There is a feeling abroad today that Western civilization is on trial before history. One of the clearest signs of it is the increasing frequency with which we hear the word “challenge” in connection with the policies and progress of Soviet Russia and the Communist world at large. The challenge of the sputniks, of Soviet science and education, of Soviet economic development—these phrases, and variations on them, have recently grown all too familiar in America and Europe. We realize, of course, that the situation is not wholly a dark one for the West, that our Communist adversaries have serious internal problems of their own to contend with, that they too face some challenges. Still, nowadays few in the West find grounds for complacency in that fact.

Most historians of the Weimar Republic, fully occupied with the domestic affairs of the Brüining government in its crucial place between democracy and dictatorship, show little interest in Germany's foreign policy of the early 1930's. If they do devote some attention to it, their evaluation tends to be highly negative, regardless of their political or national sympathies. Observers who can be classified as liberals, socialists, Nazis, and nationalists—at odds among themselves on virtually every other question—all voice strong criticism of the Brüning diplomacy.

Two years have passed since Khrushchev launched his reorganization of Soviet industrial management, the most daring and politically risky venture of a dynamic administration studded with unorthodox and sweeping programs. The vertical ministerial system of industrial management was abolished virtually overnight and replaced by a territorial organization centered in 105 regional economic councils, or sovnarkhozy; thousands of officials scurried off to new jobs in an environment alien to their previous experience; and new command and control channels had to be forged in short order.

It is customary to show that total assistance by the United States to the underdeveloped world by far exceeds that of the Soviet bloc; and since the comparison is invariably much in favor of the United States, one cannot help being puzzled by the alarm displayed about Communist aid “penetration.” Moreover, I feel that such global comparisons fail to impress individual countries, which either care little about aid given to others or resent it if it is given to unfriendly neighbors or to partners in military alliances disliked for political or ideological reasons. Even aid that is gladly received is not necessarily well remembered later.

During the past five years the Social Science Division of The RAND Corporation has been developing a procedure for the study of foreign affairs that we call “political gaming.” This article gives a brief description of the technique and some of our observations about its utility.