¹ Foucault, Michel, “The Order of Discourse,” in Young, Robert, ed., Untying the Text: A Post-structuralist Reader (Boston, 1981), 48–78, at 74Google Scholar.

² Ibid.

³ Jean Hyppolite held the chair of history of philosophical thought from 1963 until his death in 1968.

⁴ Nevertheless, the influence of his thought and teaching over the protagonists of the 1960s and 1970s still demands in-depth examination. For a first step in this direction see Bianco, Giuseppe, ed., Jean Hyppolite, entre structure et existence (Paris, 2013)Google Scholar.

⁵ Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” 4, emphasis added.

⁶ Now in Alexandre Koyré, Études d'histoire de la pensée philosophique (Paris, 1961), 225–51.

⁷ Wahl's Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel, published by Rieder in 1929, was composed of articles that had appeared over the previous three years in French reviews such as the Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger or the Revue de métaphysique et de morale. Furthermore, in 1931, the hundredth anniversary of Hegel's death, the Revue de métaphysique et de morale devoted an issue to an assessment of Hegel's philosophy including contributions of major figures like Victor Basch, René Berthelot and Martial Gueroult (1891–1976). The publication of Alain's Idées in 1932 also played an important role in rehabilitating the image of Hegel.

⁸ Baugh, Bruce, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism (London, 2003)Google Scholar; and Bellantone, Andrea, Hegel in Francia (1817–1941), 2 vols. (Soveria Mannelli, 2006)Google Scholar. It is worth mentioning also the historical sketch offered by Jarczyk, Gwendoline and Labarrière, Pierre-Jean in the first chapter of their De Kojève à Hegel: 150 ans de pensée hégélienne en France (Paris, 1996)Google Scholar. For a broader picture more centered on the twentieth century see Geroulanos, Stefanos, An Atheism That Is Not a Humanism Emerges in French Thought (Stanford, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. More specifically on Hegel's reception in the twentieth century, from Koyré onwards, see Butler, Judith, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (New York, 1987)Google Scholar; and Roth, Michael S., Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France (Ithaca and London, 1988)Google Scholar.

⁹ Baugh, French Hegel, 9–10.

¹⁰ On this point see Alexandre Koyré, “Hegel à Jena,” in Koyré, Études d'histoire de la pensée philosophique, 147–90.

¹¹ Lalande, André, ed., Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, 2 vols. (Paris, 1997), 2: 732Google Scholar.

¹² Erdmann, Johann Eduard, Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. Dritten Bandes. Zweite Abtheilung. Die Entwicklung der deutschen Spekulation seit Kant (Leipzig, 1853), 835Google Scholar.

¹³ The entry on Hegel in the Grande encyclopédie Larousse (1893), written by Lucien Herr (1865–1926) and Les origines du socialisme d’état en Allemagne (1897) by Charles Andler (1866–1933), tried to rehabilitate Hegel as a philosopher of history and a political thinker whose work contained a revolutionary potential. Herr and Andler were in fact socialist militants close to Jean Jaurès (1859–1914) and Léon Blum (1872–1950). In 1897, Georges Noël (?–1900), professor at the lycée Lakanal (Sceaux), wrote a book titled La logique de Hegel, where he opposed the panlogist interpretation: “Hegel's system is not, as many have said, a panlogism. Panlogism is a chimera that would not withstand close examination and that could not haunt the mind of a philosopher worthy of the name.” Noël, Georges, La logique de Hegel (Paris, 1897), 120Google Scholar. Finally, in 1912 Paul Roques, professor of German at the lycée de Chartres, published the first biography of Hegel, Hegel, sa vie et ses œuvres (Paris, 1912). However, these efforts where doomed to wield little influence on the philosophical milieu: Herr was in fact the librarian of the École normale, Andler failed twice the agrégation de philosophie due to a disagreement over German philosophy with the commission chaired by Jules Lachelier (he reportedly quoted Hegel) and pursued a career as a Germanist (see Lindenberg, Daniel, “Un maître des études germaniques malgré lui: Charles Andler,” Préfaces 13 (1989), 89–92)Google Scholar, while Noël and Roques were unknown and isolated professors, although Noël's book appeared as articles in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale.

