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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2014
In the 50s b.c. the Roman republic faced serious challenges, not least among them the related problems of electoral bribery and provincial extortion. The year 54 b.c., which this article takes as a case study, witnessed both the worst electoral scandal Rome had ever seen and the high-profile extortion trial of M. Aemilius Scaurus. These events defy analysis in terms of the political allegiances and prosopographical connections usually tracked. It is more helpful to think of problems and (attempted) solutions, in which the younger M. Porcius Cato played a leading role. Scaurus’ prosecutor summed up a vicious circle: governors who had engaged in extortion would buy the consulship with the money they had stolen and go on to plunder other provinces. Cato countered from both sides: in the Senate, he proposed a new form of process to combat electoral corruption; as president of the extortion court, he allowed the prosecution to hurry through a case that was as much about ambitus as repetundae. These initiatives, while not immediately successful, helped lay the groundwork for future reforms.
Versions of this paper were presented to the Australasian Society for Classical Studies in Sydney and the Classical Association in Exeter. I would like to thank those who participated in discussion on each occasion, as well as Kathryn Welch, Martin Stone, Bruce Gibson, and CQ’s anonymous reader for their helpful comments on written versions.
1 E.g. Gruen, E.S., ‘The consular elections for 53 b.c.’, in Bibauw, J. (ed.), Hommages à Marcel Renard II (Brussels, 1969), 311–21Google Scholar; Courtney, E., ‘The prosecution of Scaurus in 54 b.c.’, Philologus 105 (1961), 151–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Asc. 19C.
3 Cic. Q. Fr. 2.15.4 (= SB 19): quae quidem comitia si gratuita fuerint, ut putantur, plus unus Cato potuerit quam omnes leges omnesque iudices. Cf. Cic. Att. 4.15.8 (= SB 90).
4 Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 44.5–7.
5 Dio Cass. 55.5.3; cf. 54.16.1 on Augustus’ law barring anyone who engaged in bribery from holding office for five years.
6 Cic. Att. 4.16.5 (= SB 89): senatus consultum quod hi consules de provinciis fecerunt, ‘quicumque posthac …’, non mihi videtur esse valiturum (‘the senatus consultum which the consuls have passed about the provinces, “whoever henceforth …”, does not look to me like it will be effective’). Nothing further is known about the measure, but a connection with ambitus is suggested by context: Cicero reports the decree between C. Cato's trial for electoral disturbances in 56 and his assessment of the four candidates’ chances for 53 (Att. 4.16.5–6 [= SB 89]). A possible parallel is the senatus consultum on provincial commands passed in 53, which was intended to reduce electoral competition (Dio Cass. 40.46.2); indeed, the two decrees may have been related (see below).
7 Cic. Q. Fr. 2.15.4 (= SB 19).
8 Cic. Att. 4.15.7 (= SB 90).
9 Cic. Att. 4.17.2 (= SB 91).
10 On the date, see Sumner, G.V., ‘The coitio of 54 bc, or Waiting for Caesar’, HSPh 86 (1982), 133–9Google Scholar, at 136–7.
11 Cic. Att. 4.17.3 (= SB 91).
12 Cic. Att. 4.17.4 (= SB 91).
13 Cic. Q. Fr. 2.16.2 (= SB 20).
14 Cic. Att. 4.17.3 (= SB 91); Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 44.2–3. In Plutarch's version the process was directed at magistrates-designate (οἱ κατασταθέντες ἄρχοντες), whereas Cicero says it was to take place ante comitia. Plutarch may be confusing the tacitum iudicium with Cato's proposal concerning the praetors-elect in 55 (Cic. Q. Fr. 2.8.3 [= SB 13]) or perhaps with Athenian dokimasia (see n. 19, below).
15 Scholars have suggested that it dispensed with the role of prosecutor (Bailey, D.R. Shackleton, Cicero's Letters to Atticus, Vol. 2 [Cambridge, 1965], 215Google Scholar) or with the long speeches usual in regular trials (Fehrle, R., Cato Uticensis [Darmstadt, 1983], 190 n. 157Google Scholar).
