No single model adequately explains the American foreign policy-making process. At least six models are required, singly or in some combination, to understand recent American foreign policy formation under the Nixon Administration. The six models are: democratic politics, organizational process/bureaucratic politics, the royal-court model, multiple advocacy, groupthink, and shared images or mind-sets. After a review of the rules of the foreign policy game in Washington and the main elements of the Nixon-Kissinger National Security Council system, the article seeks to apply the models to a number of cases in recent American policy making toward Europe. U.S.-Soviet relations, the “Year of Europe,” and Nixon's New Economic Policy of August 1971 are examined as cases of royal-court decision making. A second category of cases exhibits mixed patterns of decision making: SALT, the Berlin negotiations, U.S. troops in Europe, MBFR, and U.S. trade policy. Bureaucratic variables alone explained policy outcomes in international economic policy making in the autumn of 1971, and an organizational process model was found to be dominant generally in the formation of recent international monetary policy, led by the Treasury Department. The conclusion considers the relationships between the models and certain kinds of policies.

According to Soviet military theorists, the war aims of a government determine not only the scale of military action and diplomatic alliances, but the “moral-political factor,” the extent to which soldiers and civilians regard a war as “just” and support the policy of their government. Soviet theorists caution that if both soldiers and civilians regard a war as “unjust,” the government runs a greater risk of military setbacks. If such setbacks occur, domestic opposition to the war may develop and domestic tensions that existed prior to the war may become exacerbated. In pursuing “unjust” war aims, a government risks “moral-political” threats to the morale of its troops, the stability of its home front, and the legitimacy of the regime.

Political development in Leninist regimes can be understood in terms of the relationships among elite-designated tasks, corresponding political uncertainties, and regime structures. The post-Stalin period has seen a crucial change in relations between polity and society. Whereas under Stalin the relationship between political-organizational status and socio-occupational status was hierarchical and mutually exclusive, after Stalin ruling Communist parties have allowed social elites to complement socio-occupational and political-organizational roles. The major political problem in contemporary Leninist regimes arises from the potential conflict between innovative attempts in this direction and the party's continued pre-emption of any potential political arena or role not coterminous with party organization and membership.

One of the important developments in world politics during the cold-war era was the relationship between the superpowers and small nation-states. In contrast to the period before the cold war, small nation-states had considerable latitude for maneuvering in pursuit of their own interests. This phenomenon was largely rooted in the imperatives of the cold war. The relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea during the period of the Korean War is critically analyzed in light of the new reality in international relations. South Korea tried to influence the conduct of the United States in Korea by employing five techniques: (1) a public call for assistance; (2) a public call for mutual cooperation against the common enemy; (3) a calculated policy proposal for bargaining advantage; (4) refusal to cooperate; and (5) moral suasion. These techniques are examined, with the conclusion that of the five, (1) and (2) were effective; (3) and (4) were least effective; and (5) was most effective.

The basis of NATO deterrence strategy is the manipulation of the nuclear "threshold." When NATO's conventional component is strong and the exact nature of its nuclear threshold is uncertain to Warsaw Pact countries, NATO's deterrent will be strong. Attempts to improve the “quality” of the nuclear arsenal by making the outcome of nuclear conflict more predictable weaken NATO's deterrent power. It is the possibility that NATO may use nuclear weapons, as well as the uncertainty of the consequences of such use, that strengthens the deterrent. The number of nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal could be reduced with no appreciable damage to the deterrent posture. Qualitative improvements in the conventional component, while increasing deterrent strength, also serve as safeguards in case of deterrence failures. To the extent that political unity within NATO increases the predictability of a NATO response to Warsaw Pact aggression, it is possible that political disunity actually adds to deterrent strength.