1. Rogowski, Ronald, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989)Google Scholar. For an earlier version of Rogowski's argument, see “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,” American Political Science Review 81 (12 1987), pp. 1121–1137CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. Gourevitch, Peter coined the term “second image reversed” in “The Second Image Reversed,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881–912CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kenneth Waltz conceived the original “second image” metaphor in Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)Google Scholar. Briefly, the expression refers to the impact of international-level independent variables upon domestic political processes.

3. Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, p. 4Google Scholar.

4. Learner, Edward, Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

5. Stolper, Wolfgang F. and Samuelson, Paul A., “Protection and Real Wages,” Review of Economic Studies 9 (11 1941), p. 71CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Ethier, Wilfred J., Modem International Economics, 2d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), pp. 100–109Google Scholar.

6. Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 4–5Google Scholar. The first two points also appear in Rogowski, , “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,” p. 1123Google Scholar.

7. “Trade policy” goes beyond protectionism versus free trade to include issues such as adjustment assistance (e.g., retraining) or compensation for those suffering from greater trade exposure.

8. Rogowski does propose an ad hoc explanation. Labor's reversal of its support for free trade corresponds to a substantial increase in the share of trade in U.S. gross domestic product in the mid–1970s. However, this explanation contradicts Rogowski's earlier assertion that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem applies “at any margin.” See Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 17 and 120Google Scholar, and note 143.

9. See Deardorff, Alan V. and Stern, Robert M., “American Labor's Stake in International Trade,” in Walter, Adam S., ed., Tariffs, Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1979), pp. 130–42Google Scholar; Friman, H. Richard, Patchwork Protectionism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 71, 101, and 105Google Scholar; Milner, Helen V., Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 105Google Scholar; and Parsons, Carol A., “The Domestic Employment Consequences of Managed International Competition in Apparel,” in Tyson, Laura D'Andrea, Dickens, William T., and Zysman, John, eds., The Dynamics of Trade and Employment (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 113–156, especially p. 115Google Scholar.

10. See Deardorff, and Stern, , “American Labor's Stake in International Trade,” p. 140Google Scholar; Krasner, Stephen D., “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness,” in Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 79–85Google Scholar; and Mills, D. Quinn and Lovell, Malcolm R. Jr, “Enhancing Competitiveness: The Contribution of Employee Relations,” in Scott, Bruce R. and Lodge, George C., eds., U.S. Competitiveness in the World Economy (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1985), pp. 455–78 and p. 473Google Scholar in particular.

11. Witness the opinions expressed at U.S. congressional hearings in May–June 1973. See Magee, Stephen, “Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem,” working paper no. 77–28, Graduate School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, 02 1977Google Scholar, as adapted by Deardorff, and Stern, , “American Labor's Stake in International Trade,” pp. 139–142Google Scholar, especially table 4.

12. Regarding labor unions in the television industry, see Destler, I. M., American Trade Politics: System Under Stress (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1986), appendix B, p. 240Google Scholar; and Milner, , Resisting Protectionism, pp. 136–38Google Scholar. Regarding the UAW, see Destler, pp. 70–73. As late as 1979, UAW President Douglas Fraser continued to pledge allegiance to “the benefits of liberal trade.”

13. Destler, American Trade Politics, appendix B. Watches and instruments are two separate industries placed in the same trade aggregate; see Deardorff, and Stern, , “American Labor's Stake in International Trade,” p. 140, table 4Google Scholar. The IAM even went to the trouble of lobbying against protectionist legislation in 1973, although it failed to join the Boeing Corporation and other aerospace concerns in opposing protectionism in the trade debates of the early 1980s. See Destler, I. M. and Odell, John, Anti-protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1987)Google Scholar, appendix A.

14. Rogowski fails to even mention this trend; see Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 120–21.

15. See ibid., pp. 94–95; and Paul Bairoch, , “International Industrialization Levels from 1750–1980,” Journal of European Economic History vol. 11, no. 3, 1982, pp. 269–333Google Scholar, especially appendixes A and B.

16. See Lee, Chae-Lin and Sato, Hideo, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 33–35Google Scholar; Friman, , Patchwork Protectionism, pp. 71, 101, and 105Google Scholar; Deardorff, and Stern, , “American Labor's Stake in International Trade,” p. 141Google Scholar; and Krasner, , “U.S. Commercial and Monetary Policy,” p. 79Google Scholar.

