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ASSESSING AFRICAN REGIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS AND INVESTOR–STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2020

Mmiselo Freedom Qumba
Mmiselo Freedom Qumba*
Affiliation:
Qualified attorney of the High Court of South Africa and lecturer in international economic law, University of the Free State in Bloemfontein; PhD candidate, University of Pretoria, qumbamf@ufs.ac.za.
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Abstract

This article examines the rejection of the International Investor–State dispute (ISDS) system across the African continent and its replacement with a range of domestic and regional alternatives. It assesses the advantages of the two principal options for African countries: retaining the current ISDS system, or using local courts and regional tribunals. To this end, the dispute resolution mechanisms proposed in the Pan-African Investment Code, the 2016 Southern African Development Community Finance and Investment Protocol, the SADC model BIT, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Economic Community of West African States and East African Community investment agreements and domestic approaches are critically examined. The argument is then advanced that African countries should not abandon ISDS because replacing it with isolated domestic or regional mechanisms does not reduce any of the risks. In particular, for foreign investors, the risk associated with the adjudication of investment disputes in potentially biased, politically influenced domestic courts may prove too high. African host nations, in turn, risk sending out the wrong message concerning their commitment to the protection of foreign investments. Instead of veering off course, perhaps the time has come for African States to display the political will to remain within the ISDS system and contribute to its reform from within.

Keywords

private international lawinternational investmentsinvestor–State arbitrationPan African Investment CodeSADC FIPECOWASCOMESAEACinvestment agreements
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 70 , Issue 1 , January 2021 , pp. 197 - 232
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law

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27 M Mosallam, ‘The Process Matters: South Africa's Experience Exiting Its BITs’ (2015) Global Economic Governance Programme Working Paper 2015/97 <https://www.geg.ox.ac.uk/publication/geg-wp-201597-process-matters-south-africas-experience-exiting-its-bits>.

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31 ibid. See also Mosallam (n 27) 10; and MF Qumba, ‘South Africa's Move away from International Investor-State: A Breakthrough or Bad Omen for Investment in the Developing World? (2019) 52 De Jure Law Journal 370.

32 UNCTAD, ‘Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITS: Impact on Investor-State Claims’ (2010) <http://unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf>.

33 E Thomas, ‘Ecuador Terminates 12 BITs – A Growing Trend of Reconsideration of Traditional Investment Treaties?’ <https://www.dlapiper.com/en/mexico/insights/publications/2017/05/ecuador-terminates-12-bits-a-growing-trend/>. (Concerning Ecuador's decision to terminate its BITs, Cecilia Olivet, president of the Ecuadorian Citizens Commission, said: ‘Ecuador's decision to terminate its investment protection treaties is rational and just. It is based on the insurmountable evidence our commission collected on the benefits and costs of these investment protection agreements. Our report revealed that these agreement[s] have not only failed to deliver promised investment, they have cost Ecuadorians billions of dollars and posed a serious threat to Ecuador's capacity to regulate corporate activities in order to protect its citizens. Fortunately, Ecuador is not alone in denouncing these unjust investment agreements. It is joining a wave of countries around the world calling for a new international legal framework for investment which prioritises public interest over corporate profits.’)

34 ICSID, ‘List of Member States – ICSID/3’ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/List-of-Member-States.aspx>.

35 See Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement of the Federative Republic of Brazil. JH Martins, ‘Brazil's Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements (CFIA) and Recent Developments’ <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/brazils-cooperation-facilitation-investment-agreements-cfia-recent-developments-jose-henrique-vieira-martins/> art 24.

36 Chinese model BIT version III, art 9(2)(b).

37 IISD, ‘India Takes Steps to Reform Its Investment Policy Framework after Approving New Model BIT’ (2016) <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/india-takes-steps-to-reform-its-investment-policy-framework-after-approving-new-model-bit/>.

38 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ <https://dfat.gov.au/trade/investment/Pages/investor-state-dispute-settlement.aspx>.

39 Mbengue and Schacherer (n 15) 416.

40 ibid 417.

41 E Denter and T Gazzini, ‘Role of African Regional Organization in the Promotion and Protection of Investment’ (2017) 18 JWIT 456. See also RM D'Sa, ‘The Lagos Plan of Action-Legal Mechanisms for Co-operation between the Organization of African Unity and The United Nations Economic Commissions Commission for Africa’ (2009) 27 Journal of African Law 7.

42 L Páez, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and Regional Investment Agreements in Africa: Towards a Continental Investment Area’ (2017) 18 JWIT 393.