16 Cic. Att. 4.17.3 (= SB 91).
17 It was intended to prevent the election of corrupt candidates and the people's hostile reaction suggests that it was also expected to curtail the distribution of money (Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 44.3; cf. 49.3 on the elections for 51).
18 This would explain why the candidates, who had flouted a series of anti-bribery laws, were so alarmed by the proposal: Cic. Att. 4.17.3 (= SB 91).
19 One possibility is that it was modelled on dokimasia, the examination of an Athenian magistrate-elect with respect to formal qualifications and general fitness to serve ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.2–5). The effect of apodokimasia was disqualification from office. Unlike dokimasia, the tacitum iudicium was to take place before the elections. None the less, Plutarch's description of Cato's proposal resembles the Greek process, particularly in the power of the jury to vote against a candidate even if he had no accuser (compare Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 44.2 and [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.4). A iudicium reached without any specific accusation having been made might well be described as ‘silent.’ Note also Plutarch's use of εὐθύνας διδῶσιν. The phrase probably means simply ‘give an account’ (i.e. of the electoral campaign); however, it may be that the silent process adapted elements of both dokimasia and euthynai, the rendering of accounts after a magistrate left office ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 48.4–5; Lys. 24.26). Cf. Cic. De or. 2.280 for an example of electoral accounts exhibited in an ambitus trial and Leg. 3.47 for Cicero's proposal to include a form of euthynai in his ideal constitution.
20 Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 44.2.
21 Cic. Att. 4.17.3 (= SB 91); Sumner (n. 10), 137.
22 Cic. Att. 4.17.3 (= SB 91): magnus timor candidatorum. sed quidam iudices, in his Opimius, Veiento, Rantius, tribunos pl. appellarunt ne iniussu populi iudicarent.
23 Presumably a trinum nundinum after the decree: see Sumner (n. 10), 137.
24 Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 44.3.
25 Cic. Att. 4.17.3 (= SB 91).
26 Cicero first mentions Cato's illness on 20 September, the day following the ludi Romani: Q. Fr. 3.1.15 (= SB 21). He was still ill at the end of the month and Cicero knew in advance that he would not attend the meeting on 1 October (Att. 4.17.4 [= SB 91]). He had recovered by 11 October: Q. Fr. 3.2.1 (= SB 22).
27 Cic. Att. 4.17.4 (= SB 91). Favonius was Cato's constant ally and Ateius had worked with them both in opposing the lex Trebonia in 55: see Dio Cass. 39.35.
28 Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 44.3.
29 Cic. Q. Fr. 3.2.3 (= SB 22).
30 I retain the manuscript reading patrem over partem (‘part of him’) as emended by Manutius and adopted by Shackleton Bailey ([n. 15], 216). Scaurus relied heavily on his late father's reputation (Asc. 19C) and Cicero seems to have spoken of him at length during the trial (Asc. 20–23C). Cicero's joke that he had defended Scaurus’ father might allude to his client's guilt (see n. 71, below), and/or to the prosecution's attack on Scaurus senior. Shackleton Bailey's translation ‘a few days ago’ for paucis diebus illis looks like a slip.
31 F. Münzer, RE ‘Mucius’ (23), col. 446.
32 Shackleton Bailey (n. 15), 216–17.
33 Cic. Att. 4.17.4 (= SB 91).
34 Cic. Q. Fr. 3.2.3 (= SB 22), of 11 October. The elections were blocked at least until 21 October (Cic. Q. Fr. 3.3.2 [= SB 23]).
35 Terentius vetoed the bill (Cic. Att. 4.17.3 [= SB 91]), which would not have been necessary if the voting day had been voided by obnuntiatio. It is worth noting, also, that Scaevola's name is not among the numerous supplicatores at Scaurus’ trial (Asc. 28C).
