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Simeone, John B.
1967.
1967 Annual Supplement.
p.
1.
Article contents
The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies 1950–1965
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Extract
Since the April 1960 student-led revolution there, debate in South Korea on the peaceful unification of the two Koreas has increased in frequency, intensity, and popularity among students, intellectuals, political parties, and other social groups. Popular support for independent and peaceful unification is rapidly mounting. This changing mood may be due to more effective North Korean propaganda as well as to the unhappy economic conditions in South Korea. In response to North Korea's aggressive unification campaign, the ROK (Republic of Korea) government has found it necessary to set up a research organization dedicated solely to the study of problems of unification.
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References
1 For example, see the results of the opinion poll conducted by Chosčn Ilbo (Seoul), published November 4, 1964. On the issue of North-South cultural and economic exchange, forty-eight percent of the respondents supported the idea while only fourteen percent positively rejected it. Twenty-five percent supported the idea despite their doubt about its realization.
2 Pravda, June 27, 1950.
3 New York Times, October 18, 1949.
4 The speech is reprinted in Kim Il-Sŏng, Subete-o Sengo Kokumin Keizai Fukō Hatten no Tameni [All Efforts Toward the Restoration and the Development of the Postwar National Economy] (Pyŏngyang 1961), 6–9.
5 For an interpretation identifying Pak Hŏn-Yŏng with the “war-hawk faction,” see Sam-Kyu, Kim, Konnichi no Chōsen [Korea Today] (Tokyo 1955), 91–103.Google Scholar
6 The South Korean Workers Party merged with the North Korean Workers Party in June 1949 under the new name, Korean Workers Party.
7 Kim Sam-Kyu, 100. See also Chang-Soon, Kim, Puk Han Sipo Nyŏn Sa [Fifteen Years' History of North Korea] (Seoul 1961), 135Google Scholar–50.
8 This was implied in Kim Il-Sŏng's speech of April 4, 1955, made at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of die KWP. See Kim Il-Sŏng Senshu [Selected Writings of Kim Il-Sŏng], iv (Tokyo 1962), 266Google Scholar–70.
9 At a press conference on November 30, 1950, Mr. Truman remarked that the use of the atomic bomb was under “active consideration” (Spanier, John W., The Truman-Mac Arthur Controversy and the Korean War [New York 1965], 166Google Scholar). For Eisenhower's threat to use the atomic bomb, see Rees, David, Korea: The Limited War (New York 1964), 404–6.Google Scholar In this book Mr. Rees concludes that the death of Stalin and the threat by the United States government to carry atomic war to the Chinese mainland brought an end to the Korean War.
10 The figures above are based on the report of Pak Ch'ang-Ok, Chairman of the National Planning Commission of the DPRK, at the seventh plenary meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) in April 1954. See Itaru, Maruo, Keizai Hatten no Futatsu no Ryukei [Two Patterns of Economic Development: Two Germanys and Two Koreas] (Tokyo 1962), 50–51.Google Scholar
11 See the statement of the prosecuting officer at the Military Court, in Chŏson Minjujui Innmin Kongwhakuk Chŏnbok ŏnmo Haenguiē Kwanhan Kŏn [The Case of Treason Against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (Tokyo n.d.).
12 U.S. Department of State, The Record of Korean Unification 1943–1960 (Washington 1960), 158–59.Google Scholar
13 Ibid., 176.
14 Ibid., 237; Robertson was then a member of the American delegation to the United Nations.
15 Ibid., 155.
16 Ibid., 176.
17 Kim Il-Sŏng Senshu [Selected Writings], iv, 187–94.
18 For a summary of all these proposals, see , Kongbopu, Han'guk T'ongil Bangan e Kwanhan Charyo [Materials on Korean Unification] (Seoul 1964), 10–21Google Scholar.
19 Porter, Catherine and Holand, William, “North Korea's Economic Development,” Far Eastern Survey, xxiv (November 1955), 171CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Maruo, 48–50.
20 Ibid., 50.
21 Ibid. See also Scalapino, Robert A., ed., North Korea Today (New York 1963), 61.Google Scholar
22 Kim Il-Sŏng, Chosŏn Rodongtang Chungang-wiwŏnhoe 1956-nyŏn 12-wŏl Chŏnwŏn Hoe-i Kyŏlchŏng Silhaeng Ch'ongwar-ūl wihan Kyŏngkongŏp-sŏng Yŏlsŏngcha Hoeieiŏhan Yŏnsŏl [Speech at the meeting of the Ministry of Light Industry in order to evaluate the decision made at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party in December 1956] (Pyŏngyang 1958), 3–5.
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25 Kim Il-Sŏng's Report of September n , 1961, published as Chosŏn Rodongtang 4 ch'a Taehoe-esŏhan Chungang-wiwŏnhoe Saop Ch'onghwa Boko [The Comprehensive Report on the Task of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of the KWP] (Pyŏngyang 1961), 121–24, hereafter cited as Saŏp Ch'onghwa Boko.
