¹ Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), [1954] ICJ Rep. 19, at 32. See also Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Germany v. Poland), [1928] PCIJ (Ser. A) No 15, at 22; Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 26 June 1992, [1992] ICJ Rep. 260; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment of 30 June 1995, [1995] ICJ Rep., at 101. In Status on Eastern Carelia, the PCIJ noted that ‘[i]t is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement’, Status on Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, [1923] PCIJ (Ser B) No. 5, at 27.

² Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, [1927] PCIJ (Ser A) No. 2, at 60 (Judge M. Moore, Dissenting Opinion). Yet, this statement should be tempered as it is a well-established rule under international law that only the relevant international forum is competent to determine its own jurisdiction, i.e., the so-called kompetenz-kompetenz principle enshrined in Article 36(6) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 18 November 1953, [1953] ICJ Rep., at 119. The principle prevails even in disputes where the seisin of the relevant international forum showed grave defects. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 18 November 2008, [2008] ICJ Rep., at 441–2, paras. 85–86.

³ The relevant part of Art. 36(2) of the ICJ Statute provides: ‘The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court.’

⁴ Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment of 4 June 2008, [2008] ICJ Rep., at 204, para. 62; The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 25 March 1948, [1948] ICJ Rep., at 278; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 3 February 2006, [2006] ICJ Rep., at 18.

⁵ 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3. See ‘One of the significant achievements of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference was the development of a comprehensive system for the settlement of the disputes that may arise with respect to the interpretation or application of [UNCLOS].’ M. H. Nordquist, S. Rosenne and L. B. Sohn, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (1993), vol. 5, para. XV.1. See also A. L. C. de Mestral, ‘Compulsory Dispute Settlement in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Canadian Perspective’, in T. Buergenthal (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International Law: Essays in Honor of Louis Sohn (1984), 169; E. L. Richardson, ‘Dispute Settlement Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Flexible and Comprehensive Extension of the Rule of Law to Ocean Space’, in Buergenthal, ibid., at 149. For a different view see conclusions of the arbitral tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, where it is concluded, in a finding which has not been followed by other arbitral tribunals that UNCLOS ‘falls significantly short of establishing a truly comprehensive regime of compulsory jurisdiction entailing binding decisions’. Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand v Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (2000) 23 UNRIAA 1, para. 62.

⁶ Excerpt from Art. 288(1) of UNCLOS, ibid.

⁷ Excerpt from Art. 288(2) of UNCLOS, which has driven Tullio Treves to refer to it as a ‘System for Law of Sea Dispute Settlement’, T. Treves, ‘A System for Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement’, in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds.), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (2006), 417.

⁸ 2023 Draft Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BNNJ Agreement). Consistent with Art. 55(1) of the BBNJ Agreement, ‘[d]isputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be settled in accordance with the provisions for the settlement of disputes provided for in Part XV of the Convention’. The website of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) contains a list of international agreements under Art. 288(2). The list is not exhaustive, see N. Bankes, ‘The Jurisdiction of the Dispute Settlement Bodies of the Law of the Sea Convention with Respect to Other Treaties’, (2021) 52 Ocean Development of International Law 346. It has been observed that ‘the without prejudice provision of [Article 55(7) of the BBNJ Agreement] may have broader implications than articles 281 and 282. It may be read as implying that dispute settlement procedures under other instruments and frameworks are insulated from the effect of the outcome of a related dispute settlement procedure under the BBNJ Agreement’. L. N. Nguyen, D. Georgoula and A. Oude Elferink, ‘Dispute Settlement under the BBNJ Agreement: Accepting Part XV of the UNCLOS with a Twist’, EJIL:Talk!, 15 May 2023, available at www.ejiltalk.org/dispute-settlement-under-the-bbnj-agreement-accepting-part-xv-of-the-unclos-with-a-twist/.

⁹ Art. 282 provides: ‘If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.’

¹⁰ It has been observed that ‘Articles 281 and 282 render the normative policy principle as contained in Article 280 more concrete.’ R. Wolfrum, ‘Conciliation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’, in C. Tomuschat, R. Pisillo Mazzeschi and D. Thürer (eds.), Conciliation in International Law (2016), 171, at 177.

