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Psychology and Social Structure in the Republic of Plato.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

William Ridgeway
Affiliation:
Trinity College

Extract

It is now generally recognized that Plato's whole theory of the Ideal State is based upon the principle that human society is ‘natural’ As against the antisocial doctrines of certain sophists, this proposition means, in the first place, a denial of the view that society originated in a primitive contract. But Plato does not merely reject this false opinion; he also sets up an alternative doctrine that the state is natural, in the sense that a human society constructed on ideal lines1 would be one that should reflect the structure of man's soul, and give full play to the legitimate functions of every part of his nature. Accordingly, it is vital to his purpose in the Republic to show that the division of the Ideal State into three classes—Guardians, Auxiliaries, Producers—corresponds to the division of the soul into three ‘parts’ ‘kinds’ or ‘forms’ —the Reflective, Spirited, and Appetitive.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association1912

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References

page 246 note 1 , Rep. 428

page 246 note 2 In his useful book, The Political Thought oj Plato and Aristotle, London, 1906, p.103.

page 247 note 1 Cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen, II, p. 904: Die Unterscheidung der Stande und die unbedingte Unterordnung der niederen unter die hoheren war daher schon durch Plato′s politische Ansichten gefordert. Zugleich boten aber diese Bestimmungen weiter den Vortheil, dass der Staat durch dieselben die gleiche Gliederung erhielt, wie die menschliche Seele... dass er ein Bild des Menschen im grossen...darstellte.

page 247 note 2 Professor Burnet, on Phaedo 68c, says that the tripartite psychology the Republic is here implied (in a dialogue earlier than the Republic); and that it is doubtless older than Socrates; for it stands in close relation to ulti the Pythagorean doctrine of the ”Three Lives.”

page 248 note 1 J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 1902, note on 427 E. Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., ii, p. 883. The completeness of the list is implied in Isocrates, Panath. 30–32 (342 B.C.). Cf. Nagelsbach Nachhom. Theologie, p. 308.

page 248 note 2 Cf. Hirzel, op, cit., pp. 405 sqq. same effect. Poseidonjus ap. Galen, de Hipp, et Plat. pp. 425, 478 says that the doctrine originally belonged to Pythagoras, but was worked out and completed by Plato; and this is stated of certain Pythagoreans. Poseidonius may have drawn his inference, like Professor Burnet, from

page 248 note 3 See Hirzel, op. cit.

page 249 note 1 Cf. Heracleitus, frag. 62 Byw.:

page 249 note 2 Frag. 59 (Byw):

page 249 note 3 Cf. J. Adam on Rep. 432 A.

page 249 note 4 Ar. Top. ibid. 138 b 1. Hirzel, op. cit., p. 383, pointed out that a comparison of these passages with Top. 129 1 10.

page 249 note 5 [Ar.]

page 249 note 6 I cannot agree with Hirzel op. cit p. 382: ‘Aristoteles spricht hier seine eigene nicht die platonische Ansicht aus.’ Ramsaue ‘nisi jailor, rede,’ Susemihl regarded the words as interpolated.

page 249 note 7 The Ethics of Aristotle, London, 1900.

page 251 note 1 Cf. Adam′s table in his note on Rep. 432 A.

page 252 note 1 Ar. Poet. 1454 a 22, Rhet. 1361 a 6, ‘ summarizes the Greek idea on this point ’ Rhet. 1361 a 6, water on Poet. I.e.). Eur. Heracleid. 476

page 253 note 1 Burnet compares 1103 a 3, where the lower part of the soul obeying reason is described as [Dem.]in Aristog. I. 24:

page 253 note 2 Gorgias 507 E, Empedocles and the Pythagoreans, Olympiod.

page 253 note 3 warrior is common in Homer. Cf. seems to mean in battles by land.

page 254 note 1 Eth. Nic. III, vi,

page 254 note 2 Cf. also Eth. Nic. V, I, 14:

page 255 note 1 Ar. Rhet. ii, 12, 2 , each with its special etc

page 255 note 3 Thus at 412 C where the question is raised: ‘Who are to rule, and who to be ruled?’ the firt answer , the second condition being

page 255 note 4

page 256 note 1 Ar. Rhet. i, 5, 6

page 256 note 2

page 257 note 1 is said to be connected with Latin xii, 149 mantus, Lithuanian mar-ti, bride, young woman. See Prellwitz, Elym. Worterbuch, and Boisacq, avruu. Diet. Etym. s.v.

page 257 note 2 For examples see Webster, Primitive Secret Societies, New York, 1908.

page 257 note 3 Ar. Ath. Pol. 42. [Plato] Axioch. 367 A

page 257 note 4 Bekker, Anec. Sandys on Ath. Pol. loc. cit. cites the ephebic inscription (Bull. Corr. Hell., 1888)

page 257 note 5 For this sense of for instance Ar. Pol. ii, 5, 10: the advocates of communism

page 257 note 6 Plato, Charm.

page 258 note 1 Ar. Eth. Nic. v, 1, 15

page 259 note 1 Phil. d. Griech.1 ii, 883. Hirzel op. cit. p. 379 accepts this without question.

page 259 note 2 Rep. 435 E

page 259 note 3 Rep. 544 D

page 260 note 1 It should be noticed that these parts are not called Svpdiieis (faculties); whereas Justice is described as a (a power or virtue) 443 B.

page 260 note 2 The subtlety of the point has eluded the commentators. The argument is to dispose of supan objection stated at 438 A as follows: 'We must not allow ourselves, for want of thinking judghard enough, to be disturbed by the objection that no one desires simply “drink,” but only “good drink,” nor simply “food,” but only ”good food,” on the ground that everybody (so we are told) desires good things; and so, if thirst is a desire, it must be a desire of good–drink or whatever else it may be a desire of; and so on with the other desires.’

page 261 note 1

page 262 note 1 Rohde, Psyche, ii, 170. I believe that Empedocles distinguished an immortal migrating part of soul from the mortal part, see my From Religion to Philosophy, 1912, § 124

page 263 note 1 Accordingly, Aristotle (according to Plutarch, de virt. morali. 442 B) after at first accept ing Plato′s view of

page 263 note 2 For this view of the nature of a ‘sentiment,’ first formulated by Mr. Shand, seeW. McDougall Social Psychology