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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2008
With the release of the Cabinet Papers for the Lloyd George post-war coahtion government and the opening of the Lloyd George papers in the Beaverbrook Library, the basis for a reinterpretation of the man and his era was made possible. And, indeed, several studies have been published already, most notably, by Americans. The thrust of these new works is to make a more sympathetic character of Lloyd George. Thus, Susan Armitage tells us, had he only not been so busy at peace conferences, Lloyd George would have seen to it that the labor disputes of the post-war years were less disruptive, that the grievances of the trade unions were given due consideration, and that more of the promises of the post-war Reconstruction Committee were realized. In the latter, she follows the lead of Paul Johnson, who was one of the first to plow the murky waters of the Public Records Office's offerings. Pointing a heavily accusing finger at Austen Chamberlain and the Treasury for withholding their blessing on “homes fit for heroes” and other Reconstruction plans, Johnson asks whether “an honest effprt” might have “headed off the militant strike activity” that denied Lloyd George's reconstruction plans the means of success. Thus Lloyd George appears as the victim of circumstances beyond his control – a paragon of pragmatic rationality who is opposed by reactionary Cabinet Ministers and bedevilled by stubborn trade-union leaders who refuse to understand why the promised paradise is not forthcoming.
page 1 note 1 Of these the most important are: Johnson, Paul, Land Fit for Heroes (Chicago, 1968),Google ScholarSusan, M. H.Armitage, The Politics of Decontrol: Britain and the United States (London, 1969),Google Scholar and Gilbert, Bentley B., British Social Policy, 1914–1939 (London, 1970).Google ScholarA mixed bag of essays on Lloyd George has been put together by Taylor, A. J. P., Lloyd George (London, 1970).Google Scholar See also Cline, Peter, “Reopening the Case of the Lloyd George Coalition”, in: Journal of British Studies, X (1970).Google Scholar
page 1 note 2 Johnson, p. 56.
page 2 note 1 This older view of Lloyd George portrayed him as a man who would yield matters of principle for political gain, and as a politician who missed his chance for greatness by failing to implement the recommendations of his own Reconstruction Committee. Cf. Cole, G. D. H. and Postgate, Raymond, The British Common People, University Paperback Edition (New York, 1947), pp. 543–67;Google ScholarTawney, R. H., “The Abolition of Economic Controls”, in: Economic History Review, First Series, XIII, pp. 1–30;Google ScholarAdams, W. S., “Lloyd George and the Labour Movement”, in: Past & Present, No 3 (1953).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
page 2 note 2 Both Armitage and Johnson document Lloyd George's plans to use food control as weapon against the unions, but neither seem particularly impressed by this behavior on the part of a man who claimed to be a friend of the worker. See especially Armitage, pp. 15–36.
page 3 note 1 Jones, Thomas, Whitehall Diary, ed. by Middlemas, Keith, I (London, 1969), p. 97;Google Scholar Lloyd George to Tom Jones, March 17, 1919, Lloyd George Papers F/23/4/36, Beaverbrook Library, London; The Times, September 29, 1919.
page 3 note 2 Reports of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest [Cd 8662–8669] (1917–1918), XV, passim.Google Scholar
page 3 note 3 Thomas Jones to Lloyd George, February 8, 1919, quoted in Jones, p. 73
page 3 note 4 Quoted in Armitage, p. 15.
page 4 note 1 Ibid., p. 15. A recent economic survey of the period claims that the budget of 1920 was the “first attack on inflation”. While true in a fiscal sense certainly the “first attack” on inflation was the effort launched to meet the threat of strikes and prevent major wage increases. Cf. Aldcroft, Derek H., The Inter-war Economy: Britain, 1919–1939 (London, 1970), p. 303.Google Scholar
page 4 note 2 Cabinet Papers (henceforth Cab) 23/9, War Cabinet 525, and 27/59 UC Series, Industrial Unrest Committee, Minutes and Proceedings (this committee should not be confused with the Commission of Enquiry cited p. 3, note 2), Public Records Office, London.
page 5 note 1 Respectively, Stanley, Munro, Long, Home, Shortt, and Churchill.
page 5 note 2 Cab 27/59. Subcommittees also were interdepartmental in nature and tended at first to proliferate. This feature was revised later, first by Eric Geddes and then more radically by John Anderson.
page 5 note 3 Cab 27/59, meetings No 1, February 4, 1919, No 4, February 6, and No 6, February 8.
page 5 note 4 Cab 23/10, War Cabinet 526, February 4, 1919. Tom Jones, the Cabinet Secretary, was somewhat amused by these discussions and wrote a report of them in his diary, which wondered “whether or not Curzon and Long have ever been in a Tube and am thinking of referring the question to the Ministry of Research”. Jones, p. 75.
page 6 note 1 Cab 23/10, War Cabinet 529 and 530, February 7 and 10, 1919.