¹⁴ For the importance of these networks see Soulié, Stéphan, Les philosophes en République (Rennes, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ On the agrégation see Schrift, Alan D., “Effects of the Agrégation de Philosophie on Twentieth-Century French Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 46/3 (2008), 449–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ This picture is, of course, complicated by the immense success of Bergson, who, however, never occupied a relevant role in a French university, moving from the professorship at the lycée Henri-IV to the chair at the Collège de France, with a brief stint of two years at the ENS from 1898 to 1900. See Bianco, Giuseppe, Après Bergson: Portrait du group avec philosophe (Paris, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Bonnet, Jean, Dékantations: Fonctions idéologiques du kantisme dans le XIXe siècle français (Bern, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fedi, Laurent, Kant, une passion française, 1795–1940 (Hildesheim, 2018)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Digeon, Claude, La crise allemande de la pensée française, 1870–1914 (Paris, 1992), 4, 109–10, 164Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Charle, Christophe, La republique des universitaires, 1870–1940 (Paris, 1994)Google Scholar.

²⁰ On these stakes see Bourgeois, Bernard, “La société des philosophes en France en 1900,” in Worms, Frédéric, ed., Le moment 1900 en philosophie (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2004), 63–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Despite the great success of Kantian philosophy in France in the second half of the nineteenth century, Renouvier is the only thinker who could be considered a neo-Kantian philosopher in a proper sense, at least until the Nouvelle monadologie (1898), which bears witness to a Leibnizian turn in his thought. Between 1854 and 1864, he published in fact his Essais de critique générale, with the explicit aim of prolonging and updating Kant's critical enterprise. For an overall view of Renouvier's theory of knowledge, see Fedi, Laurent, Le problème de la connaissance dans la philosophie de Charles Renouvier (Paris, 1998)Google Scholar.

²² Fedi, Laurent, “Philosopher et républicaniser: La Critique philosophique de Renouvier et Pillon, 1872–1889,” Romantisme, 115 (2002), 65–82Google Scholar.

²³ Renouvier, Charles, “La doctrine hégélienne et la politique prussienne,” La critique philosophique 21 (1872), 321–9Google Scholar. Renouvier's interpretation of Hegel would require a broader political and cultural contextualization that I cannot provide here. See on this matter the excellent Blaise, Marie-Claude, Au principe de la République: Le cas de Renouvier (Paris, 2000), 43–105Google Scholar.

²⁴ Renouvier, Charles, “La question du progrès—Hegel,” La critique philosophique 49 (1880), 353–62Google Scholar.

²⁵ Renouvier's hatred of the Spinozian pantheism was influenced by the negative entry on Spinoza in Bayle's Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697).

²⁶ Renouvier, Charles, Philosophie analytique de l'histoire: Les idées, les religions, les systèmes, 4 vols. (Paris 1897), 4: 11Google Scholar.

²⁷ Ibid., 17.

²⁸ Renouvier, Charles, “De la philosophie du XIXe siècle en France,” L'année philosophique 1 (1967), 1–108, at 89Google Scholar.

²⁹ Renouvier, Charles, Esquisse d'une classification systématique des doctrines philosophiques, 2 vols. (Paris, 1886), 2: 8Google Scholar.

³⁰ The use of the term “evolutionism” can be explained on the basis of the huge popularity at the time of the theories of Darwin, Herbert Spencer and Haeckel, whose main works had been available in French since the 1860s/1870s.

³¹ Renouvier, Charles, Introduction à la philosophie analytique de l'histoire: Les idées, les religions, les systèmes (Paris, 1896): 43.Google Scholar

³² For a broader account of Renouvier's confrontation with Hegel on this point see Dumas, Jean-Louis, “Renouvier critique de Hegel,” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 1 (1971), 32–52Google Scholar. It is worth noting, in fact, that before turning to Kant the young Renouvier was heavily inspired by Hegelian philosophy, as we can see from his 1847 entry “Philosophie” in the Encyclopédie nouvelle edited by Pierre Leroux and Jean Reynaud. See Fedi, Laurent, Kant, une passion française (Paris, 2018), 143Google Scholar.

