1 The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, Produzioni Europee Associati, 1966.

2 Solis, Gary, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 281–282CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Blum, Gabriella, “The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers”, Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2010, p. 112CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This example and others that appear in the paper will be used to exemplify the suggested models.

3 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 86.

4 Ibid.

5 See Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, TS No. 539, 1 Bevans 63 1, 36 Stat. 2277, 18 October 1907 (Hague Regulations); Hague Declaration (III) concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Expanding Bullets, 187 Consol. TS 459, 29 July 1899.

6 Melzer, Nils, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, 2009Google Scholar (ICRC Interpretive Guidance), pp. 77–78. The Guidance discusses a wider framework than just combatants, but since the focus of this paper is on combatants, I maintain the discussion from that perspective alone.

7 Ibid., p. 80.

8 Ibid., p. 81.

9 Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018 (General Comment 36), para. 64.

10 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, “Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, para. 10; European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Issa and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 31821/96, Judgment, 16 November 2004; ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011; General Comment 36, above note 9, para. 63.

11 Note that related issues concerning extraterritorial application of IHRL have been covered in literature in abundance and as such will not be further discussed here. For a good overview, see e.g. Park, Ian, The Right to Life in Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 The “equal military value” aspect is used for the purpose of all three scenarios. Military value refers to the advantage to the military from targeting either option, and equal military value is meant to demonstrate that when we evaluate proportionality, there is no difference between the two targets in terms of the concrete and direct military advantage to be gained.

13 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I), Art. 57(3).

14 Ibid.

15 It should be noted that according to a more expansive reading of the proportionality rule, which holds that as long as everything was done to avoid or minimize the relevant collateral damage and the expected collateral damage is not excessive, there is no preference between the two targets. See e.g. Henderson, Ian, The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, Proportionality and Precautions in Attack under Additional Protocol I, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009, pp. 198–199CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bartels, Rogier, “Dealing with the Principle of Proportionality in Armed Conflict in Retrospect: The Application of the Principle in International Criminal Trials”, Israel Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2013, p. 306CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Under such a reading, Scenario C could be read alongside Scenario B. However, for the sake of a more comprehensive argument I will continue with the understanding that IHL requires the attacker to choose target C2 over C1.

16 See Marko Milanovic, “Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights Law”, in Orna Ben Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, pp. 118–119 – unless hors de combat.

17 Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The Right to Life and the Relationship between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law”, in Christian Tomuschat, Evelyne Lagrange and Stefan Oeter (eds), The Right to Life, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010, p. 130.

18 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of international Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2006, pp. 1–9; Meron, Theodor, “The Humanization of Humanitarian Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94, No. 2, 2000, p. 239CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law, above note 18, p. 28.

20 Michael A. Newton and Larry May, Proportionality in International Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, p. 122. While the limitations on certain types of weapons date back to the St. Petersburg Declaration, additional limitations and prohibitions have been introduced throughout the years, and even today there are discussions about the limitations that should be placed on future weapons such as fully autonomous weapons.

21 Kretzmer, David, “Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2005, p. 171CrossRefGoogle Scholar; T. Meron, “The Humanization of Humanitarian Law”, above note 18, p. 239; Yuval Shany, “Co-Application and Harmonization of IHL and IHRL: Are Rumours about the Death of Lex Specialis Premature?”, in Robert Kolb, Gloria Gaggioli and Pavle Kilibarda (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Further Reflections and Perspectives, ElgarOnline, May 2022, pp. 4–5.

22 Doswald-Beck, Louise, “The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does International Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 864, 2006, pp. 881–882CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 M. Milanovic, above note 16.

24 Jeff McMahan, “The Morality of War and the Law of War”, in David Rodin and Henry Shue (eds), Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 26; David Rodin, “The Moral Inequality of Soldiers: Why Jus in Bello Asymmetry is Half Right”, in D. Rodin and H. Shue (eds), above, p. 46. See also the discussion in Andrew Clapham, War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021, p. 19.