17. See Krasner, , “U.S. Commercial and Monetary Policy,” p. 79Google Scholar.

18. Deardorff, and Stern, , “American Labor's Stake in International Trade,” p. 141Google Scholar. Regarding the watch industry, see Milner, , Resisting Protectionism, pp. 145–48Google Scholar.

19. Milner, , Resisting Protectionism, pp. 136–40Google Scholar.

20. See ibid., pp. 116–21; Deardorff, and Stern, , “American Labor's Stake in International Trade,” p. 141Google Scholar; Destler, and Odell, , Anti-protection, p. 43Google Scholar; Destler, , American Trade Politics, pp. 69–73Google Scholar, appendix B; and Prestowitz, Clyde, Trading Places: How We Are Giving Our Future to Japan and How to Reclaim It (New York: Basic Books, 1990), pp. 242, 245, and 342, note 19Google Scholar.

21. See Destler, and Odell, , Anti-protection, pp. 148–49Google Scholar and appendix A; and Milner, , Resisting Protectionism, pp. 122–32Google Scholar. Since the mid-1980s, semiconductor manufacturers have split over trade issues: manufacturers of mass-produced memory chips have increasingly leaned toward protectionism, while other niche-market oriented or research and development-intensive firms continue to support free trade.

22. See Destler, and Odell, , Anti-protection, pp. 148–49Google Scholar, and appendix A; and Destler, , American Trade Politics, pp. 214–16Google Scholar and appendix B.

23. All of Rogowski's citations regarding the end of labor-capitalist conflict predate the late 1960s. See Bell, Daniel, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, III.: Free Press, 1960)Google Scholar; Kirchheimer, Otto, “The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes,” Social Research 24 (Summer 1957), pp. 127–56Google Scholar; and Kirchheimer, Otto, “Germany: The Vanishing Opposition,” in Dahl, Robert, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966)Google Scholar, chap. 7, as cited by Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 97, 185, and 189Google Scholar.

24. See Crouch, Colin and Pizzorno, Alessandro, eds., The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1978)Google Scholar, especially Pizzorno, Alessandro, “Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict,” vol. 2, pp. 277–98Google Scholar. Also see Ross, George, “The Perils of Politics: French Unions and the Crisis of the 1970s,” in Lange, Peter, Ross, George, and Vannicelli, Maurizio, eds., Unions, Change and Crisis: French and Italian Union Strategy and the Political Economy 1945–1980 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 29–50Google Scholar.

25. Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 99 and 103–5Google Scholar.

26. Ibid., pp. 104–5. Also see Childs, David, Britain Since 1945: A Political History, 2d ed. (London: Methuen, 1986), pp. 316–17 and 340Google Scholar; and Bornstein, Stephen and Gourevitch, Peter, “Unions in a Declining Economy: The Case of the British TUC,” and in Gourevitch, Peter, ed., Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and Sweden (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 50 and 61–62Google Scholar.

27. Ross, , “The Perils of Politics,” pp. 38 and 42–43Google Scholar.

28. CGT leaders are quoted in Ardagh, John, France Today (London: Martin Seeker and Warburg, 1987), p. 111Google Scholar.

29. These passages, which paraphrase the Left Common Program, come from Ross, , “The Perils of Politics,” pp. 39–50Google Scholar. The Left Common Program was a joint political platform formulated in 1972 by the Socialist and Communist parties. For the original text, see Programme Commun pour un governement d'union de gauche (A program for a common united leftist government), PCF, ed. (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1972), part 2, chap 2, pp. 113–17Google Scholar.

30. Ardagh, , France Today, p. 114Google Scholar; also see p. 116.

31. See ibid., pp. 155–57; Kreile, Michael, “West Germany: The Dynamics of Expansion,” in Katzenstein, , Between Power and Plenty, pp. 220–22Google Scholar; and Markovits, Andrei S., The Politics of the West German Trade Unions: Strategies of Class and Interest Representation in Growth and Crisis (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 127–32Google Scholar.

32. Curiously, Rogowski suggests that his model may have only historical relevance. See Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 18 and 178Google Scholar.

33. See Leontief, Wassily, “Domestic Production and Foreign Trade: The American Capital Position Re-examined,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 97 (09 1953), pp. 331–49Google Scholar. Also see Ethier, , Modern International Economics, pp. 132–34Google Scholar.

34. Rogowski suggests that the Leontief paradox be dismissed because of “Learner's (1980) conclusive demonstration that Leontief's entire mode of analysis was erroneous”; see Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 16–17Google Scholar. However, Learner admits that his study does not refute more recent studies that confirmed the Leontief paradox by using a methodology different from Leontief s (see the works by Robert Baldwin as cited in the following note). See Learner, Edward, “The Leontief Paradox, Reconsidered,” Journal of Political Economy vol. 88, no. 3, 1980, pp. 495–503 and especially p. 502Google Scholar, note 2.