³³ Initially, however, Renouvier considered himself a socialist inspired by the Saint-Simonianist ideals he encountered as a student at the École polytechnique in the early 1840s.

³⁴ Quoted in Mouy, Paul, L'idée de progrès dans la philosophie de Renouvier (Paris, 1927), 79Google Scholar.

³⁵ On the question of history and freedom see also Renouvier, Charles, Science de la morale, ed. Fedi, Laurent, 2 vols. (Paris, 2002Google Scholar; first published 1869), 2: 365–438.

³⁶ The full title is in fact Uchronie (L'utopie dans l'histoire): Esquisse historique apocryphe du développement de la civilisation européenne tel qu'il n'a pas été, tel qu'il aurait pu être.

³⁷ Lachelier was a disciple of Félix Ravaisson (1813–1900) who departed from the spiritualism of his master, which was largely inspired by a mix of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, Neoplatonic cosmology and Maine de Biran's psychological analyses, in order to develop a reflexive philosophy resting on Kantian bases. His only book, Du fondement de l'induction (1872), would exert a lasting influence over the following generations of philosophers throughout the Third Republic. On Lachelier see Mauchaussat, Gaston, L'idéalisme de Lachelier (Paris, 1961)Google Scholar. Lachelier passively accepted the spread of Renouvier's ideas, which he nonetheless deemed pernicious.

³⁸ On the network of Renouvier's readers see Fedi, Kant, une passion française, 281–339.

³⁹ Berthelot, René, “Le sens de la philosophie de Hegel,” in Berthelot, Évolutionnisme et platonisme: Mélanges d'histoire de la philosophie et d'histoire des sciences (Paris, 1908), 166–249, at 168Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Hegel, Georg W. F., Phänomenologie des Geistes, in Hegel, Werke, vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), 36Google Scholar; Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Arthur V. Miller (Oxford, 1977), 19.

⁴¹ Berthelot, “Le sens de la philosophie de Hegel,” 174.

⁴² Ibid., 189.

⁴³ Ibid., 185.

⁴⁴ His Germany, however, was that of a “minor” line of post-Kantian thought that he discovered during his first travel in 1869, when he studied under Helmholtz and Zeller, and that included, inter alia, Fischer, Trendelenburg, Erdmann and Riehl. On Boutroux see Capeillères, Fabien, “Généalogie d'un néokantisme français: À propos d’Émile Boutroux,” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 3 (1998), 405–42Google Scholar; and Heidelberg, Michael, “Contingent Laws of Nature in Émile Boutroux,” in Heidelberg, Michael and Schiemann, Gregor, eds., The Significance of the Hypothetical in the Natural Sciences (Berlin and New York, 1999), 99–144Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Émile Boutroux, “Sur la nécessité, la finalité et la liberté chez Hegel,” in Boutroux, Études d'histoire de la philosophie allemande (Paris, 1926), 93–114, at 102.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 104.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Boutroux, Émile, The Contingency of the Laws of Nature, trans. Fred Rothwell (Chicago and London, 1920)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Boutroux, “Sur la nécessité, la finalité et la liberté chez Hegel,” 109.

⁵⁰ It is understood that this ideal of humanity is instead cultivated and defended in France, the nation that keeps alive the ancient humanitas. On this issue see Boutroux's wartime writings gathered in the posthumous Études d'histoire de la philosophie allemande: “L'Allemagne et la guerre” (1914), 115–36; “Germanisme et humanité” (1915), 137–62; “La pensée allemande et la pensée française” (1914), 163–96; “L’évolution de la pensée allemande” (1915), 197–228; “L'Allemagne et la guerre,” 229–57.

⁵¹ Delbos, Victor, L'esprit philosophique de l'Allemagne et la pensée française (Paris, 1915), 38Google Scholar.

⁵² Quoted in Blondel, Maurice, “Préface,” in Delbos, Victor, De Kant aux postkantiens (Paris, 1992), 5–21, at 14Google Scholar.

⁵³ Basch, Victor, “La philosophie et la littérature classiques de l'Allemagne et les doctrines pangermanistes,” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 22 (1914), 768–93Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Andler, Charles, “Les origines philosophiques du pangermanisme,” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 23/5 (1916), 659–95Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Hanna, Martha, The Mobilization of Intellect: French Scholars and Writers during the Great War (Cambridge, MA, 1996), 106–41Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Émile Bréhier, Histoire de la philosophie allemande (Paris, 1921).

