Historiography, as a special historical discipline, is defined as a history of historical scholarship reflecting the development of historical thought. In the context of this definition the study of modern Ukrainian historiography is directly related to the analysis of present historiographical trends, historical concepts, the conditions under which the discipline developed, the role of Ukrainian historical research centers in Ukraine and the West, the nature and scope of historical serials, critical evaluations of contributions of individual historians, as well as the study of characteristics of various historical schools. In my opinion, the older definition of historiography as the history of historical writings is too narrow and sometimes results only in critical or enumerative historical bibliography covering writings of individual historians.

Western studies of Russian or Soviet Central Asia originated in England, spearheaded by Anglo-Russian rivalry in the area in the second part of the nineteenth century. British research was dominant until after World War II, covering the field from classical academic study (Royal Central Asian Society) to current affairs (Col. Wheeler's Central Asian Research Center).

In the half century from the Russian annexation of eastern Georgia (Kartli-Kakheti) to the outbreak of the Crimean War, Transcaucasian society underwent a deep and irreversible transformation which, in its effects, was as fundamental a metamorphosis for Armenians and Georgians as were the contemporary political and industrial revolutions for “western Europeans. Whether the move into the Russian orbit was “progressive,” as Soviet historians insist, or a fatal perversion of these nations’ natural development, as some nationalists argue, is not really a historical judgement capable of empirical demonstration. What can be shown, however, is that with the Russian occupation a historical process began which rent the fabric of traditional Georgian and Armenian society and produced both new opportunities and loyalties for some and a persistent, if ultimately futile, resistance to centralized bureaucratic rule by others. Responding to that resistance, the tsarist administration enticed the nobility of Georgia into participation in the new order, and at the end of the first fifty years of Russian rule, the once rebellious, semiindependent dynasts of Georgia had been transformed into a service gentry loyal to their new monarch. At the same time, the Armenian merchants and craftsmen of Caucasia's towns benefited from the new security provided by Russian arms and, while competing with privileged Russian traders, oriented themselves away from the Middle East toward Russian and European commerce. In the process they laid the foundation for their own fortunes and future as the leading economic and political element in Russian Georgia. The peasantry of Transcaucasia was forced in the meantime to submit to new exactions as their status became increasingly more similar to that of Russian peasants. And the respective churches of Georgia and Armenia made fundamental and irreversible accommodations to the new political order.

For a long time state socialism in Eastern Europe has had a tendency towards ossification, and this leads to several negative consequences more or less clearly acknowledged by the local leadership. It is in the sociopolitical nature of the rigid Soviet-style system that any far-reaching reforms are difficult to introduce. Therefore, the Polish experiment of the 1970s started by Gierek and his équipe, after taking power in December 1970 from the équipe of Gomulka, should be carefully scrutinized for successes and failures. From the beginning, this has been an attempt to modernize the economy without transforming the power relations within the society. Modern industry and technology have been widely introduced in Poland during the 1970s, and a considerable part of these innovations has been financed by loans from the West. Application of scientific knowledge to production of goods and services, as well as to management and administration, has been generously promoted by the Polish government in order to maximize efficiency. There has also been much more emphasis than before on the rational utilization of human resources. In the first half of the 1970s, this path to modernity was accompanied by the rise of wages and salaries at a much faster rate than in the other countries of eastern Europe, but, on the other hand, the accelerated pressure on the population toward political conformity or at least passivity also occurred. This pressure was treated by many Poles, as well as by several western observers, rightly or wrongly, as the condition imposed by the neighbors of Poland, primarily the USSR, to tolerate any more vigorous contacts of Poland with the West, as well as the relative “secularization” of the Polish people in comparison with the rigid Marxist orthodoxy in which East Germans and Czechs and all Soviet people are constantly kept by their authorities.

On September 1, 1707, Hetman Ivan Mazepa was granted the title of Prince (Reichsfürst) of the “Holy Roman Empire” by the Emperor Joseph I.