ the expedition were earlier than 514/13, it would only imply an even longer absence for Histiaios; it is all but impossible that it could have been much later.Google Scholar For the date of Histiaios' call to Susa, see Swoboda, , p. 2048Google Scholar, and Macan, R.W., Herodotus, The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Books (London, 1895), ii. 60Google Scholar: Histiaios seems to have been summoned shortly after the Skythian expedition, but prior to the expulsion of Hippias from Athens. The outbreak of the Revolt can be placed in 499 by working backwards in Herodotus vi from the Battle of Marathon which the ancients uniformly dated to 490. We are told that the end of major operations was ‘in the sixth year’ (6.18). This, then, falls in 494, and the beginning of the Revolt will then be placed in 499, in early autumn or late summer, when the fleet had returned from its four-month siege of Naxos (5.34). This argument is followed by Burn, , p. 198Google Scholar; How, W. W. and Wells, J., A Commentary on Herodotus (Oxford, 1912), ii. 12–13Google Scholar; Macan, , pp. 62–70Google Scholar; Grundy, , p. 142Google Scholar; and Forrest.

The chronology of this period is particularly vexed; numerous minor permutations of these dates are possible. For the sake of my hypothesis, however, we need only grant that Histiaios was away from Miletus for several years, between the time of the Danube bridge episode and the outbreak of the Revolt. The exact termini do not affect the case.

¹⁴ Evans, , pp. 117–18, suggests that Histiaios still ruled Miletus and Myrkinos from Susa. There is no evidence for this. The only indication of communication between Histiaios and Aristagoras is the tattooed-slave story (Hdt. 5.35). Even if true, this story seems insufficient to posit Histiaios a ruler by proxy.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Grundy, , pp. 87–8Google Scholar, first suggested that the Revolt was plotted in advance of the tattooed slave, perhaps implying a continued co-operation between Histiaios and Aristagoras. Blamire, , p. 144, has argued that the council (Hdt. 5.36) need not imply a gathering of ‘conspirators’, but rather only ‘followers’. Earlier conspiracy seems particularly unlikely because of the nature of this council; Hecataios, one of the followers present, argues against revolt. Why debate a pre-planned conspiracyGoogle Scholar Professor Andrewes has mentioned to me that this council would not necessarily rule out previous planning. But the burden of proof would seem to rest on this view. Herodotus’ narrative implies debate, not the working out of details.

¹⁶ With Andrewes, , p. 126Google Scholar, I see no need to question the personal motives of Aristagoras in this case. Grundy, , p. 86Google Scholar; Sanctis, De, p. 51Google Scholar; Lang, , p. 28Google Scholar, all reject the motives, and suggest that Persia would not have allowed Aristagoras to attempt a ‘Milesian Empire’ nor gain too much power for himself. But Histiaios’ recall from Myrkinos is no precedent for such a policy. Neither he nor Aristagoras was told the reason for his appointment as royal counsellor (Hdt. 5.23; 24). Moreover, the involvement of Artaphrenes, and his insistence that Megabates lead the expedition, seem intentional curbs on any excess gain for which Aristagoras. might have hoped. Aristagoras' ambitions were clear enough for the Persians to take precautions.

¹⁷ Many have doubted the story of Megabates' treachery (Hdt. 5.33), cf. Cary, , p. 217Google Scholar; Grundy, , p. 86Google Scholar; Burn, , p. 196Google Scholar; Forrest (on Hdt. 5.33). Lang, , p. 28, argues that if the Persian captain had sabotaged the expedition, Aristagoras would not have been held responsible for the failure. This assumes that Artaphrenes, humiliated and empty-handed, would be just and rational in assigning the blame. Why assume such an unnatural reaction?Google Scholar

¹⁸ Cf. Grundy, , p. 88.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Cf. Blamire, , p. 147Google Scholar; Evans, , p. 120.Google Scholar

²⁰ Cf. Grundy, , p. 88Google Scholar; Cary, , p. 217Google Scholar; Lang, , p. 28Google Scholar; Chapman, , p. 559Google Scholar.

²¹ Cf. Evans, , p. 125.Google Scholar

²² Or as Hdt. 5.35 implies, did Histiaios seek to be dispatched to deal with the Revolt in Miletus? Perhaps Histiaios hoped Aristagoras would revolt, and be easily crushed by the Persian forces.

