1. Some of the major works are: Haas, Ernst B. and Ruggie, John Gerard, eds., “International Responses to Technology: Regimes, Institutions and Technocrats,” special issue of International Organization 29 (Summer 1975)Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977)Google Scholar; Krasner, Stephen D., ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983)Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; and Aggarwal, Vinod, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar. See also Haas, Ernst B., “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32 (04 1980), pp. 357–405CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Young, Oran R., “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” World Politics 32 (04 1980), 331–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. Krasner, Stephen D., “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes and Intervening Variables,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, p. 2Google Scholar.

3. Ibid., p. 18.

4. Akehurst, Michael, “Custom as a Source of International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law (1974–1975), pp. 20–31 and 53Google Scholar.

5. Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979) pp. 7 and 111Google Scholar; Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, p. 116Google Scholar.

7. Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, pp. 18–20 and 37Google Scholar. Aggarwal views both principles and norms as being part of meta-regimes. I view only the principles as being derived from more general regimes. Norms are the most general injunctions of the regime since, in the words of the International Regimes definition, they are “rights and obligations.”

8. This discussion represents a modification of the definitions in: Finlayson, Jock A. and Zacher, Mark W., “The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, pp. 276–77 and passimGoogle Scholar. The injunctions that are labeled “norms” in that article are now conceived of as “principles,” since states differ as to the importance that should be assigned to them. Also, what are labeled “sovereignty norms” and “interdependence norms” are now defined as “nonregime principles” and “regime principles.” Keohane has noted the problem of categorizing injunctions and suggests that regimes should be viewed as “injunctions of greater and lesser specificity” (After Hegemony, p. 59).

9. Freund, Paul, “Constitutional Dilemmas,” Boston University Law Review 45 (Winter 1965), p. 23Google Scholar.

10. Ibid., p. 22. Freund also comments on the polarity of principles and the desirability of integrating them into a system of laws in “Thomas Reed Powell,” Harvard Law Review 69 (1965), pp. 800–803Google Scholar.

11. This reflects Aggarwal's definition: “‘Strength’ refers to the stringency with which rules regulate the behavior of countries” (Liberal Protectionism, p. 20). To “rules” I would add “norms” and “decision-making procedures.” What Aggarwal refers to as “norms,” I would generally include under “principles.”

12. Overall, this conception of strength is mirrored by Hedley Bull's discussion of the relative prominence of the principles of “self-help” and “order” in an international system. However, a problem with this approach is that agreements on certain norms and rules are not in large part a product of attachment to “order” but of agreement on the way interstate relations should be regulated in accordance with certain principles. See Bull, The Anarchical Society, chaps. 1–2.

13. Oran Young has made a distinction between “negotiated” and “imposed” regimes which accords with the distinction between regimes possessing and lacking legitimacy. See Young, , “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of Interntional Regimes,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, p. 98–101Google Scholar.

14. Ruggie, John Gerard, “Another Round, Another Requiem? Prospects for the Global Negotiations,” in Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and Ruggie, , eds., Power, Passions and Purpose: Prospects for North-South Negotiations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), p. 40Google Scholar.

15. Aggarwal, , Liberal Protectionism, p. 21Google Scholar. Oran Young uses the term “direction” rather than “nature” in “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” p. 342.

16. McCulloch, Rachel and Pinera, Jose, “Alternative Commodity Trade Regimes,” in Arad, Ruth W. et al. , Sharing Global Resources (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 107–8Google Scholar.

17. Evaluations of alternative regulatory approaches are in ibid.; Brown, Christopher P., The Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control (New York: Praeger, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Behrman, Jere R., Development, the International Economic Order, and Commodity Agreements (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978)Google Scholar; Adams, Gerard and Klein, Sonia, eds., Stabilizing World Commodity Markets: Analyses, Practice and Policy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979)Google Scholar.

18. Wilcox, Clair, A Charter for World Trade (New York: Macmillan, 1949), chap. 11Google Scholar; and Brown, William A., The United States and the Restoration of World Trade (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1950), pp. 119–25 and 217–22Google Scholar. The submissions to and debates in the committee dealing with commodity trade issues are in the UN document series E/CONF.2/C.5(1948).

19. ECOSOC Resolution 39(IV)(1947).

20. See note 18.

21. Goreux, Louis M., Compensatory Financing Facility (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1980)Google Scholar.

