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4. “Maghiarii dezamagiti.”Google Scholar

5. E.g. the advertisement of the ‘Turul’ inn, published in Harghita Népe, 29 December 2004: ”Kiadó 30–40 férőhelyes terem kosaras évzáróra, de csak igaz magyaroknak vagy románoknak, esetleg németeknek, végül, de nem utolsósorban más nemzetiségŭ rendes embereknek.“Google Scholar

6. These surveys were designed and conducted by the author in collaboration with Horváth István and Marius Lazăr within the framework of the Research Center for Interethnic Relations (CCRIT) in Cluj-Napoca. See I. Culic et al., Radiografia opiniei publice maghiare din România (Cluj-Napoca: CCRIT, 2004), I. Culic, I. Horváth and M. Lazăr, Ethnobarometer: Interethnic Relations in Romania (Cluj-Napoca: Research Center for Interethnic Relations, 2000); I. Culic et al., Carpathian Basin. Romanians and Hungarians in Transition. Mental Representations and Interethnic Relations in Transylvania (Cluj-Napoca: CCRIT, 1998); L. Năstasă and L. Salat, eds, Interethnic Relations in Post-Communist Romania (Cluj-Napoca: Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, 2000).Google Scholar

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8. Awarded by the Allies on practical reasons, in order to allow her access to her Northwestern territories. It was admitted that this involved a certain sacrifice of the strict ethnographic principle. C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919–1937 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 278.Google Scholar

9. E. Illyés, National Minorities in Romania. Change in Transylvania (Boulder, CO: Columbia University Press, East European Monographs, 1982), pp. 10, 21–22.Google Scholar

10. Illyés, National Minorities in Romania , p. 21.Google Scholar

11. See Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors ; Illyés, National Minorities in Romania; I. Livezeanu, Cultură şi naţionalism în România Mare. 1918–1930 (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998), originally published in English as I. Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).Google Scholar

12. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors , pp. 317–321; Illyés, National Minorities in Romania, p. 90.Google Scholar

13. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors , pp. 293–298; Illyés, National Minorities in Romania, pp. 91–92.Google Scholar

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15. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors , p. 286.Google Scholar

16. Livezeanu, Cultură şi naţionalism , pp. 41–63, 157–224; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 306–315.Google Scholar

17. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors , p. 306.Google Scholar

18. Livezeanu, Cultură şi naţionalism , pp. 260–269.Google Scholar

19. Illyés, National Minorities in Romania , pp. 80–86, 95–101.Google Scholar

20. See also the provisions of the Nationalities Status introduced on 6 February 1945.Google Scholar

21. Decree Law 629/1945 of 3 August 1945.Google Scholar

22. Redrawing the borders of the historical land of the Szecklers.Google Scholar

23. For the set up of RAM, its significance and consequences, see S. Bottoni, “The Creation of the Hungarian Autonomous Region in Romania (1952): Premises and Consequences,” Regio Yearbook , 2003, pp. 71–93.Google Scholar

24. F. Constantiniu, O istorie sinceră a poporului român, 3rd revised edn (Bucureşti: Editura univers enciclopedic, 2002), p. 463 asserts that one of the lessons learnt by Gheorghiu-Dej was the necessity of a proper balance between the ethnic structure of the power and of the population, as national minorities were over-represented in the communist leadership. For the break with Moscow see the article published in the party journal Lupta de clasă, Vol. 4, 1964, pp. 3–35, which asserted that “the differences between the peoples and countries will continue for a long time, even after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. (…) No party occupies a privileged position or a claim to occupy one, and no party can enforce its own line or approach on another party.”Google Scholar

25. For figures on the evolution of minority education in communist Romania, see Illyés, National Minorities in Romania , pp. 155–212.Google Scholar

26. According to N. Bárdi, “Hungary and the Hungarians Living Abroad: A Historical Outline,” Regio Yearbook , 2003, pp. 121–138, during the period 1968–1986 Hungary developed the ideology of the double loyalty—Hungarians are culturally linked to their national culture, and through citizenship to the culture of their host-country, and of the bridging role played by the national minorities in the national communist states. See pp. 124–126.Google Scholar

27. Illyés, National Minorities in Romania , p. 152.Google Scholar

28. The flight of citizens from Romania to Hungary increased from 6,500 in 1987 to 15,000 in 1988, to a rate of about 300 persons a week in 1989. The proportion of Romanians among the asylum-seekers in Hungary increased gradually to 25% in the last weeks of 1989. Data provided in D. Deletant, “Romania sub regimul comunist,” in Mihai Bărbulescu et al., Istoria României (Bucureşti: Editura enciclopedică, 1999), pp. 567–568.Google Scholar

29. The German minority in Romania was similarly affected. Taking into account the specific of their community and economic organization, the processes of nationalization of the industry, the collectivization of the agriculture, and the subordination of the churches led to the destruction of the bases of their existence as a community.Google Scholar

30. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).Google Scholar

31. F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1969).Google Scholar

32. R. R. King, “Romania,” in R. F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs—1990 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990).Google Scholar

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34. The war of historiographies, whose main object of contention was the Dacian-Roman continuity in Transylvania versus its later colonization by Romanians migrated from the South of the Danube, peaked with the publication in 1986 of the History of Transylvania . See B. Köpeczi et al., Erdély története (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1986).Google Scholar

35. Bárdi, “Hungary and the Hungarians,” p. 127.Google Scholar

36. The reference to the kin-state continued to be a constant element of the community identity of Hungarians from Romania after 1989, a phenomenon amplified by the multiplication and diversification of the relations and exchanges between the Hungarian community in Transylvania and Hungary, through state or private institutions, or among individuals and social groups. A crucial element in the conception of their Hungarian-ness through reference to Hungary is undoubtedly the much better economic situation of Hungary compared to Romania. The many opportunities and advantages opened by the access to the labor market and social relations in Hungary make their identification with the Romanian state contextual and weak.Google Scholar

37. D. Ionescu, “Chronology of Hungarian Protests at Romanian Rural Resettlement Plans,” in Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report , No. 129 (Hungary), 1988, pp. 1–8.Google Scholar

38. L. Anania et al., Biserici osândite de Ceauşescu. Bucureşti 1977–1989 (Bucureşti: Editura Anastasia, 1995).Google Scholar

39. Triggered by criticism from both West and East the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva adopted on 9 March 1989, by 21 votes for to 7 against, a resolution calling for an inquiry into alleged human rights abuses in Romania, the first such investigation to be authorized in any country for five years. The Eastern bloc allies the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and East Germany abstained from voting, while Hungary joined the resolution's supporters. The resolution highlighted the rural systematization plan and the country's treatment of its ethnic minorities.Google Scholar

40. See the collection of documents by A. Andreescu, L. Năstasă and A. Varga, Minorităţi etnoculturale. Mărturii documentare. Maghiarii din România (1945–1955), Vol. 1, (1956–1968), Vol. 2 (Cluj: Editura CRDE, 2003).Google Scholar

41. Illyés, National Minorities in Romania , pp. 55–70.Google Scholar

42. “Hungarians understand the communist period as one of a ‘double repression’: as individuals (be they Hungarians, Romanians or other) and as members of a community. The loss of the rights that were founded on the belonging to the Hungarian community was so painful because there was no other alternative to them than a better integration in the existing social structures (obviously dominated by Romanians). I believe that this is the source of Hungarians' permanent accusation of ‘forced assimilation.‘ For example, the dissolution of the Szeklerland and the set up of districts was perceived by the Hungarian community as an essentially symbolic gesture asserting the domination of the majority over the minority, even though it had been part of the reorganization plan which affected the whole territory of the country.” Communication from a Transylvanian Hungarian.Google Scholar

43. For an analysis of the activity of UDMR especially during 1996–2000, see N. Bárdi and Z. Kántor, “Az RMDSZ a romániai kormányban, 1996–2000,” Regio, Vol. 4, 2000, pp. 150–185.Google Scholar

44. My inevitably incomplete readings of Hungarians historians, sociologists, or political analysts, whether born or not in Transylvania, revealed almost uniformly the lack of their availability to relate to Romanians and the institutions of the Romanian state other than in terms of a relation of domination, defined as anti-Hungarian attitude and action. See, for example, the book published in 1982 by Illyés in an American prestigious academic series, remarkable for the rigorous documentation and data provided, and its uniform interpretation in terms of Romanian anti-Hungarianism.Google Scholar

45. See data summarized by J. Tóth, “Pulling the Wool over Hungarians' Eyes,” Regio Yearbook , 2002, p. 130.Google Scholar

46. The split labor market contains at least two groups of workers whose price of labor differs for the same work, or would differ if they did the same work. Price of labor refers to all costs born by the employer: wages, recruitment, transportation, room and board, education, health care, and costs of labor unrest. Ethnic antagonism first germinates in a labor market split along ethnic lines. See E. Bonacich, “A Theory of Ethic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 37, 1972, pp. 547–559. In the case of Hungarian–Hungarian relations, the competition on the split labor market between local Hungarians and immigrant Hungarians from across the borders reshapes ethnicity so that both groups feel a differential in their Hungarian-ness.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

47. See also J. Bodnar, “Assembling the Square: Social Transformation in Public Space and the Broken Image of the Second Economy in Postsocialist Budapest,” Slavic Review, Vol. 57, No. 3, 1998, pp. 493, 499, 506.Google Scholar

48. According to the various surveys on the Hungarian population in Transylvania, Hungarians assign primarily the following characteristics to Romanians: religious, hypocrites, united, hostile, superstitious, backward, lazy. A great majority of them also agree that there are some things that should make them feel ashamed of being a Romanian citizen. See I. Culic et al., Ethnobarometer .Google Scholar