¹¹ On this issue see N. Bankes, ‘Precluding the Applicability of Section 2 of Part XV of the Law of the Sea Convention’, (2017) 48 Ocean Development of International Law 239; see Wolfrum, ibid., at 178.

¹² 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331. The ICJ has observed in numerous cases that Arts. 31 and 32 of the VCLT reflect international customary law. See Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment of 27 January 2014, [2014] ICJ Rep. 3, at 28, para. 57; Genocide Convention (Bosnia v. Serbia), Judgment of 26 February 2007, [2007] ICJ. Rep. 43, at 110, para. 160; Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment of 17 December 2002, [2002] ICJ Rep. 625, at 645, para. 37; Case Concerning Kasikilil Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep. 1045, at 1059, para. 18; Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994, [1994] ICJ Rep. 6, at 21, para. 41.

¹³ While customary treaty interpretation is based on a single rule, it relies on four different components, including the context, all of which ‘are to be applied together, not individually’. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševic, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 22 September 2004, para. 31.

¹⁴ D. A. Colson and P. Hoyle, ‘Satisfying the Procedural Prerequisites to the Compulsory Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: Did the Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal Get it Right?’, (2003) 34 Ocean Development & International Law 59.

¹⁵ See Nguyen, Georgoula and Elferink, supra note 8.

¹⁶ Yet, R. Wolfrum argues that agreements under Art. 281 ‘are not required to contain a compulsory dispute settlement system’. See Wolfrum, supra note 10, at 177.

¹⁷ Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), PCA Case 2017-06, Award on Preliminary Objections, 21 February 2020, at 141, para. 489 (emphasis added).

¹⁸ Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), Judgment of 2 February 2017, [2017] ICJ Rep. 3, at 48, para. 122.

¹⁹ While the distinction between obiter dictum and ratio decidendi is important in a legal order that relies on stare decisis, ‘it is not conducive to clarity to apply the work of the Court, the supposedly rigid delimitation between obiter dicta and ratio decidendi applicable to a legal system based on the strict doctrine of precedent’. H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958), at 61. On this issue see also R. Y. Jennings, ‘The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law’, (1996) 45 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 10.

²⁰ See Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean, supra note 18, at 49, para. 126 (emphasis added).

²¹ Ibid., at 48, para. 122.

²² South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), PCA Case 2013-30, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 29 October 2015, at 95, para. 247 (emphasis added). The arbitral tribunal relies on the statement to the same effect by Justice Sir Kenneth Keith in his Separate Opinion in Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia v Japan; New Zealand v Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (2000) 23 UNRIAA 1, at 56, para. 26 (Judge Sir Kenneth Keith, Dissenting Opinion).

²³ Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 20 December 1974, [1974] ICJ Rep. 457, at 473, para. 48.

²⁴ Excerpt from Art. 281(1) of UNCLOS, supra note 5.

²⁵ A. Proelss (ed.), The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (2017), at 1821. Further, while Art. 280 provides that nothing in Part XV of UNCLOS impairs the right of States Parties ‘to settle’ any dispute by peaceful means of their own choice, Art. 281 uses the expression ‘to seek settlement’ rather than ‘to settle’, which is the expression used in Art. 280.

²⁶ Excerpt from Art.2(1)(a) of the VCLT.

²⁷ Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, [2003] ITLOS Rep. 10, at 21, para. 56.

²⁸ Art. 279 of UNCLOS is titled ‘Obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means’ and reads as follows: ‘States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek a solution by the means indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.’

²⁹ The title of Art. 281 of UNCLOS is ‘Procedure where no settlement has been reached by the parties’.

³⁰ Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, PCA Case 2004-02, Award of 11 April 2006, at 62, para. 200(ii).

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ See South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 22, at 84, para. 217.

³⁴ Ibid., at 85, para. 219.

³⁵ Timor Sea Conciliation (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Decision on Competence, 19 September 2016, at 13–14, para. 56.

³⁶ Ibid., at 14, para. 57.