35. See Postner, H. H., Factor Content of Canadian International Trade (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1975)Google Scholar; Roskamp, K. W. and McMeekin, G. C., “Factor Proportions, Human Capital, and Foreign Trade: The Case of West Germany Reconsidered,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 82 (02 1968), pp. 152–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rosefielde, Steven, Soviet International Trade in Heckscher-Ohlin Perspective: An Input Output Analysis (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973)Google Scholar. Concerning confirmation of the Leontief paradox for the United States, see Baldwin, Robert E., “Determinants of the Commodity Structure of U.S. Trade,” American Economic Review 61 (03 1971), pp. 126–46Google Scholar; and Baldwin, Robert E., “Determinants of Trade and Foreign Investment: Further Evidence,” Review of Economics and Statistics 61 (02 1979), pp. 40–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Ethier, , Modern International Economics, p. 133Google Scholar; Caves, Richard E. and Jones, Ronald W., World Trade and Payments: An Introduction (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), pp. 130–34Google Scholar; and Krugman, Paul and Obstfeld, Maurice, International Economics (Glenview, III.: Scott, Foresman, 1988), p. 85Google Scholar.

36. Leontief, , “Domestic Production and Foreign Trade,” p. 349Google Scholar. Rogowski's eagerness to reject the paradox appears to stem from the belief that the Leontief paradox refutes the entire factor endowments approach. See Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 16–17Google Scholar.

37. See Keesing, Donald B., “Labor Skills and International Trade: Evaluating Many Trade Flows With a Single Measuring Device,” Review of Economics and Statistics (08 1965), pp. 287–94Google Scholar; Kenen, Peter B., “Nature, Capital, and Trade,” Journal of Political Economy 73 (10 1965), pp. 437–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Branson, William H. and Monoyios, Nikolaos, “Factor Inputs in U.S. Trade,” Journal of International Economics 7 (05 1977), pp. 111–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar. At one point Rogowski suggests that his model might be better recast as a new type of trichotomy: skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital; see Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 177–78Google Scholar.

38. Many recent applications of the factor endowments approach use multifactor models. See Postner, Factor Content of Canadian International Trade; Dixit, A. K. and Norman, V., Theory of International Trade (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chaps. 1 and 4; Baldwin, “Determinants of Commodity Structure of U.S. Trade”; Roskamp and McMeekin, “The Case of West Germany Reconsidered”; and Vanek, Janos, “The Factor-proportions Theory: The N-factor Case,” Kyklos 4 (10 1968)Google Scholar; and Rosefielde, Soviet International Trade in Heckscher-Ohlin Perspective.

39. Baldwin, , “Determinants of Commodity Structure of U.S. Trade,” p. 127Google Scholar.

40. Learner, , Sources of International Comparative Advantage, pp. 94–95Google Scholar. Also see Bowen, , Learner, , and Sveikauskas, , “Multicountry, Multifactor Tests,” pp. 791–809Google Scholar; Krugman, and Obstfeld, , International Economics, p. 85Google Scholar; and Ethier, , Modern International Economics, p. 145Google Scholar.

41. Hence, if the United States produced 20 percent of world GNP, it would only be abundant in capital if it possessed more than 20 percent of the world's capital stock.

42. Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 91–97Google Scholar.

43. Learner, , Sources of Comparative Advantage, pp. 93–94Google Scholar. Rogowski consistently equates land abundance exclusively with temperate land (i.e., that land needed to grow grain). Thus, he identifies Sweden as land scarce. See Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 96 and 99–107Google Scholar.

44. Capital is defined as accumulated and discounted gross domestic investment flows since 1948, assuming an average life of fifteen years. See Learner, , Sources of Comparative Advantage, pp. 90 and 234Google Scholar.

45. Semiskilled labor includes all workers who are literate, whereas unskilled labor encompasses illiterate labor. Professional labor is defined below. See ibid., pp. 90–92.

46. Learner's labor-intensive manufactures aggregate includes-based on the Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) two-digit classification system-nonmetallic manufactures, furniture, travel/handbags, clothing, footwear, and miscellaneous. Capital-intensive manufactures include rubber goods, textiles, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, metal manufactures, non-metal mineral manufactures, and sanitary fixtures. The machinery aggregate includes nonelectrical machinery, electrical machinery, transportation equipment, watches, and instruments. The chemical aggregate includes chemical elements, chemical compounds, refined fossil fuels and chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, explosives, plastics, paints, and dyes. See ibid., pp. 63–70.