page 6 note 2 Cab 27/59, meeting No 8, February 10, 1919.
page 6 note 3 For details from the miners' point of view, see Arnot, R. Page, The Miners, II (London, 1953), pp. 182–202.Google Scholar
page 6 note 4 Cab 27/59, meeting No 12, February 17, 1919. The IUC acted immediately following a Cabinet meeting on the same day, which had discussed the best way to meet foreign trade competition. It had come down hard in favor of decontrolling government regulation to provide for a “New, natural level of prices”, cf. Johnson, pp. 365–72. This action it knew would probably provoke industrial unrest. It also knew that on February 27th the National Industrial Conference was due to start.
page 6 note 5 Quoted in Johnson, pp. 372–3.
page 7 note 1 For the railway negotiations, see Bagwell, Philip S., The Railwaymen (London, 1963), pp. 370–81.Google Scholar
page 7 note 2 Cab 27/59, meeting No 15; also Bonar Law admitted in a letter to Lloyd George of March 21, 1919, that he “was prepared if a strike broke out to pass legislation empowering the Government to seize strike funds and arrest leaders”, Bonar Law Papers 101.3.39, Beaverbrook Library.
page 7 note 3 Bagwell, pp. 378–80.
page 7 note 4 Bonar Law to Lloyd George, March 21, 1919, Bonar Law Papers 101.3.31.
page 8 note 1 Cab 27/59, Minutes of the IUC, meeting No 28, August 14, 1919.
page 8 note 2 “Memo on Public Appeals For Volunteers“, Cab 27/60, UC No 21.
page 8 note 3 Cab 27/59, meeting No 29.
page 8 note 4 Cab 23/15, War Cabinet 606A, August 5, 1919. Earlier he had put the same thought in slightly more dramatic terms in a letter to Tom Jones, writing that “Once the strike [by the Triple Alliance] begins, it is imperative that the state should win. Failure to do so would inevitably lead to a Soviet Republic so that we ought to have our plans well thought out.” Lloyd George to Tom Jones, Lloyd George Papers F/23/4/36.
page 8 note 5 “Machinery for the Distribution and Rationing of Food”, G149, War Series G. Cab 24/3. This machinery was expanded and made more efficient under Lord Rhondda in 1918. Control of food prices became part of the Food Ministry's function in January of 1918, G180, Cab 24/4. The Food Ministry was revived on 19 July 1919 to import food in bulk in expectation of industrial strife. Control over shipping was maintained in order that the government could be assured of sufficient supplies in case of a general strike. Cf. Susan Armitage, pp. 33–16.
page 9 note 1 Cab 27/59, IUC meeting No 14, March 12, 1919.
page 9 note 2 Cab 27/50 and 27/77. Contains Geddes's reports.
page 10 note 1 The Times, August 6, 1919.
page 10 note 2 Hansard, August 18, 1919.
page 10 note 3 Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 1918–24, ed. by Cole, Margaret (London, 1955), p. 167.Google Scholar
page 11 note 1 The Strike Committee replaces the IUC in name, but the personnel and structure, with some additions and modification, remain the same. Cab 23/12, War Cabinet 626.
page 11 note 2 Cab 27/60, “Review of the Work of the Strike Committee”, p. 1.
page 11 note 3 SirWoodward, Llewellyn, Great Britain and the War (London, 1967), pp. 256–8.Google Scholar
page 11 note 4 Cab 27/59, IUC meeting No 17, March 19, 1919.
page 11 note 5 Ibid.
page 11 note 6 Cab 27/61, Minutes of Negotiation with Trade Union Leaders, October 2, 1919.
page 12 note 1 Cab 27/59, meeting No 17, March 19, 1919.
page 12 note 2 The Times, September 27, 1919.
page 12 note 3 The fact that the railwaymen and the dockworkers both won significant wage increases while the miners were left hanging has been used at times to show that Lloyd George was either weak or clever or some combination of the two. Evidence now would seem to indicate that he was neither, for the records of various strikebreaking committees show that the government was strong enough to fight but it chose at times to pay; a position that depends on cost analysis to determine strategy, something that every businessman does as a matter of course. Thus, Thomas and Bevin won increases during inflationary periods but the miners were held back during the depression of 1921. The Triple Alliance could not hold together when faced with such strong economic facts. This is perhaps what Lloyd George meant in his comment to Lord Riddell after the strike, “Now we have detached the Railwaymen [from the Triple Alliance].” Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary, p. 131.
page 13 note 1 Cab 23/9, War Cabinet 525, February 4, 1919.
page 14 note 1 The history of the Committee is given in detail in my unpublished dissertation “The Supply and Transport Committee: A Study of the British Government's Method of Handling Emergencies Stemming from Industrial Disputes” (University of Wisconsin, 1970).Google Scholar
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