³⁷ It follows from the travaux préparatoires that the use of a singular rule rather than several rules was a conscious and deliberate choice: ‘the [ILC] desired to emphasize that the process of interpretation is a unity and that the provisions of the article form a single, closely integrated rule’. See ‘Commentary to Article 28’, in International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1996), vol. II, at 222–3.

³⁸ See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, supra note 13, at para. 31.

³⁹ See Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute, supra note 12, at 21–2, para 41.

⁴⁰ P. Reuter, ‘Quelques réflexions sur le vocabulaire du droit international’, in Mélanges offerts à M. le Doyen Louis Trotabas (1970), at 431.

⁴¹ See Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, supra note 30, at 62, para. 200(ii).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Art. 32 of the VCLT provides in its relevant part that ‘[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31’.

⁴⁴ See Proelss, supra note 25, at 1821.

⁴⁵ UNCLOS III, Informal Single Negotiating Text (Part IV), UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9 (1975), OR V, 112.

⁴⁶ UNCLOS III, Revised Single Negotiating Text (Part IV), UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9/REV.2 (1976), OR. VI, 144, 145.

⁴⁷ UNCLOS III, Informal Composite Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 (1977), OR VIII, at 1, 45–6 (Art. 283).

⁴⁸ UNCLOS III, Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78 (1981), OR XV, 172, 218 (Art. 281).

⁴⁹ Reference can be made to the 2002 China–ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), which China in its Position Paper argued was an agreement under Art. 281(1) of UNCLOS. As discussed before, the arbitral tribunal dismissed the Chinese position on the basis that the DOC was not a legally binding agreement under international law. See South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 22, at 84, para. 217.

⁵⁰ In the Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago case, the arbitral tribunal concluded that to allow general agreements to fall within the umbrella of Art. 281 would be difficult to reconcile with the purpose and object of Art. 282 of UNCLOS. See Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, supra note 30, at 62, para. 200(ii).

⁵¹ Judge Sir Kenneth Keith observed that the term ‘exclude’ in Art. 281 must require an ‘opting out’ from Part XV rather than a positive act of ‘opting in’. See Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 22, para. 17 (Judge Sir Kenneth Keith, Dissenting Opinion). See also A. Boyle, ‘Some Problems of Compulsory Jurisdiction before Specialised Tribunals: The Law of the Sea’, in P. Capps, M. Evans and S. Konstadinidis (eds.), Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives (2003), 246; B. Kwiatkowsk, ‘The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitral Tribunal Did Get It Right: A Commentary and Reply to the Article by David A Colson and Dr. Peggy Hoyle’, (2003) 34 Ocean Development & International Law 369.

⁵² Excerpt from Art. 281(1) of UNCLOS, supra note 5 (emphasis added).

⁵³ See Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 5, para. 57.

⁵⁴ Regarding the above-mentioned finding of the arbitral tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, see the statement of the arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration on the decision on jurisdiction and admissibility that ‘the better view’ is that Art. 281 of UNCLOS requires an explicit exclusion. See South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 22, at 86, para. 223.

⁵⁵ On this issue, it has been observed elsewhere that ‘seemingly any treaty relating to ocean matters … must have an explicit exclusion of [UNCLOS] dispute settlement … If it does not, the parties’ preferred choice of dispute settlement under that treaty may not be upheld under Article 281’. N. Klein, ‘Expansions and Restrictions in the UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Regime: Lessons from Recent Decisions’, (2015) 15 Chinese Journal of International Law 403, at 406.

⁵⁶ See Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 5, para. 57.

⁵⁷ Art. 290(5) of UNCLOS provides: ‘Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being submitted under this section, any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or, with respect to activities in the Area, the Seabed Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures in accordance with this article if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or affirm those provisional measures, acting in conformity with paragraphs 1 to 4.’

⁵⁸ 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79.

⁵⁹ Ibid., at 105, para. 286.

⁶⁰ See Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean, supra note 18, at 48, para. 122.

⁶¹ Yoshifumi Tanaka has observed on this that ‘there is a risk that the effectiveness of the compulsory procedures may be seriously undermined by the liberal interpretation of Article 281’ of UNCLOS. Y. Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (2023), 537. In the same vein, Nigel Bankes has observed that ‘[w]here the parties have not agreed on a time limit, the matter will be governed by customary law. Under customary law, a state is not obliged to continue negotiations when it concludes that the possibilities of settlement have been exhausted’. See Bankes, supra note 11, at 249.

