Online ordering is currently unavailable due to technical issues. We apologise for any delays responding to customers while we resolve this. For further updates please visit our website: https://www.cambridge.org/news-and-insights/technical-incident
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
1 Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War (6 vols., London, 1948–54).Google Scholar
2 Plumb, J. H., ‘The historian’, in A.J. P. Taylor et al., Churchill: four faces and the man (London, 1969), p. 149.Google Scholar
3 Roosevelt and Churchill: their secret wartime correspondence, eds. Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold
4 This period is also discussed in James Leutze,’ The secret of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence: September 1939-May 1940’, Journal of Contemporary History, x, 3 (1975), 465–91.Google Scholar
5 Some of this work probably appeared too late for use, e.g. Irvine H. Anderson, Jr., ‘The 1941 de facto embargo on oil to Japan: a bureaucratic reflex’, Pacific Historical Review, xLIv, 2 (1975), 201–31; Jonathan G. Utley, ‘Upstairs, downstairs at Foggy Bottom: oil exports and Japan, 1940–41’, Prologue, VIII, 1 (1976), 17–28. But no use seems to have been made of other important studies, e.g. Dorothy, Borg and Shumpei, Okamoto (eds.), Pearl Harbor as history: Japanese-American relations, 1931–1941 (New York, 1973)Google Scholar; Butow, R. J. C., The John Doe Associates: backdoor diplomacy for peace, 1941 (Stanford, Ca., 1974).Google Scholar
6 E.g. Russett, Bruce M., No clear and present danger: a skeptical view of the U.S. entry into World War II (New York, 1972).Google Scholar
7 The defence of F.D.R. in Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., The imperial presidency (New York, 1973), pp. 111–20, also seems somewhat disingenuous. Like Mr Lash, Professor Schlesinger was deeply involved in the events he describes.Google Scholar
8 Cf. George W. Egerton, ‘Britain and the”Great Betrayal”: Anglo-American relations and the struggle for United States ratification of the treaty of Versailles, 1919–1920’, The Historical Journal, xxI, 4 (1978), 885–911.Google Scholar
9 Rosenberg, Emily S., ‘Anglo-American economic rivalry in Brazil during World War I’, Diplomatic History, 11, 2 (1978), 131–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Parsons, Edward B., ‘Why the British reduced the flow of American troops to Europe in August-October 1918’, Canadian Journal of History, XII, 2 (1977). 173–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
10 Gostigliola, Frank C., ‘Anglo-American financial rivalry in the 1920s’, Journal of Economic History, xxxvII, 4 (1977), 911–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
11 Rabe, Stephen G., ‘ Anglo-American rivalry for Venezuelan oil, 1919–1929’, Mid-America, LVIII, 2 (1976), 97–109Google Scholar; Hogan, Michael J., Informal entente: the private structure 0f co-operation in Anglo-American economic diplomacy, 1918–1928 (Columbia, Mo., 1977)Google Scholar; Megaw, M. Ruth, ‘The scramble for the Pacific: Anglo-United States rivalry in the 1930s’, Historical Studies (Melbourne), XVII, 69 (1977), 458–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12 Rowland, Benjamin M., ‘Preparing the American ascendancy: the transfer of economic power from Britain to the United States, 1933–1944’, in Rowland, Benjamin M. (ed.), Balance of power or hegemony: the interwar monetary system (New York, 1976), pp. 193–224. For a somewhat different view see the essay by Robert J. A. Skidelsky, ‘The retreat from leadership: the evolution of British foreign economic policy, 1870–1939’Google Scholar, ibid., esp. pp. 178–89.
13 See Roberta Dayer, A., ‘ The British war debts to the United States and the Anglo-Japanesealliance, 1920–23’, Pacific Historical Review, XLV, 4 (1976), 569–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
14 Peterson, Merrill D., Thomas Jefferson and the new nation: a biography (New York, 1970), p. 416.Google Scholar
15 Gladwyn, Jebb, as recalled in The memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), p. 90.Google Scholar
16 Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 27 Jan. 1940, Neville Chamberlain papers NC 18/1/1140 (quoted by kind permission of Birmingham University Library).
17 Herzog, James H., Closing the Open Door: American—Japanese diplomatic negotiations, 1936–41 (Annapolis, Maryland, 1973), pp. 233–5; Henry L. Stimson, diary, xxx1v, 13, 20, 28, 31, entries for 6, 8, 11, 13 May 1941, Sterling library, Yale University.Google Scholar
18 Weigley, Russell F., ‘The role of the War Department and the Army’, in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor as history, pp. 181–4Google Scholar; Brune, Lester H., ‘Considerations of force in Cordell Hull's diplomacy, July 26 to November 26, 1941’, Diplomatic History, II, 4 (1978), 395.Google Scholar
19 Kimball, Warren F., ‘Churchill and Roosevelt: the personal equation’, Prologue, vi, 3 (1974), 178–9.Google Scholar
20 Steele, Richard W., The first offensive, 1942: Roosevelt, Marshall and the making of American strategy (Bloomington, Ind., 1973).Google Scholar
21 Harrod, R. F., The life of John Maynard Keynes (London, 1951), chs. 13–14Google Scholar; Gardner, Richard N., Sterling—dollar diplomacy: Anglo-American collaboration in the reconstruction of multilateral trade (Oxford, 1956). A revised and expanded edition was published in 1969.Google Scholar
22 Rowland, ‘Preparing the American ascendancy’.
23 Cf. Thorne, Allies of a kind, p. 170, that it is ‘… a theme of the present work, that, fundamentally, - there existed in China more common ground between the British and Americans than some protagonists of the time - above all on the American side - realized or would admit.’
24 Kimball, ‘Churchill and Roosevelt’, p. 172.
25 Steele, The first offensive, made good use of the British war cabinet records.
26 In World War Two the British Board of Trade alone apparently produced twelve million files, which would occupy sixteen miles of shelving. Dilks, D. N., ‘Appeasement revisited’, The University of Leeds Review, xv, 1 (1972), 33.Google Scholar
27 These are sometimes noted by the authors, e.g. Thorne, Allies of a kind, pp. 393–4, but such qualifications are usually lost in the mass of material on Anglo-American rivalry.
28 The same duality is apparent from the study by Phillip, Baram, ’ Undermining the British: Department of State policies in Egypt and the Suez Canal before and during World War II’, The Historian, XL, 4 (1978), 631–49.Google Scholar
29 See, for example, Daniel, Yergin, Shattered peace: the origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (London, 1978); cf. D. C. Watt,’The British Cold War’, The Listener, I June 1978, pp. 711–12.Google Scholar
30 Points that emerge from Manderson-Jones, R. B., The special relationship: Anglo-American relations and Western European unity, 1947–1956 (London, 1972).Google Scholar
31 Elisabeth, Barker, Churchill and Eden at war (London, 1978), esp. ch. 15.Google Scholar
32 Speaking to the House of Lords, 18 Dec., 1945, H.L. Debs., 5s., vol. 138, 778.
33 Thorne, Allies of a kind, in particular, makes this point on several occasions, but again only briefly, (e.g. pp. 134, 699).
34 Cf.Anthony, Adamthwaite, France and the coming of the Second World War, 1936–1939 (London, 1977).Google Scholar
35 A point made by Coral Bell, ‘The “special relationship”‘, in Constraints and adjustments in British foreign policy, ed. Michael, Leifer (London, 1972), p. 106.Google Scholar
36 Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield to Sir Warren Fisher, 4 June 1934, Chatfield papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, CHT/3/1, p. 62.
