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Individual application to the Turkish Constitutional Court as a case of constitutional transfer

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 June 2016

ENGIN YILDIRIM  and
SERDAR GÜLENER
ENGIN YILDIRIM*
Affiliation:
Constitutional Court of Turkey
SERDAR GÜLENER*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Sakarya University, Turkey
*
*Email: engin.yildirim@anayasa.gov.tr
†Email: sgulener@sakarya.edu.tr
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Abstract:

The article has sought to clarify the phenomenon of constitutional transfer through an analysis of the introduction and implementation of the individual complaint procedure in Turkey. Individual access to constitutional courts has recently attained prominence as an effective tool of human rights protection and it is viewed as an example of the broader phenomenon of transfer of constitutional ideas from a point of origin to a new host environment. Critically applying the IKEA theory of constitutional transfer to the Turkish experience of the individual application to the Constitutional Court, we argue that the transfer process involves more than a simple interaction between the promoter and the importer, both of whom have converging as well as diverging expectations. The Turkish experience has proved a useful case to demonstrate the dynamic and multifaceted nature of the process of constitutional transfers. The Venice Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, the Turkish Constitutional Court and the Turkish Government all have important stakes in the success of the transfer to realise their own policy objectives.

Keywords

constitutional complaintIKEA theory of constitutional transferindividual applicationTurkish Constitutional Court
Type
Research Article
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , July 2016 , pp. 269 - 294
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

1 For an excellent review of the genealogy of the legal transplant debate, see JW Cairns ‘Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants’ (2013) 41 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 637–96; see also Y Roznai, ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments – The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea’ (2013) 61 American Journal of Comparative Law 657–719; V Perju, ‘Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing and Migrations’ in M Rosenfeld and A Sajo (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 1313; S Choudhry, ‘Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law’ in S Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2006) 22; N Walker, ‘The Migration of Constitutional Ideas and the Migration of the Constitutional Idea: The Case of the EU’ in Choudhry, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas 320–1; F Schauer, ‘On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas’ (2005) 7 Connecticut Law Review 909–10; D Berkowitz, K Pistor and J-F Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 163; L Epstein and J Knight, ‘Constitutional Borrowing and Nonborrowing’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 197; R Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II of II)’ (1991) 39(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 398; A Watson, ‘Legal Transplant and Law Reform’ (1976) 92(1) Law Quarterly Review 79.

2 See a special report prepared by the Venice Commission ‘Study on Individual Access to Constitutional Justice (CDL-AD(2010)039rev)’ available at <http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)039rev-e>, accessed 12 November 2015.

3 G Dannemann, ‘Constitutional Complaints: The European Perspective’ (1994) 43 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 142.

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5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point.

6 In Spain, around 8000 amparo applications are lodged before the Constitutional Court. See <http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/tribunal/estadisticas/Paginas/Estadisticas2014.aspx>, accessed 21 December 2015. The corresponding figure for Germany is around 6000 applications annually. See <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Statistik/statistics_2014.pdf__blob=publicationFile&v=3>, accessed 21 December 2015.

7 See (n 2) 22.

8 Ibid.

9 A method similar to normative constitutional complaint also exists in France where concrete review introduced in the 2008 constitutional reforms functions as an indirect constitutional complaint. See O Pfersmann, ‘Concrete Review as Indirect Constitutional Complaint in French Constitutional Law: A Comparative Perspective’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 235.

10 See (n 2) 23.

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12 KL Scheppele, ‘The Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas: The Post-9/11 Globalization of Public Law and the International State of Emergency’ in Choudhry (n 1) 348.

13 Choudry (n 1) 22; Walker (n 1) 320; Schauer (n 1) 909.

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19 Ibid 572.

20 Ibid 571.

21 Ibid 575.

22 For example, see R Rubio-Marin, ‘Legal Transfer of Women and Fetuses: A Trip from German to Portuguese Abortion Constitutionalism’ in Frankenberg (n 14) 147–9; For a critical reading of the IKEA theory of constitutional transfer, see U Baxi, ‘‘‘Ordering’’ Constitutional Transfer: A View from India’ in Frankenberg (n 14) 189–208.

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26 Perju (n 1) 1317.

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30 These principles are Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism and Revolutionism. They are considered as unchangeable and sacrosanct. See Y Roznai and S Yolcu, ‘An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment—The Turkish Perspective: A Comment on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Headscarf Decision’ (2012) 10(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 175; E Özbudun, ‘Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in Turkey’ (2009) 15(4) European Public Law 533, 537.