36 See Appendix.
37 Cic. Q. Fr. 3.4.2 (= SB 24); Att. 4.18.4 (= SB 92). They were joined by the younger P. Servilius Isauricus, one of Cato's aemulatores (Cic. Att. 2.1.10 [= SB 21]). Other evidence points to amicitia between Cato and Scaevola: a contemporary Scaevola, probably identifiable as the tribune of 54, was a friend of Cato's nephew Brutus (Cic. Brut. 147, with Douglas, A.E., Cicero: Brutus [Oxford, 1966]Google Scholar, 118), and Cato was related to the family of Scaevola ‘the Pontifex’ (Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 14.3), who may have been the tribune's grandfather (Eilers, C.F. and Milner, N.P., ‘Q. Mucius Scaevola and Oenoanda: a new inscription’, AS 45 [1995] 73–89Google Scholar, at 82–3). Scaevola's subsequent service with Ap. Claudius in Cilicia (Cic. Fam. 3.5.5 [= SB 68]; cf. Shackleton Bailey [n. 15], 217) is perhaps best explained by Scaevola's friendship with Brutus, Appius’ quaestor and son-in-law, rather than any close connection between Appius and Scaevola; Cicero's tone suggests the two were not on such good terms as Appius claimed.
38 We do not know how long he continued. On 21 October the elections were still blocked by obnuntiatio, surely Scaevola's (Cic. Q. Fr. 3.3.2 [= SB 23]). Dio Cass. 40.45.3 suggests that the elections continued to be obstructed by religious means well into 53.
39 Cic. Q. Fr. 3.3.2 (= SB 23): comitiorum cottidie singuli dies tolluntur obnuntiationibus magna voluntate bonorum omnium. Admittedly the candidates did not want the elections held either, but their reasons were different from Scaevola's: C. Memmius, for instance, was hoping for Caesar's return (Cic. Q. Fr. 3.2.3 [= SB 22], 3.6.3 [= SB 26]). Likewise, the fact that Scaurus had an opportunity to distribute bribes was a consequence and not the object of Scaevola's actions.
40 Read together, Dio Cass. 40.46.1 and Plut. Vit. Pomp. 54.3 suggest that it was on Cato's initiative in 53 that the Senate authorized Pompey to have elections held. Messalla and Domitius Calvinus were elected, as Cicero had anticipated in September 54 (Cic. Att. 4.17.3 [= SB 91]). By then, it seems, Cato had decided that even corrupt magistrates were better than no magistrates at all (see Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 47.3).
41 Asc. 18C. See below on Triarius’ praenomen.
42 Through Cato's sister Servilia, who was very close to Triarius’ mother Flaminia: Asc. 19C.
43 L. Marius L. f., perhaps a relative of Cato's colleague in the tribunate, L. Marius, who joined him in passing the lex Porcia Maria regulating the award of triumphs (Val. Max. 2.8.1): see Gruen, E.S., The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley, CA, 1974)Google Scholar, 333 n. 107.
44 Asc. 20C.
45 Asc. 18C, 28C.
46 See e.g. Courtney (n. 1) and the data collected by Marshall, B.A., A Historical Commentary on Asconius (Columbia, MO, 1985), 150–5Google Scholar. The results of prosopographical analysis are summarized and critiqued by Alexander, M.C., The Case for the Prosecution in the Ciceronian Era (Ann Arbor, MI, 2002), 101–2Google Scholar. Pompey's role was particularly ambiguous: he provided a written laudatio for Scaurus but his support was lukewarm (Asc. 19–20C, 28C), and around this time he also withdrew his support for Scaurus’ consular campaign (Cic. Att. 4.15.7 [= SB 90]; Q. Fr. 3.6.3 [= SB 26]).
47 Gruen (n. 43), 336–7, followed by Alexander (n. 46), 102–6.
48 The year of his consular campaign was the natural time to prosecute an ex-praetor. Extortion charges were usually laid immediately upon the governor's return from his province, which (following an ex praetura command of at least one year) was also the first year in which he was eligible to stand for the consulship. A survey of Alexander, M.C., Trials in the Late Roman Republic 149 bc to 50 bc (Toronto, 1990)Google Scholar shows numerous prosecutions of ex-praetors de repetundis. At least one, M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 78), was prosecuted, like Scaurus, in the year of his consular campaign, though the charge was dropped (Alexander [this note], no. 131). In other cases it is impossible to tell whether the defendant had consular aspirations which were affected or abandoned on account of the criminal charge; naturally, those who were convicted will not have gone on to the consulship, and it is normal to hear nothing of defeated candidates: Broughton counted only fifty or so for the whole of the Republic (Broughton, T.R.S., ‘Candidates defeated in Roman elections: some ancient Roman “also-rans”’, TAPhS 81 [1991], i–vi and 1–64Google Scholar). Alexander (n. 46), 106, endorses Gruen's view, even though his own earlier work provides the basis for questioning it.