⁵⁷ Wetshingolo, Ndjate-Lotanga, La nature de la connaissance scientifique: L’épistémologie meyersonienne face à la critique de Gaston Bachelard (Bern, 1996)Google Scholar; de Laclos, Frédéric Fruteau, L’épistémologie d’Émile Meyerson: Une anthropologie de la connaissance (Paris, 2009), 9–12Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ For a recent attempt to reverse this trend see de Laclos, Frédéric Fruteau, Le cheminement de la pensée selon Émile Meyerson (Paris, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and the aforementioned Laclos, L’épistémologie d’Émile Meyerson.

⁵⁹ Meyerson, Émile, Explanation in the Sciences, trans. Mary-Alice Sipfle and David A. Sipfle (Dordrecht, 1991), 268, original emphasisCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁰ Hegel, Georg W. F., Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Zweiter Teil. Die Naturphilosophie, in Hegel, , Werke, vol. 9 (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), 19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Philosophy of Nature, trans. Arthur V. Miller (Oxford, 2004), 10.

⁶¹ Meyerson, Explanation in the Sciences, 290, original emphasis.

⁶² Hegel, Naturphilosophie, §247, 24; Philosophy of Nature, 15.

⁶³ Meyerson, Explanation in the Sciences, 299.

⁶⁴ Hegel, Naturphilosophie, §250, 35; Philosophy of Nature, 23.

⁶⁵ Hegel, Naturphilosophie, §248, 30; Philosophy of Nature, 19.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Meyerson, Explanation in the Sciences, 331, original emphasis. By “play” and “impotence,” Meyerson refers to paragraphs 248 and 250 of the Philosophy of Nature, where Hegel speaks of the “boundless and unbridled contingency” (ungebundene, zügellose Zufälligkeit) of Nature's “play of forms” (Hegel, Naturphilosophie, 28; Philosophy of Nature, 17; translation modified) and defines the “impotence” (Ohnmacht) of Nature as the fact that it “preserves [zu erhalten] the determinations of the Notion only abstractly.” Hegel, Naturphilosophie, 34; Philosophy of Nature, 23.

⁶⁸ Hegel, Naturphilosophie, §246, 20; Philosophy of Nature, 10.

⁶⁹ “The nature of the obstacle standing here in the way of our understanding of phenomena was not specified until the nineteenth century with what was perhaps the most memorable, the most scientifically productive discovery witnessed by this remarkably fertile century—that of Sadi Carnot.” Meyerson, Explanation in the Sciences, 154. According to Meyerson, Carnot's principle, by showing that the successive states of a system are different and nonequivalent because of the dissipation of energy, demonstrates that a full explanation of reality based on the principle of identity (which for Meyerson is the main regulative concept of human reason) is not possible.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 512, original emphasis.

⁷¹ Ibid., 381.

⁷² “Hegel does not intend to study the paths of scientific thought in order to codify them and thus make the further progress of this thought easier, more logical. What he wants is to accuse science before the tribunal of intelligence, to destroy it in the opinion of thinking men. If he reveals its anatomy, it is because he considers that it is horrible to behold and that the mere sight of it is sufficient to provoke disgust. He tears away the tawdry trappings with which he believes it has artificially covered itself, in order to expose it in its nakedness as an object of scorn and mockery. Behold, he seems to exclaim, this dazzling beauty which was the object of your most ardent desires, before which you prostrated yourself in boundless admiration. It is a hideous monster—worse than that, it is nothingness, an immense tautology with no content.” Ibid., 512. After reading this passage, Baugh's and Bellantone's characterization of Meyerson's epistemology as “neo-Hegelian” appears highly questionable. See Baugh, Bruce, “Limiting Reason's Empire: The Early Reception of Hegel in France,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31/2 (1993), 259–75, at 267CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bellantone, Hegel in Francia, 2: 492.

⁷³ Meyerson, Explanation in the Sciences, 4.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 442.