47. Ibid., pp. 170–79 and 187, appendix C.

48. Ibid., appendix D.

49. Ibid., pp. 93–98. For this reason, Learner's original model is perhaps best thought of as a ten-factor model.

50. Ibid., p. 234.

51. Ibid., pp. 91–92, 108, and 207. Regarding the ISCO, see International Labor Office, Yearbook of Labor Statistics (New York: United Nations, various years)Google Scholar. According to Learner's data, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are far more abundant in professional labor than is the United States. Yet, when human capital, a measure closely related to professional labor, is measured as the proportion of school-age population enrolled, especially at the secondary and university levels, U.S. human capital is found to be eight to ten times more abundant than in those three countries. See Kuznets, Paul W., “Economic Development, Export Structure, and Shifting Comparative Advantage in the Pacific Basin Region,” in Benjamin, Roger and Kudrle, Robert T., eds., The Industrial Future of the Pacific Basin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 35–54Google Scholar.

52. Further evidence indicating that professional labor scores are underrated for the four countries in this study comes from Learner's trade data. His data indicate that chemical manufacturing intensively utilizes professional labor and also that all four of the nations in this study enjoy sizable exports of chemicals. Conversely, the nations that have the largest endowments of professional labor, generally less developed countries, do not export chemicals. See Learner, , Sources of International Comparative Advantage, pp. 68, 73, and 170–79Google Scholar and appendix D.

53. Two prominent examples are the oil industry and sugar growers. Regarding protection of oil, see Oppenheimer, Bruce I., Oil and the Congressional Process (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974)Google Scholar. Sugar producers utilize tropical land (for sugarcane) and temperate land (for sugar beets). Despite the extreme scarcity of tropical land, sugarcane growers as well as sugar beet growers have been a strong force in U.S. trade politics. See Arnold, R. Douglas, The Logic of Congressional Action (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 123–26Google Scholar.

54. Krugman, and Obslfeld, , International Economics, p. 219Google Scholar.

55. Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 172–74Google Scholar. Concerning subsidies for U.S. farmers, see Arnold, , The Logic of Congressional Action, pp. 127–29Google Scholar.

56. Ibid., appendix D. India in 1958, with a capital endowment of –0.50 and labor-intensive exports of 0.05, is a slight exception.

57. Ibid., pp. 174 and 178–79 and appendix D. Malaysia was not yet an exporter of labor-intensive manufactures in 1975. Learner's data do not include Taiwan, yet there is evidence suggesting Taiwan's capital accumulation and trade patterns parallel Korea's. See Kuznets, , “Economic Development, Export Structure, and Shifting Comparative Advantage in the Pacific Basin Region,” pp. 42 and 50–51Google Scholar. Kuznets's data reveal that both countries had a strong comparative advantage in several capital-intensive industries, including textiles and telecommunications. Regarding capital accumulation among Asia's NIEs, see Hofheinz, Roy Jr, and Calder, Kent E., The Eastasia Edge: Why an Entire Region is Overtaking the West in Technology, Exports, and Management (New York: Basic Books, 1982)Google Scholar, chap. 9 and appendix A.

58. See the discussion in the final section of the present article.

59. Learner, , Sources of International Comparative Advantage, pp. 162–79, 187, and 260–73Google Scholar.

60. Regarding the relative paucity of human capital in East Asia's developing countries and NIEs, see Kuznets, , “Economic Development, Export Structure, and Shifting Comparative Advantage,” pp. 42–44Google Scholar.

61. Regarding the relationship between the product cycle and this development, see ibid., p. 49; and Chung-in Moon, , “Trade Friction and Industrial Adjustment,” in Haggard, Stephan and Moon, Chung-in, eds., Pacific Dynamics: The International Politics of Industrial Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 188Google Scholar.

62. Learner, Sources of International Comparative Advantage, appendix D. Colombia suffered from declining capital abundance.