43 Pan African Investment Code (n 23) preamble.

44 ibid.

45 ibid, art 42(d).

46 ibid, art 41(1).

47 ibid, art 41(1)(d).

48 Schlemmer (n 8) 192.

49 Pan African Investment Code (n 23) art 41(2).

50 Mbengue and Schacherer (n 15) 442.

51 ibid 443.

52 AR Johnson, ‘Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2010) 56 EmoryLJ 965.

53 MM Kane, ‘The Pan-African Investment Code: A Good First Step, but More Is Needed’ (2018) <https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:2bvq83bk50>.

54 Pan African Investment Code (n 23) art 42(1)(b).

55 JW Salacuse, ‘Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution’ (2007) 31 Fordham IntILJ 141.

56 Schill (n 11).

57 SW Schill, ‘Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-Conceptualizing the Standard of Review’ (2012) (3) JIDS 579.

58 Pan African Investment Code (n 23) art 41(2).

59 ibid, art 41(2) (c).

60 The Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 S13.

61 Pan African Investment Code (n 23) art 41(2).

62 ibid, art 43(1).

63 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/07/26 (8 December 2016) para 1117.

64 Pan African Investment Code (n 23) art 41(2).

65 LE Trakman and D Musayelyan, ‘The Repudiation of Investor–State Arbitration and Subsequent Treaty Practice: The Resurgence of Qualified Investor–State Arbitration’ (2015) ICSIDRev/FILJ 192.

66 A Saurombe, ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in Implementing of SADC Treaty Provisions Dealing with Regional Integration’ (2012) 2 PELJ 456.

67 ibid 457.

68 Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (signed 17 August 1992).

69 ibid.

70 The SADC Treaty states in the Preamble: ‘Determined to alleviate poverty, with the ultimate objective of its eradication, through deeper regional integration and sustainable economic growth and development.’

71 Denters and Gazzini (n 41) 470.

72 SADC Treaty (n 70) preamble.

73 SADC FIP (n 20).

74 Agreement Amending Annex of the SADC FIP (n 24) art 26.

75 ibid, preamble.

76 ibid.

77 ibid, art 25.

78 Sornarajah (n 2) 216.

79 Gas Natural SA (n 4) para 29.

80 Saurombe (n 66) 129.

81 SADC Model BIT (n 25).

82 SADC Model BIT (n 25) art 29(4)(b).

83 S Woolfrey, ‘The SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template: Towards a New Standard of Investor Protection in Southern Africa’ <https://www.tralac.org/publications/article/6771-the-sadc-model-bilateral-investment-treaty-template-towards-a-new-standard-of-investor-protection-in-southern-africa.html>.

84 Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and South African States (PTA) (signed on December 1981, entered into force in September 1992).

85 ibid, Preamble.

86 ibid.

87 Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA Treaty) (initially established in 1981 as the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa, transformed into COMESA 1994).

88 ibid, art 3(c).

89 COMESA Common Investment Area (n 18).

90 COMESA Common Investment area (n 18) art 28.

91 ibid, art 28(1).

92 ibid, art 26(3).

93 ibid, art 26(4).

94 ibid, art 26(5).

95 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) <http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/>.

96 West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) (signed 10 January 1994, entered into force August 1994).

97 Economic Community of West African States (n 95).

98 ibid.

99 ibid, art 3(1) provides the aim of ECOWAS as ‘to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent’.

100 ibid, art 3(2)(i).

101 Economic Community of West African States Supplementary Act (n 19).

102 ibid, art 33(5).

103 ibid, art 33(6).

104 ibid, art 29.

105 PA Kasaija, ‘Regional Integration: A Political Federation of the East African Countries?’ (2004) 7 AJOL 24.

106 ibid.

107 The Treaty establishing East African Community (originally founded in 1967, revived in 1999).

108 Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation (signed 30 November 1993).

109 The Treaty establishing East African Community (originally founded in 1967, revived in 1999).

110 History of the East African Community (EAC) <https://www.eac.int/eac-history>.

111 ibid.

112 East African Community, the EAC Model Investment Treaty (n 21).

113 ibid, art 23.

114 Ofodile (n 14).

115 P Muchlinski, ‘The COMESA Common Investment Area: Substantive Standards and Procedural Problems in Dispute Settlement.’ SOAS School of Law Research Paper No 11/2010 <https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22042/>.

116 COMESA Common Investment Area (n18) art 28(1)(a).

117 ibid, art 28(1).

118 Economic Community of West African States Supplementary Act (n 19) art 33(6)(a).

119 Protection of Investment Act (n 60).

120 ibid, S13(2) (b).

