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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
More sharply now than ever before, the world is divided into its more and its less developed parts—into relatively stable and fundamentally unstable communities—and the prospect before it is one of unavoidable but limited disturbance in and between its less developed societies, for as long as makes no matter, and of inescapable choice for its more advanced states between uncontrollable violence and abstention from war.
1 Morgenthau, Hans J., “The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy”, American Political Science Review, LVIII (March 1964), 35Google Scholar.
2 “Reflections on the History of International Relations,” in Gilbert, Martin, ed., A Century of Conflict 1850–1950; Essays for A. J. P. Taylor (London 1966)Google Scholar.
3 Ibid., 28.
4 Even as I write, this point is illustrated in a letter from MrMazzawi, Musa, to the editor of The Times (London), January 24, 1968Google Scholar: “… The oil revenue of the Gulf shaikhdoms is large, and expected to increase. The population of the area is … about one-thousandth of the entire Arab nation…. The Arabs maintain that the Gulf is traditionally part of the Arab world, and that the Arab nation is in essence a single nation. It is wrong to continue artificial divisions and distribute among a small minority the wealth which morally belongs to the whole nation…. The people of Britain would not like it if a small and rich part of these islands were to seek independence and arrogate for themselves their local wealth….”