25 J. McMahan, above note 24.

26 A. Clapham, above note 24, pp. 267–268; Kubo Mačák, “A Needle in a Haystack? Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict”, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 45, 2015, p. 93; Anne Quintin, The Nature of International Humanitarian Law: A Permissive or Restrictive Regime?, Edwar Elgar, Cheltenham, 2020 (demonstrating the legitimacy of attacking combatants under IHL). See also the discussion below on military necessity for more about this topic.

27 Would it be legitimate to shoot a German soldier bathing in a lake during World War II despite the lack of any immediate apparent threat to the British forces surrounding him? See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed., Basic Books, New York, 2006, pp. 138–140.

28 G. Blum, above note 2, pp. 71, 76.

29 Jakob Kellenberger, “Keynote International Humanitarian Law and New Weapon Technologies, 34th Round Table on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 8–10 September 2011”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 886, 2012, p. 809.

30 Michael E. O'Hanlon, A Retrospective on the So-Called Revolution in Military Affairs, 2000–2020, Brookings Institution, 2018, available at: www.brookings.edu/articles/a-retrospective-on-the-so-called-revolution-in-military-affairs-2000-2020 (all internet references were accessed in April 2024).

31 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 73.

32 Peter Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 30; UK Supreme Court (UKSC), Smith and Others (FC) (Appellants) v. The Ministry of Defence (Respondent), [2013] UKSC 41, 19 June 2013, paras 61–62; ECtHR, Soering v. UK, [1989] 11 EHRR 439, 1989, para. 439; House of Lords, R (Gentle and Another) v. Prime Minister, [2008] UKHL 20, [2008] AC 1356, 2008, para. 9; ECtHR, Stoyanovi v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 42980/04, 9 November 2010, para. 61.

33 G. Blum, above note 2, pp. 73–74; M. A. Newton and L. May, above note 20, p. 135.

34 J. McMahan, above note 24, pp. 21–22.

35 D. Rodin, above note 24, pp. 63–64; A. Clapham, above note 24, p. 277.

36 Jeff McMahan, “The Ethics of Killing in War”, Ethics, Vol. 114, No. 4, 2004, p. 728.

37 See e.g. Eliav Lieblich, “The Humanization of Jus ad Bellum: Prospects and Perils”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2021, p. 588; Ryan Goodman, Christof Heyns and Yuval Shany, “Human Rights, Deprivation of Life and National Security: Q&A with Christof Heyns and Yuval Shany on General Comment 36”, Just Security, 4 February 2019, available at: www.justsecurity.org/62467/human-life-national-security-qa-christof-heyns-yuval-shany-general-comment-36.

38 Miles Jackson and Dapo Akande, “The Right to Life and the Jus ad Bellum: Belligerent Equality and the Duty to Prosecute Acts of Aggression”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 2, 2022, p. 5.

39 One could argue that the possibility of future liability might limit gratuitous harming of combatants.

40 Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order No. 100, US Department of War, 24 April 1863 (Lieber Code).

41 T. Meron, “The Humanization of Humanitarian Law”, above note 18, p. 239; Y. Shany, above note 21, pp. 4–5.

42 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 7, pp. 77–82; Nils Melzer, Fifth Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Geneva, 5/6 February 2008: Summary Report, ICRC, Geneva, 2008, pp. 13–14, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/2008-05-report-dph-2008-icrc.pdf.

43 N. Melzer, above note 42, pp. 14–16.

44 Ibid., p. 14.

45 See the special NYU Journal symposium, with W. Hays Parks, Kenneth Watkin, Michael N. Schmitt, Bill Boothby and Nils Melzer, NYU Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2010; Dapo Akande, “Clearing the Fog of War? The ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2010, p. 192.

46 N. Melzer, above note 42, p. 14.

47 Since the proposed approach requires a change in the interpretation of the military necessity of targeting combatants, it falls within the notion of lex ferenda and not lex lata.

48 See Ziv Bohrer and Mark Osiel, “Proportionality in Military Force at War's Multiple Levels: Averting Civilian Casualties vs. Safeguarding Soldiers”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 46. No. 3, 2012, pp. 766–767; David Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protection, Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 11-72, 2011, p. 36, available at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/654.