121 Schlemmer (n 8) 182.

122 W Kidane, ‘China's Bilateral Investment Treaties with African States in Comparative Context’ (2016) 49 CornellIntLJ 170.

123 P Leon, ‘Africa Needs to Resist Any Temptation to Dump Investor–State Dispute Arbitration’ (2017) <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-10-06-africa-needs-to-resist-any-temptation-to-dump-investor-state-arbitration/>.

124 Qumba (n 31) 353.

125 ibid 378.

126 Sornarajah (n 2) 216.

127 ibid.

128 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of South Africa for the Promotion and Protection of Investments with Protocol to the Agreement (signed 20 September 1994, entered into force 27 May 1998, termination 31 August 2014) <http://196.14.41.167/dbtwwpd/images/19940920%20UK%20PROTECTION%20OF%20INVESTMENTS.pdf> art 8.

129 Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Tunisia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (signed 28 February, not yet entered into force) <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5215/download> art 7(3).

130 Protection of Investment Act (n 60).

131 This was confirmed Gas Natural SDG (n 4) para 2, where the tribunal held: ‘The creation of ICSID and the adoption of bilateral investment treaties offered to investors’ assurances that disputes that might flow from their investments would not be subject to the perceived hazards of delays and political pressures of adjudication in national courts.’

132 Reg 7(2) in terms of GN 958 in GG 40526 <https://www.justice.gov.za/mediation/mediation.htmp>. The investor and the department can jointly appoint a mediator from the list maintained by the department.

133 Schlemmer (n 8) 182.

134 Schill (n 11) 315.

135 T Gazzini, ‘Travelling the National Route: South Africa's Protection of Investment Act’ (2018) (26) AJICL 258.

136 Qumba (n 31) 362.

137 In Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) Nkabinde J said: ‘Although it is trite that the Constitution and its attended reform legislation must be interpreted purposively, courts should be cautious not to extend the meaning of expropriation to situations where the deprivation does not have the effect of property being acquired by the state. It must be emphasized that section 10(3) does not transfer rights to the state. . . . As I have said, the state has not acquired the applicants’ land as envisaged in sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution. For that reason, no compensation need be paid.’

138 F Adeleke, ‘Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration’ (2016) 32 SAJHR 151

139 Agri SA v Minister of Mining and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC). The Constitutional Court dealt with section 25(1) and subsection (2) of the Constitution. In para 48, Mogoeng CJ said: ‘Deprivation within the context of section 25 includes extinguishing a right previously enjoyed, and expropriation is a subset thereof whereas deprivation always takes place when property or rights therein are either taken away or significantly interfered with, the same is not necessarily true of expropriation. Deprivation relates to sacrifices that holders of private property rights may have to make without compensation, whereas expropriation entails state acquisition of that property in the public interest and must always be accompanied by compensation.’

140 Schlemmer (n 8) 181.

141 Adeleke (n 138) 160.

142 Piero Foresti (n 7) para 56.

143 Written laws (Miscellaneous Amendment Act) of 2 of 2017.

144 The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017.

145 Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act 2017.

146 P Leon, ‘International Arbitration in Africa’ (2017) <https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/international_arbitration>.

147 Agreement between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Kingdom of Netherlands of Africa for the Promotion and Protection of Investments with Protocol to the Agreement (signed 31 July 2001, entered into force 1 April 2004 and terminated 1 April 2019).

148 ibid, art 14.

149 C Kidanka, ‘Tanzania Ends Investment Treaty with Netherlands’ (2018) East African News <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/tanzania-ends-investment-treaty-with-netherlands-1403968>.

150 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Award (24 July 2008).

151 Standard Chartered Bank v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/10/12, Award (2 November 2012).

152 F Ngwanakilala, ‘US Firm Seeks $561 Million from Tanzania in Power Supply Dispute’ (Reuters, 21 March 2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-power-symbion/u-s-firm-seeks-561-million-from-tanzania-in-power-supply-dispute-idUSKBN16S1NA>.

153 Leon (n 146).

154 ibid.

155 Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No ARB/05/6, Award (22 April 2009).

156 Funnekotter and Others v Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe and Others, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No 13 Civ. 1917 (CM) ( 17 December 2015).

157 Bernhard von Pezold and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe and Border Timbers Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No ARB/10/15.

158 R Baruti, ‘Investment Facilitation in Regional Economic Integration in Africa: The Cases of COMESA, EAC and SADC’ (2017)18 JWIT 498.

159 Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency Act 10 of 2019.