49 Cic. Att. 4.16.6 (= SB 89); Asc. 28C.
50 Cic. Scaur. 31–7.
51 Presumably the coitio was formed after it became known that C. Claudius would not be standing for the consulship. See Marshall, B.A., ‘Faustus Sulla and political labels in the 60's and 50's b.c.’ Historia 33 (1984), 199–219Google Scholar, at 212. Courtney (n. 1), 154, doubts whether C. Claudius ever intended to stand for 53.
52 Cic. Q. Fr. 2.16.3 (= SB 20).
53 Cic. Q. Fr. 2.11.4 (= SB 15), c. 13 February 54.
54 The coitio reflected particularly badly on the consuls, e.g. Cic. Q. Fr. 3.3.2 (= SB 23): tanta invidia sunt consules propter suspicionem pactorum a candidatis praemiorum (‘such is the odium the consuls are in, owing to the suspicion that they have done a deal with the candidates’). Cicero, at least, was prepared to defend all four candidates.
55 Even Appius’ brother Clodius joined the defence (Asc. 20C) and, according to Cicero, spoke critically of Appius (Scaur. 37). Tatum, W.J., The Patrician Tribune: Publius Clodius Pulcher (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999), 233Google Scholar, explains Clodius’ involvement as ‘a foot in both camps’ for the Claudii Pulchri and a means for Clodius (soon to become a candidate for the praetorship) to distance himself from his brother's disreputable behaviour. Note also that Clodius seems to have been moving closer to Pompey in October (Cic. Q. Fr. 3.4.2 [= SB 24]), while Appius was acting against Pompey's interests by attacking Gabinius (Q. Fr. 3.2.3 [= SB 22]). See also Gruen, E.S., ‘Pompey, the Roman aristocracy, and the conference of Luca’, Historia 18 (1969), 71–108Google Scholar, at 101–3, on Appius’ independence.
56 By 11 October, Scaurus’ campaign had ‘gone cold’ (Scaurus refrixerat): Cic. Q. Fr. 3.2.3 (= SB 23).
57 Appius was not only consul but a former governor of Sardinia. The Sardinians may have appealed to him as patron: Alexander (n. 46), 100.
58 His father had served there: Asc. 18–19C. See also Greenidge, A.H.J., The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (Oxford, 1901), 460Google Scholar; Marshall (n. 46), 122.
59 Douglas (n. 37), 194; Cic. Brut. 265. In fact, some MSS give Triarius’ praenomen as ‘C.’ at Asc. 29C. Asconius’ description of Triarius (Asc. 18C) supports the identification, as does the fact that both men were family friends of Servilia: Asc. 19C; Cic. Brut. 266 (C. Triarius was a close friend of Servilia's son Brutus). Cicero's references to ‘Triarius’ without praenomen suggest that there was only one important Valerius Triarius in this period.
60 Cic. Scaur. 29.
61 Asc. 18C: adulescente parato ad dicendum et notae industriae.
62 Cic. Scaur. fr. g: congesta fuit accusatio magis acervo quodam criminum.
63 Cic. Scaur. 18: Poposcit, imperavit, eripuit, coegit (‘he demanded, he requisitioned, he seized, he extorted’).
64 E.g. the allegations concerning Aris and Bostar's mother (Cic. Scaur. 5–13).
65 Cic. Scaur. 21–2. Unfortunately, the part of Cicero's speech dealing with the frumentarium crimen is lost. Alexander (n. 46), 107, hypothesizes profiteering analogous to Verres’. The charge may have had particular significance in light of Pompey's grain commissionership. Cicero's brother had recently visited Sardinia on that business (Cic. Scaur. 30).
