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Davidson's Conceptual Argument for Rational Cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2009

Wayne A. Davis
Wayne A. Davis
Affiliation:
Georgetown University
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Extract

According to Jules Coleman, Rational Choice (RC) Theory holds that human action is both intentional and rational. “The rationality of intentional action is evaluated along the two dimensions corresponding to the two elements of the belief-desire model.” On the belief-dimension, RC Theory assumes that people are “able to draw appropriate inferences from the information (or truths) they possess.”

Type
Articles
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 3 , Issue 2: Special Issue: Rationality , June 1997 , pp. 205 - 210
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1997

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References

1. Coleman, J., Rational Choice and Rational Cognition, 2. The Olin Conference on Rationality and Cognition, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington D.C., 11 15–16, 1996.Google Scholar

2. Id. at 3.

3. Davidson, D., Thought and Talk, in The Nature of Mind 370Google Scholar (Guttenplan, S. ed., 1975).Google Scholar

4. Id. at 366.