The Saint Esprit was a merchant ship which sailed from the harbor of Marseilles in the spring of 1248, bound for Acre. One hundred and fifty contracts relating directly to this voyage are preserved in the notarial records. This article attempts to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding this venture and analyzes the statistical data available with regard to passengers, investors, and cargo. The general picture which emerges from studying the total venture offers a new perspective on medieval business.

There is at present no series of crop yields available for early modern England. This paper describes a method for calculating estimates of grain yields in bushels per acre using data derived from English probate inventories. Results are presented of 10-year average yields for wheat, rye, barley, oats, and peas for the two counties of Norfolk and Suffolk during 1587–98, 1628–40, and 1660–1735. These results are compared with other yield figures for the periods before and after these dates, and used to revise existing estimates of the progress of productivity changes.

This paper reports new calculations of foreign investment in Russia between 1881 and 1913. As the major recipient of foreign capital under the gold standard, Russia provides an ideal case study of capital flows among countries. The conclusions are that the influx of foreign investment into Russia following convertibility was much more substantial than the early estimates suggested and that the Russian growth rate was raised by about 0.5 percent annually as a consequence of the gold standard. The major cost of achieving convertibility was that two-thirds of official borrowing abroad between 1885 and 1897 was used to acquire gold reserves, but the ensuing growth benefits which are estimated far outweigh these costs. The Russian case confirms the standard portfolio theory of capital movements, and the relationship between the demand and supply of fiat money explains observed variations in the exchange rate.

The standard modern model of married women's labor force participation is modified because turn-of-the-century families had the alternatives of substituting children for the mother in the labor force and of taking in paying boarders. The modified model explained 1901 participation rates quite well. Participation rates were significantly related (negatively) to the number of older children (potential workers) but not to the number of young children. In addition, the availability of jobs was more important than high wages in inducing women to seek work. Other family income, the male unemployment rate, and literacy also were significant.

During the nineteenth century the export of bulk commodities from West Africa expanded at the expense of slave exports. Research has focused on the political implications of the expansion of so-called “legitimate trade” rather than on its economic character. In the interests of an economic approach, new terminology and a conceptual framework are proposed, and then applied to a historical problem—the levels of competition prevailing in the African trader networks serving the coastal ports. The conclusions of this study are related to the issue of the historical origins of African underdevelopment.

More than half the variance in length of school session in a cross section of 329 localities in Massachusetts in 1855 can be explained by the share of Irish in.the town's population, the family per dwelling ratio, and a proxy for the share of male merchants over 15 in the population, all of which enter regression equations with strong positive coefficients. This paper considers what these results may tell us about a number of hypotheses that link industrialization and educational revitalization in antebellum Massachusetts, discusses independent confirmation of these basic relationships, and concludes with a more general discussion of the implications of this Massachusetts evidence.

In an earlier issue of this Journal, M. E. Sushka criticized the methodology of such “revisionists” as Peter Temin in their evaluation of the impact of the Bank War on the Jacksonian economy. Sushka characterizes the work of the revisionists as the “use of descriptive statistical tools in an attempt to analyze developments empirically.” Sushka, on the other hand, applies “modern econometric techniques” to “an economic framework drawn from contemporary monetary and macroeconomic theory.”

In their comment Curran and Johnston raise two general points. They suggest (1) that my main conclusions are not substantiated by statistical tests of stability, and (2) that the specifications used in my analysis are inappropriate.

Let me summarize my reply. With regard to Curran and Johnston's statistical tests for the structural stability of my money model, there are three major points. First, in using the Chow test for structural stability the authors do not use the relevant statistical information to carry out the test, so the results they derive are not the appropriate test of the economic hypotheses. I on the other hand report and interpret the results of the relevant Chow test that uses the appropriate statistical information and lends support to my hypothesis that the Bank War altered the public's liquidity preference. Second, Curran and Johnston do not correctly analyze and interpret their own results. Actually, the implications of their own evidence support my original hypothesis that the Bank War caused a shift in the liquidity preference of the public. Third, although the Chow test is a statistical test for stability, in this case it is not a direct test of the economic question at hand; that is, it is a weak test. I therefore provide a more direct statistical F test that provides evidence to support my hypothesis that the Bank War caused the Panic of 1837 and that refutes the Temin hypothesis that the Bank War left monetary behavior unaffected.1 Furthermore, the empirical evidence demonstrates that banks were quite interest sensitive during the years prior to the Bank War and that the Bank War altered commercial bank behavior before 1837 in a manner that, coupled with the shift in the public's liquidity preference, culminated in the Panic of 1837.

In the June 1977 issue of this Journal, Lewis R. Jones criticized my analysis of the diffusion of mechanical reaping and mowing machinery. Jones attempts to revive the threshold argument popularized by Paul David. In doing so Jones either confuses or ignores the main points I raised while concentrating on a peripheral issue of little significance.

I raised three major issues. First, and of least importance, I revised the values of some of the parameters David used to estimate the threshold acreage. Jones correctly notes that I erred by reporting that the revised threshold was more than twice as large as that previously estimated; the correct calculation is about 93 percent, as Jones notes. If I were to write the paper again, I would correct this mistake. Nonetheless, my major conclusions on this issue are unaltered. Revising two of the parameters used to calculate the threshold acreage so that they better conform with the actual historical situation generates a threshold about twice as large as that previously estimated. I felt this discrepancy was sufficient to cast reasonable doubt on previous estimates, and I noted that similar revisions could be made of most of the parameters and variables used for such estimations (p. 333). Anyone who doubts this assertion should see Robert Ankli's excellent work on the subject.