66 Alexander (n. 46), 107.
67 Asc. 20C; cf. 28C on Scaurus’ laudatores. Earlier in the year, the abuse of laudationes had been raised in the Senate (Cic. Q. Fr. 2.12.2 [= SB 16]). Scaurus’ was probably the sort of acquittal that prompted the prohibition on character testimony in 52 (Dio Cass. 40.52.2; Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 48.4).
68 Cic. Scaur. 18–20; e.g. Cicero claims that it is impossible to prove whether a ‘gift’ was given voluntarily or not (19), but even voluntary gifts seem to have been forbidden by the lex Julia de pecuniis repetundis, if the relevant rules in the Digest reflect the Republican statute (e.g. Dig. 48.11.1, 48.11.6.1).
69 E.g. Cic. Scaur. 15, 20, 38–45. Cicero even tries to make the unanimity of the Sardinian witnesses an argument against their credibility (38).
70 Alexander (n. 46), 108–9.
71 Cic. Att. 4.15.9 (= SB 90). Indeed, if the patrem of the MSS is maintained (see n. 30), Cicero in Att. 4.17.4 (= SB 91) seems to imply that he could only defend Scaurus’ father. See also R.G. Lewis, Asconius: Commentaries on Speeches by Cicero (Oxford, 2006), 219.
72 For example, Cicero was obliged to explain Scaurus’ possession of a magnificent house: Asc. 26–27C. As proquaestor under Pompey, he was said to have behaved avariciously and accepted bribes from foreign kings: Joseph BJ 1.127–32. Asc. 18C seems to reflect general feeling that Scaurus had not been a model of virtue in Sardinia; cf. Cic. Att. 4.16.6 (= SB 89).
73 Asc. 18C.
74 Scaurus was worried: Asc. 19C; cf. Cic. Att. 4.15.9 (= SB 90).
75 Cic. Scaur. 23–8.
76 Cic. Scaur. 24: ‘Delata enim’, inquit, ‘causa ad me Romam est.’
77 Cic. Scaur. 17: Agmen tu mihi inducas Sardorum et catervas. However, Triarius seems to have had no written evidence: Cic. Scaur. 18–19.
78 Note that a magistrate-elect did not become immune until he actually entered office, as this passage shows; see also Weinrib, E.J., ‘The prosecution of magistrates-designate’, Phoenix 25 (1971), 145–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 149.
79 If the prosecutors had spent (say) sixty days collecting evidence, Scaurus’ trial would not have commenced before the ludi Romani in September, and thus might not have been completed before the end of the year, even without the sort of delaying tactics used by Verres’ supporters in 70 (e.g. Cic. 2 Verr. 1.30). It seems that extortion trials could easily take three months (Brennan, T.C., The Praetorship in the Roman Republic [Oxford, 2000], 2.456Google Scholar) and, under the epigraphic law at least, normally could not be commenced after 1 September (Lex. rep. lines 7–8), though Gabinius was charged with extortion in October 54 (Cic. Q. Fr. 3.2.1 [= SB 22]). Triarius’ concern was justifiable. As Alexander (n. 46), 105, points out, Cicero had been equally anxious to complete Verres’ trial by the end of the year.
80 The trial in question is often dated to 114, following Scaurus’ consulship (e.g. Alexander [n. 48], no. 96), but the parallel suggested by Asc. 19C seems to require a trial following a praetorian command. Marshall ([n. 46], 124–5; Marshall, B.A., ‘Two court cases in the late second century b.c.’, AJPh 98 [1977], 417–23Google Scholar) would identify it with the prosecution of the elder Scaurus for repetundae by M. Iunius Brutus.
81 Scaurus was charged on 6 July, before the coitio was revealed or the silent process proposed. By the end of July Cicero suspected that the elections would drag on, but he nonetheless expected them to be completed before Scaurus’ trial: Cic. Att. 4.15.9 (= SB 90). The senatus consultum postponing the elections was passed shortly before Scaurus’ trial began (Cic. Q. Fr. 2.16.3 [= SB 20]).
