One of the most important dates in German legal history is 1 October 1879. On this day the four Imperial Judiciary Laws (Reichsjustizgesetze) became effective: the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung), the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung), the Law on the Organization of Courts (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) and the Bankruptcy Code (Konkursordnung). They replaced a large number of different organizational and procedural provisions in the existing German states and effectively established legal uniformity in civil and criminal procedure in the German Empire. More specifically, the Court Organization Law created a national system of courts for civil and criminal matters consisting of Local Courts (Amtsgericht), District Courts (Landgericht), Appeals Courts (Oberlandesgericht) and the Imperial Court of Justice (Reichsgericht). The Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Bankruptcy Code provided the procedural framework for all these courts thereby bringing procedural unity to the German Empire for the first time.

Socrates, Oscar Wilde, Klaus Mann and many other men in history had one thing in common: they loved men. Some of them were lucky and could live a peaceful life regardless, since they either had the respective social standing or lived in societies where homosexuality was at least tolerated. Most others in history, however, were in a rather unfortunate position. To be gay was to be criminal. A conviction for homosexual conduct resulted in years in prison or worse: even today the death penalty can be imposed upon homosexuals in countries where the Shari'a, the Islamic Criminal Code, is interpreted and applied in a strict and conservative way.

For the German-trained lawyer, the process of coming to terms with the constitutional law of the United Kingdom can be disconcerting. This disorientation arises principally because the study of constitutional law on the other side of the English Channel seems to lack an appropriate object to deal with. State order in the United Kingdom is not based on a definitive constitutional document created at a particular point in history which would be in any way comparable to the German constitutional document, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). In spite of this, as Helmut Weber so aptly noted in a talk before the Centre for British Studies of Berlin's Humboldt University, “British textbooks on constitutional law […] are no less numerous and no less comprehensive than German textbooks on Verfassungsrecht”. This observation is not in the least surprising. Even though it may be disputed that a UK constitution exists in the narrower and more common continental European sense of the term, it cannot be denied that the learned discourse forming the body of constitutional scholarship in the United Kingdom is regarded by jurists not only in Europe, but in all corners of the globe, as an important standard for the scholarly examination of their own constitutional systems. This is certainly due in large measure not only to the centuries-old traditions of English constitutional law, but also to its striking intellectual depth and variety.

Criminal Justice is never only about identifying and sentencing unwanted and thus, outlawed behaviour. As one of the closest contacts between state and citizens, Criminal Justice implies also a system of values and more or less subtle messages which the state wants to transmit to the people. In all modern legal systems, Criminal Law is about society as a whole being deterred from crime, educated and moreover ensured of the state's power, its efficiency and above all its benevolence. In other words, Criminal Justice does not only deal with offenders and victims but additionally with its own presentation in public and the citizens’ perception of it.

The following reflections, that will focus exclusively on the European primacy clause in the light of the Statement by the Constitutional Court no. 1/2004 of 13 December, in particular with regard to its scope as regards the Spanish Constitution itself, may take as a starting point the conclusion contained at the last paragraph of FJ 4 of the Statement, which states as follows:

“In the scarcely-conceivable event that in the ultimate functioning of European Union Law this Law were to result irreconcilable with the Spanish Constitution, and without the hypothetical excesses of European Law with regard to the European Constitution itself being remedied by the ordinary channels provided for in the latter, ultimately the preservation of the sovereignty of the Spanish people and of the supremacy of the Constitution as it provides for itself could lead this Court to tackle the problems that would arise in such a case, and which from the current point of view are considered to be non-existent, by way of the relevant constitutional procedures”.

On 1 March 2005, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘ECJ’ or ‘the Court’) got another opportunity to rule on the effect of recommendations and decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter ‘DSB’) in the Community legal order. The ECJ concluded that an individual does not have the right to challenge, before a national court, the incompatibility of Community measures with WTO rules, even if the DSB had previously declared the Community legislation to be incompatible with those rules.