Since the Korean War, United States policies in Asia have gradually developed along the lines of the “containment” doctrine so successfully applied in Europe after 1947. Washington has increasingly seen the problem of Chinese power in Asia in much the same light as that posed by Soviet power in Europe and has behaved as if both threats could be contained by basically the same kinds of responses. In both Asia and Europe, containment measures have reflected a perceived need for complementary interaction between military policies and aid programs in order to prevent aggression by Communist powers and to foster the internal stability of nations in the area. Although difficulties have arisen in seeking the best balance of these components of the containment policy in Europe, most of the essential American objectives in the West have been attained.

It may seem preposterous to write about the effects of the economic sanctions currently in effect against Rhodesia since the process is not yet completed: we do not know how it will all end, and primary source material of a crucial nature is not yet available. But the purpose of this article is more in the direction of a general theory, using the case of Rhodesia as a source of examples and illustrations. The material on Rhodesia included here consists of some secondary sources, such as books and articles, and some primary sources, such as documents and other printed material; but the basic sources are mainly personal observation and a number of informal interviews with Rhodesian citizens (mostly businessmen) and with citizens of other African countries (mostly politicians), all dating from January 1966, about two months after UDI.

General André Beaufre defines strategy as “the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.” Nowhere is this dialectic more pronounced than in Beaufre's own works where Beaufre as strategist is pitted against Beaufre as a leading Gaullist strategist and director of the Institut Français d'Études Stratégiques. Beaufre, as strategist, broadens the image of French military thinking projected, for example, by General Pierre Gallois's more widely known, always stimulating, but more flamboyant and less precise, writings. Beaufre, as Gaullist, delineates the profound dimensions and compelling attractions of newly emergent French nationalism which still are only dimly perceived in what is for the French the Anglo-Saxon world.

One of the major questions about foreign policy concerns the level of effort: How much should the state extract from the internal political system in order to pursue its external objectives? As posed, the issue involves the control of resources, and although the resources it deals with usually include material resources, the limiting factors are political. It should not be stretching the meaning of political things (although it would be changing the frame of reference) to identify the issue as one of allocating political “assets” among several (in this case, two major) sectors to deal with political risks or threats. It is easy enough to identify this allocative function as a requirement of independent governments and quite another to establish what is required to achieve it.

Complaints and resistance encountered by American scholars pursuing social science research abroad can be attributed to the following clusters of attitudes: (i) the fear complex, (2) political hostility, (3) cultural sensitivity, (4) the exploitation syndrome, and (5) the saturation factor.1 In this article I shall briefly analyze these different sources of resistance, then point to changes and variations in their incidence, and finally address the question of remedies.

These notes are part of a study on the problem of political integration. My hypothesis is that the political system driving for integration maximizes its chances for achieving a high degree of integration and remaining stable, in spite of the short-run destabilizing effects of the drive for integration, if it is authoritarian, consensual, “identific,” and paternal. If any of these four characteristics is absent, and to the extent that functionally compensating factors are also absent, the destabilizing effects of the drive for integration are increased.

At Least one element of consistency has continued to characterize the course of political events in Indonesia—its capacity to confound the expectations and defy the predictions of most Western observers and scholars. The fate of the Communist movement provides the most recent example. Donald Hindley concluded, in his 1964 study of the policies and development of the Indonesian Communist party since national independence, that a “Communist rebellion is out of the question in the foreseeable future” (p. 301). Guy Pauker's analyses in 1964 and early 1965 of political developments stressed the probability that Indonesia would imminently become a Communist state, either by acclamation or in default of opposing forces.

SEALE and Kerr, the authors of the two books under review, have covered between them a series of events from 1945 until 1964, but they have done so from quite different points of view. Seale's book, entitled The Struggle for Syria, covers the period from 1945 until 1958, while Kerr's, The Arab Cold War, covers the period from 1958 until 1964. The struggle for Syria that Seale describes is supposed to be a struggle between Egypt and Iraq, but the cold war that Kerr describes is a war of ideology, and perhaps one of wills, between Egypt's President Nasser and the leaders of the Syrian Ba'th party. Although both authors include a reference to dates in the titles of their books, the chronological element is not equally important in both. Seale's work is a review of the high points of Syrian politics through the period indicated, whereas Kerr is primarily concerned with a summary and analysis of the unity talks that took place between Nasser and the Ba'th leaders in 1963.