82 Cic. Scaur. 30.
83 Cic. Att. 4.17.4 (= SB 91), quoted above.
84 Cic. Att. 4.17.4 (= SB 91): sed tamen, etsi uberior liberalitas huius, gratior esse videbatur eorum qui occuparant.
85 Surprisingly, no sureties were taken in extortion trials in this period unless and until a guilty verdict was reached (Cic. Rab. Post. 37). In theory, the provision quo ea pecunia pervenerit provided for the recovery of res repetundae from third parties (Cic. Rab. Post. 8), but it would be of little use in cases such as Scaurus’, where the recipients were Roman voters at large. It may be that Scaurus chose not to commit his money until the case was decided, or he may have been unable to obtain finance, as the prosecution made him a credit risk. A further possibility is that Cato placed some sort of ad hoc control on Scaurus’ property by virtue of his praetorian imperium. The seizure of property was among the regular forms of magisterial coercion (Greenidge [n. 58], 336–7) and the taking of pledges was a key feature of Cato's arrangement with the tribunician candidates (Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 44.6). Note also that, during his mission to Cyprus in 58–56, Cato threatened his friend Munatius with pignora capere for refusing to obey orders (Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 37.3: ἐνέχυρα λήψεσθαι).
86 While a magistrate-elect was not immune, in practice it was more difficult to secure the conviction of a designatus: Cic. Att. 4.15.9 (= SB 90); Weinrib (n. 78), 149 n. 8.
87 Cic. Scaur. 29. Triarius probably thought that Valerius, a Roman citizen, would be a particularly weighty witness.
88 Cic. 2 Verr. 1.29–31.
89 Asc. 29C. There were three votes against L. Marius and ten against each of the two other subscriptores, M. and Q. Pacuvius.
90 Asc. 19C: M. Catonem … metuebat admodum propter amicitiam quae erat illi cum Triario.
91 Asc. 20C.
92 See n. 85.
93 Cic. Scaur. 30.
94 Asc. 19C: Qui inquisitionis in Sardiniam itemque in Corsicam insulas dies tricenos acceperunt. The alternative – 30 days in total – would mean that Cato agreed to an extraordinarily short inquisitio, which likewise would be a significant concession to the prosecution. By way of comparison, Cicero says that 110 days was a ‘very short’ time (perexiguus) for an inquisitio in Sicily (Cic. 1 Verr. 6; 2 Verr. 1.30).
95 See Appendix.
96 Neither Asconius nor Cicero gives any indication that Cato acted improperly. Indeed, Cicero had cut short his own inquisitio in Sicily, using only 50 of the 110 days granted him, so enabling Verres’ trial to commence before the trial which Verres’ supporters had tried to interpose by requesting a 108-day inquisitio in Achaia (Cic. 1 Verr. 6; 2 Verr. 1.30). In 70, as in 54, the praetor must have agreed to the new schedule.
97 Scaurus’ trial began shortly after the decree delaying the elections. Cic. Q. Fr. 2.16.3 (= SB 20): comitia in mensem Septembrem reiecta sunt. Scauri iudicium statim exercebitur (‘the elections have been pushed back into September. Scaurus’ trial will proceed immediately’). This passage might just indicate that the trial had been brought forward, now that there was a chance of completing it before the elections.
98 Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 44.2–3. This was not the only violent episode connected with the trial. Scaurus’ half-brother Faustus Sulla claimed that he was attacked by Scaurus’ electoral rivals shortly after postulatio (Asc. 20C).
99 Asc. 29C: Cato praetor, [Cicero] cum vellet de accusatoribus in consilium mittere multique e populo manus in accusatores intenderent, cessit imperitae multitudini ac postero die in consilium de calumnia accusatorum misit (‘the praetor Cato, when [?] wanted a decision taken on the accusers and many from the people shook their fists at the accusers, yielded to the ignorant multitude and the following day had the jury consider the question of false accusation by the prosecutors’). A textual problem here obscures the circumstances of the calumnia enquiry. The text as transmitted would mean that Cato wanted an enquiry, which would be hard to explain if, as I have argued, he sympathized with the prosecution. However, it seems clear from what follows that Cato acted against his will. Some change is therefore necessary, either emending vellet to nollet (Mommsen, T., Römisches Strafrecht [Leipzig, 1899], 494 n. 7Google Scholar) or supplying an alternative subject (‘Cicero’ is Clark's guess). From a legal point of view, Marshall (n. 46), 157, suggests that the praetor was required to put the question of calumnia to the jury as a matter of course (see also Greenidge [n. 58], 469); Lewis (n. 71), 231, argues that the initiative came from the defendant. The latter seems more likely, since Cato is described as yielding to pressure from the mob rather than legal obligation.