49 Z. Bohrer and M. Osiel, above note 48, pp. 766–767. Luban refers to the combatants from this perspective as merely “means” to an end: D. Luban, above note 48, p. 36.

50 Geoffrey S. Corn, Laurie R. Blank, Chris Jenks and Eric Talbot Jensen, “Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule”, International Law Studies, Vol. 89, No. 536, 2013, pp. 554–555.

51 Luban refers to combatants from this perspective as an “end” on its own: D. Luban, above note 48, p. 36. See also Z. Bohrer and M. Osiel, above note 48, pp. 766–767.

52 G. Blum, above note 2, pp. 109–114; Z. Bohrer and M. Osiel, above note 48, pp. 766–767.

53 UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 2005, p. 22, para. 2.2.1.

54 Other aspects can include for example combatants conducting law enforcement operations in situations of belligerent occupation. However, these aspects, important as they may be, provide redundant “noise” in the basic discussion, and therefore are outside of the scope of this paper.

55 G. S. Corn et al., above note 50, p. 543.

56 A. Quintin, above note 26, pp. 25–26.

57 Ibid., pp. 253–270.

58 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 80; G. S. Corn et al., above note 50, pp. 554–555. The notion of military advantage is bound by the framework of military necessity: see e.g. Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, pp. 106–107.

59 M. Milanovic, above note 16, pp. 118–119. See also Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmerman, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1986, para. 1953.

60 Agnieszka Jachec-Neale, “The Right to Take Life: Killing and Death in Armed Conflict”, in Jon Yorke (ed.), The Right to Life and the Value of Life, Routledge, London, 2010, p. 127.

61 G. Blum, above note 2, pp. 157–158.

62 M. Walzer, above note 27, pp. 138–140.

63 Françoise J. Hampson, “Proportionality and Necessity in the Gulf Conflict”, in Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting, Vol. 86, 1992, p. 53.

64 M. Walzer, above note 27, p. 144.

65 Ibid. See also G. Blum, above note 2, pp. 91–92; M. A. Newton and L. May, above note 20, pp. 134–135.

66 Jean Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 2, Brill, Leiden, 1985, p. 76.

67 G. Blum, above note 2, pp. 95, 116.

68 Yishai Beer, “Humanity Considerations Cannot Reduce War's Hazards Alone: Revitalizing the Concept of Military Necessity”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No. 801, 2015. See also “EJIL: Live! Professor Yishai Beer”, YouTube, 20 March 2016, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=xAfhKMDZrAo.

69 Oscar Schachter and Frits Kalshoven, “Introduction”, Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting, Vol. 86, 1992, pp. 39–45; A. Clapham, above note 24, pp. 276–279; I. Henderson, above note 15, p. 85.

70 McMahan has sharpened this approach, arguing that just combatants can become unjust if their actions are immoral (e.g. directly attacking uninvolved civilians), and that they can thus be considered fair game in such circumstances. See J. McMahan, above note 24, pp. 21–22

71 F. J. Hampson, above note 63, pp. 53–54; I. Henderson, above note 15, pp. 85–86.

72 Geoffrey S. Corn, “Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict”, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, Vol. 1, 2010, p. 80.

73 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 6, pp. 77–82.

74 Ibid., p. 78.

75 Ibid., p. 79. Although the ICRC Interpretive Guidance addresses mainly situations of non-international armed conflict, this general norm is applicable both to international and non-international armed conflicts.

76 G. Blum, above note 2, pp. 95, 116.

77 Torbjörn Tännsjö, Moral Rights in Understanding Ethics, 3rd ed., Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2013, pp. 73–74.

78 Kalshoven raised this issue in the context of the “Highway of Death”, but kept it an open question. See O. Schachter and F. Kalshoven, above note 69.

79 C. A. J. (Tony) Coady, “The Status of Combatants”, in D. Rodin and H. Shue (eds), above note 24, p. 157.

80 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 72; ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 6, pp. 77–82.

