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Aum Shinrikyo and the Japanese Law on Bioterrorism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 June 2012

Masaaki Sugishima
Masaaki Sugishima*
Affiliation:
School of Law, Asahi University, Gifu, Japan
*
School of Law, Asahi University, 1851 Hozumi, Mizuho, Gifu, 501–0296 Japan, E-mail: msugi@attglobal.net or Sugi@alice.asahi-u.ac.jp
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Abstract

Before the sarin incidents in Tokyo and Matsumoto, the Aum Shinrikyo (now Aleph) had tried to conduct bioterrorism with botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis. Followers of the Aum could not overcome technical difficulties inherent in developing biological weapons, and the perpetrators had not been prosecuted for their failed attempts of bioterrorism. But the Aum's biological attack revealed several shortcomings in the Japanese law that regulated biological weapons. Since the missile experiment of North Korea conducted in 1998, the Japanese government has come to consider the threat posed by biological weapons more seriously. In 2001, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the series of anthrax letter scares in the United States of America, the Japanese government established its Five Basic Principles for Chemical and Biological Weapons Terrorism and several measures were taken at the central and local levels. Activities of the Aum have been monitored by the Public Security Investigation Agency and the National Police Agency under the Anti-Aum Law since 2000.

Keywords

anthraxAum Shimkyobioterrorismbioweaponsbotulism toxinchemical attackscitizenscyanideJapanlawspublicsarinterrorism
Type
Special Reports
Information
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine , Volume 18 , Issue 3: Terrorism-II: Special Reports , September 2003 , pp. 179 - 183
Copyright
Copyright © World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine 2003

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References

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