22. The history of the International Wheat Agreements is summarized in UN Doc. TD/B.C. 1/258 (1985). See also McLin, John, “Surrogate International Organization and the Case of World Food Security, 1949–1969,” International Organization 33 (Winter 1979), pp. 35–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23. The debates at UNCTAD I are in the UN document series E/CONF.46/C. 1(1964). Subsequently debates were in the Committee on Commodities and are summarized in the UN document series TD/B/C.l. See also Gosovic, Branislav, UNCTAD: Conflict and Compromise (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972)Google Scholar.

24. Brown, The Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control, chap. 2; Hveem, H., The Political Economy of Third World Producer Associations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Mikdashi, Zuhayr, The International Politics of Natural Resources (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976)Google Scholar.

25. General Assembly Resolutions 3201 and 3202 (S-VI) and 3281 (XXIX) (1974).

26. UNCTAD Resolution 93(IV)(1976). For analyses of the development of the IPC, see Brown, The Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control; and Rothstein, Robert L., Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

27. UN Doc. TD/IPC/CF/CONF/24(1980); Reynolds, Paul D., International Commodity Agreements and the Common Fund: A Legal and Financial Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1978)Google Scholar.

28. The decision that launched the negotiations on a new scheme is in UNCTAD Resolution 124(V)(1979). The key secretariat studies and proposals are in UN Docs. TD/B/C. 1/214(1980), 221 and 222(1981), and 234(1982).

29. See note 18.

30. Articles 57 and 63. The text of the charter is in Wilcox, , A Charter for World Trade, pp. 227–327Google Scholar.

31. For analyses of the ICAs, see Finlayson, Jock A. and Zacher, Mark W., The Politics of International Commodity Trade Regulation: Developing Countries and Regime Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming), chaps. 3 and 4Google Scholar.

32. Ibid., chap. 5; and Finlayson, Jock A. and Zacher, Mark W., “The Third World and the Management of International Commodity Trade: Accord and Discord,” in Hollist, W. Ladd and Tullis, F. LaMond, eds., An International Political Economy (Boulder: Westview, 1985), pp. 199–222Google Scholar.

33. Ibid.; and Brown, The Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control, chap. 6.

34. See note 27; and Finlayson and Zacher, The Politics of International Commodity Trade Regulation, chap. 2.

35. General Assembly Resolutions 3201 and 3202(S-VI)(1974) and 3281(XXXIX)(1974).

36. Ali, Liaquat, “The Regulation of Trade in Tea,” Journal of World Trade Law 4 (07–08 1970), pp. 570–72Google Scholar.

37. Fisher, S. Bart, The International Coffee Agreement: A Study in Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 19–30Google Scholar.

38. Stewart, Larry R., “Canada's Role in the Uranium Cartel,” International Organization 35 (Autumn 1981), pp. 657–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39. See note 24.

40. Goreux, Compensatory Financing Facility. The international discussions concerning the creation of the CFF are described in Horsefield, J. Keith, The International Monetary Fund, 1945–1965, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1969), pp. 531–36; and vol. 3, pp. 442–57Google Scholar; and de Vries, Margaret G. and Horsefield, J. Keith et al. , The International Monetary Fund, 1945–1965, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1969), pp. 416–24Google Scholar.

41. Analyses of STABEX and MINEX are in Ravenhill, John, “What Is to Be Done for Third World Commodity Exporters? An Evaluation of the STABEX Scheme,” International Organization 38 (Summer 1984), pp. 544–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goreux, , Compensatory Financing Facility, pp. 80–84Google Scholar; Reynolds, , International Commodity Agreements and the Common Fund, pp. 165–69Google Scholar; Cuddy, J.D.A., “Compensatory Financing in the North-South Dialogue: The IMF and STABEX (EEC) Schemes,” Journal of the World Trade Law 13 (01–02 1979), pp. 66–76Google Scholar; Dell, Sidney, “Fifth Credit Tranche,” World Development 13 (1985), pp. 245–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and UN Doc. TD/B/C. 1/222(1981).

42. See note 28; and Finlayson and Zacher, The Politics of International Commodity Trade Regulation, chap. 2.

43. Jackson, John H., World Trade and the Law of the GATT (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), pp. 392–96Google Scholar. Article 16(3) does stipulate that subsidies for primary products should not result in the exporting countries “having more than an equitable share of world export trade.” However, this does not have a constraining effect.