²³ Hdt. 5.37. First suggested by Evans, , p. 120.Google Scholar

²⁴ This point is made by Chapman, , p. 555. Also, note that only Histiaios' persuasive arguments saved him at Chios; Hdt. 6.2.Google Scholar

²⁵ pp. 30–1.

²⁶ In addition, Professor Andrewes has suggested to me that the topography of the area makes the Plutarch tradition unlikely.

²⁷ Cf. Grundy, , pp. 112 ff. for the analysis of the Persian counter-attack.Google Scholar

²⁸ Cf. Sanctis, De, pp. 70–1Google Scholar; Blamire, , p. 149.Google Scholar

²⁹ Aristagoras may have known of Histiaios' boast or prior interest in Sardinia.

³⁰ Both Paeonia and Myrkinos are on the Strymon river (5.13; 23).

³¹ Cf. How and Wells, , p. 58.Google Scholar

³² Once again, the exact chronology of events is vexed. The attack on Sardis can be placed in the first campaigning season after the Naxos expedition of summer/autumn 499, i.e. summer 498 (so Macan, , p. 69Google Scholar; Grundy, , p. 119Google Scholar; How, and Wells, , p. 12Google Scholar; Forrest). We must then account for his whereabouts until the death of Aristagoras, which can be dated to late 497 at the earliest (Dio. Sic. 12.32.3; Thuc. 4.102.2). In other words, if Histiaios arrived in Sardis soon after the death of Aristagoras (6.1), we might conclude that he was travelling for upwards of a year or more. Presumably, in going from Susa to Sardis, Histiaios followed the Royal Road. According to Hdt. 5.52–4, this journey would last only three months, although here too there are problems with Herodotus' calculations (cf. How, and Wells, , pp. 21–4Google Scholar). Chapman, , p. 560Google Scholar, rejects this chronology, and suggests the alternative date of spring 497 for Histiaios' arrival. His calculations also involve many assumptions; it might be better to accept his more general point that we should not press Herodotus' implied chronology in 6.1 too closely. For Evans's conjecture on the problem, see below. The exact delay of Histiaios in coming to Sardis is not crucial. Notice, whatever the timing, that Histiaios did not proceed directly to Miletus, as promised.

³³ Contra. Blamire, , p. 147.Google Scholar

³⁴ Professor Andrewes has suggested to me that Histiaios, if escorted to Sardis, may have had no choice in his destination. But if Histiaios were brought to Sardis under orders by Darius, how could the satrap Artaphrenes so casually dismiss him?

³⁵ Hdt. 6.1. Cf. Evans, , p. 123 n.23.Google Scholar

³⁴ Hdt. 6.1:

³⁵ Cf. Blamire, , pp. 147–8.Google Scholar

³⁸ That the Royal Road led directly to Sardis might suggest that Histiaios, as negotiator, was on his way to Miletus via Sardis. But after the rejection by Artaphrenes, he flees to Chios (Hdt. 6.1–2). See below and note 39.

³⁹ Chapman, , pp. 561–2, has suggested that Histiaios' visit to Sardis confirmed his role as a negotiator: his attempted alliance with Artaphrenes is to be explained by his need for Persian arms and direct contact with Susa; he would then restore Miletus to subject status. However, this hardly seems to be ‘negotiation’. It is tantamount to an armed assault on Miletus in the service of the King. My own view, then, agrees in part with Chapman's. But Histiaios' need to overthrow the new government in Miletus must not be overlooked.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Hdt. 6.1. ‘Aristagoras had gone to Myrkinos, if not Hades’ (Grundy). See arguments above for Histiaios' arrival prior to Aristagoras' flight.

⁴¹ Hdt. 6.1–2. Artaphrenes' accusation that ‘Histiaios stitched the shoe and Aristagoras put it on’ is not necessarily as Herodotus assumes. As Forrest writes, ‘It is another sign of the satrap's determination to eliminate Histiaios. It is pointless to waste a good charge on a dead man’ (Aristagoras).

