In Law’s Empire,Ronald Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). Hereinafter referred to as LE. Ronald Dworkin distinguishes two kinds of disagreement legal practitioners can have about law. Lawyers can agree on the criteria a rule must satisfy to be legally valid but disagree on whether it satisfies those criteria. For example, two lawyers might agree that a rule is valid if enacted by the state legislature but disagree on whether it was, in fact, enacted by the state legislature. Such disagreement is empirical in nature and poses no difficulties for positivism. There is, however, a second kind of disagreement that Dworkin believes is inconsistent with positivism. Lawyers can agree on the facts about a rule’s creation but disagree on whether those facts are sufficient to endow the rule with legal authority. This sort of disagreement is theoretical in nature as it concerns the grounds of law, which, according to positivism, are exhausted by the rule of recognition.