The problem suggested by this passage cannot be properly appreciated unless it is shown first of all that the treatment of poetry and art in the Laws fundamentally agrees with, though of course in some respects it provides a welcome supplement to, the attitude set forth in the Republic and elsewhere by Plato. The demand that music and poetry should ‘imitate’ the good; and that this ‘imitation’ should have meaning and accuracy, and be free from mere emotionalism (655–9, 667 sqq.) directly recalls the doctrine of the Republic (e.g. 395, 401) and other dialogues on the two kinds of imitation, which I have explained in the Classical Quarterly XXII p. 16, XXVI p. 161; the reason for the demand is the same—the imitation of evil has the same effect on character as the companionship of evil men. As for the effect of this ruling on comedy, the Republic (396e where παιδιᾶς χάριν leaves a loop-hole, 606c) is perhaps not over-clear. But the Laws explains that the comic art is to some extent valuable; its pictures of the ludicrous serve as a warning, and also help to make goodness more intelligible by setting it in relief; hence comedy may be performed for the edification of citizens by slaves or hired aliens (816) under certain restrictions such as that a piece shall not have too long a run (England on 8i6e 9) and that no ridicule of free men is to be permitted (935–6). On tragedy the two dialogues are in full agreement; it must become once more a hymn (Rep. 607a), using for a good purpose those forms of dramatic representation which are allowed to the poet in Rep. 396, and avoiding the mournful and complaining language (and music) of profane tragedy, which merely harrows the feelings and which cannot be used without blasphemy at a festival of the gods (Rep. 383bc, 605–6, Laws 800, 817).