Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2025
Is fiscal decentralisation in a polity divided by languages, cultures, tribes, and geography a means to nation-building or a route to secession? I consider the case of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea to provide nuanced information on the above question. This case study reveals that fiscal decentralisation, agreed to as part of a peace agreement signed in 2001 following a decade-long civil war in Bougainville, provided the opportunity for national consolidation. However, tensions surrounding the implementation of arrangements for budgetary support of Bougainville are forcing further fracturing. A definitive answer to the question of whether fiscal decentralisation helped or hindered nation-building will be provided by the referendum, due by mid-2020, when the people of Bougainville will have the option to vote for independence from Papua New Guinea.
I am grateful to Christine Bell, Usman Chohan, Ron Levy, Anthony Regan, Thomas Webster, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Views expressed and remaining errors are those of the author alone, however.
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