63. The United States was the fourth largest exporter of labor-intensive goods. See ibid., p. 234.

64. See ibid., appendixes B and D, for data on U.S. labor. According to Learner's methodology, the United States had no measurable endowment of unskilled (illiterate) labor. Nonetheless, his raw data reveal that the United States does possess tiny quantities of illiterate labor: 2 percent of the American work force was illiterate in 1958, 0.04 percent in 1975. It is reasonable to postulate that workers lacking vocational skills but who are nonetheless classified as semiskilled in Learner's model simply because they are literate might have preferences similar to unskilled workers. Concerning the impact of international trade on this group, see Parsons, , “The Domestic Employment Consequences of Managed International Competition in Apparel,” pp. 113–56Google Scholar.

65. See Learner, , Sources of International Comparative Advantage, p. 165Google Scholar and appendix D. Regarding the impact of international trade on professional labor, see the following chapters in Tyson, Dickens, and Zysman, The Dynamics of Trade and Employment: Parsons, , “The Changing Shape of Domestic Employment in a High Technology Industry,” especially p. 260Google Scholar; Stowsky, Jay S., “The Domestic Employment Consequences of International Trade in Telecommunications Equipment,” pp. 205–36 and p. 219 and 233Google Scholar in particular; and Tyson, Laura D'Andrea and Zysman, John, “Trade and Employment: An Overview of the Issues and Evidence,” pp. 1–40Google Scholar.

66. Japan, which had a factor abundance profile similar to that of the NIEs in 1958, appears to have been the initial trigger for protectionist sentiment. Demands for protection first emerged in the textile and apparel industries, the very sectors in which Japanese industry was concentrated in the 1950s. Regarding the textile industry, see Friman, , Patchwork Protectionism, pp. 71, 101, and 105Google Scholar.

67. See Deardorff, and Stern, , “American Labor's Stake in International Trade,” pp. 138–39Google Scholar; and Friman, , Patchwork Protectionism, pp. 71, 101, and 105Google Scholar.

68. Included are unions representing workers in hardware, ball bearings, watches, toys, and electrical products industries. See Deardorff, and Stern, , “American Labor's Stake in International Trade,” pp. 139–42Google Scholar. Regarding steel workers, see Krasner, , “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy,” pp. 84–85Google Scholar.

69. There is some evidence that the skill level of the UAW's membership has increased substantially in recent years. According to the UAW's methodology, in 1975 the skill ratio within its ranks (i.e., the ratio of production workers to workers in “skilled trades”) was 0.20. See Scott, Robert E., “Trade and Employment in Automobiles: The Short-run Success and Long-run Failure of Protectionist Measures,” in Tyson, , Dickens, , and Zysman, , The Dynamics of Trade and Employment, p. 191Google Scholar.

70. See Destler, American Trade Politics, appendix B; Deardorff, and Stern, , “American Labor's Stake in International Trade,” p. 140Google Scholar; and Destler and Odell, Anti-protection, appendix A.

71. Learner, , Sources ofComparative International Advantage, p. 165Google Scholar.

72. The predominance of small family-owned firms (often rural) in labor-intensive industries suggests that information scarcity might act as a significant barrier to mobility into more capital-intensive industries. See Kurth, James R., “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes,” International Organization 33 (Winter 1979), pp. 1–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and especially pp. 5–11. Kurth identifies substantial barriers of capital scale between textile manufacturing and heavier industries such as steel. Also see Parsons, , “International Competition in Apparel,” pp. 113–20Google Scholar.

73. For an empirical study that divides capital into similar categories, see Buigues, P. and Goybet, P., “The Community's Industrial Competitiveness and International Trade in Manufactured Products,” in Jacquemin, Alexis and Sapir, Andre, eds., The European Internal Market: Trade and Competition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 227–47Google Scholar. Regarding RD capital, see Keesing, Donald, “The Impact of Research and Development on United States Trade,” in Kenen, Peter B. and Lawrence, Robert, eds., The Open Economy: Essays on International Trade (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 175–89Google Scholar. Also see Caves, and Jones, , World Trade and Payments, pp. 132–33Google Scholar; and Kuznets, “Economic Development, Export Structure, and Shifting Comparative Advantage in the Pacific Basin Region.”

74. See Bornstein, and Gourevitch, , “Unions in a Declining Economy,” pp. 50 and 61–62Google Scholar, and Ross, George and Gourevitch, Peter, “Conclusion,” pp. 372–93Google Scholar, both in Gourevitch, Unions and Economic Crisis.

75. Childs, David, Britain Since 1945, pp. 316–17 and 340Google Scholar. Also regarding this trend, see Crouch, Colin, “United Kingdom: The Rejection of Compromise,” in Baglioni, Guido and Crouch, Colin, eds., European Industrial Relations: The Challenge of Flexibility (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 326–55Google Scholar and especially p. 353.