⁷⁵ Lalande, André, “L’épistémologie de M. Meyerson et sa portée philosophique,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 93 (1922), 259–80Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ Parodi, Dominique, “De l'explication dans les sciences par Émile Meyerson,” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 31/4 (1924), 585–97Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ Brunschvicg, Léon, “La philosophie d’Émile Meyerson,” in Brunschvicg, Écrits philosophiques, vol. 3, Science—religion, ed. Weill-Brunschvicg, Adrienne R. and Lehec, Claude (Paris, 1954), 183–206Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ As Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Eva Telkes-Klein have shown, Meyerson was at the center of the main social circles of the time: besides his scientific relationships, he frequented the parlors of Aline Boutroux, Cécile Brunschvicg and Lévy-Bruhl, and dined frequently with the Lalandes or the Brunschvicgs. See the introduction to Meyerson, Émile, Lettres françaises, éd. Bensaude-Vincent, Bernadette and Telkes-Klein, Eva (Paris, 2009)Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Brunschvicg himself provided a broader retrospective account of the reflexive philosophy of consciousness from Biran to Lachelier in his masterwork Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale, 2 vols. (Paris, 1927), 2: 594–602.

⁸⁰ Aron, Raymond, “Préface,” in Bo Bramsen, Michelle, Portrait d’Élie Halévy (Amsterdam, 1978), i–iv, at iGoogle Scholar.

⁸¹ In the free play of faculties that defines the reflective judgment, Brunschvicg discovers the possibility of addressing the activity of judgment in all its spontaneity and freedom, as the most peculiar expression of the creativity of the mind. He writes, “The method employed in the Critique of the Power of Judgement—a method that makes this work the most satisfying of Kant's analyses, regardless of its relation with the two other Critiques—is the true method.” Brunschvicg, Léon, La modalité du jugement (Paris, 1964), 26Google Scholar. And, in the preface to the second edition of 1934, he adds that the Critique of the Power of Judgement releases us from “the uncertainties and the embarrassments that Kant suffered on account of his enslavement to the formalism of categories.” Ibid., xi. Fichte's presence is more hidden, but we have to keep in mind the fact that Brunschvicg was very close to Xavier Léon (1868–1935), founder of the société and cofounder, with Élie Halévy, Brunschvicg himself and others, of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, which he also directed. Léon wrote two important books on Fichte, namely La philosophie de Fichte: Ses rapports avec la conscience contemporaine, published by Alcan in 1902, and Fichte et son temps, published by Armand Colin in 1922.

⁸² Brunschvicg, La modalité du jugement, 73.

⁸³ Ibid., 72.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 238.

⁸⁵ In Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale, he quotes approvingly a passage from Boutroux's objections to Berthelot, where Boutroux says, “Does pushing anything that is other to consider itself as contradictory really represent progress? Should we not, on the contrary . . . consider that which believes itself contradictory to be simply other? Where we think we see an opposition, a mutual exclusion, I would like to see, as far as possible, a variety that can become a harmony even without destruction, sublation or Aufhebung . . . Despite its wide scope, Hegel's system turns out to be somewhat narrow. It reduces every relation to contradiction and noncontradiction, thus disturbing and mutilating reality . . . Reason is a living being; it forms itself, cultivates itself, perfects itself, develops and enriches itself by feeding on realities, by adapting to things . . . Today our task should be to look for relationships of harmony and compossibility between things, beyond the logic relations of incompatibility and implication, and to steer reason towards the understanding of the individual.” Boutroux, “Sur la nécessité, la finalité et la liberté chez Hegel,” 109, original emphasis, quoted in Brunschvicg, Le progrès de la conscience, 2: 369.

⁸⁶ Brunschvicg, Léon, “L'idée critique et le système kantien,” in Brunschvicg, Écrits philosophiques, vol. 1, L'humanisme de l'Occident, ed. Weill-Brunschvicg, Adrienne R. and Lehec, Claude (Paris, 1951), 206–70, at 208Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 209.