49. Bodnar, “Assembling the Square,” pp. 493–494.Google Scholar

50. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Premier Antall Assumes ‘spiritual’ Leadership of Hungarians Beyond the Borders', 22 August 1992, quoting Hungarian TV, 16 August 1992.Google Scholar

51. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Hungarian Foreign Minister on Signing Agreements with Neighbouring Countries,” 22 August 1992, quoting Hungarian Radio, 18 August 1992.Google Scholar

52. N. Bárdi, “Hungary and the Hungarians Living Abroad: A Historical Outline,” Regio Yearbook , 2003, p. 129.Google Scholar

53. B. Fowler, “Fuzzing Citizenship, Nationalising Political Space: A Framework for Interpreting the Hungarian ‘Status Law’ as a New Form of Kin-State Policy in Central and Eastern Europe” (Birmingham: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, European Research Institute, University of Birmingham, 2002), WP No. 40, p. 46.Google Scholar

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60. See the debates in the bilingual journal Provincia, or Kántor et al., The Hungarian Status Law.Google Scholar

61. Fowler, “Fuzzing Citizenship,” p. 43.Google Scholar

62. See, for example: “In the future it won't be the territorially defined state that determines everything. Its role will remain important, but alongside it national communities, for example, will also strengthen. For me, in the future there won't be minorities, only communities. And I believe that our continent will become a community of communities.” János Mártonyi, Hungarian Foreign Minister, on the Hungarian Status Law, 168 Óra , 31 May 2001, or “The status law is a milestone in the process whereby Hungarian nation-policy shifts the emphasis from borders, which are becoming ever less significant in the uniting Europe, to people and their communities.” Zsolt Németh, State Secretary for the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2001, during the first day of parliamentarian debates over the Status Law.Google Scholar

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75. UDMR was part of the 1996–2000 government coalition. For an evaluation of its performance, see Bárdi and Kántor, “Az RMDSZ a romániai kormányban.” During the 2000–2004 legislature, UDMR supported the governing Social Democratic Party (PSD) in Parliament, annually signing an agreement of cooperation. UDMR is at present one of the partners of the government coalition of the Justice and Truth Alliance (Alianţa D.A.). While there are splinter organizations from or factions within UDMR competing for the ethnic Hungarian vote, so far only the Hungarian Civic Union (UCM) posed certain challenge to UDMR in the local elections, where UDMR also loses votes to Romanian parties (mainly to PSD and PNL), but was prevented from taking part in the national elections. According to survey data, more than 10% of the Hungarians voted for the PSD candidates in the 2004 local elections. Data come from the survey carried out by the Research Center for Interethnic Relations (CCRIT) in September 2004, commissioned by UDMR. Author's database.Google Scholar

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80. According to data from the survey carried out by the Research Center for Interethnic Relations (CCRIT) in September 2004, commissioned by UDMR, approximately 9% of Hungarian voters would have voted for PSD, 4% for USM, 4% for the National Liberal Party (PNL). Author's database.Google Scholar

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82. This is obvious even at the academic level in conclusions such as the following: “For the case of the parents who decide to send their children to Hungarian schools, the ethnically closed character of the micro-community relations functions, on one hand, as a conservation factor and plays an important role in preserving and forming the identity of the children, but we have to emphasize that exclusivity […] represents in the same their condition.” A. Sorbán, “Copilul să studieze în limba română, ca să se poată afirma mai bine—Radiografia asimilării,” in Alternative minoritare: Prezentarea problemelor minoritare în revista Magyar Kisebbség (1995–2000) (Sfântu Gheorghe: Editura T3, 2002), p. 189. Or the following: “An important part of the political parties in Romania are not anti-Hungarian because this doctrine may bring success to the party, and not because this is the conviction of their members/leaders. This does not mean that there do not exist anti-Hungarian sentiments, but rather the fact that anti-Hungarianism plays a functional role in the Romanian political life.” M. Bakk, A. Horváth and L. Salat, “În prag de an 2000: politică şi minoritate maghiară în România,” in Alternative minoritare, p. 319.Google Scholar

83. See, for example, the article by M. Lazăr, “Metastaza ostentaţiei. Imagini în alb-negru din Clujul tricolor,” IDEA. arts + society , No. 15–16, 2003, pp. 125–134.Google Scholar

84. According to the survey conducted by the Research Center for Interethnic Relations (CCRIT) in 1997, 68% of the Transylvanian Hungarians consider Romania their homeland, 21% Transylvania, 3% the place where I live, 2% Hungary, and 5% did not answer. Author's data.Google Scholar

85. See V. Veres, “A társadalmi struktúra etnikai sajátosságai a posztszocialista Erdélyben,” Erdélyi Társadalom, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003, pp. 87–112.Google Scholar

86. Culic, “Nationhood and Identity,” p. 240.Google Scholar

87. “I wish it were like in the old times when everything was clear and all things were at their place, when we had no dilemmas and had peace.” Excerpt from a discussion with a Hungarian from Szeklerland.Google Scholar