⁶² On this issue see L. B. Sohn, ‘Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of the Law of the Sea Convention’, (1975) 12 San Diego Legal Review 516. Other authors have also noted that creating an effective dispute settlement mechanism ‘should be regarded as one of the pillars of the new world order in the ocean space’. A. O. Adede, ‘Settlement of Disputes Arising under the Law of the Sea Convention’, (1975) 69 American Journal of International Law 798.

⁶³ See UNCLOS, supra note 5, Art. 298(1).

⁶⁴ UNCLOS III, Australia et al., Working Paper on the Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.7 (1974).

⁶⁵ See UNCLOS III, Revised Single Negotiating Text (Part IV), supra note 46.

⁶⁶ UNCLOS III, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1.

⁶⁷ UNCLOS III, UN Doc. A/CONF62/WP.10/Rev.2.

⁶⁸ UNCLOS III, /CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3.

⁶⁹ M. H. Nordquist et al. (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (1993), vol. 5, para. XV.1, at para 281.5 (emphasis added).

⁷⁰ See South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 22, at 87, para. 208.

⁷¹ Excerpt from Art. 281(1) of UNCLOS, supra note 5.

⁷² See Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 5, para. 57.

⁷³ See South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 22, at 87, para. 224.

⁷⁴ See Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean, supra note 18, at 48, para. 122.

⁷⁵ See Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait, supra note 17, at 141, para. 489.

⁷⁶ UNCLOS III, A/CONF.62/L.78.

⁷⁷ Available at www.dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/preclude.

⁷⁸ Available at www.dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/exclude.

⁷⁹ See Nuclear Tests, supra note 23, at 473, para 48.

⁸⁰ Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 26 March 1961 [1961] ICJ Rep. 17, at 31.

⁸¹ 2009 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, 2899 UNTS (SPRFMO Convention).

⁸² On the consensual dispute settlement provisions in the SPRFMO Convention see B. Mansfield, ‘Consensus: A Good Goal but a Bad Rule? Decision Making in Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and the Implementation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement’, (2016) 5 ANZIL Perspective, at 2.

⁸³ See SPRFMO Convention, supra note 81, Art. 17(2)(c).

⁸⁴ 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 2167 UNTS 3.

⁸⁵ Art. 34(2) of the SPRFMO Convention provides: ‘In any case where a dispute is not resolved through the means set out in paragraph 1, the provisions relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part VIII of the 1995 Agreement shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to any dispute between the Contracting Parties.’

⁸⁶ 1978 Convention on Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1135 UNTS 369. NAFO 29^th Annual Meeting – September 2007, GC Doc 07/4 Amendment to the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, available at https://www.nafo.int/Portals/0/PDFs/key-publications/NAFOConvention.pdf, Art. XV(3) (NAFO Convention).

⁸⁷ Excerpt from Art. XV(3) of ibid.

⁸⁸ Excerpt from Art. XV(6) of ibid.

⁸⁹ In the SPRFMO, the panel is due to be established 30 days upon the expiration of the 60-day objection period. Once established the panel is due to deliver its findings and recommendations within 45 days. See SPRFMO Convention, supra note 81, Art. 17(5)(a). Under Art. 7 of Annex II to the NAFO Convention, ad hoc panels shall within 90 days from the establishment of the ad hoc panel make its report and recommendations.

⁹⁰ On this conflict of norm see J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law – How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law (2009), 525; N. Matz-Luck, ‘Norm Interpretation across International Regimes: Competences and Legitimacy’, in M. A. Young (2012), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation, 201; J. Crawford and P. Nevill, ‘Relations between International Courts and Tribunals: The “Regime Problem”’, in Young, ibid., at 235.

⁹¹ The SPRFMO was adopted in 2010 and entered into force in 2012. The amendment to NAFO was adopted in 2007 and entered into force in 2017.