31 From 1950 to 1960, the centre-right Democrat Party ruled the country. The party was frequently accused of suppressing political dissent and tolerating religious activities deemed incompatible with secularism on the basis of its firm parliamentary majority.

32 G Gentili, ‘A Comparative Perspective on Direct Access to Constitutional and Supreme Courts in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America: Assessing Advantages for the Italian Constitutional Court’ (2011) 29(4) Penn State International Law Review 714.

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35 Frankenberg (n 15) 572.

36 See the presentation of the President of the Venice Commission, urging Indonesia to adopt constitutional complaint system; ‘Constitutional Complaint as an Instrument for Protecting Fundamental Rights of Citizen’ in the International Symposium on ‘Constitutional Complaint’ (Jakarta, 15–17 August 2015) 169 available at <http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/banner/file/PROSEDING.pdf>, accessed 4 January 2016.

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38 G Buquicchio and T Gerwien, ‘Mélanges in Honour of the President of the Turkish Constitutional Court Mr. Haşim Kılıç, Individual Access to the Constitutional Court – Effective Human Rights Protection on the National Level – The Contribution of the Venice Commission’ in AR Çoban, S Gülener, M Sağlam and H Ekinci (eds), Haşim Kılıç’a Armağan (Anayasa Mahkemesi Yayınları, Ankara, 2015) 566.

39 See (n 2) 23.

40 Ibid.

41 See ‘Opinion on the Law on the Establishment and Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court of Turkey (CDL-AD(2011)040’ para 102, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 88th Plenary Session (Venice, 14–15 October 2011) available at <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2011)040-e>, accessed 12 November 2015.

42 See (n 55) 568.

43 H Kılıç, ‘Konuşmalar’ in Çoban, Gülener, Sağlam and Ekinci (n 38) 102, 131–2.

44 See (n 58) 573.

45 Epstein, L and Knight, J, The Choices Justices Make (CQ Press, Washington, DC, 1998)Google Scholar; Epstein, L, Landes, WM and Posner, RA, The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2013).Google Scholar

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48 See (n 2) 5.

49 In the German system, if the constitutional complaint challenges a law or another sovereign act, it, may only be lodged within one year of the law entering into force; see Law on the Federal Constitutional Court section 93 available at <http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm>, accessed 20 December 2015; the Spanish system sets a deadline of 20 days for lodging an amparo suit for action or inaction of public administration bodies. See Almendral (n 47) 4.

50 See (n 34) 410.

51 Almendral (n 47) 4.

52 See (n 34) 410.

53 See (n 34) 413; Almendral (n 47) 4.

54 Gentili (n 47) 182.

55 The figure is derived from data given at <http://www.inhak.adalet.gov.tr/istatistik/2014/4.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2016; <http://anayasa.gov.tr/files/bireyselbasvuru/23_eylul_2012_10_nisan_2015.pdf>, accessed 11 January 2016.

56 A Nalbant, ‘İnsan Haklarının Korunmasında Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Rolü: Beklentiler, Gözlemler ve Riskler’ in Çoban, Gülener, Sağlam and Ekinci (n 38) 553.

57 <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_2011_ENG.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2016.

58 A Ruiz Robledo, Constitutional Law in Spain (Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2012) 143.

59 Calculations based on statistics published in an internal memo of the TCC, dated 11 January 2016.

60 <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Statistik/statistics_2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3>, accessed 21 December 2015; see (n 46) 32.

61 See <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/kararlar/kbb.html>, accessed 1 May 2016.

62 E Örücü, ‘Turkey: The Constitutional Court of Turkey: The Anayasa Mahkemesi as the Protector of the System’ in A Harding and P Leyland (eds), Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing, London, 2009) 208–9.

63 See (n 2) 10–11.

64 See Hasan Uzun v Turkey, ECtHR Case No 10755/13 (30 April 2013). The court declared the application inadmissible by a 5 to 2 majority.

65 The Council of Europe held a conference on best practices of individual complaint to the Constitutional Courts in Europe in July 2014 in Strasbourg, which included a presentation and discussion of the Turkish system. In addition to judges and representatives from Germany, Spain and Turkey, the Conference was attended by judges from Albania, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russian Federation, Serbia, and Kosovo. See <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/capacitybuilding/echr_en.asp>, accessed 8 December 2015.

66 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/en-guvenilir-kurum-tsk/siyaset/detay/1997746/default.htm>, accessed 14 December 2015.

