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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Senator Fulbright's recent excursion into the analysis of1 foreign policy has been hailed as a breath of fresh air that sweeps away the cobwebs of cant and misunderstanding. The history of postwar foreign policy explains why such a study is needed. The inspiring successes and inventive genius of the first Truman Administration—an era unparalleled in American history for resourceful and courageous adaptation to changing circumstances—have been succeeded by disarray and confusion in American foreign policy. Both the early postwar stereotypes and the grand design of policy are breaking down. Thus the Senator's objective—an objective of unmasking old myths and clarifying new realities—is necessary and salutary.
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12 It could be argued that Bismarck's seizure of Alsace-Lorraine did indirectly have the last-named consequence. This does not affect the principle of the discussion, for the issue of the series is too remote to fall within the terms of the generalization.