⁸⁸ See ibid., 224. This reproach marks the main difference between Brunschvicg's critical idealism and Renouvier's neo-criticism. In the first of his Essais de critique générale (1854), in fact, Renouvier, who advocated a theory of knowledge based on a radical phenomenalism, tried to formulate a new table of categories that differed significantly from the Kantian one. For example, he considered relation and personality as the most important categories, the first one being the most abstract and the second one the most concrete, also including space, time (now renamed “position” and “succession”) and finality. See Renouvier, Charles, Essais de critique générale. Premier essai: Traité de logique générale et de logique formelle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1912), 1: 123Google Scholar. This interpretation of Kantianism, still attached to the determination of the actual list of the pure concepts of understanding, was harshly criticized by Brunschvicg, to the point that, in an article dedicated to Octave Hamelin (1856–1907), he established a parallel between Hegel and Renouvier: “Hegel's conceptualism represented a step backwards in relation to the Critique in a proper sense, and this becomes even clearer, at least from a speculative perspective, if we consider Renouvier's doctrine, which nonetheless has been called neo-criticism.” Brunschvicg, Léon, “L'orientation du rationalisme,” in Brunschvicg, Écrits philosophiques, vol. 2, L'orientation du rationalisme, ed. Weill-Brunschvicg, Adrienne R. and Lehec, Claude (Paris, 1953), 1–81, at 21–2, original emphasisGoogle Scholar. See also Brunschvicg, L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique (Paris, 1922), 299.

⁸⁹ A similar critical stance towards Romanticism was already taken by Renouvier in his Philosophie analytique de l'histoire, 4: 493–4, where “Romanticism” means the tendency characterized by a “lack of taste for the idea and any alleged abstract truth,” “the hostility towards duty,” “a celebration of the principle of passion” and “the separation of the spirit from any subject requiring reflection or study.”

⁹⁰ Brunschvicg, Le progrès de la conscience, 2: 363, original emphasis.

⁹¹ Brunschvicg, “La philosophie d’Émile Meyerson,” 205, emphasis added.

⁹² Brunschvicg, Le progrès de la conscience, 2: 368, original emphasis.

⁹³ Ibid., 369–70.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 374.

⁹⁵ Brunschvicg borrows this definition from the article on Meyerson's De l'explication dans les sciences where Lalande expressed some reservations about Meyerson's epistemology. See Lalande, “L’épistémologie de M. Meyerson et sa portée philosophique,” 274.

⁹⁶ Brunschvicg, Le progrès de la conscience, 2: 380.

⁹⁷ Ibid., original emphasis.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 750.

⁹⁹ Politzer, Georges, “La fin d'une parade philosophique: Le bergsonisme,” in Politzer, Contre Bergson et quelques autres: Écrits philosophiques, 1924-1939, ed. Bruyeron, Roger (Paris, 2013), 127–260, at 131Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁰ Nizan, Paul, Les chiens de garde (Paris, 1960), 33–4Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ Alexandre Koyré, “Note sur la langue et la terminologie hégéliennes,” in Koyré, Études d'histoire de la pensée philosophique, 191–224, at 179–80, emphasis added. Geroulanos has also stressed the importance of Recherches philosophiques, the review founded by Koyré, for the mapping and the diffusion of the new philosophical trends. See Geroulanos, An Atheism That Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought, 55–7.

¹⁰² Brunschvicg always identified the true concrete with the scientific and philosophical image of the world worked out by the understanding, i.e. with what appeared to his critics as the most abstract form of knowledge. In 1934 he denounced this “qui pro quo” that lured young people into the trap of the generational clash and that generated “today's youth fascination for what they call the concrete”, as well as “their repulsion . . . for an idealism that they regard as lifeless.” Brunschvicg, Léon, Les âges de l'intelligence (Paris, 1953), 132, original emphasisGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰³ Hyppolite, Jean, “L'intersubjectivité chez Husserl,” in Hyppolite, , Figures de la pensée philosophique: Écrits 1931–1968, 2 vols. (Paris, 1971), 1: 499–512, at 500–1Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ It is an irony of history that Brunschvicg himself invited Husserl to deliver his lectures at the Sorbonne in 1929. See Dupont, Christian, Phenomenology in French Philosophy: Early Encounters (Dordrecht, 2013)Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ Sartre, Jean-Paul, “Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology,” in Moran, Dermot and Mooney, Timothy, eds., The Phenomenological Reader (London and New York, 2002), 382–5, at 382Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁶ Hyppolite, “L'intersubjectivité chez Husserl,” 501.