44. Puchala, Donald J. and Hopkins, Raymond F., “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analyses,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, p. 81Google Scholar.

45. Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, p. 221Google Scholar.

46. Cordovez, Diego, “The Making of UNCTAD,” Journal of World Trade Law 1 (05–06 1967), pp. 243–79Google Scholar; Gosovic, UNCTAD.

47. Articles 63–64 of ITO Charter.

48. The most recent agreements for the five commodities have quite similar provisions, and they have not changed too much over the years. The basic guideline is that countries accounting for 65–80% of both exports and imports must ratify an agreement before it enters into force, but the precise ways in which this requirement is spelled out varies. Sometimes export and import figures are used, and in other cases export quotas, number of votes, and production/consumption figures are used. See UN Docs. TD/SUGAR/9/10(1977), Art. 75; TD/RUBBER/15/Rev. 1(1979), Art. 61; TD/COCOA/6/7(1980), Art. 66; and TD/TIN/6/4/14(1981), Art. 55; also, International Coffee Organization, “International Coffee Agreement 1983,” Art. 61.

49. Articles 63–64 of ITO Charter.

50. Hooke, A. W., The International Monetary Fund: Its Evolution, Organization and Activities (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1981), pp. 17–18Google Scholar. Also see Zamora, Stephen, “Voting in International Economic Organizations,” American Journal of International Law 74 (1980), pp. 566–608CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51. UN Doc. TD/IPC/CF/CONF/24(1980), Articles 11–14, 35, and 51.

52. The voting rules of ICAs are now almost identical, although they did vary a bit more in the past. Each ICA distributes 5–15% of the 1,000 votes of the exporter and importer groupings equally among the members. The remaining votes are distributed according to shares of global exports and imports, but the methods of doing this vary. Each agreement also indicates that decisions are made by a simple distributed majority unless stipulated that a two-thirds distributed majority voting rule should apply. The texts of the ICAs specify that all of the important issues should be decided by the latter method. See UN Docs, TD/SUGAR/9/10(1977), Arts. 2(7–8), 11 and 13; TD/RUBBER/15/Rev. 1(1979), Arts. 2(8 and 10), 15 and 18; TD/COCOA/6/7(1980), Arts. 2(n and o), 10 and 12; and TD/TIN/6/14(1981), Arts. 2, 14, and 15. Also, International Coffee Organization, “International Coffee Agreement 1983,” Arts. 3(9–10), 13, and 15.

53. See notes 50 and 51.

54. The traditional legal order with its unanimity rule, based on an interpretation of the principle of sovereign equality, is discussed in Zamora, “Voting in International Economic Organizations”; and Claude, Inis L., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1964) pp. 111–31Google Scholar.

55. Stephen Krasner has posited that the basic conflict between North and South is between the “market-oriented” principles and “authoritative” principle. I use the term “development” instead of “authoritative” because the developing countries were not merely trying to gain acceptance of intergovernmental control of economic relations; they were seeking intergovernmental controls that would transfer resources to them and hence promote their development. See Krasner, , Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 5, 66, 290, 311–12Google Scholar, and passim.

56. Ruggie, John Gerard, “Political Structure and Change in the International Economic Order: The North-South Dimension,” in Ruggie, , ed., The Antinomies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 464Google Scholar.

57. Claude and Zamora (the latter using the terminology of the former) identify three principles and voting norms: equalitarianism (unanimity), majoritarianism (majority rule) and elitism (weighted voting). For our purposes equalitarianism (unanimity) is relevant to an analysis of regime strength–not the nature of a regime. There is no regime with regard to the procedural dimension of an issue-area if all decisions require unanimity. I prefer the terms “democracy” and “power” instead of “majoritarianism” and “elitism.” Zamora, “Voting in International Economic Organizations”; and Claude, , Swords into Plowshares, pp. 111–31Google Scholar.

58. Some of the key works are Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977)Google Scholar; Krasner, ed., International Regimes, especially the articles by Krasner; Krasner, Structural Conflict: Third World against Global Liberalism; Keohane, After Hegemony; Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism.

59. Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (1978), pp. 167–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lipson, Charles, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Matters,” World Politics 37 (10 1984), pp. 1–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60. In Structural Conflict (especially chaps. 1 and 12), Krasner notes that realists believe that the central goals of states are “power” and “control.” By control he means the ability of states to govern their societies free from constraints imposed by foreign actors.

61. Structural realist theorists have not tended to focus on this hypothesis, but it does flow from their assumptions. Studies that apply public goods theory to international collaboration are Ruggie, John G., “Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration,” American Political Science Review 66 (09 1972), pp. 874–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Russett, Bruce and Sullivan, John, “Collective Goods and International Organization,” International Organization 25 (Autumn 1971), pp. 845–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Snidal, Duncan, “Public Goods, Property Rights and Political Organization,” International Studies Quarterly 23 (12 1979), pp. 532–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62. Keohane, After Hegemony, chaps. 3 and 8–10; Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism; Kindleberger, Charles, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy,” International Studies Quarterly 25 (06 1981), pp. 242–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Russett, Bruce, “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?”, International Organization 39 (Spring 1985), pp. 207–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Snidal, Duncan, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McKeown, Timothy, “Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th-century Tariffs in Europe,” International Organization 37 (Winter 1983), pp. 73–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Cowhey, Peter and Long, E., “Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline or Surplus Capacity,” International Organization 37 (Spring 1983), pp. 457–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63. Most of the literature on hegemonic stability cited in note 62 touches on this issue. See esp. the articles by Keohane and McKeown.

64. Keohane, After Hegemony, esp. chaps. 1, 4–7, and 11; Nye and Keohane, Power and Interdependence, esp. chap. 3; Krasner, ed., International Regimes, esp. articles by Krasner and Keohane; Young, Oran R., Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

65. Finlayson and Zacher, The Politics of International Commodity Trade Regulation, chaps. 3 and 4; Fisher, The International Coffee Agreement; Fisher, S. Bart, “Enforcing Export Commodity Agreements: The Case of Coffee,” Harvard International Law Journal 12 (1971)Google Scholar.

66. The ICAs for sugar, coffee, and cocoa had restrictions on imports from nonmembers. See UN Docs. TD/SUGAR/9/10(1977), Art. 57; and TD/COCOA.6/7(1980), Art. 51. Also, International Coffee Organization, “International Coffee Agreement 1983,” Art. 45.

67. Sherer, F. M., Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1980), chaps. 6 and 7Google Scholar; Streeton, Paul, “The Dynamics of the New Poor Power,” Resources Policy 2 (06 1976), pp. 73–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Labys, Walter C., Market Structure, Bargaining Power, and Resource Price Formation (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980)Google Scholar.

68. Data on market shares are in the World Bank's annual publication Commodity Trade and Price Trends. Analysis of the roles of exporting countries in bargaining on ICAs is in Finlayson and Zacher, The Politics of International Commodity Trade Regulation.

69. Finlayson and Zacher, The Politics of International Commodity Trade Regulation, especially chaps. 3–5.

70. See note 64.

71. Keohane, After Hegemony, chaps. 1 and 4–7; and Keohane, Robert O., ’The Demand for International Regimes,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes, pp. 141–72Google Scholar.

72. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 89Google Scholar.

73. An excellent study on the development of the IPC and the role of the secretariat is Rothstein, Global Bargaining. Also, see Finlayson and Zacher, The Politics of International Commodity Trade Regulation; and Brown, The Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control.

74. Young, Oran R., “International Resource Regimes,” in Russell, Clifford S., ed., Collective Decision Making: Applications from Public Choice Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 241–82Google Scholar; and Young, Compliance and Public Authority.

75. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 89Google Scholar.

76. Ibid., p. 63.

77. Finlayson and Zacher, The Politics of International Commodity Trade Regulation, chap. 4.

78. Hansen, Roger D., Beyond the North-South Stalemate (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 38–39Google Scholar; Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, pp. 36 and 54–58Google Scholar; and Krasner, Stephen D., “North-South Economic Relations: The Quests for Economic Well-Being and Political Autonomy,” in Oye, Kenneth A., Lieber, Robert J., and Rothschild, Donald, eds., Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World (New York: Longman, 1979), p. 129Google Scholar.

79. Quoted in Fawcett, J.E.S., “UNCTAD IV: Another Bill of Rights,” World Today 32 (1976), p. 158Google Scholar.