81 T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law, above note 18, p. 27.

82 M. A. Newton and L. May, above note 20, p. 128; T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law, above note 18, p. 28.

83 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 7, p. 86; M. A. Newton and L. May, above note 20, p. 144.

84 G. Blum, above note 2, pp. 109–114.

85 D. Akande, above note 45, p. 192.

86 The practicality of the ability to take a lower functional proximity into account will be discussed later on in this paper.

87 O. Schachter and F. Kalshoven, above note 69, p. 42 See also C. A. J. Coady, above note 79, p. 157.

88 G. S. Corn, above note 72, p. 84.

89 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 78 (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion).

90 AP I, Art. 51.

91 Ibid., Art. 41(1)

92 Ibid., Art. 48; Emily Crawford, The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 31.

93 Ryan Goodman, “The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 24. No. 3, 2013, p. 819; Michael S. Schmitt, “Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman's ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2013, p. 855.

94 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 93.

95 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above note 89, para. 78.

96 AP I, Arts 43, 50.

97 For a discussion on the suggested proportionality model, see the next section.

98 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 85.

99 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 85; Robin Geiss, “The Principle of Proportionality: ‘Force Protection’ as a Military Advantage”, Israel Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, p. 71. But see G. Solis, above note 2, p. 285 (advocating that the lives of combatants (force protection) should be excluded as part of the proportionality analysis).

100 See e.g. New Zealand, Manual of Armed Forces Law, 2nd ed., Vol. 4, DM 69, 2017, para. 8.6.3(g); R. Geiss, above note 99, p. 78. Some might refer to force protection as a decision to avoid launching operations in order to protect the attacker's own combatants from excessive risk. However, this aspect of force protection should not be included under military advantage as part of the proportionality equation, but rather should be included under the humanity principle.

101 See Y. Dinstein, above note 58, p. 106, para. 286, and p. 168, paras 449–450; R. Geiss, above note 99, p. 71; Z. Bohrer and M. Osiel, above note 48; D. Luban, above note 48; G. Solis above note 2, p. 285.

102 Y. Dinstein, above note 58, pp. 168–168; G. Solis, above note 2, p. 285.

103 While this might be in contrast with the obligation to take all feasible efforts to minimize collateral damage in accordance with the humanity principle, this section focuses on the principle of proportionality and military advantage.

104 Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany, “Contextualizing Proportionality Analysis? A Response to Schmitt and Merriam on Israel's Targeting Practices”, Just Security, 7 May 2015, available at: www.justsecurity.org/22786/contextualizing-proportionality-analysis-response-schmitt-merriam.

105 Z. Bohrer and M. Osiel, above note 48, pp. 766–767; D. Luban, above note 48, p. 36.

106 For further discussion on force protection for the purpose of self-defence, see R. Geiss, above note 99. See also Elvina Pothelet and Kevin Jon Heller, “Symposium on Soldier Self-Defense and International Law: Highlighting and Framing the Issue”, Opinio Juris, 29 April 2019, available at: https://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/29/symposium-on-soldier-self-defense-and-international-law-highlighting-and-framing-the-issue%EF%BB%BF (including related submissions).

107 Ziv Bohrer and Mark Osiel, “Proportionality in War, Protecting Soldiers from Enemy Captivity, and Israel's Cast Lead Operation – ‘The Soldiers Are Everyone's Children’”, Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2013, p. 637.

108 See Maayan Lubell and Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Did Israel's ‘Hannibal Directive’ Lead to a War Crime in Gaza?”, Reuters, 13 October 2014, available at: www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0I20FN; Françoise J. Hampson, “Legality of Military Activities during Operation ‘Protective Edge’ According to International Law”, YouTube, 18 January 2015, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rqz3nQhoOlY.

109 See F. J. Hampson, above note 108. See also A. Cohen and Y. Shany, above note 104.

110 A. P. V. Rogers, “Zero-Casualty Warfare”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 82, No. 837, 2000, p. 165.