⁴² Histiaios' foiled attempts to stir up revolt in Sardis can be seen as malicious revenge for his rejection by Artaphrenes. It need not be assumed that his chief interest in going to Chios was to send the Hermippus letters (6.4), cf. Heinlein, , p. 345Google Scholar. His choice of Chios may have been based on a traditional friendship between Chios and Miletus (cf. How, and Wells, i. 63Google Scholar; Hdt. 1.18.3). Perhaps he hoped that Strattis, tyrant of Chios, was still in power; in 514/13 Strattis had been at the Danube bridge with Histiaios (4.138). There is some evidence that Strattis remained in power, or at least influential, in Chios through the Revolt. Cf. Hdt. 8.132 and How, and Wells, , ii. 279.Google Scholar

⁴³ Blamire, , p. 150Google Scholar (contra Heinlein, , pp. 346–7) argues that Histiaios was not trying to re-establish himself as tyrant, since he would have been aware of anti-tyrannical sentiment in Ionia. This sentiment clearly explains Histiaios' failure at Miletus-but not his intent.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ ‘Even Herodotus now seems baffled’ (Forrest).

⁴⁵ p. 2049.

⁴⁶ Hdt. 6.26:

⁴⁷ Cf. Blamire, , p. 151.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ pp. 349–51.

⁴⁹ Cf. Blamire, , pp. 149–50Google Scholar; adopted by Chapman, , pp. 564–7.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ pp. 35–6.

⁵¹ p. 227.

⁵² Hdt. 4.137. Evans, , p. 117, suggests that Histiaios maintained this belief throughout the Revolt.Google Scholar

⁵³ Forrest notes that Histiaios captured only those ships (6.5; 26), and thus argues that his aims were more specific than piracy and personal gain (contra Blamire, , p. 150Google Scholar; Cary, , p. 225Google Scholar; Chapman, , p. 566Google Scholar). The control of the Ionian food supply (cf. Grundy, , pp. 121–2Google Scholar) is consistent with the strategy of blackmail; Miletus would be an obvious target for Histiaios' extortion. It may be significant that during the late sixth and fifth centuries B.C. the corn trade from the Black Sea was becoming influential for the first time. The new trade would have been a particularly vulnerable market. See Noonan, T., ‘Grain Trade of the Northern Black Sea’, AJPh 94 (1973), 231–42Google Scholar; also, Ormerod, H., Piracy in the Ancient World (Liverpool, 1924), p. 106Google Scholar. Compare the identical strategy of Lysander, blackmailing cities who had revolted from the Lacedaemonians in 405 B.C. (Xen, . Hell. 2. 1. 17Google Scholar). Other explanations are less likely. Chios' refusal to accept Histiaios when he returns from the Black Sea discredits the case for his patriotic interest (6.26), e.g. Grundy, , pp. 121–2Google Scholar, who suggests Histiaios was putting pressure on ‘wavering allies’, or Burn, , p. 208Google Scholar, arguing that he was ensuring the safe delivery of grain to the cities in revolt. Perhaps Chios' resistance to Histiaios indicates nothing more than a desire to ally with the winning side after Lade. But the next year the Persians had to capture Chios, apparently offering last-moment resistance (6.31).

⁵⁴ Lesbos was not as attractive an alternative. The men of Lesbos had fled at Lade (6.14), and Histiaios may have considered their returning armada more of a threat to his own humble force.

⁵⁵ Grundy, , p. 120, makes a similar suggestion of Thracian alienation because of Aristagoras.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Hdt. 6.46; Thuc. 1.100. Cf. How, and Wells, , p. 74Google Scholar; Grundy, , p. 139Google Scholar; Blamire, , p. 151Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Cf. Grundy, , p. 139Google Scholar; Burn, , p. 215.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Scholars' difficulties in explaining his trip to Lesbos lead one to consider that it was not Histiaios' goal. Grundy, , p. 140, argues that the Lesbian contingent of the navy demanded defence of their homeland.Google Scholar

If so, why didn't the Chians in Histiaios' crew demand the same? (The force was composed of both Aeolians and Ionians; 6.28) Chios would have been more immediately threatened from the south.

Evans, , p. 126, suggests that Histiaios sailed to Lesbos to negotiate with the Persian fleet. Once again, one must ask, why not to Chios, which he controlled, and was further south than Lesbos?Google Scholar