No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
China's Diplomatic Leverage on North Korean Provocations: Effect of High-Level Meetings Between China and North Korea on North Korean Missile and Nuclear Tests
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 August 2023
Abstract
Nuclear and missile tests by North Korea, which directly threaten China's national interests, regional stability, and economic development, have consistently irritated China. Since the 1950s, China and North Korea have held high-level meetings aimed at discussing and improving their bilateral relationship. Using empirical analysis, this study attempts to examine the impact of these meetings on North Korea's missile and nuclear tests. The study argues that as the frequency of high-level meetings between China and North Korea increases, North Korea's provocative actions decrease. The high-level meetings serve to address the issue of incomplete information, create avenues for economic aid and cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of future nuclear and missile tests. The empirical findings indicate that while high-level meetings with or without the presence of top leaders can lead to a reduction in missile tests by North Korea, only summits between China and North Korea have a significant impact on the reduction of nuclear tests by North Korea.
- Type
- Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the East Asia Institute
References
Ahn, Mun Suk. 2011. “What is the Root Cause of the North Korean Nuclear Program?.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 38 (4): 175–187.Google Scholar
Allport, Gordon Willard, Clark, Kenneth, and Pettigrew, Thomas. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Antonio, Anthony Lising. 2001. “The Role of Interracial Interaction in the Development of Leadership Skills and Cultural Knowledge and Understanding.” Research in Higher Education 42 (5): 593–617.Google Scholar
Aoyama, Rumi, ed. 2017. “China's North Korea Policy: The Dilemma between Security and Economic Engagement.” In The Kim Jong Un Regime and the Future Security Environment Surrounding the Korean Peninsula, 143–160. Tokyo, Japan: The National Institute for Defense Studies.Google Scholar
Bernhardt, Jordan, and Sukin, Lauren. 2021. “Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 65 (5): 855–888.Google Scholar
Bondaz, Antoine. 2015. “The Fear of Opening Pandora's Box: China's Heptagon of Policy Options in Dealing with the North Korean Issue.” Korean Review of International Studies 17 (1).Google Scholar
Boschee, Elizabeth, Lautenschlager, Jennifer, O'Brien, Sean, Shellman, Steve, Starz, James, Ward, Michael. 2015. “ICEWS Coded Event Data,” https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28075, Harvard Dataverse, V37.Google Scholar
Carlin, Robert, and Lewis, John W.. 2008. Negotiating with North Korea: 1992–2007. Stanford: Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University.Google Scholar
Chambers, Michael R. 2005. “Dealing by a Truculent Ally: A Comparative Perspective on China's Handling of North Korea.” Journal of East Asian Studies 5 (1): 35–75.Google Scholar
Chanlett-Avery, Emma, and Taylor, Mi Ae. 2010. “North Korea: US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation.” Report prepared for the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.Google Scholar
Cheow, Eric Teo Chu. 2006. “The North Korean Missile and Nuclear Crises: China's Historic and Strategic Stakes on the Korean Peninsula.” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 18 (4): 31–50.Google Scholar
Chon, Hyun-Joon. 2010. “Prospects for North Korea's Internal Policy Following the North Korea-China Summit.” Korea Institute for National Unification, Online Series, https://repo.kinu.or.kr/handle/2015.oak/1631.Google Scholar
Choo, Jaewoo. 2008. “Mirroring North Korea's Growing Economic Dependence on China: Political Ramifications.” Asian Survey 48 (2): 343–372.Google Scholar
Chung, Chong-Wook. 2010. “Korean Peninsula in China's Grand Strategy: China's Role in Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Quandary.” RSIS Working Paper, 192. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University.Google Scholar
The CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies). 2017. “China-North Korea High Level Visits Since 1953.” Beyond Parallel, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/china-dprk-high-level-visits-since-1953-2/.Google Scholar
The CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies). 2019. “Database: North Korean Provocations.” Beyond Parallel, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/database-north-korean-provocations/.Google Scholar
Davenport, Kelsey. 2020. “Chronology of U.S.–North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy.” The Arms Control Association, www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.Google Scholar
Easley, Leif-Eric, and Park, In Young. 2016. “China's Norms in Its Near Abroad: Understanding Beijing's North Korea Policy.” Journal of Contemporary China 25 (101): 651–668.Google Scholar
Fearon, James. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization,49 (3): 379–414.Google Scholar
Gaertner, Samuel. et al. 2000. “Reducing Intergroup Conflict: From Superordinate Goals to Decategorization, Recategorization, and Mutual Differentiation.” Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice 4 (1): 98–114.Google Scholar
Geddes, Barbara, Wright, Joseph, and Frantz, Erica. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics 12 (2): 313–331.Google Scholar
Haas, Ernst B. 1980. “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes.” World Politics 32 (3): 357–405.Google Scholar
Hong, C. J. 2016 (February 25). “Jungdandunghang bughanseonbag ibhang-geumji jochi…‘daebug jejae chawon-in deus’.” Yonhapnews, www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20160225211100097.Google Scholar
Jeong, Dongjin. 2012. “China's Foreign Policy toward North Korea: The Nuclear Issue.” Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School.Google Scholar
Ji, You. 2001. “China and North Korea: A Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience.” Journal of Contemporary China 10 (28): 387–398.Google Scholar
Ji, You. 2011a. “Hedging Opportunities and Crises against Pyongyang's Hereditary Succession: A Chinese Perspective.” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 20 (1): 55–87.Google Scholar
Jung, Heon-joo, and Rich, Timothy S.. 2016. “Why Invest in North Korea? Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in North Korea and its Implications.” Pacific Review 29 (3): 307–330.Google Scholar
Khun, Anthony. 2016 (March 18). Why China Supports New Sanctions Against North Korea. NPR Parallels, www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/03/18/470956712/why-china-supports-new-sanctions-against-north-korea.Google Scholar
Kim, Donggil, and Lee, Seong-hyon. 2018. “Historical Perspective on China's ‘Tipping Point’ with North Korea.” Asian Perspective 42 (1): 33–60.Google Scholar
Kim, Hong Nack. 2013. “China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-Il.” International Journal of Korean Studies 17(1): 21–49.Google Scholar
Kim, Jin-Moo. 2011. “North Korea's Reliance on China and China's Influence on North Korea.” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 23 (2): 257–271.Google Scholar
Kim, Min-hyung. 2017. “Cracks in the Blood-Shared Alliance? Explaining Strained PRC–DPRK Relations in the Post-Cold War World.” Pacific Focus 32 (1): 109–128.Google Scholar
Kim, Samuel S., and Lee, Tai Hwan, eds. 2002. “Chinese-North Korean Relations: Managing Asymmetrical Interdependence.” In North Korea and Northeast Asia, 109–138. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.Google Scholar
Kim, Sea-Young. 2018. “China's Crackdown on North Korean Refugees: North Korean Provocations Intensify Border Control.” Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University.Google Scholar
Kim, Suk Hi, and Martin-Hermosillo, Mario. 2013. “The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against a Nuclear North Korea.” North Korean Review 9 (2): 99–110.Google Scholar
Kong, Tat-Yan. 2018. “China's Engagement-Oriented Strategy towards North Korea: Achievements and Limitations.” Pacific Review 31 (1): 76–95.Google Scholar
Lautenschlager, Jennifer. 2015a. ICEWS Coded Event Data Read Me. Advanced Technology Laboratories, Lockheed Martin, http://data.nber.org/ens/feldstein/NBER_Sources/ENS%20Conference%20Sources/2016/Predicting%20Conflict%20Via%20Machine%20Learning/ICEWS%20(Lockheed%20Martin)/Coded%20Event%20Data/ICEWS%20Coded%20Event%20Data%20Read%20Me.pdf.Google Scholar
Lautenschlager, Jennifer. 2015b. ICEWS Events and Aggregations. Advanced Technology Laboratories, Lockheed Martin. Accessed on June 3, 2021. www.nber.org/ens/feldstein/NBER_Sources/ENS%20Conference%20Sources/2016/Predicting%20Conflict%20Via%20Machine%20Learning/ICEWS%20(Lockheed%20Martin)/Dictionaries/ICEWS%20Events%20and%20Aggregations.pdf.Google Scholar