111 R. Geiss, above note 99, p. 84.

112 See G. Solis, above note 2, p. 596, discussing “combatant collateral damage” in the context of the prohibition on using certain incendiary weapons against combatants under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons’ Protocol (III) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Geneva, 10 October 1980.

113 AP I, Art. 57(1). See further discussion on the relevant precautionary measures in the following section.

114 The attack is not expected to cause disproportionate collateral damage in this scenario.

115 R. Geiss, above note 99, p. 85; Stefan Oeter, “Collateral Damages – Military Necessity and the Right to Life”, in Christian Tomuschat, Evelyne Lagrange and Stefan Oeter (eds), The Right to Life, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010, p. 185.

116 Z. Bohrer and M. Osiel, above note 48, p. 766; D. Luban, above note 48, p. 36.

117 Adil Ahmed Haque, Law and Morality at War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 85–86; Seth Lazar, Sparing Civilians, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 128; Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, Oxford University Press, April 2009, pp. 234–235; Helen Frowe, “The Just War Framework”, in Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe (eds), Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 3.

118 Jovana Davidovic, “Proportionate Killing: Using Traditional Jus in Bello Conditions to Model the Relationship between Liability and Lesser-Evil Justifications for Killing in War”, in Jens David Ohlin, Larry May and Claire Finkelstein (eds), Weighing Lives in War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 158–159.

119 AP I, Art. 57.

120 G. Solis, above note 2, pp. 270, 325–326; Françoise J. Hampson, “Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf”, in Peter Rowe (ed.), The Gulf War 1990–91 in International and English Law, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 105–107; G. S. Corn et al., above note 50, p. 544; D. Akande, above note 45, p. 192.

121 C. A. J. Coady, above note 79, p. 157.

122 Based on AP I, Art. 57(2)(a), with appropriate changes.

123 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 85; A. Quintin, above note 26, pp. 254–257.

124 Z. Bohrer and M. Osiel, above note 48, p. 767.

125 See discussion on the requirement to capture rather than kill in the following section.

126 Frédéric Mégret, “The Limits of the Laws of War”, in Bardo Fassbender and Knut Traisbach (eds), The Limits of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020, pp. 290–292.

127 G. Solis, above note 2, p. 188; Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, “The Relationship between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 871, 2008, pp. 605–606; G. Blum, above note 2, p. 108.

128 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 108.

129 This model might raise questions and criticism about its manageability. For further discussion, see the section below on “Concerns about Practical Implementation”.

130 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight, 138 CTS 297. 11 December 1868 (St. Petersburg Declaration); Hague Regulations, above note 5, Art. 22; AP I, Art. 35.

131 J. Pictet, above note 66, p. 75.

132 G. Blum, above note 2, pp. 71, 78; G. S. Corn et al., above note 50, p. 544.

133 D. Akande, above note 45, p. 192.

134 G. Blum, above note 2, pp. 116–117.

135 There could also be a reference to peacekeeping forces, but in the context of their operations they can operate either under a law enforcement paradigm or an IHL paradigm, and in the latter they would be considered to be adversaries in some circumstances. See Magdalena Pacholska, Complicity and the Law of International Organizations, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2020, pp. 55–60.

136 See above in the discussion on military necessity.

137 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 6, pp. 77–82.

138 St. Petersburg Declaration, above note 130.

139 J. Pictet, above note 66, p. 75. See also Ryan Goodman, “The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2013, p. 820; Gabriella Blum, “The Laws of War and the ‘Lesser Evil’”, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2010, p. 57.

140 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 6, p. 80; N. Melzer, above note 42, pp. 13–16. See also W. Hays Parks, “Part IX of the ICRC ‘Direct Participation In Hostilities’ Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect”, NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2010, pp. 783–785.

141 W. H. Parks, above note 140. See also Marko Milanovic, “When to Kill and When to Capture?”, EJIL: Talk!, 6 May 2011, available at: www.ejiltalk.org/when-to-kill-and-when-to-capture; G. S. Corn et al., above note 50.

142 Or combatants, in the case of more than one combatant. In such a case we will refer to cumulative combatant collateral damage, as mentioned earlier in this paper.