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28 See Hiroshi, Sakurai, “Kita Chōsen ni okeru Senriba Undo” [The Flying Horse Movement in North Korea], Chōsen Kenkyu Geppo (Tokyo), xvi (April 1963), 1–11Google Scholar.
29 Kim Il-Sŏng's Report to the Congress of the KWP in September 1961, in Chosŏn Rodongtang Che 4-Hoe Taehoe Munhŏnjip [Materials on the Fourth Congress of the KWP] (Pyŏngyang 1961), 48–49.Google Scholar
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31 See “Report of President Ch'oe Yong-Kon at the Eleventh Session of the Second Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK on June 20, 1962” in the pamphlet On Waging a Nation-wide Struggle for the Withdrawal of the U.S. Army from South Korea (Tokyo 1962), 17–18.Google Scholar
32 Barnett, 244; Maruo, 43. For detailed information, see Chŏsen Minshushugi Jinmin Kyowa Koku Kagakuin Keizai-Hŏgaku Kenkyusho [Research Institute of Economics and Law, Academy of Social Sciences, DPRK], Chŏsen ni okeru Shakaishugi no Kiso Kensetsu [Construction of the Foundation of Socialism in Korea] (Tokyo 1962), 33–41. See also Terao Koro, “Kita Chōsen ni okeru Nogyo ni kansuru Shomondai” [Problems of North Korean Agriculture], Chōsen Kenhyu Geppo, xx (August 1963), 11-18.
33 Kongbopu, 18. See also Kim Il-Sŏng, Chŏsen Minshushugi Jinmin Kyowakoku, Seifu no Tŏmen no Kadai ni tsuide [On the Present Task of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (Pyŏngyang 1962), 25–36. This is Kim Il-Sōng's speech delivered at the Supreme People's Assembly on October 23, 1962.
34 See Ch'oe Yong-Kŏn's Report to the SPA (October 19–24, i960), in Chōsen Mondai Kenkyu (Tokyo), iv (December 1960), 10–13. See also Nam Il's Report to the SPA (October 26–29, 1959), ibid., III (December 1959), 8–10.
35 Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, reprinted by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Tokyo 1962), 54–55Google Scholar.
36 “Report of President Ch'oe Yong-Kŏn,” in On Waging a Nation-wide Struggle, 21–26. See also “Memorandum of the DPRK to the United Nations” (issued October 23, 1962), in Chŏsen Tsushin Shiryo (Tokyo), No. 5 (January 1, 1963), 36–49Google Scholar.
37 Since 1964, however, the South Korean economy has shown an upswing, especially in the fields of coal, cement, power, textiles, rubber processing, and oil refining. During the 1964–1965 period it attained an average annual growth rate of eight percent in its GNP.
38 Chōsen Daigaku [Chōsen University], Chōsen ni kansuru Shiryo [Materials on Korea], No. 6 (Tokyo 1962), 45–53. This monographic series was compiled by the North Korea-oriented Chōsen University in Tokyo.
39 Statement of Yong-Kŏn, Ch'oe, in One Korea (Tokyo), No. 36 (April 1964), 21Google Scholar. This monthly journal is published in Japan by an advocate of Korean neutralization.
40 Documents of the Fourth Congress of the KWP, 391.
41 U.S. Department of State, 174. See also Chosen Daigaku, 36–37.
42 On October 20, 1965, Yi Tong-Wŏn, Foreign Minister of South Korea, suggested that in the future the Republic of Korea “would reconsider its policy of presenting the issue of Korean unification to the United Nations as the international organization might not be able to discuss the matter effectively.” The South Korean Prime Minister, Chung Il-Kwŏn, also expressed the view that “the South Korean government would not accept a United Nations unification plan if the organization could not guarantee fair elections in the North.” These statements indicate a possible change in South Korea's unification policy in the future (Dong-A llbo [Seoul], October 20, 29, and December 9, 1965).
43 Chŏsen Shiryo, No. 48 (May 1965), 9–11.
44 Documents of the Fourth Congress of the KWP, 384. See also Kim Il-Sŏng's Report to the Fourth Congress on the unification of Korea, in Saŏp Ch'onghwa Boko, 99–118.
45 Associated Press release, September 29, 1965.
46 Chosen Shiryo, No. 48, 9–33; and Kim Il-Sŏng's Report to the Fourth Congress on Party, in Saŏp Ch'onghwa Boko, 118–60.
47 Chōsen Shiryo, No. 48, 14. See also Kim's letter to Kim Yong-Jun, ibid., No. 44 (January 1965), 12–13.
48 Saŏp Ch'onghwa Boko, 106; Documents of the Fourth Congress of the KWP, 388.
49 Chŏsen Shiryo, No. 48, 33.
50 Ministry of Public Information, ROK, Neutralization Is Impossible for Korea, The Unification Study Series (Seoul 1965), 45.
51 The recent takeover in Indonesia by General Suharto will, of course, certainly affect relations between North Korea and Indonesia.
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