100 Cf. Dio Cass. 43.47.5 on the praetor L. Basilius, to whom Caesar gave a large sum of money in lieu of a province.
101 Thus Flower's recent assessment of Cato's ‘politics of constant obstruction’ and insistence on ‘narrow family tradition over constructive dialogue or innovation’ (Flower, H., Roman Republics [Princeton, NJ, 2010], 144–5Google Scholar) is not far removed from Mommsen's biting portrait of ‘the Don Quixote of the aristocracy’ (Mommsen, T., Römische Geschichte [Berlin, 1922 13], 3.166–7Google Scholar), though more positive appraisals are to be found as well.
102 See e.g. Gruen (n. 43), 233–9.
103 At Pompey's invitation: Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 48.1–4; Vit. Pomp. 54.5–6. Plutarch specifically reports that Cato advised Pompey on his ambitus law (Vit. Cat. Min. 48.3). While Cato is usually thought of as an opponent of Pompey, cooperation was possible in 52. Note that Cato and his son-in-law M. Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59) had been instrumental in bringing about Pompey's sole consulship in the wake of Clodius’ death (Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 47.3; Vit. Pomp. 54.4; Vit. Caes. 28.7; Asc. 36C; Dio Cass. 40.50.4; App. B Civ. 2.23.1). Plutarch (Vit. Pomp. 54.3) reports that Cato had earlier called on Pompey to restore order in 53.
104 Dio Cass. 40.46.2, 40.56.1. The law cannot be considered in detail here; for discussion, see e.g. A.J. Marshall, ‘The lex Pompeia de provinciis (52 b.c.) and Cicero's imperium in 51–50 b.c.: constitutional aspects’, ANRW 1.1 (1972), 887–921; Gruen (n. 43), 457–60; Brennan (n. 79), 402–3; Steel, C., ‘The lex Pompeia de provinciis of 52 b.c.: a reconsideration’, Historia 61 (2012), 83–93Google Scholar.
105 Dio (40.46.2) describes the measure as an attempt to curb electoral competition. See Steel (n. 104), 88–90, on the connection with the consular elections for 53.
106 See e.g. Gruen (n. 43), 459; Brennan (n. 79), 402; Steel, C., Cicero, Rhetoric, and Empire (Oxford, 2001), 224Google Scholar.
107 Bailey, D.R. Shackleton, Cicero's Letters to Atticus, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1968), 246Google Scholar; see also Gelzer, M., Cicero (Weisbaden, 1969), 232Google Scholar.
108 Dio Cass. 40.56.1.
109 Unfortunately, the content of the decree is unknown, but there is reason to think that it was concerned, in some way, with electoral corruption: see n. 6 above. Cobban, J.M., Senate and Provinces, 78–49 b.c. (Cambridge, 1935), 82Google Scholar, and Vervaet, F.J., ‘The scope of the lex Sempronia concerning the assignment of the consular provinces (123 bce)’, Athenaeum 94 (2006) 625–54Google Scholar, at 654 n. 102, suggest that it was a forerunner of the lex Pompeia. See also Steel (n. 104), 88 n. 21.
110 Domitius Ahenobarbus: see e.g. Plut. Vit. Cat. Min. 41. The silent process was also a consular motion, though not to the consuls’ liking. Cic. Att. 4.17.3 (= SB 91): consules, qui illud levi bracchio egissent, rem ad senatum detulerunt (‘the consuls, who had managed this very slackly, referred the matter to the Senate’).
111 This table follows Sumner (n. 10), 137–8, with additional dates from Asconius and Cicero.