76. Rogowski, , Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 104–5Google Scholar.

77. Smith, Chris, Technical Workers: Class, Labour, and Trade Unionism (Hampshire, England: Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1987), pp. 186 and 293–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

78. Ross, , “The Perils of Politics,” p. 47Google Scholar; and Ardagh, , France Today, pp. 39 and 67–68Google Scholar.

79. Ross, , “The Perils of Politics,” p. 39Google Scholar.

80. See Segrestin, Denis, “Recent Changes in France,” in Baglioni, and Crouch, , European Industrial Relations, pp. 97–126Google Scholar; and Ardagh, , France Today, p. 40–41Google Scholar. Concerning demands within the Socialist party and from the Communist party that President Mitterrand respond by imposing stiff tariffs, see Ardagh, , France Today, p. 41Google Scholar.

81. Ibid., p. 113. For background see Williams, Philip M. and Harrison, Martin, Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic (London: Longman, 1971), p. 11Google Scholar.

82. See ibid., pp. 40–42; and Segrestin, , “Recent Changes in France,” p. 107Google Scholar.

83. See Benguigui, Georges and Montjardet, Dominique, “The CGC and the Ambiguous Position of the Middle Strata,” in Kesselman, Mark, ed., The French Workers' Movement: Economic Crisis and Political Change (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 104–22Google Scholar; Ardagh, , France Today, p. 113Google Scholar; and Williams, and Harrison, , Politics and Society in de Gaulle's Republic, p. 11Google Scholar.

84. See Markovits, , The Politics of the West German Trade Unions, p. 128Google Scholar; and Markovits, Andrei S. and Allen, Christopher S., “Trade Unions and Economic Crisis: The West German Case,” in Gourevitch, , Unions and Economic Crisis, p. 154Google Scholar.

85. Markovits, , The Politics of the West German Trade Unions, p. 146Google Scholar.

86. Ibid., pp. 125–27.

87. See Kern, Horst and Schumann, Michael, “New Concepts of Production in West German Plants,” in Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., Industry and Politics in West Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 92–102Google Scholar.

88. Markovits notes that the bargaining power of I. G. Chemie (a union largely representing semiskilled workers) over management has been handicapped by the “hostility” of many professional workers. As for the few professional workers who have joined I. G. Chemie, tensions and “political disagreements” between them and semiskilled workers contributed to “perhaps the most severe intraunion battle within any of the DGB's major industrial unions.” See Markovits, , The Politics of the West German Trade Unions, pp. 272–73Google Scholar.

89. Berghahn, Volker R., Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 254–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the other hand, trade union members have remained remarkably loyal to the SPD. Concerning the prominence of professional labor in the Free Democrats, see Markovits, , The Politics of the West German Trade Unions, p. 130Google Scholar.

90. See Ardagh, , France Today, pp. 28–31, 36–37, and 38–39Google Scholar; Berghahn, , Modem Germany, pp. 241–12Google Scholar; and Zysman, John, Governments, Markets, and Growth (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 25Google Scholar.

91. Kurth makes an analogous observation regarding the development of the nineteenthcentury English steel industry, i.e., that the accumulation of capital (via the profits of lucrative exports) allowed English textile firms to move easily into more capital-intensive steel manufacturing. See Kurth, , “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle,” pp. 12–13Google Scholar.

92. See Childs, , Britain Since 1945, pp. 135 and 252–54Google Scholar; and Learner, , Sources of International Comparative Advantage, p. 207Google Scholar and appendix D. Britain is the only country in Northern Europe with a negative capital figure.

93. Baldwin, “Determinants of the Commodity Structure of U.S. Trade.” Five-factor models are frequently used; see Roskamp and McMeekin, “The Case of West Germany Reconsidered”; and Rosefielde, Soviet International Trade in Heckscher-Ohlin Perspective.

94. See Magee, “Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem”; Mussa, Michael, “Tariffs and the Distribution of Income: The Importance of Factor Specificity, Substitutability, and Intensity in the Short and Long Run,” Journal of Political Economy 82 (09 1974), pp. 1191–203CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ethier, , Modern International Economics, pp. 128–32Google Scholar.

95. This paragraph was inspired by the comments of an anonymous reviewer.

96. Rogowski suggests that the relevance of the interfactorial model may have increased since 1960; see Commerce and Coalitions, p. 18. For a good example of the political implications of high interfactorial mobility, see Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl, “Specific Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio Diversification, and Free Trade,” World Politics 43 (07 1991), pp. 545–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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