143 As mentioned above, the use of a point-based system is done to illustrate and simplify the situation rather than to set a numeric value on the life of combatants or on their embedded military value.

144 G. Solis, above note 2, p. 5.

145 This is not to say that other legitimate military considerations such as force protection should not be taken into account as discussed earlier in this paper. If using less lethal measures would impose no additional risk on one's own forces, it would only emphasize the need for the use of such measures. See C. A. J. Coady, above note 79, p. 157.

146 R. Geiss, above note 99, p. 71.

147 Some might argue that the rules on the protection of civilians are not very clear, but IHL does provide us with clear guidance and restrictions.

148 R. Geiss, above note 99, p. 71; Z. Bohrer and M. Osiel, above note 48, p. 774; Y. Dinstein, above note 58, pp. 106, 168.

149 R. Geiss, above note 99, pp. 85–87; S. Oeter, above note 115, p. 185.

150 See above in the discussion on proportionality.

151 See Z. Bohrer and M. Osiel, above note 48, pp. 756–757 (comparing and prioritizing the lives of combatants and civilians from both sides); D. Luban, above note 48, p. 37.

152 R. Geiss, above note 99, p. 72; Y. Beer, above note 68, p. 821.

153 R. Geiss, above note 99, p. 72.

154 AP I, Art. 57(2)(c): “effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit” (emphasis added).

155 See Ruth Margalit, “Hadar Goldin and the Hannibal Directive”, The New Yorker, 6 August 2014, available at: www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/hadar-goldin-hannibal-directive.

156 R. Geiss, above note 99, p. 74; A. A. Haque, above note 117, pp. 85–86; S. Lazar, above note 117, p. 128; J. McMahan, above note 117, pp. 234–235.

157 UK Ministry of Defence Official Twitter Account, 14 May 2023, available at: https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1657643236989517825.

158 Kyiv Independent Twitter Account, 14 May 2023, available at: https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1657666886585274369.

159 UKSC, Smith, above note 32, para. 71.

160 Goddard, David S., “Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to the Use of Physical Force: Al-Saadoon”, International Law Studies, Vol. 91, 2015, p. 420Google Scholar.

161 See UKSC, R. (Smith) (FC) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2010] UKSC 29, 2010, para. 195.

162 D. S. Goddard, above note 160, p. 423.

163 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 86.

164 UKSC, Smith, above note 32, para. 76.

165 General Comment 36, above note 9, para. 64.

166 M. Walzer, above note 27, pp. 136, 155–156; UKSC, Smith, above note 32, paras 61–62; ECtHR, Soering, above note 32, para. 439; House of Lords, R (Gentle and Another), above note 32, para. 9; ECtHR, Stoyanovi, above note 32, para. 61; P. Rowe, above note 32, p. 30.

167 P. Rowe, above note 32, p. 138.

168 Much like IHL requires attackers to first take the relevant precautions to avoid collateral damage and only if that option is not available does the question of civilian collateral damage and proportionality become relevant. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Ken Watkin and Jamie Williamson, The Law in War: A Concise Overview, Routledge, London, 2018, p. 151.

169 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 74.

170 Z. Bohrer and M. Osiel, above note 48, pp. 788–789; Clapham, Andrew, “The Limits of Human Rights in Times of Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Armed Violence”, in Fassbender, Bardo and Traisbach, Knut (eds), The Limits of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020, p. 308Google Scholar; G. S. Corn, above note 72, p. 83: “Attempting to extend human rights based use of force standards into the realm of armed conflict is therefore not only illogical, it is operationally debilitating.”

171 G. Blum, above note 2, p. 106.

172 Haque, Adil Ahmed, “Killing in the Fog of War”, Southern California Law Review, Vol. 86, No. 1, 2020, p. 115Google Scholar; Eriksen, Jørgen Weidemann, “Should Soldiers Think Before They Shoot?”, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2010, p. 214CrossRefGoogle Scholar; G. Blum, above note 2, p. 74.