Lee, Dong-ryul. 2010. “China's Policy and Influence on the North Korea Nuclear Issue: Denuclearization and/or Stabilization of the Korean Peninsula?.” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 22 (2): 163–181.Google Scholar
Lee, Jong-Seok. 2014. “China–North Korea Relations in the Post-Cold War Era and New Changes in 2009.” The Chinese Historical Review 21 (2): 143–161.Google Scholar
Lee, Julia Joo-A. 2009. “To Fuel or not to Fuel: China's Energy Assistance to North Korea.” Asian Security 5 (1): 45–72.Google Scholar
Lee, Ki-Hyun, Kim, Ae-Kyoung, and Lee, Young-Hak. 2016. China's Neighborhood Diplomacy and Policies on North Korea. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification.Google Scholar
Levy, Jack S. 1989. “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique.” In Handbook of War Studies, edited by Midlarsky, M., 259–88.Google Scholar
Liu, Ming. 2003. “China and the North Korean Crisis: Facing Test and Transition.” Pacific Affairs 76 (3): 347–373.Google Scholar
Moore, Gregory J. 2008. “How North Korea Threatens China's Interests: Understanding Chinese ‘Duplicity’ on the North Korean Nuclear Issue.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8 (1): 1–29.Google Scholar
Morrow, James. 1989. “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining.” American Journal of Political Science 33 (4): 941–972.Google Scholar
Noesselt, Nele. 2014. “China's Contradictory Role (s) in World Politics: Decrypting China's North Korea Strategy.” Third World Quarterly 35 (7): 1307–1325.Google Scholar
Park, Hongseo, and Park, Jae Jeok. 2017. “How Not to be Abandoned by China: North Korea's Nuclear Brinkmanship Revisited.” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 29 (3): 371–387.Google Scholar
Park, Si-yeon. 2016. “China's Policy on North Korean Nuclear Tests: Changed and Unchanged.” Ph.D. diss., Seoul National University.Google Scholar
Pettigrew, Thomas. (1998). “Intergroup Contact Theory.” Annual Review of Psychology, 49 (1), 65–85.Google Scholar
Poast, Paul. 2012. “Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945.” International Organization 66 (2): 277–310.Google Scholar
Reed, William. 2003. “Information, Power, and War.” American Political Science Review 97 (4): 633–641.Google Scholar
Sebenius, James K. 1983. “Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties.” International Organization 37 (2):281–316.Google Scholar
Shambaugh, David. 2003. “China and the Korean peninsula: Playing for the Long Term.” The Washington Quarterly 26 (2): 43–56.Google Scholar
Shi, Yinhong. 2011. “New Games in Tightly Fixed Structures: North Korea's Volatile Desperation and China's Cornered Strategy.” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 23 (3): 353–368.Google Scholar
Shin, Jongho. 2018. “China's Great Power Identity and Its Policy on the Korean Peninsula in the Xi Jinping Era.” Pacific Focus 33 (2): 284–307.Google Scholar
Snyder, Scott. 2016. “Will China Change Its North Korea Policy?.” Council on Foreign Relations March 31, www.cfr.org/expert-brief/will-china-change-its-north-korea-policy.Google Scholar
Song, Wenzhi, and Lee, Sangkeun. 2016. “China's Engagement Patterns towards North Korea.” Pacific Focus 31 (1): 5–30.Google Scholar
Szalontai, Bálazs. 2015. “‘If the Neighborhood Catches Fire, One Will Also Come to Grief”: Chinese Attitudes toward North Korea's Confrontational Acts, 2009–2014.” Tiempo devorado 2 (2): 180–209.Google Scholar
VOA. 2005. Hujintao jung-gug guggajuseog pyeong-yang bangmun. The Voice of America, October 28, www.voakorea.com/a/a-35-2005-10-28-voa7-91189574/1294095.html.Google Scholar
Walt, Stephen M. 1985. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International security 9 (2): 3–43.Google Scholar
Wang, Fei-Ling. 2018. “China and the Prospects of Denuclearization of North Korea.” Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 6 (2): 267–288.Google Scholar
Wang, Tianyi. 2014. “Small State, Big Influence: China's North Korea Policy Dilemma.” The Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs 1 (1): 5–27.Google Scholar
Weilemann, Peter R. 2000. “The Summit Meeting: The Role and Agenda of Diplomacy at its Highest Level.” Nira Review 7 (2): 16–20.Google Scholar
Wortzel, Larry. 2018. “China's Role in the North Korea Crisis.” Defense Dossier 22: 10–15.Google Scholar
Yang, Eunsook. 2003. “China's Changing Relations with the Two Koreas.” UNISCI Discussion Papers 3: 1–7.Google Scholar
Yoon, Seung-Hyun, and Lee, Seung-Ook. 2013.“From Old Comrades to New Partnerships: Dynamic Development of Economic Relations between China and North Korea.” The Geographical Journal 179 (1):19–31.Google Scholar