67 ‘The Speech of Dean Spielman, the president of the ECtHR in a meeting on 7 July 2014’, available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20140707_Spielmann_ENG.pdf>, accessed 24 November 2015.

68 See Yaman Akdeniz and Others, TCC Individual App Case No 2014/3986 (2 April 2014) available at <http://www.constitutionalcourt.gov.tr/inlinepages/leadingjudgements/IndividualApplication/judgment/2014-3986.pdf>, accessed 16 December 2015.

69 See Youtube LLC Corporation Service Company and Others, TCC Individual App Case No 2014/4705 (29 May 2014) available at <http://www.constitutionalcourt.gov.tr/inlinepages/leadingjudgements/IndividualApplication/judgment/2014-4705.pdf>, accessed 16 December 2015.

70 See Abdullah Öcalan, TCC Individual App Case No 2013/409 (25 June 2014) <http://www.constitutionalcourt.gov.tr/inlinepages/leadingjudgements/IndividualApplication/judgment/2013-409.pdf>, accessed 19 December 2015.

71 <http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/turkiye/basbakan-erdogan-anayasa-mahkemesi-kararina-saygi-duymuyorum>, accessed 26 October 2015.

72 Erdem Gül and Can Dündar, TCC Individual App Case No 2015/15867 (25 February 2016) <http://www.kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/BireyselKarar/Content/131a2423-8a42-4f99-8ff2-b5e6a979280c?excludeGerekce=False&wordsOnly=False>, accessed 28 March 2016.

73 <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogans-fury-at-the-constitutional-court-and-the-ankara-beltway-.aspx?PageID=238&NID=95797&NewsCatID=409>; S Demirtaş, ‘Erdoğan’s fight against top court weakens judicial system’ at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogans-fight-against-top-court-weakens-judicial-system.aspx?pageID=449&nID=96070&NewsCatID=429>, accessed 31 March 2016.

74 See Gülsim Genç, TCC Individual App Case No 2013/4439 (6 March 2014) available at <http://www.constitutionalcourt.gov.tr/inlinepages/leadingjudgements/IndividualApplication/judgment/2013-4439.pdf>, accessed 26 October 2015.

75 For example, see B Çalı, ‘Third Time Lucky? The Dynamics of the Internationalisation of Domestic Courts, the Turkish Constitutional Court and Women’s Right to Identity in International Law’ at <http://www.ejiltalk.org/third-time-lucky-the-dynamics-of-the-internationalisation-of-domestic-courts-the-turkish-constitutional-court-and-womens-right-to-identity-in-international-law/>, accessed 22 December 2015.

76 For a critical review of the TCC’s individual application rulings, see E Göztepe, ‘Alman Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararları Işığında Türk Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin Bireysel Başvuru Kararlarının Değerlendirilmesi’ (2015) 7 <http://www.kamuhukukculari.org/upload/dosyalar/Ece_GyoZTEPE222.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2016.

77 See Onurhan Solmaz, TCC Individual App Case No 2012/1049 (26 March 2013) available at <http://www.kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/BireyselKarar/Content/a95a9fb7-ef02-4b50-a826-7d9a6188ca3f?wordsOnly=False>, accessed 27 December 2015.

78 See Nejdet Atalay, TCC Individual App Case No 2014/184 (16 July 2014) para 61, 62, 63 available at <http://www.kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/BireyselKarar/Content/8874330c-659e-4199-817b-1ba70f4f0b4b?wordsOnly=False>, accessed 27 December 2015; see Mansur Yavaş ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, TCC Individual App Case No 2014/5425 (23 July 2014) paras 35, 36, 37 at <http://www.kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/BireyselKarar/Content/f2be0ce5-74de-47d9-b43a-3b3d8dfe9581?wordsOnly=False>, accessed 27 December 2015.

79 T Şirin, Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararları Işığında Bireysel Başvuru Hakkı (On İki levha Yayınları, İstanbul, 2015) 268.

80 ‘The Council of Europe, Needs Assessment Report on The Individual Application to the Constitutional Court of Turkey’ (2014) 61 available at <http://www.coe.int/t/dgi/hr-natimplement/Source/documentation/NA_Report_CC_Turkey_2014.pdf>, accessed 16 December 2015.

81 See (n 88).

82 LR Helfer, ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime’ (2008) 19(1), European Journal of International Law 126.

83 See (n 60) 125.

84 <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/basin/konusmalar/arsiv/22.html>, accessed 23 April 2016.

85 For example, see the latest report of Human Rights Watch at <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/turkey#515640>, accessed 31 March 2016.