160 Zimbabwe Transitional Stabilisation Programme Reform Agenda, <https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/by-country/zimbabwe/2347-zimbabwe-transitional-stabilisation-programme-abridged-version-5-october-2018/file.html>.

161 T Chidede, ‘The ZIDA Act: An Overhaul of the Investment Policy Regime and Impetus for Investment in Zimbabwe?’ (Tralac Blog, 9 March 2020) <https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/14431-the-zida-act-an-overhaul-of-the-investment-policy-regime-and-impetus-for-investment-in-zimbabwe.html>.

162 Piero Foresti (n 7) para 56.

163 Gazzini (n 135) 258.

164 M Masamba, ‘Government Regulatory Space in the Shadow of BITs: The Case of Tanzania's Natural Resource Regulatory Reform’ (Investment Treaty News, 21 December 2017) <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/12/21/governmentregulatory-space-in-the-shadow-of-bits-the-case-of-tanzanias-natural-resource-regulatory-reform-magalie-masamba/>.

165 National Promotion of Investment Act 131 of 2009.

166 Permanent Sovereignty (n 144).

167 Masamba (n 164).

168 General Assembly Resolution, 1710 (XVI), United Nations Development Decade (19 December 1961).

169 A Martinez and E Mason, ‘Arbitration in Africa: Past, Present, and Future’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 13 January 2016) <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/01/13/arbitration-in-africa-past-present-and-future/>.

170 Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for the Reconstruction and Development on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (Report of the Executive Directors), para 11.

171 ibid, para 13.

172 P J Le Cannu, ‘Foundation and Innovations: The Participation of African States in the ICSID Dispute Resolution System’ (2018) 33 ICSIDRev/FILJ.

173 Report of the Executive Directors (n 170) para 14.

174 Piero Foresti (n 7) para 57.

175 CPI-2019 Sub-Saharan Africa <https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2019-sub-saharan-africa#>.

176 World Justice Project <https://worldjusticeproject.org/resource-hub/leading-organizations?geography=All&factor=All&name=&order=title&sort=asc&page=108>.

177 The World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Rankings of Africa <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/688761571934946384/pdf/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies.pdf>.

178 Tunisian government, the Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activités Pétrolières (ETAP) art 13.

179 Agreement Between the Egyptian Government and the Macedonian Government Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/1091/download>.

180 Holiday Inns SA and others v Morocco, ICSID Case No ARB/72/1, Award (12 May 1974).

181 Gardella SpA v Cote d'Ivoire, ICSID Case No ARB/76/1, Award (5 June 1990).

182 Southern Pacific Properties Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, Award (16 February 1983).

183 Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID No ARB/00/4 (31 July 2001).

184 Lowenfeld, AF, ‘The ICISD Convention, Origins and Transformation’ (2009) 38 GaJIntl&CompL 57Google Scholar.

185 Agyemang, AA, ‘African States and ICSID Arbitration’ (1988) 21 CILSA 178Google Scholar.

186 Baruti (n 158) 520. A number of African nationals served as arbitrators, conciliators or ad hoc committee members in ICSID cases. In total, approximately 4 per cent of all appointments made in ICSID cases involved nationals from African States.

187 Livingston, MA, ‘Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration: Popular Fallacy or Proven Fact?’ (2008) 25 JlntlArb 529Google Scholar.

188 Brower and Schill (n 9) 472.

189 Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) (signed 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159, art 14(1).

190 IBA Guidelines for International Arbitration clauses (adopted by a resolution of the IBA Council on 7 October 2010).

191 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010) <https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf> art 11.

192 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap <https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf>.

193 Brower and Schill (n 9) 473.

194 Arbitration Rule 48(4), ICSID Rules <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Convention-Arbitration-Rules.aspx>. See also art 53(3) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/AFR_English-final.pdf>.

195 Agyemang (n 185) 177.

196 Agreement Amending Annex of the SADC FIP (n 24) art 25.

197 Pan African Investment Code (n 23) art 41(1) and 42(1)(d).

198 Sornarajah (n 2) 216.

199 ‘Another Notch for African ADR as Rwanda Opens an Arbitration Centre’ (African Law and Business, 8 June 2012) <https://iclg.com/alb/another-notch-for-african-adr-as-rwanda-opens-arbitration-centre>.

200 Arbitration and ADR Worldwide <https://www.lcia.org/lcia-miac.aspx>.

201 The Mauritius International Arbitration Centre <https://miac.mu/dispute-resolution-services/>.

202 Pan African Investment Code (n 23) art 41(2).

203 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd & Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) [2008] SADCT.