In Treasures among Men; the Fudai Daimyo in Tokugawa Japan (Yale, 1974), Harold Bolitho has discussed the role of the fudai daimyo in the functioning and collapse of the Tokugawa polity, arguing in fine that their conduct during the 1860's was dictated by their concern for the security of their han. This concern, he argues, led them to refuse to assist the bakufu even in its moment of supreme crisis. He sees this outcome as the final expression of an enduring situation in which the interests of fudai daimyo were in permanent conflict with the interests of the bakufu.

In 1876 Baba Tatsui, then a young twenty-six year old man who had just completed two years' study of English law in London, published a booklet there called The Treaty Between Japan and England. It was a remarkable work in that it was destined to become the source most frequently cited by many Meiji publicists and later historians who attacked the inequity of the extraterritorial regime in Japan. In this work Baba wrote that it was evidently to the interest of British consuls in Japan “to protect their countrymen rather than to prosecute or convict them,” and that the majority of the English residents in Japan had “strong prejudices against the natives of the country … and … against the native government. …” These facts alone, Baba went on to say, “show that the judges of the consular courts are not impartial, and therefore it is difficult to see how justice can be done in a court of justice where the judges have so much interest for the one and prejudice against the other.” In a similar vein in 1893 the Kaishintō Tōhō, a bi-monthly periodical published by the Kaishintō, commented: “Injustice is the general rule in these [British and American consular] tribunals: justice is rare. Nevertheless, when they render just judgments we applaud their justice, hoping thereby to encourage them in the exercise of that quality.” Thus arose in the late nineteenth century the farreaching generalization that the Western consular tribunals in Japan were so partial—toward Westerners and against Japanese—that they seldom rendered even-handed justice.

Though there have been in China since 1949 occasional deviations in the policy regarding family life, some ideals enunciated at the start of the revolutionary regime have remained constant. The dominant policy has been that the family should be retained and its strengths used. However, family commitments should not interfere with commitments to the state or the collective, and within the family feudal customs should be eliminated. The parents' stranglehold over the lives of their children should be broken. Children should be able to marry without parental interfence. There should be no buying and selling of brides, and big, ostentatious and wasteful wedding feasts should be stopped. In an effort to limit births, marriages should be delayed to age twenty-three for girls and age twenty-five for boys in rural areas. As part of the program for more equal treatment of women, parents should show no favoritism towards boys. Women like men should work in the fields, and nurseries should be established so as to help women join in productive work. At more sporadic intervals, young children have been urged to teach their parents about the thought of Mao Tse-tung in order to rid them of old feudal ideas.

The establishent of the Chinese rural people's commune in 1958 as a new political and economic organization has aroused considerable interest among observers. One important question in this regard has been the role the commune has played in China's modernization. Since China is committed to both “socialist transformation and construction,” modernization in China involves two tasks: revolution and development. As for China's rural problems, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regards the commune as the best organization for achieving these two goals during its transition to communism. Yet the commune has undergone a series of changes as a result of interactions between the Party's revolutionary goals and its development requirements, presenting a microcosm of Chinese communism. This article is an attempt to account for changes and continuities in the political economy of the commune.

Socialization is “the process by which someone learns the ways of a given O society or social group so that he can function within it.” Socialization occurs in many different groups and settings, but in all societies, the first and usually the most important of these is the family. For this reason, family socialization has been of interest to scholars in several different disciplines using a variety of conceptual frameworks.

In describing the failures of the old society, Chinese communist writers have frequently condemned the evils of bureaucratic capitalism. It is not easy to extract a clear definition of this term from their polemic literature, but I shall attempt to construct a preliminary working proposition.

The Changsha rice riot of April 12–16, 1910 was one of the series of popular revolts that racked the Ch'ing dynasty in its closing years.1 Triggered by serious crop failures and peasant demand for relief, it involved over twenty thousand participants and the occupation of a heavily garrisoned provincial capital. Rioters put the torch to the governor's yamen, foreign property and government offices and looted over one hundred rice shops. In outlying districts secret societies made spasmodic attempts to incite a general uprising against the dynasty.

Patrimonial politics and administration in princely India from the middle of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century are the subjects of this essay. The bureaucratic lineage, exemplified here by three related families, is our unit of analysis for understanding elite formation and conflict. The period of the lineage's historical ascendency, a century spanning four generations, is sufficiently long to capture processes of conflict and change as well as more visible and easily accessible features of integration and stability.

The progressive shift of formerly subject peoples from political acquiescence to participatory citizenship has been the focus of numerous diverse studies of modernization in India and elsewhere. As modernization proceeds, such studies inform us, this transformation is reflected in new attitudes and new social relationships. At the same time, there is not a complete break with the past, but rather an adaptation of traditional structures and relationships to meet modern needs.

During the Cultural Revolution (CR) the numerous “Red Guard” and “Revolutionary Rebel” organizations published an enormous amount of printed materials in various forms, all of them now referred to as “Red Guard publications.” Some of them have become available to the academic community outside China, thus providing China specialists with their best opportunity for the foreseeable future—until we are able to interview Chinese people freely—to study Chinese politics. This paper contains a general bibliographical survey of the available Red Guard publications and an appraisal of their potential value as source materials.

The Himalaya, the southern frontier of Central Asia, has been for centuries a geographic enigma akin to the headwaters of the Nile and the wanderings of the Lop Nor. The earlier problems of location and elevation were solved, for the most part, by the pioneering efforts of the Surveyor General of India and the Survey of India, conducted since the mid-nineteenth century. Unfortunately, virtually all of the maps produced by the Surveyor General of India are officially restricted and thus normally not available. Far from satisfying our curiosity of the Himalaya, the Surveyor General and the Survey generated a host of questions regarding the population, cultures, and human ecology of that mountain system. These questions have attracted the full attention of numerous scholars representing many disciplines. Among geographers interested in the Himalaya, the cartographic work of Professor Pradyumna P. Karan is well known.