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Nature and Self-Love: A Reinterpretation of Rousseau's “Passion primitive”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2020

Juliet Flower MacCannell*
Affiliation:
Davis, California

Abstract

Rousseau opposed both traditional and modern (empiricist) thinking when he made self-love the cornerstone of his system. Other modes of thought treat self-consciousness as constituted primarily by temporal desire. Rousseau raises love, for him the suspension of desire, to a position of ontological primacy in regard to self-consciousness. Like Pascal, he throws the empirical existence of the self into radical question and finds it to be as insubstantial and empty a concept as the Western tradition has found it—from Ecclesiastes and Socrates on. Rousseau declines the moralistic reproof of the self, however, and emphasizes its insubstantiality as its one strength, although a fictional one. The self exists only in the mode of a hypothesis (the fictional “as if”); it is a failure at being. But to amour (and to pitié) it makes all the difference and is worthy of their support.

Type
Research Article
Information
PMLA , Volume 92 , Issue 5 , October 1977 , pp. 890 - 902
Copyright
Copyright © Modern Language Association of America, 1977

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References

The author wishes to dedicate this essay to the memory of her mother, Patricia Mary Flower.