⁹² To this effect see Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 5, para. 55; Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Order of 27 August 1999, [1999] ITLOS Rep. 280, at 295, para. 60; Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor, supra note 27, para. 47; MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order of 3 December 2001, [2001] ITLOS Rep. 95, at 107, para. 60.

⁹³ Excerpt from Art. 280 of UNCLOS, supra note 5.

⁹⁴ See Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 5, at 42, para. 55.

⁹⁵ Excerpt from Art. 280 of UNCLOS, supra note 5.

⁹⁶ Excerpt from Art. 281(1) of UNCLOS, supra note 5.

⁹⁷ Rüdiger Wolfrum has noted that agreements under Art. 281 ‘are not required to contain a compulsory dispute settlement system’. See Wolfrum, supra note 10, at 178.

⁹⁸ Excerpt from Art. 281(1) of UNCLOS, supra note 5.

⁹⁹ See Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait, supra note 17, at 141, para. 489.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., at 141, para. 491.

¹⁰¹ See Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean, supra note 18, at 48, para. 122.

¹⁰² Excerpt from Art. 281(1) of UNCLOS, supra note 5.

¹⁰³ See UNCLOS III, Informal Single Negotiating Text, supra note 45 (emphasis added).

¹⁰⁴ See UNCLOS III, Revised Single Negotiating Text (Part IV), supra note 46.

¹⁰⁵ Art.281(2) provides: ‘If the parties have also agreed on a time-limit, paragraph 1 applies only upon the expiration of that time-limit.’

¹⁰⁶ See Wolfrum, supra note 10, at 178.

¹⁰⁷ B. Oxman, ‘Courts and Tribunals: The ICJ, ITLOS and Arbitral Tribunals’, in D. R. Rothwell et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (2015), 394, at 402.

¹⁰⁸ R. Churchill, V. Lowe and A. Sander, The Law of the Sea (2022), at 864.

¹⁰⁹ The relevant provisions of Art. 286 of UNCLOS provide that ‘any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of [UNCLOS] shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section’.

¹¹⁰ See Proelss, supra note 25, at 1845.

¹¹¹ Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v. Switzerland), [1929] PCIJ Ser A, No 2, at 13.

¹¹² On this issue see A. Pellet, ‘Canons of Interpretation under the Vienna Convention’, in J. Klingler, Y. Parkhomenko and C. Salonidis (eds.), Between the Lines of the Vienna Convention? Canons and Other Principles of Interpretation in Public International Law (2019), 1.

¹¹³ Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Judgment of 4 December 1998, [1998] ICJ Rep. 432, at 452. Gerald Fitzmaurice stressed the importance that an interpretation requires that ‘particular provisions are to be interpreted so as to give them their fullest weight and effect consistent with the normal sense of the words and with other parts of the text, and in such a way that a reason and a meaning can be attributed to every part of the text’. G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951 – 4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’, (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International Law 204, at 211. On effet utile see C. Braumann and A. Reinisch, ‘Effet Utile’, Klingler, Parkhomenko and Salonidis, ibid., at 72.

¹¹⁴ See Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute, supra note 12, at 24, para. 51.

¹¹⁵ G. Guillaume, ‘Methods and Practice of Treaty Interpretation by the International Court of Justice’, in G. Sacerdoti, A. Yanovich and J. Bohanes (eds.), The WTO at Ten – The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System (2006), 29, at 469.

¹¹⁶ Appellate Report United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, adopted 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/9, at 23.

¹¹⁷ Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 18th session, 4 May–19 July 1966, ILC Yearbook 1966 (II), UN Doc. A/CN4/SerA/1966/Add1, at 219.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ See UNCLOS III, Informal Single Negotiating Text, supra note 45.

¹²⁰ See UNCLOS III, Revised Single Negotiating Text (Part IV), supra note 46.

¹²¹ See Nordquist et al., supra note 69, para. XV.1, para. 281.5 (emphasis added).

¹²² See South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 22, at 95, para. 247.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ See Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean, supra note 18, at 48, para. 122 (emphasis added).

¹²⁵ See Wolfrum, supra note 10, at 177.

¹²⁶ See Nguyen, Georgoula and Oude Elferink, supra note 8.

¹²⁷ Ibid.